미국 회사법상 이사회 구성에 관한 연구 - 델라웨어 주를 중심으로

박준선 한국기업법학회 2023 企業法硏究 Vol.37 No.4

본 논문에서는 델라웨어 주 회사법상 이사회 제도, 그중에서 이사회의 구성에 대해 살펴보았다. 첫째, 미국 델라웨어 주 회사법은 업무집행과 감독 기능을 하나의 이사회에서 담당하는 일원적 이사회 구조를 취하고 있고, 증권거래소 상장규칙 등에서 사외이사를 두도록 하여 상장회사에 대해 서는 사실상 업무집행과 감독 기능의 분리를 실현하고 있다. 둘째, 미국 델라웨어 주에서는 시차임기제가 주주들의 압력으로부터 이사의 지위를 보호하는 메 커니즘으로 작용할 수 있어, 시차임기제를 적대적 공개매수에 대한 경영권 방어 수단으로 활용하고 있다. 셋째, 미국 델라웨어 주 회사법에는 사외이사를 포함한 이사의 자격에 관한 규정이 없으나, 증권 거래소 상장규칙이 적용되는 상장회사는 사외이사의 자격 요건을 충족해야 한다. 넷째, 미국 델라웨어 주 회사법은 이사회의 권한 위임을 허용하는 규정을 두고, 이 규정에 근거 하여 이사회 내 위원회를 설치하여 운영할 수 있도록 한다. 다만, 주 회사법에는 의무적으로 설치 해야 하는 위원회의 종류나 필요로 하는 위원회 구성원의 자격 요건 등에 관하여는 규정하고 있지 않다. 다만, 증권거래소 상장규칙이 적용되는 상장회사는 이사회 내에 감사위원회, 보수위원회, 지 명/기업지배구조위원회를 의무적으로 설치해야 하고, 그 구성원을 모두 사외이사로 구성해야 한다. 이중 감사위원회도 이사회 내부에 설치되는 위원회 중 하나이므로 그 구성원인 감사위원은 당연히 주주총회가 아닌 이사회를 통해서 이사 중에서 선임된다. This paper examines the board system under the Delaware General Corporation Law, including the composition of the board of directors. First, the Delaware General Corporation Law has a unitary board structure in which the executive and supervisory functions are performed by a single board of directors, and the stock exchange listing rules require independent directors, which practically realizes the separation of executive and supervisory functions for listed companies. Second, the Delaware General Corporation Law allows staggered boards. The staggered boards can be used as a means of protecting directors' positions from shareholder pressure including a hostile takeover bid. Third, the Delaware General Corporation Law does not define the qualifications of directors, including independent directors. However, a public company subject to stock exchange listing rules must meet the qualifications for independent directors set forth in the listing rules. Fourth, the Delaware General Corporation Law provides for the delegation of powers by the board of directors and allows for the establishment and operation of committees within the board of directors. Fourth, the Delaware General Corporation Law provides for the delegation of powers by the board of directors and allows for the establishment and operation of committees within the board of directors. However, the Delaware General Corporation Law does not specify the types of committees that must be established or the qualifications of committee members. However, public companies subject to stock exchange listing rules are required to have an audit committee, compensation committee, and nominating/corporate governance committee on their board of directors, all of which must be composed of independent directors. Since the audit committee is one of the committees within the board of directors, its members are naturally appointed from among the directors by the board of directors, not by the shareholders' meeting.

이사회 영향력과 이익조정: 독립적인 사외이사의 존재와 대표이사-이사회 의장 분리를 중심으로

박하연 ( Park Ha Yeon ),이아영 ( Lee A Young ),강윤식 ( Kang Yun Sik ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계저널 Vol.25 No.5

본 연구는 이사회 영향력이 회계정보의 신뢰성에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 살펴본다. 본 연구에서 이사회 영향력은 경영자와 사회적 관계를 가지고 있지 않은 사외이사의 존재와 경영자와 이사회 의장의 분리여부로 측정되며, 이러한 변수가 경영자의 이익조정규모에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 정부는 회계투명성 개선작업으로써 경영자를 견제하고 내부 의사결정 시스템의 신뢰성을 높이기 위한 제도적 장치의 하나로 사외이사 선임을 의무화하였다. 하지만 사외이사들이 본연의 기능을 수행하고 있는지에 대한 실효성 논란은 현재 진행형이다. 이러한 논란은 대부분의 경영자들이 사외이사 선임권을 가지고 있어, 자신과 연고관계가 있는 사외이사로 이사회를 구성하여 이사회의 감시기능을 무력화시킬 가능성에서 비롯된다. 또한 대부분의 국내 기업들은 경영자가 이사회 의장을 겸직하고 있다. 경영자가 이사회의 의장을 맡고 있는 경우 경영자의 독단과 전횡적인 의사결정에 대하여 이사회의 통제기능이 제대로 작동될 수 없을 것이다. 따라서 본 연구는 이사회의 독립성 결여를 이사회의 실효성에 영향을 미치는 중요한 요인으로 보고, 이사회의 독립성이 이익조정에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 알아보고자 한다. 본 연구의 실증분석 결과, 먼저 경영자와 사회적 관계가 없는 사외이사의 비율이 높은 기업일수록, 경영자의 이익조정 크기가 작은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 경영자와 이사회 의장이 분리된 기업의 이익조정 크기는 작게 나타나는 것을 확인하였다. 본 연구의 공헌점으로, 첫째, 기존의 연구들은 주로 이사회 내 사외이사의 비율을 이사회의 독립성에 대한 대용치로 사용하여 분석하였다. 그러나 본 연구는 한국의 독특한 인적 네트워크의 특성을 반영하여 실질적인 사외이사 독립성의 기준을 찾고자 하였다. 둘째, 경영자와 이사회 의장 분리를 통한 이사회 구조적 독립성 확보가 경영자의 이익조정 동기를 억제시킨다는 발견은 국내 다수의 경영자가 이사회 의장을 겸직하는 현실에서 향후 지배구조개선 방향에 정책적 함의를 가질 것으로 기대한다. 마지막으로 본 연구는 사외이사 제도의 형식적인 도입이 기업지배구조의 실질적인 개선에 한계가 있으며, 이를 극복하기 위해서는 실질적으로 독립적인 사외이사가 선임될 필요가 있음을 시사한다는 점에서 의미가 있다. This paper examines the relation between Board Leadership and the reliability of financial reporting. The Board Leadership is measured based on the proportion of outside directors who have no social ties with the management, and the separation of the roles of CEO(Chief Executive Officer) and the chairman of the board. We investigate the efficiency of such board characteristics in reducing earnings management(measured by discretionary accruals). As part of efforts to improve accounting transparency, the government has mandated the introduction of outside director system as an institutional device to keep the management in check and improve the reliability of the internal decision-making system. The board of directors (BOD) of a corporation, on behalf of the shareholders, has the responsibility to keep the management in check and prevent despotism. In this light, the role of outside directors is important. However, the debate is ongoing as to whether outside directors are properly carrying out their expected function. Most of these debates arise from the fact that, in most cases, the management has the right to appoint outside directors, and possibly appoint outside directors socially connected with the management, accordingly weakening the control function of the board. Also, in most Korean corporations, the CEO serves as the chairman of the board concurrently. This is also very likely to harm the independence of the board of directors (BOD). If the CEO is also the chairman of the board, the monitoring ability of the board of directors (BOD) to prevent the management’s arbitrary and despotic decision-making is less. In this study, the lack of independence of the board of directors (BOD) is considered to be an important factor that affects on the effectiveness of the board of directors (BOD), and aims to investigate the relation between independence of the board of directors (BOD) and earnings management. That is, it is analyzed whether ensuring independence of the board of directors (BOD) induces the management to provide suitable and reliable financial reporting. The results of this study are as follow. First, Based on a sample of Korean companies, it was shown that, if the ratio of outside directors having no social relationship with the management is high, the managers are likely to engage in lower level of earnings management. Second, the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board showed a significant association with earnings management. We found that Chairman Independence is an important factor in constraining the inclination of CEO to engage in earnings management. The contributions of this study are as follow. First, previous studies, mostly under the premise that outside directors are independent, used the ratio of outside directors to the board as an indicator of the board of directors (BOD) independence. However, under the current outside director system, wherein the ratio of outside directors is regulated by law, using the ratio of outside directors as a proxy for the independence of the board of directors (BOD) has its limitations. To improve on this limitation, this study aimed to find a practical standard for the independence of the board of directors (BOD), reflecting the unique characteristics of Korean human networks. That is, addition to previous studies, this study examined whether the outside directors had social ties with the management or not. Second, CEO duality is the important characteristic of board. CEO duality means that the position of the CEO and the chairman of the board are served by the same person. It is the responsibility of the board of directors (BOD) to make sure that the CEO is serving the stakeholder’s interests in the best possible way. Therefore, the relationship between the chairman of the board of director (BOD) and the CEO is essential. It is assumed that non-duality is an important matter in the securing of structural independence of the board. Most of Korean listed companies have CEO duality, so there is lack of studies to shed light on CEO duality issue. It is meaningful that the examination of whether such structural differences weaken manager’s incentives for earnings management. This paper provides empirical evidence on the significance CEO duality has in influencing the earnings management of Korea listed firms. Third, this study has pointed out that the perfunctory introduction of the outside director system is limited in bringing practical improvements to corporate governance structure - firms need to hire genuinely independent outside directors.

Institutional Proposals for Enhancing Board Diversity in Chinese Companies

쉬창,정대 중국지역학회 2024 중국지역연구 Vol.11 No.1

Recently, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) has become a new paradigm for corporate management and investment as a global trend. In particular, the board diversity is being emphasized as a standard related to the corporate governance of ESG. In a broader sense, the board diversity includes race, gender, nationality, and sexual orientation, and in a narrow sense, the board diversity focuses on gender diversity, among which female directors are a key issue. In this regard, while some countries implement a female director quota system that forces the appointment of female directors, others implement a system that entrusts the appointment of female directors to the autonomy of companies. In general, the board of directors is a main body in a company's business decision-making, and the responsibilities of directors who are members of the board of directors are gradually expanding. Since there is an important relationship between corporate governance and sustainable growth, the issue of the board diversity has become an important concern for long-term investors. There are a number of empirical studies that say that expanding the number of female directors can improve the monitoring and supervision functions and decision-making functions of the board of directors and can improve corporate management performance through changes in corporate culture. In other words, it can be evaluated that there is a correlation between securing gender diversity and improving corporate management performance or corporate governance in the board diversity. From this point of view, in order for listed companies in China to further grow into a global company, it is necessary to pay more attention to securing the board diversity, such as expanding the number of female directors, and the Chinese government needs to strengthen policy support on the board diversity. In conclusion, the following institutional improvement measures should be taken to improve the board diversity of Chinese companies. First, it is necessary to promote policies that provide internal motivation for the board diversity for Chinese companies. For example, in most companies, it is necessary to implement policies to promote the appointment of female directors because the board diversity is insufficient. Second, it is necessary to promote policies to improve the quality of information disclosure by Chinese companies regarding the diversity of the board of directors. In addition to promoting the introduction of a mandatory disclosure system, it is necessary to develop qualitative and quantitative disclosure indicators. Third, there is a need to improve the evaluation model for the diversity of the board of directors and ESG of Chinese companies. The ESG evaluation model needs to be improved by incorporating long-term practical experience. In order not to neglect the diversity of the board of directors, it is necessary to delegate the evaluation to a more specialized institution such as the Women's Federation to summarize the experience and use it to improve the overall evaluation model. Fourth, it is necessary to establish a regular exchange platform between mainland China and Hong Kong so that companies can share and learn experiences and examples of ESG practice between companies in various aspects

이사회 특성이 내부회계 관리제도의 품질과 사외이사의 보상에 미치는 효과

김용식,황국재,김유찬 韓國公認會計士會 2008 회계·세무와 감사 연구 Vol.48 No.-

기업지배구조에 대한 사회적 관심이 증대됨에 따라, 이사회의 기능 강화에 대한 중요성도 높아지고 있다. 하지만, 일각에서는 이사회 제도의 실효성을 두고 여전히 의문을 제기하고 있다. 많은 기업들이 관련 법규에서 정하는 최소한의 기준만을 강제적으로 준수하고 있다는 사실은 이러한 의문과 무관하지 않을 것이다. 이러한 점에서 본다면, 이사회 제도는 형식적 차원이 아니라 실질적 차원에서 효과적으로 운영될 수 있어야 할 것이다. 이에 관한 논의는 내부회계 관리제도에 관한 문제로 확대⋅적용될 수 있다. 경영자의 관리⋅책임 하에 있는 내부회계 관리제도의 품질은 이를 감시⋅감독하는 이사회의 외관상 구성에 의해 좌우되기 보다는, 운영상의 효과성에 의해 영향을 받을 가능성이 높다. 따라서 본 연구는 이사회의 특성과 내부회계 관리제도의 취약점 보고 여부와의 관계를 실증적으로 검정하는 것에 주된 목적을 두었다. 실증분석은 모범규준과 검토기준이 모든 상장법인에 적용되기 시작한 2007년도 주권상장법인과 코스닥상장법인을 대상으로 이루어졌다. 분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 사외이사의 활동성과 재무전문성 그리고 이사회의 주식보유비율이 높아질수록 내부회계 관리제도에서 중요한 취약점이 보고될 가능성은 낮아지는 것으로 나타났으며, 감사위원회의 활동성이 높아질수록 중요한 취약점이 보고될 가능성은 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 주목할 만한 것은 의무 규정의 영향을 받고 있는 이사회 내의 사외이사비율과 감사위원회의 설치 여부의 경우, 중요한 취약점이 보고될 가능성과 통계적인 관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났다는 점이다. 이는 기업의 내부통제를 강화시키기 위해 법적인 강제규정보다는 기업이 자발적으로 내부통제를 강화할 수 있는 정책적 방향성이 필요함을 시사하는 것이다. 또한 본 연구는 이사회의 특성과 사외이사의 보수와의 관계를 실증적으로 검정하였다. 실증분석결과, 이사회가 실질적 차원에서 효과적으로 운영되고 있는 기업일수록 사외이사에게 높은 보수를 지급하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 본 연구는 건전한 내부회계 관리제도의 유지⋅관리에 있어 이사회의 형식적 제도보다는 효과적 운영의 중요성을 확인시켜주고 있다. It is required to enhance the function of a board of directors as the corporate governance is seem to be material. In accordance with Securities and Exchange Act, it is mandatory to meet the ratio of outside directors in a board of directors and to establish an audit committee. In this study, we investigate which characteristics of a board of directors and an audit committee as well as the ratio of outside directors in a board of directors might affect the auditor's review opinion of internal control over financial reporting. Based on the logistic regression, the activity and the financial expertise of outside directors in a board of directors and a board of directors' ownership are negatively related to the material weaknesses. Also, the activity of an audit committee or internal auditors is negatively related to the material weaknesses. It is noticeable that the mandatory regulations such as the ratio of outside directors in a board of directors and establishment of an audit committee are not related to the material weaknesses statistically. Based on the analysis of the compensation of outside directors through the linear regression, the ratio of outside directors in a board of directors and the participation ratio of outside directors in board meetings controlled by firm size and board's ownership are positively related to the compensation of outside directors. Additionally, we find that the disclosure of material weaknesses, the ratio of outside directors in a board of directors, the compensation of outside directors, and firm size showed the statistical mean difference between the firms with stock option granted to outside directors and the firms without stock option granted to outside directors. This study contributes to provide the concept that it is more necessary to make policy to lead a voluntary participation than to make mandatory regulation and provide the guideline of which characteristics of a board of directors should be supported to enhance the function of a board of directors. However, limitation of this paper is that the portion of the firms with material weaknesses are low, which means that it is likely that some companies do not disclose their weaknesses even if they have material weaknesses. In the future, it is worthwhile to investigate which companies with material weaknesses do not disclose their weaknesses.

이사회의 특성이 연구개발투자 의사결정에 미치는 효과

김유찬,황국재,정무관 한국인사조직학회 2009 인사조직연구 Vol.17 No.1

The investment for research and development is not only the driving force of firm growth but also the source of competitive advantage. However, the managers have incentives to reduce R&D expenditure because the success of R&D investment is uncertain and the benefits of R&D investment will be taken in the long term. According to agency theory, as the investment opportunities of stockholders are well-diversified, risk-neutral stockholders prefer R&D investment toward high returns whereas managers whose human resources are dependent on their companies are reluctant to invest the resources to R&D. Managers make decisions to invest only in case benefits are greater than costs, that is, comparing personal benefits from R&D investment to personal costs. However, in general, R&D investment has negative impacts on short-term oriented accounting profits, so managers who are evaluated largely by accounting profits can be likely to avoid the unfavorable rewards in current period. That’'s why managers are least likely to invest the resources to R&D, for fear that they will be evaluated negatively at their job market. In this context, several prior researches have used R&D expenditure as the measure of agency costs, and paid a lot of attentions to find the ways to bring about optimal level of R&D investment through the reduction of agency costs.12)37 The internal control systems to reduce agency costs can be divided into two categories:monitoring and incentive contracts(including the issues of ownership structure). The representative means to monitor managers is the board of directors, and this paper has a purpose of finding out how the board attributes can have an impact on R&D investment, focusing on the monitoring mechanism of the board of directors. Based on the literature review of Zahra & Pearce(1989), this paper suggested the framework for empirical tests to analyze the board attributes systematically, and built the variables related to board attributes. As a result, the board attributes were classified into four categories:board compositions, board characteristics, board structures, and decision-making processes. For the empirical analysis, except for the decision-making processes, five variables were selected in the areas of board compositions, board characteristics, and board structures. The board compositions include the authentically independent outside directors’ratio, the grey directors’ratio, and the inside directors’ratio. The board characteristics also include the ratio of outsiders with former executive careers, and the ratio of directors over retirement age. The number of board committees and the leadership structure are considered as the indicators of the board structures. The empirical results of this study were as followed. The authentically independent outside directors’ratio had a significant positive effect on R&D expenditure statistically. This result interpreted that the assurance of the board of directors’independence made it possible to monitor the mangers’decision-making for R&D investment effectively and efficiently, and then R&D expenditure increased. The grey directors’ratio had a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically. It was regarded that the grey directors were unable to monitor managers effectively and efficiently due to the absence of substantial independence though they were classified into outside directors seemingly. The inside directors’ratio had a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically, which meant that the inside directors were not effective and efficient in monitoring roles. The ratio of outsiders with former executive careers showed a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically. As discussed in the social network theory, it seemed that social networking process among the directors made directors’monitoring roles ineffective and inefficient though the directors were outsiders. This evidence should be consider... 연구개발투자는 기업성장의 원천임에도 불구하고, 경영자는 이를 회피하려는 유인을 가진다. 이러한 점을 활용하여, 여러 선행연구에서는 연구개발비를 대리인 비용의 척도로 활용해 왔다. 본 연구는 이사회의 특성이 경영자의 연구개발투자 의사결정에 미치는 효과를 분석했다. 우선 이사회의 특성을 체계적으로 분석할 수 있는 논리적 틀을 제안하고, 이를 바탕으로 이사회 관련변수를 구축했다. 특히, 다수의 선행연구에서 이사회 독립성의 대용치로 사용해온 사외이사비율의 측정방법에 문제가 있을 수 있음을 강조하고, 전통적 사외이사비율로부터 “관계이사”를 구분할 것을 제안했다. 2003년부터 2005년까지 한국증권거래소에 상장된 제조기업 955개의 표본을 대상으로 실증 분석한 결과, 이사회 내의 “독립된 사외이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “위원회 수”가 증가할수록 연구개발투자는 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 반면, 이사회 내의 “사내이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “관계이사비율”, 임원경력을 가진 “독립된 사외이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “고령임원의 비율”이 증가할수록, 연구개발투자는 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 이사회의 리더십 구조의 경우, 연구개발투자와 통계적인 관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 증권거래법 제191조 16에서는 이사회의 설계와 관련된 의무규정을 명시하고 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 관련법규의 영향을 분석결과에 반영하고자 추가분석을 실시했다. 분석 결과, 사외이사의 구성에 있어서는 의무규정의 영향력이 존재하지 않는 것으로 나타났으나, 위원회의 설치와 관련해서는 의무규정의 영향력이 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 관계이사 분리의 타당성을 검정하기위해, 전통적 방식으로 측정한 사외이사비율 변수를 포함하는 모형과 본 연구에서 제안한 “독립된 사외이사비율” 변수를 포함하는 모형의 설명력을 비교.평가했다. 분석결과, 전통적 사외이사비율로부터 “관계이사”를 분리하여 측정하는 것이 보다 바람직하다는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 또한 전문경영자 집단과 소유경영자 집단의 구분에 기초한 추가분석이 수행되었다. 분석결과, 이사회의 특성과 연구개발투자와의 관계는 소유경영자 집단 보다는 전문경영자 집단에서 보다 명확하게 나타나는 것으로 나타났다.

이사회의 특성이 연구개발투자 의사결정에 미치는 효과

김유찬(Yoo Chan Kim)/황국재(Kookjae Hwang)/정무관(Mu Goan Jeong) 한국인사ㆍ조직학회 2009 인사조직연구 Vol.17 No.1

연구개발투자는 기업성장의 원천임에도 불구하고, 경영자는 이를 회피하려는 유인을 가진다. 이러한 점을 활용하여, 여러 선행연구에서는 연구개발비를 대리인 비용의 척도로 활용해 왔다. 본 연구는 이사회의 특성이 경영자의 연구개발투자 의사결정에 미치는 효과를 분석했다. 우선 이사회의 특성을 체계적으로 분석할 수 있는 논리적 틀을 제안하고, 이를 바탕으로 이사회 관련변수를 구축했다. 특히, 다수의 선행연구에서 이사회 독립성의 대용치로 사용해온 사외이사비율의 측정방법에 문제가 있을 수 있음을 강조하고, 전통적 사외이사비율로부터 “관계이사”를 구분할 것을 제안했다. 2003년부터 2005년까지 한국증권거래소에 상장된 제조기업 955개의 표본을 대상으로 실증 분석한 결과, 이사회 내의 “독립된 사외이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “위원회 수”가 증가할수록 연구개발투자는 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 반면, 이사회 내의“사내이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “관계이사비율”, 임원경력을 가진 “독립된 사외이사비율”, 이사회 내의 “고령임원의 비율”이 증가할수록, 연구개발투자는 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 이사회의 리더십 구조의 경우, 연구개발투자와 통계적인 관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 증권거래법 제191조 16에서는 이사회의 설계와 관련된 의무규정을 명시하고 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 관련법규의 영향을 분석결과에 반영하고자 추가분석을 실시했다. 분석 결과, 사외이사의 구성에 있어서는 의무규정의 영향력이 존재하지 않는 것으로 나타났으나, 위원회의 설치와 관련해서는 의무규정의 영향력이 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 관계이사 분리의 타당성을 검정하기위해, 전통적 방식으로 측정한 사외이사비율 변수를 포함하는 모형과 본 연구에서 제안한 “독립된 사외이사비율”변수를 포함하는 모형의 설명력을 비교․평가했다. 분석결과, 전통적 사외이사비율로부터 “관계이사”를 분리하여 측정하는 것이 보다 바람직하다는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 또한 전문경영자 집단과 소유경영자 집단의 구분에 기초한 추가분석이 수행되었다. 분석결과, 이사회의 특성과 연구개발투자와의 관계는 소유경영자 집단 보다는 전문경영자 집단에서 보다 명확하게 나타나는 것으로 나타났다. The investment for research and development is not only the driving force of firm growth but also the source of competitive advantage. However, the managers have incentives to reduce R&D expenditure because the success of R&D investment is uncertain and the benefits of R&D investment will be taken in the long term. According to agency theory, as the investment opportunities of stockholders are well-diversified, risk-neutral stockholders prefer R&D investment toward high returns whereas managers whose human resources are dependent on their companies are reluctant to invest the resources to R&D. Managers make decisions to invest only in case benefits are greater than costs, that is, comparing personal benefits from R&D investment to personal costs. However, in general, R&D investment has negative impacts on short-term oriented accounting profits, so managers who are evaluated largely by accounting profits can be likely to avoid the unfavorable rewards in current period. That’s why managers are least likely to invest the resources to R&D, for fear that they will be evaluated negatively at their job market. In this context, several prior researches have used R&D expenditure as the measure of agency costs, and paid a lot of attentions to find the ways to bring about optimal level of R&D investment through the reduction of agency costs.12)37 The internal control systems to reduce agency costs can be divided into two categories:monitoring and incentive contracts(including the issues of ownership structure). The representative means to monitor managers is the board of directors, and this paper has a purpose of finding out how the board attributes can have an impact on R&D investment, focusing on the monitoring mechanism of the board of directors. Based on the literature review of Zahra & Pearce(1989), this paper suggested the framework for empirical tests to analyze the board attributes systematically, and built the variables related to board attributes. As a result, the board attributes were classified into four categories:board compositions, board characteristics, board structures, and decision-making processes. For the empirical analysis, except for the decision-making processes, five variables were selected in the areas of board compositions, board characteristics, and board structures. The board compositions include the authentically independent outside directors’ ratio, the grey directors’ ratio, and the inside directors’ ratio. The board characteristics also include the ratio of outsiders with former executive careers, and the ratio of directors over retirement age. The number of board committees and the leadership structure are considered as the indicators of the board structures. The empirical results of this study were as followed. The authentically independent outside directors’ ratio had a significant positive effect on R&D expenditure statistically. This result interpreted that the assurance of the board of directors’ independence made it possible to monitor the mangers’ decision-making for R&D investment effectively and efficiently, and then R&D expenditure increased. The grey directors’ ratio had a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically.It was regarded that the grey directors were unable to monitor managers effectively and efficiently due to the absence of substantial independence though they were classified into outside directors seemingly. The inside directors’ ratio had a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically, which meant that the inside directors were not effective and efficient in monitoring roles. The ratio of outsiders with former executive careers showed a significant negative effect on R&D expenditure statistically. As discussed in the social network theory, it seemed that social networking process among the directors made directors’ monitoring roles ineffective and inefficient though the directors were outsiders. This evidence shoul

금융회사 지배구조법에 관한 일고(一考)

정찬형 한국기업법학회 2017 企業法硏究 Vol.31 No.4

1. The Act of Financial Companies’ Governance structures(Law No.13453) (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) was promulgated on July 31, 2015 and is force from August 1st, 2016 in Korea. The Act does not harmonize with Korean Commercial Code(hereinafter referred to as “Code”) which is the fundamental law for Korean companies. The Act also contains contradictory provisions to each other, ambiguous regulations or stipulations against its purpose. 2. The important problems in the act are as followings. (1) The Act provides ‘executive managers’ as the executive organs of financial companies, but dose not stipulate their obligations, liabilities, and registrations, etc. (2) The Act provides that the board of a financial company should be composed in principle of three persons or more and a majority outside directors of total directors(so-called, supervisory board of directors). But the Act dose not provide that such financial company should adopt mandatorily executive officer system under the Code. Therefore, a financial company may adopt so-called executive board of directors. But it is cleary contradictory and also makes both functions of the administration(execution) and the supervision of the board of directors drop off that a financial company without executive officer system(namely, a financial company with executive boards of directors) should have a majority outside directors of total directors (supervisory board of directors). (3) The Act provides that a financial company in principle should have the audit committee which is one of the committees under the board of directors as auditing organ. But the members of audit committee should be appointed and removed by resolution of the shareholders’meeting in which the voting rights of certain shareholders are limited. The audit committee system is the system on the condition of supervisory board of directors with executive officer system under the Code. Therefore, it is clearly contradictory that a financial company without executive officer system(namely, executive board of directors) should have the mandatory audit committee. 3. I would propose followings for transparent and effective management of a financial company. (1) A financial company in principle should absolutely adopt the executive officer system under the Code. In other words, the Act should provide that a financial company should mandatorily adopt the executive officer system under the Code separated from board of directors. Such provision is harmonized with the provision of majority outside directors in board of directors. In this case, the provisions for executive managers in the Act should be deleted. (2) The members of the audit committee in a financial company should be appointed and removed not by the shareholders’ meeting but by the (supervisory) board of directors. For this purpose, the provision for appointing and removing members of the audit committee by shareholders’ meeting in the Act should be deleted. All members of the audit committee should be outside(independent) directors for more effective auditing to executive organ.

이사회 내 위원회 구성이 인적자원 및 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향

정금희,김유찬 한국경영교육학회 2013 경영교육연구 Vol.28 No.2

The roles of Board of Directors could be divided broadly into the two (i.e. monitoring and supporting the management), and these two roles should function in a balanced way. With respect to the composition of Board of Directors, prior studies heavily put their emphasis on the monitoring role of outside directors in the board. However, it is obviously beneficial to include inside directors in the board because they can sufficiently support managerial decision-making as insiders with the relevant information. A few of prior studies shed light on the role of inside directors in improving the firm performance. This study extended prior researches by examining board committee composition in specific decision contexts. The purpose of this study is to test the impact of board committee composition on the investment in human resources and research & development. The analysis in this paper was performed with firm-year observations from 2008 through 2010 listed on Korea Exchange. As a result, it was found that the proportion of inside directors on management committee and the proportion of outside directors on other supporting committee were statistically significantly associated with investment in human resources while the proportion of outside directors on audit committee was not statistically associated with investment in human resources. In addition, it was found that the proportion of outside directors on audit committee was statistically associated with investment in research and development while the proportion of inside directors on management committee and the proportion of outside directors on other supporting committee were not statistically associated with investment in research and development. These results indicate that more inside directors are needed when the board committee is organized for the decision for which the relevant information within a firm is required. This study has the implication for board committee composition in that it analyzes the board committee composition for the two specific decisions. It seems to be important that practitioners evaluate appropriately the role and the necessity of inside directors upon organizing board committees in Board of Directors. 이사회의 역할은 크게 감독기능과 경영지원기능으로 구분될 수 있다. 그리고 두 역할은 균형 있게 작동되어야한다. 이사회의 구성과 관련하여, 선행연구들은 사외이사가 수행하는 감독기능만을 지나치게 강조해 왔다. 그러나 이사회 내에 사내이사를 두는 것 역시 유익한 점이 있음이 분명하다. 왜냐하면, 그들은 목적 적합한 정보를 가진 내부자로서, 경영진의 의사결정을 충실하게 지원할 수 있을 것이기 때문이다. 몇몇 선행연구들은 기업성과의 개선이라는 측면에서 사내이사의 역할과 필요성에 주목했다. 본 연구는 연구개발과 인적자원 투자라는 구체적인 의사결정 상황에서 전문위원회의 구성을 논의함으로써, 선행연구의 틀을 확장하고자했다. 본 연구의 목적은 이사회 내 위원회의 구성이 인적자원 및 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향을 검정하는데 있다. 본 연구에서의 분석은 2008년부터 2010년까지 한국거래소에 상장된 주권상장법인의 기업-연도 관측치를 대상으로 수행되었다. 분석결과, 경영위원회 사내이사비율과 기타운영위원회 사외이사비율은 인적자원투자와 통계적으로 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났으나, 감사위원회 사외이사비율은 인적자원투자와 통계적으로 유의하지 않은 것으로 확인되었다. 또한, 감사위원회 사외이사비율은 연구개발투자와 통계적으로 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났으나, 경영위원회 사내이사비율과 기타운영위원회 사외이사비율은 연구개발투자와 통계적으로 유의하지 않은 것으로 확인되었다. 이러한 결과는 기업 내의 목적적합한 정보가 요청되는 의사결정에 대해 전문위원회가 구성될 경우, 보다 많은 사내이사가 요구된다는 점을 보여주는 것이라고 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 두 가지의 구체적 의사결정 상황에서 전문위원회의 구성을 분석하였다는 점에서 이사회 구성의 문제에 대한 함의를 제공한다. 실무자들은 이사회 내 위원회를 구성할 때, 사내이사의 역할과 필요성을 적절히 평가할 필요가 있을 것이다.

금융사지배구조법 시행 3년에 대한 평가 및 향후 제도 개선 방향

김홍기 ( Kim Hongki ) 한국금융법학회 2019 金融法硏究 Vol.16 No.3

우리나라는 2016년 8월 1일부터 은행법, 자본시장법, 보험업법 등 개별 금융법에 따라 실시되던 각종 금융회사의 지배구조에 관한 규제를 ‘금융사지배구조법’에서 통합 운영하고 있다. 이 글은 금융사지배구조법의 시행 3년에 즈음하여 그 성과를 평가하고 개선방안을 제시한 것이다. 공정하고 투명성이 더욱 중시되는 경영환경을 고려하면 금융사지배구조법은 아래와 같은 방향으로 개선할 필요가 있다. 첫째, 대주주의 변경승인이나 주기적 자격심사제도는 금융사지배구조법에서 규제하기 보다는 개별 금융업법에서 규제하는 것이 타당하다. 같은 내용을 진입단계에서는 개별 금융업법에서 인·허가 등으로 규제하고, 유지단계에서는 금융사지배구조법에서 대주주의 변경승인 등으로 따로 규제하는 것이 혼란스럽기 때문이다. 둘째, 금융회사의 이사회는 사외이사 위주로 구성하되, 과중한 업무부담을 줄이기 위해서는 1명의 사외이사는 3개 이상의 위원회 소속을 금지하는 것이 바람직하다. 이를 위해서는 법정 사외이사의 숫자를 3명에서 5명으로 늘릴 필요가 있다. 견제와 균형을 위해서는 이사회 의장과 최고경영자(CEO)는 분리할 필요가 있다. 이사회 구성원인 대표이사가 최고경영자를 겸직하는 경우에는 이사회의 기능이 유명무실해질 우려가 있기 때문이다. 사외이사회의를 실제 운영하려면 사외이사회의의 권한을 법률에서 분명하게 규정하여야 한다. 셋째, 감사위원의 독립성을 확보하려면 후보추천위원회 위원 전원을 사외이사로 구성할 필요가 있다. 지금처럼 감사위원 중 1명이 아니라 감사위원 전부를 주주총회에서 분리 선출할 필요가 있다. 감사위원의 자기감사를 방지하고 감사업무에 집중하려면, 경영과 감독을 분리하는 이원적 이사회나 집행임원 제도의 실시가 필요하다. 넷째, 효과적인 감독을 위해서는 다양한 재제수단과 충분한 재정 및 인력지원이 필요하다. 감독당국은 관치금융의 강화로 오해받지 않도록 금융회사와 국민경제를 위해 감독이 이루어지고 있다고 느낄 수 있도록 하여야 한다. Since August 1, 2016, Korea has integrated and regulated the governance regulation of various financial companies, which has been enforced under individual financial laws such as the Banking Act, Capital Markets Act and Insurance Business Act into Act on Financial Corporate Governance Act(FCGA). This article evaluates the results of FCGA 3 years and suggests ways to improve them. Given the fair and transparent management environment, the FCGA needs to be improved in the following directions. First, it is reasonable to regulate the approval of changes in large shareholders and/or the periodic examination of qualification for largest shareholders in the individual financial industry law rather than in FCGA. This is because it is confusing to regulate the same contents as the approval and permission in individual financial law at the entry stage, and to separately approve major shareholders in the financial and governance law at the maintenance stage. Second, the board of directors of financial companies should be mainly focused on outside directors. However, to reduce the heavy work burden, it is recommended that one outside director is prohibited from belonging to more than three committees. To this end, it is necessary to increase the number of statutory outside directors from three to five. For checks and balances, the chairman of the board and the CEO need to be separated. If the CEO, who is a member of the board of directors, also acts as the chief executive officer, the board's function may become obsolete. In order to actually operate an external board of directors, the power of the board of directors must be clearly defined in the law. Third, to secure the independence of the audit committee, all members of the nomination committee need to be outside directors. As of now, not all of the auditors need to be elected separately at the general shareholders' meeting. In order to prevent the auditors' self-audit and to focus on audit work, it is necessary to implement a dual board or executive system that separates management and supervision. Fourth, effective supervision requires a variety of financial instruments and sufficient financial and human resources support. Supervisors should ensure that supervision is being done for financial companies and the national economy so as not to be mistaken for strengthening government finance. three committees. To this end, it is necessary to increase the number of statutory outside directors from three to five. For checks and balances, the chairman of the board and the CEO need to be separated. If the CEO, who is a member of the board of directors, also acts as the chief executive officer, the board's function may become obsolete. In order to actually operate an external board of directors, the power of the board of directors must be clearly defined in the law. Third, to secure the independence of the audit committee, all members of the nomination committee need to be outside directors. As of now, not all of the auditors need to be elected separately at the general shareholders' meeting. In order to prevent the auditors' self-audit and to focus on audit work, it is necessary to implement a dual board or executive system that separates management and supervision. Fourth, effective supervision requires a variety of financial instruments and sufficient financial and human resources support. Supervisors should ensure that supervision is being done for financial companies and the national economy so as not to be mistaken for strengthening government finance.

이사회의 특성이 이익조정에 미치는 영향: 전직관료출신 이사를 중심으로

최정운 한국회계학회 2016 회계저널 Vol.25 No.2

This paper is to examine the relation between the board characteristic and earnings management (absolute value of discretionary accruals: ABDA). In particular, this paper focuses on former official directors and their backgrounds (bureaucrat born), such as Financial Supervisory Service (or The Bank of Korea, Fair Trade Commission; FSS), National Tax Service (NTS), Ministry of Justice (or Court of Korea, Prosecution Service, National Police Agency; MOJ), Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), Office of the President (BH), National Intelligence Service (NIS), Ministry of National Defence (including military officers; MND), Assembly (including the local assembly), Minister, Vice-Minister (excluding Ministers) and Deputy Commissioner (excluding Ministers and Vice-Ministers; Grade 3). The board of directors is the most important corporate governance in monitoring top management (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, the board characteristic has a significant impact on firms. So this paper focuses on whether the appointment of former official (bureaucrat born) director, carries out investigation into the board characteristic. Because the appointment of former official director is a possibility to affect firms’ earnings management when their abilities used to achieve individual objects of CEO or purposes of avoiding various regulations. Firms’ financial and board characteristic data are obtained from KIS-VALUE and TS2000 databases, between 2000 and 2013. Therefore, the final sample is 11,972 listed firm-years in Korea. In particular, to obtain information on the board characteristic and backgrounds (bureaucrat born), this study searched for the personal characteristic of director in TS2000 database (based on business reports). In 27,175 directors (including duplication and concurrent positions) from 2000 to 2013, this study collected backgrounds (bureaucrat born) of 4,688 director-years (excluding duplication). Of 11,972 firm-years, 3,507 firm-years had former official directors and this trend had been gradually increasing form 2000 to 2013. This situation is shown the need for this study empirically. Empirical results are as follow. Former official directors within the board are found to be a positive relationship between earnings management (ABDA). However, the relationship was a significantly negative if former official directors came from the economic sector. Specifically, relationships were negative if former official directors came from Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), National Tax Service (NTS) and Ministry of Justice (MOJ). As in the recent media concerns, these results mean that director appointment of former officials can affect on firms’ earnings management. Nevertheless, former official directors based on economic and legal sectors rather appeared to lower earnings management of firms, they mean that the effect is differentially showed according to their career. And they can be guessed that it is possible to select to backgrounds (bureaucrat born) of former official directors with the purpose of the firm. These empirical results indicate there is a possibility that former official directors are used for the purpose of avoiding the regulation authority. However, if their differentiated abilities by origin (background) can be properly utilized for the firm, they can be effectively used to monitor management. These points suggest policy implications for effective using to former official directors. But results of this study may contain some subject judgments and errors when to classify the detailed documentation such as backgrounds or careers of personal directors. This can be improve when the information related to the board of directors has been systematically disclosed. 본 연구는 이사회의 특성이 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 조사한다. 구체적으로 이사회를 구성하는 개별 이사의 전직관료출신 여부 및 세부 경력에 초점을 맞추어, 해당 특성이 기업의 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 조사한다. 특히 전직관료출신의 세부 경력을 경제관련 관료출신 뿐만 아니라, 금융감독원(한국은행, 공정거래위원회) 등과 국세청, 법무부(검찰 및 법원), 감사원, 청와대, 국가정보원, 국방부(군인 등), 국회의원(기초의원 포함)의 각 출신기관별로 구분하며, 동시에 장관급, 차관급, 3급 공무원 등의 최종직급으로 구분하여 구체적으로 조사한다. 이는 기업의 전직관료출신 이사선임에 대한 최근 언론의 우려를 실증적으로 조사하여, 정책적 시사점을 제공한다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 실증결과, 이사회 내 전직관료출신 이사의 포함여부는 해당기업의 이익조정과 유의한 양의 관계로 나타난 반면, 경제관료출신의 이사포함 여부와의 교호변수는 유의한 음의 관계로 나타났다. 구체적으로 금융감독원, 국세청, 법무부 등 출신의 이사포함 여부와의 교호변수는 이익조정과 유의한 음의 관계로 나타났으나, 최종 직급이 장관급 이상인 이사의 교호변수는 유의한 양으로 나타났다. 이는 전직관료출신 인원에 대한 이사선임 행태가, 최근 언론의 우려와 같이 이익조정을 증가하는 효과로 나타날 수 있음을 의미한다. 그러나 경제 및 법률에 근거한 감독기관 출신의 이사선임은 오히려 전직관료출신 이사선임의 이익조정 증가효과를 완화하는 것으로 나타나, 전직관료출신 이사선임의 효과가 그들의 경력에 따라 차별적으로 나타날 수 있음을 의미한다. 이러한 실증결과는 전직관료출신으로서 지닌 그들의 능력이 감독기관의 규제를 회피하는 등의 목적으로 사용될 가능성이 있음을 의미한다. 그러나 그들의 출신기관별 차별화된 능력이 이사 본연의 업무에 적절하게 활용된다면, 오히려 경영자 감시와 견제에 효과적으로 이용될 수 있다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 점은 전직관료출신의 기업진출에 대한 적절한 통제와 동시에, 효과적인 활용에 대한 정책적 시사점을 제시한다.