Evaluating the Korean Bargaining Power: The Case of the Financial Crisis in 1997

김석우 ( Seok Woo Kim ),( Jong Ryn Mo ) 한국세계지역학회 2007 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.25 No.2

Ten years ago, the Korean economy was seriously hit by the financial crises. During the crises, and in the process of bailout program negotiations, Korea faced lack of bargaining power vis-a-vis the IMF and other international financial institutions. This paper tries to evaluate the overall Korean bargaining power during the crises, and to find out why the Korean bargaining power was so limited. This paper argues that procedural and structural constraints, lack of BATNA, time constraints, and domestic constraints lessened the Korean bargaining power during the financial crises. However, after some bailout programs by the IMF started, the Korean bargaining power was enhanced. Because of this, the Korean economy could recover from the crises earlier than expected. To assess the overall Korean bargaining power, this study suggests that scholars perform comparative studies on diverse types of negotiations done by the Korean government during the past 10 years.

중국시장에서 FDI 협상력 불안정성의 결정요인 분석

이지석(Ji-Seok Lee) 한국관세학회 2012 관세학회지 Vol.13 No.1

This paper examines factors of the FDI bargaining relationship instability between foreign firms and host government in China market. There are provides some insights into the sources of bargaining power instability that have a significant impact on the shifts in balance of bargaining power. The relative bargaining power of two parties changes over time as a result of the effectiveness of multinational’s local knowledge acquisition, the social contribution, the environment change in host country and the performance of foreign firms. First, the increase of emergency of local competitors and substitutes of firms in strategy was related to shifts in bargaining power instability between foreign firms and host government. Second, the increase of social contribution to the local area was related to shifts in bargaining power instability in China market. This paper draws some implications to improve the sources of bargaining power instability and provide new clues for future research. Some limitations of the current study and future studies were suggested.

정보의 비대칭과 협상력의 불균형 완화를 위한 연구

가정준 ( Ka Jung-joon ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2008 외법논집 Vol.31 No.-

The article aims to explore how the Korean Civil Code can deal with transactional problems arising from asymmetric information or/and unequal bargaining power, given that there have been few researches which examined why unfair transactions between consumer and producer occur even in a competitive market. In fact, most transactions or contracts between consumer and producer are made under conditions of asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power. Asymmetric information relates to the content of products and services while unequal bargaining power concerns the relationship between consumer and producer. They are likely to bring about unfair transactions even in relatively competitive markets and are also likely to occur where the distribution of the per capita stakes of consumer and producer are skewed. In most transactions, the per capita impact for consumers is much lower than that for producers. Low per capita impact for consumers refers to cases where there are many consumers each of whom may obtain a little benefit from the total volume of transactions. In contrast, high per capita impact for producers means that there are a few producers each of whom may obtain large benefit from the total volume of transactions. The amount of benefit that consumer and producer obtain from each transaction may not make a big difference on an individual basis. However, the aggregate impact for all of consumers and producers is about same. An individual consumer is less likely to become a repeating buyer while the producer is highly likely to become a repeating seller. The aggregate impact for consumers and producers is distributed widely and narrowly, respectively. The per capita stake of transactions for each consumer and producer is low and high, respectively, thus its distribution is skewed. Where such skewed distribution provides an advantage for concentrated producers (minority) over consumers (majority), high per capita producers take advantage of low per capita consumers due to asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power. Low per capita consumers are unlikely to have an incentive to correct asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power over high per capita producers. In contrast, high per capita producers are likely to have incentives to mislead low per capita consumers. As such, high per capita producers are likely to prefer "rent-seeking activities" to "technological innovation". Originally, rent is an economic concept, which is related to profits rather than productivity. Rent-seeking may increase profits without improving productivity or innovation by increasing the volume of sales. Rent-seeking, however, plays a criticized role in the functioning of markets. Rent-seeking activities have been strongly criticized for their adverse effects on competition and their waste of resources. In general, a producer advertises and uses a standard form contract in order to increase the volume of transactions and decrease transaction costs. Advertising and using a standard form contract may turn out to be rent-seeking activities. Advertising differentiates similar products and equalizes different products toward low per capita consumers, who have little incentive to distinguish products and services on the market. Using a standard form contract does not make consumers negotiate their own contract. Consequently, it brings large benefits to high per capita produces, who have large incentives for decreasing transactional costs and taking advantage of consumers in contractual terms. Such unfair transactions have rarely been reviewed by courts. In other words, courts have not taken any active role under the Civil Code to intervene in unfair transactions. This is because the Civil Code is passed and translated under the assumption that all contracts are made based on "freedom of contract" and equal bargaining power between parties. As such, the Civil Code is not expected to take account of the unequal relationship between consumer and producer. Courts have rarely intervened in the effectiveness of contacts despite a few provisions such as Civil Code § 104, 109, and 110. These provisions are entitled to have effect on correcting asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power by invalidating a contract. This article suggests, therefore, that courts should reconsider the role of these provisions in this age of informational asymmetry and unequal relationships between consumers and producers.

외교력 연구: 개념적 분석과 정책제언

김태현 세종연구소 2008 국가전략 Vol.14 No.1

How do governments and their agents wield power, defined as the control over other government's minds and actions in bilateral relations and the control over outcomes in multilateral contexts? In South Korean public discourse, Oe-gyo-ryeog, literally meaning diplomatic power, refers to both the degree of international influence exerted by national governments in general and the skills and capabilities of diplomatic squad to exert such influence in particular. This paper presents a behavioral model in which both hard and soft power in Joseph Nye's terms are combined to generate international influence. In so doing, the concept of soft power is refined and extended, beyond the power to attract, to include the power to prevail in international politico-normative discourse. It is further contended that soft power so defined is operant in various international regimes. Given that, this paper suggests that South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade orients its recent campaign to improve its "diplomatic power" in terms of the organizational and personnel restructuring toward enhancing and extending the expertise of international regimes, beyond the pressing diplomatic needs. 이 글은 외교력의 개념과 작동논리를 분석하고 대한민국의 외교력을 증진하기 위한 정책과제를 제안한다. 그리고 그를 통해 한국 국제정치학의 발전방향에 대한 제언을 담고 있다. 외교력이란 넓게는 한 나라가 가지는 국제정치적 영향력, 좁게는 주어진 실력자원을 가지고 보다 큰 영향력을 발휘할 수 있는 외교적 능력, 곧 협상력으로 정의된다. 이 글은 국제정치적 영향력으로서 외교력은 실력자원의 기반 위에 그 행사를 정당화할 수 있도록 국제정치 도덕담론을 지배하는 힘, 곧 소프트파워를 통해 극대화할 수 있다고 주장한다. 그리고 그 소프트파워는 구체적으로 특정 이슈영역에서 작동하는 국제레짐을 마스터할 때 발현된다고 주장한다. 따라서 소프트파워는 그 나라가 풍기는 매력을 포함하되 그 이상이다. 소프트파워의 증강을 통한 외교력의 제고도 흔히 말하는 문화외교나 공공외교 이상의 방법을 필요로 한다. 일관성있는 외교적 태세를 포함구체적으로 외교부의 인적, 조직적 역량을 강화하되 그 방향은 다양한 기능영역으로의 질적, 양적 확대를 지향해야 한다.

공급사슬 네트워크에서 협상력을 고려한 의사결정 조정 방안에 관한 연구

서용원,차운아 한국경영과학회 2020 한국경영과학회지 Vol.45 No.1

The bargaining power of a member in a supply chain is significantly affected by its network location. Bargaining power affects the sensitivity to incentives and penalties to the supply chain member. This behavioral bias is necessary for designing incentive and penalty functions to coordinate supply chain decisions for achieving global optimum. Thus, in this research, we propose a model to derive optimal incentive and penalty functions considering behavioral bias induced from the bargaining power. We model a supply chain network consisting of multiple tiers of members that make transactions with one another. Each member transacts with its partner, determining their level of effort in the transaction and affecting the demand and performance of the transaction. Members making transactions with multiple partners have the economy of scale by exploiting the flexibility in the efforts among partners and thus have a higher power. In this setting, we analyze the equilibrium and global optimum of members’ decisions and provide methods to design efficient incentive and penalty functions. Results show that considering the difference in sensitivity to incentives and penalties induced from the bargaining power in designing yields significantly improves the efficiency of coordination.

선진국과 저소득국 사이의 수출입 바기닝 파워 - 1980년 및 1990년을 중심으로

한기조(Han Ki Jo) 한국사회경제학회 2007 사회경제평론 Vol.- No.28

  본 연구의 목적은 소니와 디 피에트로의 모델을 이용하여 선진국과 저소득국의 수출입 바기닝 파워를 산출하는 것에 의해 프레비시가 제기한 저소득국의 교역조건의 장기적 악화 가설을 검증하는 데에 있다. 소니와 디 피에트로의 모델에 의해 산출한 저소득국의 바기닝 파워 값은 과대 산출된다는 한계성이 있기는 하나, 산출한 1974년도, 1980년도 및 1990년도의 선진국 및 저소득국의 바기닝 파워 값은 프레비시 가설을 지지하고 있다. 또한 선진국은 수출입시장에서 수출입 바기닝 파워의 결정자로서 독점적인 우위를 점하고 있다는 사실도 도출되었다. 바로 그러한 선진국의 독점적 우위가 수출 및 수입에서 저소득국의 판매력 및 구매력에 지대한 영향력을 미치고 있으며 결과적으로 교역조건에 영향을 미친다고 하겠다.   The purpose of this paper is to examine the secular deterioration hypothesis with respect to the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries by using the model of Sahwney and Di Pietro in terms of the importing and exporting bargaining power. Although, in general, it is known that the model is likely to overestimate the value of the bargaining power of those countries, the value in years of 1974, 1980 and 1990 we calculated with data of those years supports the Prebisch hypothesis<BR>  It is also verified that developed countries have been occupying monopolistic domination as a bargaining power determiner in the import and export market. The study concludes that such monopolistic domination of the developed countries has correctly exerted a large influence on the bargaining power and the Terms of Trade of underdeveloped countries in international trade.

대규모유통업법상 ‘거래상 우월적 지위’ - 대형 가전제품 유통시장을 실례로 하여 -

강우경 ( Kang Woo-kyung ) 한국유통법학회 2020 유통법연구 Vol.7 No.2

거래상 지위 남용 특별법(하도급법, 대리점법, 대규모유통업법, 가맹사업법)은 당해 영역에서 활동하는 사업자 간 거래상 지위가 대등하게 형성되지 않는다는 전제하에 공정거래법상 거래상 지위 남용규제보다 강도 높은 규제방법으로 그 지위의 격차를 조정하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이들 특별법은 규제 대상의 '거래상 지위'를 행위자 요건으로 하되, 이에 더하여 규제 및 보호의 대상이 되는 사업자의 외형적 요건이나 법 적용이 배제되는 객관적 기준을 두어 수범자의 범위를 한정 짓고 있다. 그런데 대규모유통업법의 경우, 객관적·외형적 기준 없이 ‘거래상 우월적 지위’가 부정되는 경우를 법 적용 제외 사유로 한다는 점에서 다른 특별법과 차이가 있다. 그런데 이 '거래상 우월적 지위'의 개념과 판단기준이 상당히 모호하여 수범자의 입장에서 규제 대상에 포섭되는지에 관한 예측가능성과 명확성을 제공하고 있지 못하고 있어 문제가 있다. 이 때문에 대규모유통업자로서는 거래관계에서 사실상 우월적 지위에 있지 않은 납품업자에 대해서도 법상의 의무 및 금지사항을 준수하여 사업 활동을 해야 하고, 이는 결국 불필요한 거래 비용의 발생으로 이어진다. 가령 대형가전제품과 같이 납품업자가 상품 공급시장에서 상당한 지배력이 있는 경우, 위와 같은 문제 상황이 선명하게 드러난다. 필자의 생각으로, 납품업자가 공정거래법 제9조 제1항에 따른 상호출자제한기업 집단에 속하는 대기업인 경우에는 특별법으로 보호할 필요성이 현저히 감소하므로 원칙적으로 대규모유통업법의 적용을 제외하도록 관련 규정을 개정하는 것이 바람직하다. 대기업인 납품업자를 보호 대상에서 제외하더라도 공정거래법의 적용은 여전히 받으므로 규제 공백의 우려는 크지 않을 것으로 보인다. 나아가 ‘거래상 우월적 지위’가 대규모유통업법 규제 대상을 준별하는 행위자 요건으로서의 비판적 역할을 다하기 위해서는 이를 판단하는 데에 필요한 구체적 기준을 마련할 필요가 있다. 그리고 위와 같은 판단기준은 양자의 협상력 차이로 인해 납품업자가 대규모유통업자에게 경제적으로 의존하는 상황을 야기하는 수준인지 교량할 수 있는 지표여야 할 것이며, 구체적으로 협상결렬대안 (BATNA)에 영향을 미치는 요소가 모두 반영되어야 한다. The Special Law on the Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position (Subcontract Act, Agency Act, Large Retail Business Act, and Franchise Business Act) aims to narrow the gap in the bargaining position by means of more stringent regulation than those found in the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter "MRFTA"). These Special Laws require ‘superior bargaining position’ as a qualification of the ‘violator (doer)’, and also limit the scope of the ‘violator’ by setting objective and quantified criteria for operators subject to regulation or protection. However, the Large Retail Business Act (hereinafter "LRBA") differs from other Special Laws in that there is no such criteria as mentioned supra, which only excludes the application of the law in cases where “the large retailer has no superior buying power”. This is problematic because the concept and criteria of 'superior buying power' is quite vague and does not provide predictability and clarity on whether the operator is included as part of the regulator’s list. Large retailers must also engage in business activities in compliance with legal obligations and prohibitions when dealing with suppliers who are not in an inferior position, which leads to the occurrence of unnecessary transaction costs. For example, if a supplier has market power (or market dominance) in the product supply market, such as the home appliance distribution market, the above problem becomes more critical. When suppliers belong to a group of companies restricted from cross-shareholding under Article 9 (1) of MRFTA, the need to protect them with Special Law is significantly reduced. So therefore, it is desirable to apply the MRFTA in principal, and the LRBA as an exception only if the superior buying power of the large retailer is recognized. Even so, concerns over a regulatory vacuum are not likely to be high as the MRFTA still applies. Furthermore, the specific criteria and concept of "superior buying power" should be introduced to fulfill its role that distinguishes it from the subject of regulation under LRBA. Furthermore, the supra criteria should reflect all factors affecting the BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), so that it can define whether the bargaining power of a large retailer results in economic dependence of the supplier.

지식자원과 네트워크가 다국적 기업 해외 자회사의 자율성에 미치는 영향: 내부 협상력을 중심으로

이건희 한국국제경영관리학회 2009 국제경영리뷰 Vol.13 No.2

본 연구는 다국적기업의 한국 내 자회사가 보유한 지식자원과 네트워크를 중심으로 의사결정 자율성에 영향을 미치는 요인들에 대하여 살펴보았다. 이를 위해 기존 문헌 연구를 통해 12개의 가설을 설정하였다. 설정된 가설의 검증을 위하여 다국적기업의 한국 자회사 표본 211개를 대상으로 신뢰성 검증, 타당성 검증, 상관관계 분석 및 구조방정식모형 분석을 실시하였다. 이를 통해 얻어진 분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 해외 자회사의 내부 협상력은 자회사 자율성에 통계적으로 유의한 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 지식자원 보유량, 지식자원의 경쟁우위정도, 외부 네트워크 배태성, 자회사 중요도가 높을수록 자회사의 자율성은 높은 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 자율성에 영향을 미치는 요인중 지식자원 보유량과 지식자원의 경쟁우위정도는 내부 협상력을 완전매개로 정(+)의 영향을 미쳤다. 넷째, 외부 네트워크와 자회사 중요도는 내부 협상력을 부분매개로 하여 자율성에 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 이론적 의의는 기존의 자회사의 발전에 관한 연구에 자회사의 내부 협상력이 자율성에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써 기존의 자회사 자율성 연구의 확장을 시도한 것이다. 실무적으로는 해외 자회사의 자율성을 확대하고자하는 본사 경영자에게 다국적기업 전체 네트워크의 효율성을 저하시킬 가능성이 있는 자회사 내부 협상력과 자율성과의 관계에 대한 이해를 제공하고 있다. The purpose of the study is to learn more about the factors influencing subsidiary autonomy of the MNCs located in Korea by bringing focus into the resources and networks of the subsidiary. Following the qualitative research tradition in the field of international business studies, the study examines twelve hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, the study analyzes two hundred eleven subsidiaries of MNCs in Korea by reliability test, validity test, correlation analysis, and path analysis by structure equation modeling. The key findings of the study are as follows. First, the study reveals bargaining power of overseas subsidiary is related to subsidiary autonomy in a positive direction with statistic significance. Second, knowledge stock, competitiveness of knowledge, external network embeddedness and degree of subsidiary importance are positively related to subsidiary autonomy. Third, The effect of knowledge stock and competitiveness of knowledge on subsidiary autonomy is fully mediated by subsidiary bargaining power. Forth, the bargaining power partially mediates between two independent variables, external network embededness and degree of subsidiary importance, and subsidiary autonomy. Theoretical implication for the study is expansion of traditional view to subsidiary autonomy by analysis of the effect of bargaining power on subsidiary autonomy derived from subsidiary development theory of international business studies. In terms of implication for management practices, the study provides the managers of headquarters who wish to increase the level of subsidiary autonomy with profound understanding of relationship between subsidiary autonomy and bargaining power which may jeopardize the global efficiency of MNCs network.

거래상 지위의 남용행위와 거래질서

이민호 ( Lee Min Ho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2016 競爭法硏究 Vol.34 No.-

Article 23 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prohibits the “abuse of superior bargaining power”―a type of “unfair trade practices”. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (the “KFTC”), as the administrative body possessing the authority to levy corrective measures and administrative fines against companies that enter into agreements with counterparties containing unfair terms and conditions, may restrain the principle of private autonomy through such legal enforcement. According to the Supreme Court of Korea, Decision 2012du18325 on September 10, 2015, in order to find an impediment of fair trade, behaviors must at least have “relevance to trade order”, and when the counterparties are consumers, if there are concerns of harm to many unspecified consumers arising from the behaviors of the enterprise with the superior bargaining power or that similar behaviors would be repeated continuously, then “relevance to trade order” would be established. The ruling demanded a change in the KFTC`s practices which have not accounted for the “relevance to trade order” until now. The “relevance to trade order” seems to mean that the unfairness of a transaction has a substantial negative effect, or raises concerns of such effect, on transactions between private persons in the entire societal context. The aforementioned court ruling, holding that an abuse of superior bargaining power would not be found in the absence of “relevance to trade order”, may be criticized for making it more difficult for transaction counterparties harmed by unfair terms and conditions to obtain legal remedies. To resolve this issue, if necessary, the enactment of a special civil law that allows for transaction counterparties subjected to such disadvantage to file injunctions against the relevant enterprise abusing its superior bargaining power may be considered as an alternative.

원가정보 및 권력구조가 공급체인 협상에 미치는 영향

정재을 한국회계정보학회 2016 재무와회계정보저널 Vol.16 No.4

[Purpose] The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of cost information and power on the negotiation of supply chain. [Methodology] For the investigation, a laboratory experiment using studentsubjects with field experiences was applied. The case used in the experiment was franchise negotiation between buyer(franchisee) and supplier(franchiser). For the experiment, cost information was divided with traditional cost and total cost of ownership(TCO) and the power structure was divided with low power and high power according to availability of alternative negotiation partners. The results of negotiation were measured with buyer’s individual profits after negotiation, and negotiation behavior was measured with buyer’s bargaining techniques(distributive bargaining/integrative bargaining) during negotiation. [Findings] The experiment showed that cost information and power have a significant influence on the negotiation results and negotiation behavior, and cost information could be moderating variable on the effect of power. [Implications] The results of this study could have implication on the less powerful negotiator’s bargaining strategy and information sharing policy of public sector negotiations. [연구목적] 본 연구는 공급체인 협상에서 원가정보와 권력구조가 구매자의 협상결과와 협상행위에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. [연구방법] 연구방법으로는 구매자와 공급자의 역할이 부여된 실무 경험이 있는계약학과 학생들을 대상으로 한 실험실연구를 이용하였고, 실험사례는 구매자(가맹점)와 공급자(가맹본부) 간의 프랜차이즈 구매협상을 대상으로 하였다. 독립변수인 원가정보는 전통적 원가정보와 총소유원가(Total Cost of Ownership:TCO) 정보로 구분하고, 권력구조는 대체적인 거래상대자의 유무에 따라 권력수준을 구분하였다. 종속변수인 협상결과는 협상후 계약체결에 따른 구매자의 개별적 이익으로 측정하였고, 협상행위는 협상중 구매자가 사용한 협상기법(분배적 교섭/통합적 교섭)을 통해 측정하였다. [연구결과] 실험결과에 따르면 원가정보와 권력구조는 공급체인의 협상결과와협상행위에 유의적인 영향을 미치고, 권력이 협상에 미치는 영향에 있어 원가정보가 조절변수로 작용할 가능성이 있음이 발견되었다. [연구의 시사점] 본 연구의 결과는 대기업과 중소기업간의 계약, 주택공급업자와실수요자간의 계약 등과 같이 권력수준이 낮은 계약자(구매자)의 협상전략 및 정부의 정보공개 정책에 활용될 수 있다.