2015년 G20/OECD 기업지배구조원칙 개정의 특징 및 주요 쟁점의 비교분석

윤승영 한국상사법학회 2016 商事法硏究 Vol.35 No.1

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. The objective is to contribute to “economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability.” In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were originally developed in 1999, updated in 2004 in the wake of large and disruptive corporate scandals, and again in 2015 drawing upon lessons from the global financial crisis. The most recent update maintains many of the Principles from earlier versions as essential components of an effective corporate governance framework while introducing some new issues and bringing greater emphasis or additional clarity to others. Alignment between the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Korean Corporate Governance Code will reinforce and strengthen the ultimate objective of enabling business to grow and create sustainable value and of upholding investor confidence in Korean capital markets. At this point, I believe that the “comply or explain” rule is an important foundation for the flexibility of corporate governance code in Korea. To support effective disclosure and implementation of corporate governance codes under the “comply or explain” system, KRX should issue a national report reviewing adherence to the code by listed companies. Furthermore, institutional investors are also expected to place adequate pressure to bear to secure improvements in disclosure and implementation of the codes. Thus, we should introduced stewardship codes with an aim to strengthen the role of institutional investors in holding management accountable.

기업지배구조와 규제간의 상관성 모색: 영국의 기업지배구조법제 변천에 기초하여

안수현 ( Soo Hyun Ahn ) 한국상사판례학회 2011 상사판례연구 Vol.24 No.1

This paper investigates the relationship with corporate governance and regulation based on the lots of governance initiatives published in the period of 1990s-2010 in UK. There have been few continuous analyses to assess the performance of these changes, and to identify subsequent changes to corporate governance structures. This paper measures the extent to which the corporate governance structures in UK changed between 1990-2010 and uses this research to assess the impact of UK corporate governance revolution on Korea in the future. Since the early 1990s, the UK has witnessed a vibrant debate on corporate governance issues. The roots of this debate can be traced to a series of governance failures that led to calls for the improved regulation of companies. These incidents lead to a publication of lots of governance initiatives including Cadbury Report, Turnbull Report, Hampel Report, Rutsman Report, Greenbury Report, Myer Report, Smiths Report, Higgs report etc. during the 1990s. Based on these experiences, the current UK system has led to have largely voluntary governance codes. However, the efforts of the these report have gradually tightened the governance system since the early 1990s. The recommendations from these reports and the subsequent Codes have had a far-reaching influence on the managerial practice. Listed companies on the UK Stock Exchange are required to adhere to the Combined Code, and to report details of their compliance in their corporate reports. The Code is set of recommendation for UK Public companies, and firms are required only to disclose either their compliance with the guidlines or to give reasons for non-compliance. However, after the experience of 2007-2008 financial crisis, the environment of corporate governance has changed radially. The Financial Reporting Council(FRC) has published the new ``UK Corporate Governance Code`` which replaces the Combined Code for accounting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2010. The new Code stipulates that all directors of FTSE 350 companies be put up for reelection every year and an express reference to gender diversity in the Code principles on board appointments. In addition, despite some opposition form listed companies, the Financial Reporting Council is pressing ahead with the requirement for external evaluation of board reviews at least every three years, but initially just for FTSE 350 companies. The new Code has added additional responsibility to and emphasis on the role of the Chairman and all non-executive directors will be required to devote more time to the discharge of their responsibilities. Many of these recent corporate governance reforms allow us to look in details to corporate governance`s framework and its formation history. However this study suggests that UK corporate governance framework has been developed on the basis of the different environment such as share ownership, financial constraints and financial market.

금융회사 지배구조의 개선방안

손영화 한국경영법률학회 2016 經營法律 Vol.27 No.1

종래에는 좋은 기업지배구조의 목표를 주주와 경영자 사이의 대리인문제를 잘 해결하는 것에 두었다. 그러나 2007년부터 2008년까지 심화된 글로벌 금융위기는 그러한 기업지배구조가 금융기관의 건전성을 해칠 가능성을 검토하는 계기가 되었다. 국제기구 및 각국에서는 금융기관의 지배구조의 개선을 위한 많은 권고를 하고 있다. 우리나라의 경우에도 금융기관의 지배구조를 개선하기 위한 노력을 하고 있다. 그러한 일환으로, 2015년 7월 6일 「금융회사의 지배구조에 관한 법률」(이하, ‘금융사지배구조법’이라고 한다)이 제정된 바 있다. 동법은 2016년 8월 1일부터 시행될 예정이다. 지배구조란 일반적으로 기존 기업운영과 관리에 사용되는 시스템이라고 정의할 수 있다. 지배구조는 기업경영진, 이사회, 주주 및 기타 이해관계인 간의 일련의 관계와 관련된 것이라고 할 수 있다. 바람직한 금융회사 지배구조는 원칙적으로 다음과 같은 것을 생각할 수 있다. 우선, 경영진이 그 역할을 다하는 다시 말해, 경영진이 주주와 회사의 이익을 위하여 회사경영을 담당하는 지배구조이어야 한다. 이를 위해서는 경영진에 대한 이사회의 감시・감독기능이 제 기능을 발휘하여야 할 것이다. 경영진과 주주와의 대리인문제를 해결하기 위해서는 경영진에 대한 보상체계를 주식을 베이스로 하는 장기에 걸친 인센티브 체계로 하는 것이 바람직하다고 할 수 있다. 둘째, 이사회의 기능 및 역할이 경영진의 선임 또는 해임과 경영감독이라고 이해되고 있다. 이사회의 경영감독 기능 및 역할을 통해 지배구조를 개선하여야 할 것이다. 독립성을 갖춘 사외이사 중심으로 이사회를 구성하는 것도 이사회의 경영감독의 기능강화를 위한 것이다. 사외이사로 구성되는 감사위원회 등이 그 기능을 제대로 발휘하도록 하기 위해서는 사외이사 지위의 강화가 필요하다. 셋째, 주주 및 기타 이해관계자의 이익을 도모하기 위한 안전장치의 하나로서 금융회사에 있어서 적극적인 기관투자자의 의결권행사가 요구되고 있다. 특히, 국민연금이 우리나라 주요 금융지주회사의 1대 또는 2대 주요주주를 차지하고 있는 현실을 생각할 때, 기관투자자 중에서도 국민연금의 역할이 매우 중요하다. 국민연금이 기관투자자로서 의결권을 행사하는 경우 단기적인 성과보다는 장기적인 주주의 이익에 주안점을 둘 필요가 있다. 금융회사의 지배구조가 보다 선진화될 수 있도록 의결권을 행사하여야 할 것이다. 이와 같은 의결권의 행사는 주주의 이익을 추구하면서도 금융 전반에 걸친 공익의 추구도 함께 실현하는 것이라고 할 것이다. 마지막으로, 실질적으로 회사 업무집행자를 선임하고, 또한 사실상 회사를 지배하고 있는 지배주주의 책임문제도 명확히 할 필요가 있다. 금융회사를 포함한 우리나라 회사의 지배구조가 보다 투명하고, 책임경영이 이루어질 수 있도록 하기 위해 지배주주 등에 대한 명확한 책임규정을 상법상 도입할 필요가 있다. 우리 금융회사를 포함한 기업들이 세계시장에서 경쟁력을 가질 수 있도록 하는 입법정책이 계속해서 요구된다고 할 것이다. Conventionally, it puts the goal of good corporate governance to successfully solve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. However, the global financial crisis that has been deepening up to 2008 from 2007 was an opportunity to consider the possibility that such a corporate governance is detrimental to the soundness of financial institutions. In international organizations and countries, we have a number of recommendations for the improvement of corporate governance of financial corporation. Even in the case of South Korea have been efforts to improve the corporate governance of financial corporation. In such a part, it has been enacted "Governance Act for the Financial Corporations" in 2015 July 6. The law is scheduled to come into force from August 1, 2016. Corporate governance can be defined as a general system used to manage an business operations. Corporate governance is, it can be said that the thing that is associated with a series of relationships between corporate management, board of directors, the shareholders and other stakeholders. Desirable corporate governance of financial corporation is considered a principle something like the following. First, management is do his or her role, in other words, management must have a good corporate governance that the company management has responsible for the benefit of shareholders and the company. In order to solve the agency problem between management and shareholders, it can be said that it is desirable that the long-term incentive compensation system based on stock. Second, the function and role of the board of directors has been understood that the oversight and the appointment or dismissal of the management. Corporate governance through the supervisory function and role of the board of directors will have to improve. Also, Outside directors are aimed to the strengthening of the supervisory functions of the board of directors for the management. It is necessary to strengthen the position of outside directors such as the audit committee member to be able to fully perform its function. Third, it has been required to exercise of the voting rights of institutional investors as one of the safety device in order to achieve the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders in financial corporation. In particular, when considering the reality that national pension accounts for 1 large main shareholder or 2 large main shareholder of the main financial holding company of South Korea, among institutional investors, the role of the national pension is very important. If exercise voting rights of national pension as the institutional investors, it is necessary to put the focus on the interests of long-term shareholder than short-term results. The exercise of voting rights in terms of the long-term interests of institutional investors is going to be a plus to improve the corporate governance of the financial corporation. The exercise of such voting rights are while pursuing the interests of the shareholders, it is also the pursuit of public interest. Finally, there is a need to clarify the responsibility of controlling shareholder who controls virtually corporation like as substantially appoint the executive officer of the corporation. In order to corporate Governance of the Korean corporations including financial corporations more transparent, so that the responsibility for management is carried out, it is necessary to introduce on the Commercial Code a clear responsibility provisions of the controlling shareholder. It is required to continue the legislative policy to be able to have a competitiveness of financial corporation in the world market.

Quality of Corporate Governance: A Review from the Literature

Md. Musfiqur Rahman,Naima Khatun 한국유통과학회 2017 The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Busine Vol.4 No.1

The purpose of this paper is to review the quality of corporate governance from the prior empirical literature. This study finds that most of the researchers developed the self structured corporate governance index and few researchers used the corporate governance index provided by rating agencies. This study also finds that there is no uniform basis to measure the corporate governance quality and observed the variation in terms of overall and individual attributes of corporate governance; sub-indices of corporate governance; scoring system; weighted and un-weighted method; statistical method; time period; financial and non financial companies; code of corporate governance; listing requirement; disclosure practices; legal environment; firms characteristics; and country perspective. This study also observed that overall corporate governance quality is very low in most of the studies and even quality of corporate governance varies in the firms within the same country. This study recommends that the boundary of corporate governance quality should be defined based on the agreed set of rules and regulation, code of governance and practices. This study also suggests that the regulator and policy makers should more emphasize on code of corporate governance and regulatory framework and monitoring to improve the quality of corporate governance.

기업지배구조와 이익유연화에 관한 연구

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ),박종일 ( Jong Il Park ),신재용 ( Jae Yong Shin ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.3

본 연구는 지배구조와 경영자의 보고이익 전략 중 하나인 이익유연화 정도 간에 어떠한 관계가 있는지를 규명하는데 목적이 있다. 이전 지배구조 관련연구에서는 경영자의 기회주의적인 발생액에 기초한 이익조정이나 실제 이익조정행위는 투자자들의 미래 수익성에 대한 불확실성을 높이고, 정보위험을 증가시키기 때문에 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 이러한 이익조정을 보다 억제시킬 유인이 있다고 주장한다(최정호 2007; 김유찬 등 2011). 그러나 최근 이익유연화행위에 대한 자본시장 반응을 살펴본 연구들에서는 기업이 보고이익의 변동성을 줄이면 미래 수익성에 대한 경영자의 사적정보를 전달할 수 있어, 그 결과로 이익유연화 정도가 높은 기업일수록 주식수익률이 높고, 신용평가기관이 발행하는 신용등급은 상향조정되며, 또한 재무분석가의 이익예측오차를 줄여 이익예측 정확성은 높아질 뿐 아니라, 자본비용 역시 감소된다는 결과를 제시한 바 있다(Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Gu and Zhao 2006; Li and Richie 2009; Amiram and Owens 2011 등). 이와 같이 발생액이나 비정상적인 실물거래활동을 이용한 이익조정행위가 증가하면 영업현금흐름으로 연결되지 못할 가능성이 높아 미래 수익성을 보다 악화시킬 수 있지만, 보고이익의 변동성을 낮추는 이익유연화의 경우에는 투자자들에게 기업의 미래 이익정보력을 보다 개선시킬 수 있다는 점에서 자본시장에서는 보다 긍정적인 평가를 받을 수 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 볼 때 자본시장에서 보다 긍정적인 보상(rewards)을 받는 보고이익 전략이 존재한다면 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 이를 억제시키기 보다는 오히려 더 선호되고, 이러한 전략을 보다 효과적으로 수행할 유인이 존재할 것으로 예상된다. 이러한 검증가능한(testable) 실증적 의문사항을 알아보기 위해, 본 연구는 개별 지배구조 변수 대신 기업지배구조 평가에 전문성을 갖춘 한국기업지배구조원(KCGS) 자료를 이용해 기업지배구조 평가점수와 이들의 5개 부문 점수를 가지고 이익유연화와의 관계를 검증하였다. 이익유연화에 대한 측정치는 Leuz et al.(2003) 및 Tucker and Zarowin(2006)의 방법에 따라 두 가지 측정치를 비교목적상 병행하였다. 분석대상은 유가증권상장기업이고, 분석기간은 2004년부터 2009년까지 최종표본 2,726개 기업/연 자료가 이용되었다. 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 이익유연화 측정치에 관계없이 이익유연화에 영향을 미치는 일정 변수를 통제한 후에도 기업지배구조 평가점수가 높은 기업일수록 기업의 이익유연화 정도는 보다 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 이익유연화 정도가 클수록 시계열적 이익변동성을 줄여 미래 수익성에 관한 경영자의 사적정보를 시장에 신호(signaling)하는 수단으로 이용된다는 관점과 같이 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업이면 이익유연화를 보다 선호한다는 결과이다. 둘째, 지배구조의 개별 부문점수를 이용한 결과에 따르면 경영과실 배분의 지배구조 점수가 높은 기업일수록 이익유연화 정도에 가장 중요한 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났고, 한계적인 수준이지만, 주주의 권리보호 및 공시 부문도 이익유연화와 양(+)의 관계가 나타났다. 이는 보고이익의 질을 결정하는데 있어서는 지배구조 중에 이사회 특성 및 감사기구의 영향이 중요할 수 있지만, 이익유연화의 경우는 이러한 효과 보다는 시장과 관련한 외부효과들이 반영된 지배구조가 보다 중요한 영향을 미친다는 발견이다. 이상의 결과로 볼 때 공격적 이익조정 수단인 재량적 발생액이나 실제 이익조정과 달리 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 보고이익에 대한 유연화를 더 선호함을 본 연구는 보여주고 있다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 이전 서베이 조사결과에서는 경영자들이 이익유연화를 선호한다는 결과를 제시했고(Graham et al. 2005), 이익유연화 정보는 경영자의 사적정보를 전달하여 자본시장에서 호의적인 평가를 받는다는 다수의 연구가 존재하지만, 본 연구와 같이 이익유연화와 기업지배구조 간에 어떠한 체계적인 관계가 있는지를 직접 살펴본 연구는 전무했다. 따라서 본 연구의 결과는 지배구조뿐 아니라 이익유연화 관련연구에도 동시에 추가적인 공헌점을 제공한다. 이와 더불어 본 연구는 경영자들의 보고이익 전략을 지배구조 관점에서 살펴보았다는 점에서 경영자의 보고이익 행태를 이해하는데 있어서도 학계, 실무계, 회계기준 제정기관 및 규제기관에게 유익한 도움을 제공해 줄 것으로 기대된다. This study examines the effect of corporate governance on income smoothing. Prior literature classifies between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management and generally argues that income smoothing is negatively associated with corporate governance quality. The reason is that earnings management increases investor uncertainty of reported earnings and information risk (Choi 2007, Kim et al. 2011). However, more recent studies show that managers can convey private information by reducing earnings volatility so that firms associated with more income smoothing tend to experience higher stock returns and improvements in debt ratings. Moreover, income smoothing has been shown to increase analysts` earnings forecast accuracy and decrease firms` cost of capital (Tucker and Zarowin 2006, Gu an Zhao 2006, Li and Richie 2009, Amiram and Owens 2011). As a result, prior literature shows that accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management are not only associated with negative consequences such as aggravating firms` profitability but can also have positive effects by improving earnings informativeness. These findings suggest that earnings reporting choices inducing positive effects in the capital market should be encouraged in firms with stronger corporate governance and that firms will be incentivized to choose earnings reporting strategies that elicit such favorable responses. To test the association between corporate governance and income smoothing, our study employs a corporate governance quality index issued by the KCGS including their subscores on five different corporate governance characteristics. We adopt two different income smoothing measures following Leuz et al.(2003) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to facilitate comparability. Our sample consists of listed companies from 2004 to 2009 with a total of 2,726 firm-year observations. The results of our analyses are as follows. First, we find that higher corporate governance quality scores are associated with more income smoothing regardless of the choice of different income smoothing measures and even after controlling for other factors that could affect the level of income smoothing. This finding is in line with the prediction that firms with stronger corporate governance tend to favor income smoothing since the management in such firms is likely to utilize income smoothing as a means to communicate or signal private information to the market thereby decreasing time-series-related earnings volatility. Second, from the analyses using the subcategorical corporate governance quality scores based on the five different corporate governance characteristics, we also show that high ratings on the category "distribution of earnings" exerts the greatest impact on the degree of income smoothing. In addition, our results reveal that firms which scored high on the category "protection of shareholder rights" (even though only marginally significant) are positively associated with the level of income smoothing. Our result suggests that board of director- and auditor-related attributes could affect the quality of reported earnings but that in the case of income smoothing the market-related external factors of corporate governance have a significant impact on firms` propensity to smooth earnings. We contribute to the existing literature on corporate governance and income smoothing in several ways. First, despite survey results that illustrate managers` preference for income smoothing (Graham et al. 2005) and a number of research portraying managers` ability to efficiently communicate private signals through income smoothing, we are the first to directly investigate the relation between income smoothing and corporate governance. Therefore, our study extends the prior literature not only related to corporate governance but also related to income smoothing. Second, prior literature has mostly shown that firms with strong corporate governance tend to refrain from adopting aggressive accounting practices such as accrual-based or real earnings management that may involve opportunistic intentions of managers. Contrary to these findings, however, we are able to provide empirical evidence that firms with stronger corporate governance are more likely to smooth their earnings and, thus, propose that income smoothing in firms with strong corporate governance can act as a means to communicate private signals to the market by decreasing time-series-related earnings volatility. Lastly, our study highlights the potential positive effects related to income smoothing whereas in prior literature income smoothing is largely associated with negative evaluations. In particular, prior works investigating how income smoothing is evaluated in the market have mostly pointed out some positive effects only related to external mechanisms. However, our study is the first to shed light on related internal mechanisms by directly investigating the association between income smoothing and corporate governance. Specifically we show how better corporate governance based on strong internal mechanisms affect managers` earnings reporting strategies and provide insights into what earnings reporting strategies are favored in firms with strong corporate governance. By examining managers` earnings reporting strategies emphasizing the role of corporate governance, our study should be of interest to academicians, practitioners and regulation setters.

국내 인수기업의 지배구조와 피인수기업의 주주가치

이수진,최정화,최문섭 한국기업경영학회 2013 기업경영연구 Vol.20 No.3

The objective of improving the corporate governance lies in maximizing the firm value by alleviating information asymmetry between stake holders by coordinating their conflict of interests (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Amongst numerous articles pertaining to corporate governance, a hypothesis associating corporate governance and the firm value has attracted a dense clustering in the literature. Choi and Huang (2008) find that the corporate governance of U.S.-listed acuirers are negatively correlated with the shareholder values of U.S.-listed targets. This is implied from Gompers et al. (2003)’s claim that reckless managers with impulsive decisions can undermine their shareholders’ wealth. Gompers et al. (2003) document that corporate governance and the firm or shareholder value is positively associated by using an index they derive by summing up to 24 anti-takeover provisions of U.S.-listed firms. Anti-takeover provisions tend to entrench managers by relieving them from the market for corporate control, an external discipline mechanism: The shareholders as a result incur higher agency costs. While Bhagat and Romano (2002) and Palia (2001) record a statistically weakly negative association between the independent board of directors and Tobin’s Q (1969), Cremers and Nair (2005) note a strong correlation between internation and external governance mechanisms and long-run excess stock returns. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a multitasking means of corporate restructuring, corporate governance and transparency improvement. Also, the market for corporate control provides a positive incentive of efficient managerial resource allocation thereby maxiziming the firm value. In Korea, M&As are utilized actively as a restructuring device and a strategic breakthrough of prolonged stagnation since the foreign exchange crisis in the late 1990’s. The Government of the Republic of Korea, in a bid to encourage M&As, amended various legal codes and relaxed regulation by allowing hostile takeovers and shortening the discontent period of merger votes. On another hand, while M&As are expected to positvely affect the sharholder value from the pespective of firm-value management, the results of empirical analyses have hitherto been mixed. In this regard, it would worth a documentation in the literature if the effects of M&As can be focused on the target firms instead of the acquiring counterparties through the channel of corporate governance. It is a conventional wisdom in the corporate governance literature that the managers in poorly governed firms make sub-optimal investment decisions. A natural question is a possible link between shareholder wealth transfers and the corporate governance of merging entities. By using the Korea Corporate Governance Index (KCGI) of Black et al. (2006) to proxy for the firm-level degree of corporate governance, we find the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of an average Korea Exchange (KRX)-listed target is negatively associated with the governance of a KRX-listed acquirer. The economic and statistic robustness of this result is further confirmed by controling for a variety of firm and market-level confounding correlates. 미국의 7대 기업 중 하나로 꼽혔던 Enron의 파산 원인이 회계부정과 경영자 관리감독 등을 포함하는 기업지배구조의 실패에 있었다는 것이 밝혀지면서 투명성 및 기업지배구조 이슈는 기업 경영의 화두로 떠오르게 되었다. 우리나라에서도 1997년 외환위기 직후, 불투명한 경영과 기업지배구조의 낙후성으로 인해 기업부실이 초래되었다는 지적이 제기되면서 기업지배구조와 관련해 많은 제도개혁이 이루어졌다. 본 연구에서는 유가 증권시장에서 상장된 기업을 대상으로 인수합병공시로 인한 피인수기업의 주주가치와 인수기업의 지배구조와의 관계를 살펴보고자 한다. 취약한 지배구조를 갖는 기업의 경영진일수록 비합리적인 투자결정을 내린다는 것이 기업지배구조 문헌에 알려져 있다. 이에 기업 간 인수합병시의 주주가치 이전효과와 기업지배구조와의 상관 관계를 상정해볼 수 있다. 본 연구는 국내 상장기업에 대한 인수건에 대하여 Black et al.(2006)이 발표한 국내 기업의 지배구조지수(KCGI)로써 인수기업의 지배구조가 열악할수록 피인수기업의 누적초과수익률(cumulative abnormal return)이 상승하는 실증결론을 얻었다. 기업 및 시장수준의 여러 요인을 통제한 후에도 여전히 인수기업 지배구조와 피인수기업의 주주가치는 경제․통계적으로 유의적인 음의 관계를 나타내었다. 이는 지배구조가 열악한 인수기업이 피인수기업에 대해 과다한 합병 프리미엄을 지급함에 따른 부의 이전으로 해석된다.

상장회사의 지속가능경영을 위한 연성규범의 활용과 ‘기업지배구조 공시제도’의 개선

정재규 한국경제법학회 2018 경제법연구 Vol.17 No.1

Improvement of corporate governance is essential for sustainable growth of companies and healthy development of capital markets. However, there is no single governance model best suited for all companies, regardless of size, growth stage, industry, business environment and corporate culture. Therefore, in order to improve corporate governance, it is necessary to use soft law such as corporate governance code. In many countries, flexible norms are used to improve corporate governance. In Korea, the “Corporate Governance Disclosure System” was introduced and implemented from 2017 on the basis of the ‘Corporate Governance Code’. However, a considerable need for improvement has been pointed out. For this purpose, it is necessary to review the corporate governance best practices and the corporate governance disclosure system in an integrated manner and to make improvements. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to find out the current state of the system operation of the developed countries and the recent trends in the past three years, which are combined with the best practices and comply or explain methods. In conclusion, Korea’s corporate governance code should be improved by a principle-based approach, and detailed guidelines should be prepared and supported so that the company can derive its meaning and details. In addition, the corporate governance disclosure system needs to be improved in such a way as to comply with the choice of the company, but obligation to explain it in case of noncompliance. In this case, it is necessary to clearly clarify the items to be disclosed, to prepare the disclosure report form so that it can be understood more easily, to be able to compare with each other, and to explain concrete reasons for non-compliance, so that it can be easily utilized by stakeholders. 기업의 지속가능한 성장과 자본시장의 건전한 발전을 위해서 기업지배구조의 개선은 필수적이다. 그러나 기업의 규모, 성장단계, 업종, 경영환경과 기업문화 등에 관계없이 모든 기업에게 가장 적합한 단일의 지배구조 모델은 있을 수 없다. 따라서 지배구조 개선을 위해 모범규준과 같은 연성규범의 활용 필요성이 인정되며 다수 국가에서 기업지배구조 개선을 위하여 연성규범을 활용하고 있다. 우리나라에서도 ‘기업지배구조 모범규준’을 토대로 2017년부터 ‘기업지배구조 공시제도’가 도입되어 시행되었다. 그러나 이에 관하여 상당한 개선 필요성이 제시되었으며, 이를 위해서는 기업지배구조 모범규준과 기업지배구조 공시제도를 통합적으로 고찰하며 개선방향을 마련하여야 한다. 이를 위해 모범규준과 comply or explain 방식을 결합하여 활용하고 있는 영국, 독일, 일본 등 선진 각국의 제도 운영현황과 2015년부터 2018년 3월까지 최근 3년간의 동향을 파악해 봄으로써 우리나라 기업지배구조 모범규준의 실효성을 확보하는 방안을 마련하는 데 시사점을 얻고자 하였다. 결론적으로 우리나라의 기업지배구조 모범규준은 원칙중심방식으로 개선하되 그 의미와 구체적 사항을 기업 스스로 도출할 수 있도록 해설서나 가이드라인, 세부지침 등을 마련하여 지원하여야 한다. 또한 기업지배구조 공시제도는 대부분의 국가에서처럼 준수여부는 기업의 선택에 따르되 준수 여부 공시와 미준수 시 설명은 의무화하는 방식으로 개선이 필요하다. 이 때 준수 여부를 공시해야 하는 항목을 명확히 하고, 공시 보고서 양식을 구체적으로 마련하여 보다 쉽게 이해할 수 있고, 기업 간 비교가 가능하며, 구체적인 미준수 사유 설명이 기재되어 이해관계자들이 활용하기 용이하게 개선되어야 한다.

Comply or Explain 방식의 기업지배구조 공시와 기업가치 - 핵심지표를 중심으로 -

안성희 ( Sung-hee Ahn ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2021 유라시아연구 Vol.18 No.4

우리나라는 기업지배구조 모범규준의 실효성을 제고하기 위해 「Comply or Explain(원칙준수, 예외설명)」방식의 기업지배구조 공시제도를 도입하였다. 기업지배구조 공시제도에 따라, 기업들은 기업지배구조 모범규준을 적용한다면 그 사실을 밝히고(Comply), 모범규준을 적용하지 않는다면 그 이유를 상세히 설명(Explain)하는 기업지배구조보고서를 공시하고 있다. 동 제도는 지배구조의 투명성 향상을 통해 기업의 경쟁력을 강화하고 중장기 기업가치 제고에 기여하는 데 그 취지가 있다. Comply or Explain 방식의 기업지배 구조보고서는 2018년까지 자율적으로 공시되다가, 2019년부터 대규모 유가증권 상장기업에 한해 의무공시되고 있으며, 기업지배구조보고서가 제공하는 정보의 비교가능성과 유용성을 높이기 위해 정부당국에서 제시한 15대 핵심지표 준수여부를 O, X형태로 표기하고 있다. 본 연구는 기업지배구조 의무공시기업의 핵심지표 준수현황을 살펴보고, O, X 형태로 공시된 핵심지표 준수정도가 기업가치에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 분석한다. 본 연구의 표본은 2019년, 2020년에 O, X 형태로 핵심지표 준수여부를 기업지배구조보고서에 공시한 약 326개 기업-연도이다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 우리나라 대규모 유가증권 상장기업은 지배 구조의 15개 핵심지표 중 8.4개 정도를 준수하는데 그쳐, 보다 적극적인 지배구조 개선 노력이 필요해 보인다. 핵심지표의 분류별로 살펴보면, 주주 관련 핵심지표 준수율이 약 32%로 가장 낮게 나타났으며, 감사기구 관련 핵심지표 준수율이 70%이상으로 가장 높은 것으로 나타났다. 15개의 개별 핵심지표 중에서는 집중투표제를 채택한 기업이 가장 적은 것으로 파악된다. 둘째, 핵심지표의 준수율이 높은 기업일수록 기업가치가 유의하게 높은 것으로 나타났으며, 이는 기업지배구조보고서상의 핵심지표 준수율이 높을수록 투자자들은 기업지배구조가 양호하다고 평가하고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 셋째, 이사회 및 감사기구와 관련된 핵심지표 준수율이 높을수록 기업가치에 유의한 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타난 반면, 주주관련 지표의 준수정도는 기업가치에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 투자자들이 주주 관련 핵심지표 준수여부에 대해서는 차별적인 가치를 부여하지 않는 것으로 해석된다. 마지막으로, 개별 핵심지표 준수율이 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 살펴본 결과, 집중투표제 채택은 기업가치와 유의한 부(-)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타난다. 이는 집중투표제의 채택이 경영권을 위협한다는 기업의 우려와 일맥상통한 결과이므로 핵심지표로서 적정한지에 대한 추가적인 고민이 필요해 보인다. 본 연구는 O, X형태의 핵심지표 준수여부가 포함된 Comply or Explain 방식의 기업지배구조 공시와 기업가치 간의 관계를 연구한 최초의 연구라는 공헌점이 존재한다. 또한 그간 선행연구에서는 이사회, 감사위원회 등 주요 기구의 기업지배구조 현황과 기업가치 간의 관계를 연구한 반면, 본 연구는 주주, 이사회, 감사기구를 포괄하는 정량화된 지배구조 수준을 토대로 기업지배구조와 기업가치 간의 관계를 연구했다는 측면에서 선행연구 대비 차별점을 갖는다. 본 연구의 결과는 2026년까지 전체 유가증권 상장기업으로 기업지배구조보고서 공시를 확대하고자 하는 정부의 정책을 지지하고 있다는 측면에서 의의를 갖는다. 최근 ESG가 화두인 상황에서 기업의 경영진은 법적인 의무에 따라 단순히 기업지배구조보고서를 작성ㆍ공시하는 데 그치는 것이 아니라, 장기적으로 기업의 가치를 재고하는 측면에서 해당 기업에 가장 바람직한 지배구조 모델을 찾아가는 것이 필요할 것으로 보인다. In order to improve the effectiveness of the best corporate governance standards, Korea introduced the corporate governance disclosure system of the “Comply or Explain” method. According to the Corporate Governance Disclosure System, companies disclose the Corporate Governance Report that explains the fact if they apply the Best Corporate Governance Standards (Comply) and explains why if they do not apply the Best Corporate Governance Codes (Explain). The purpose of this system is to enhance corporate competitiveness and to contribute to enhancing mid- to long-term corporate value by improving the transparency of corporate governance. The Comply or Explain method of corporate governance report was voluntarily disclosed until 2018, and has been made mandatory only for large-scale securities- listed companies from 2019. Compliance with the 15 core indicators suggested by the authorities is indicated in the form of O and X. This study examines the compliance status of core indicators of companies with mandatory corporate governance disclosure, and analyzes how the degree of compliance with key indicators disclosed in the form of O and X affects corporate value. The sample of this study is about 326 company-years that disclosed compliance with core indicators in the corporate governance report in the form of O and X in 2019 and 2020. The analysis results of this study are as follows. First, large-scale securities listed companies in Korea only comply with 8.4 out of 15 core indicators, suggesting that more active efforts to improve governance are needed. When looking at the core indicators by category, the shareholder-related core indicators compliance rate was the lowest at about 32%, and the compliance rate of the audit organization-related core indicators was the highest at over 70%. Among the 15 individual core indicators, it is found that the number of companies that adopted the concentrated voting system is the lowest. Second, the higher the compliance ratio of the core indicators, the higher the firm value was, which means that the higher the compliance ratio of the core indicators, the higher the investor’s evaluation of the corporate governance structure. Third, it was found that the higher the compliance ratio of core indicators related to the board of directors and monitoring organizations had a significant positive effect on the firm value, while compliance ratio of the shareholder related indicators did not have significant relationship with firm value. Finally, it appears that the adoption of the cumulative voting has a significant negative effect on the firm value. This is a result consistent with corporate concerns that the adoption of cumulative voting threatens management rights, so it seems necessary to consider whether it is appropriate as a core indicator. This study contributes that it is the first study to study the relationship between compliance of core indicators of corporate governance reports using Comply or Explain method and firm value. In addition, while previous studies have studied the relationship between corporate governance status and firm value of major organizations such as the board of directors and audit committees, this study is based on the quantified level of governance that includes shareholders, board of directors, and audit organizations. It is different from previous studies in that it studied the relationship between corporate values. This study supports the government’s policy to expand the disclosure of corporate governance reports to all companies listed on securities by 2026. Corporate management does not simply disclose corporate governance reports according to legal obligations, but seeks the most desirable governance model for enhancing firm value in the long term.

주식회사 모델에 기초한 공기업 지배구조의 개선 방향

김원기,박성진 전남대학교 법학연구소 2008 법학논총 Vol.28 No.2

In our country, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) still represent a substantial part of GDP, employment and market capitalisation. Moreover, SOEs are often pre- valent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, rural development, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sector. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. Fundamentally, corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that the accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (ownership entities, ministries, management, board), without clearly and easily identifiable principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge. In order to carry out its ownership responsibilities, the state can benefit from using tools that are applicable to the private sector, including the ‘Korean Com- mercial law’, the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ and the ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’. The followings are the characteristic features obtained from this study. First, the ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such as the Parliament. In order to increase the public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of SOEs, it is important that ownership entity roles are clarified and explained to the general public. Second, governments should base themselves as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise. Streamlining of the legal form of SOEs would enhance transparency and facilitate oversight through benchmarking of Commercial law. Third, the state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent judgement. They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO like a Stock Company. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s per- formance. Finally, ownership entities and SOEs should observe high standards of trans- parency. They should disclose material information on all matters described in the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’, ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’, and in addition focus on areas of signi- ficant concern for the general public. This study is intended to provide opinion that will assist governments in im- proving the corporate governance of SOEs. This study also suggest that the state plays a positive role in improving corporate governance across all sectors of our legal system. In our country, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) still represent a substantial part of GDP, employment and market capitalisation. Moreover, SOEs are often pre- valent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, rural development, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sector. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. Fundamentally, corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that the accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (ownership entities, ministries, management, board), without clearly and easily identifiable principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge. In order to carry out its ownership responsibilities, the state can benefit from using tools that are applicable to the private sector, including the ‘Korean Com- mercial law’, the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ and the ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’. The followings are the characteristic features obtained from this study. First, the ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such as the Parliament. In order to increase the public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of SOEs, it is important that ownership entity roles are clarified and explained to the general public. Second, governments should base themselves as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise. Streamlining of the legal form of SOEs would enhance transparency and facilitate oversight through benchmarking of Commercial law. Third, the state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent judgement. They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO like a Stock Company. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s per- formance. Finally, ownership entities and SOEs should observe high standards of trans- parency. They should disclose material information on all matters described in the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’, ‘OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise’, and in addition focus on areas of signi- ficant concern for the general public. This study is intended to provide opinion that will assist governments in im- proving the corporate governance of SOEs. This study also suggest that the state plays a positive role in improving corporate governance across all sectors of our legal system.

기업지배구조 개선을 위한 소수주주 권리확장에 관한 소고

고은정 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2020 홍익법학 Vol.21 No.1

We translate Corporate Governance, which is used in English-American law. However, the concept of corporate governance that we are using now is unclear, and the range of minority shareholders used in it is too narrow. This paper examines the problem of agents in corporate governance. Corporate governance is a system that governs and directs a company in a large sense, and is a mechanism for distributing power that embodies rights and responsibilities. The reform of Korea's corporate governance mainly adopted the American model. It also partially accepted the OECD's corporate governance recommendations. The OECD divides the legal pillars of Korea's corporate governance into three broad categories. One column is the Commercial Law, the second is the Capital Markets Law, and the third is the rules for optimized corporate governance in each country. In order to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders, the concept of corporate governance should be examined and the issue of agents, which is the core of corporate governance, should be examined. And finds justification for minority rights in the agency problem. As we saw in the previous paper, the concept of corporate governance in our current law is too narrow. However, when examining the global trend, the rights of minority shareholders are strengthened. In order to reflect these trends and promote sound corporate governance, minority shareholder rights should be strengthened. In order to do this, minority shareholders must be given the authority to check corporate control. The purpose of this paper is to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders and to promote sound corporate governance. 기업지배구조는 다양한 국가적, 문화적 형태로 사용되어 온 개념으로 학문적 영역에서도 그 개념에 관하여 적잖은 논쟁이 따른다. 법적 구조와 기관 및 기업들의 형태 등에 통일된 기업지배구조의 국제적인 모델은 아직까지 존재하지 않는 실정이며, 앞으로도 공통분모를 찾아 통일적이고 일괄적인 정의를 정립하는 것에 무리가 있을지도 모른다. 하지만 현재 우리 「상법」상 기업지배구조에 관한 규정들과 해석은 너무 협소하다는 지적이다. 제도상의 메커니즘은 이를 뒷받침해주는 힘이 있지 않으면 작동하지 않는다는 점에서 회사법의 기업지배구조 규정은 적용상 한계가 있다. 본 논문에서는 소수주주의 권리를 강화하기 위한 선행작업으로 기업지배구조의 개념을 살피고, 대리인 이론에서 주주권리의 정당성을 찾는다. 또한 각국의 기업지배구조와 관련된 개별규준을 검토하고, 기업지배구조에 있어 새로운 패러다임을 제시하고자 한다. 앞으로 기업지배구조의 개선의 새로운 방향은 소수주주의 권리 확장에서 답을 얻어야 한다. 자본시장의 변화와 주식시장의 성장은 더 많은 소수주주들을 양성하게 될 것이다. 소수주주들의 권한은 강화되어야 하며, 그러기 위해서 소수주주에게 주어지는 법상의 권리도 보장되어야 한다. 소수주주의 권리확장은 기업지배구조개선에 긍정적인 효과를 가져오게 될 것이다. 그들의 권한은 기업지배구조에 있어 도덕적 해이와 대리인 문제를 해결할 수 있는 강력한 견제장치가 되어 줄 것이다.