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      • KCI등재후보

        2009년 12월 11일 한양대학교 법학연구소 학술대회 : 「주요법 개정의 현황과 문제점」-민법, 형법, 상법, 개정의 쟁점과 관련하여- ; 집행임원제도하의 임원보수 규제방안 -미국 경기부양법(Stimulus Bill)상의 임원보수 제한규정을 중심으로-

        문상일 ( Sang Il Moon ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.27 No.1

        In this article, I analyze the executive compensation provision (§ 408-2(3)(6)) under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code, and demonstrate its shortcomings in order to effectively regulate the compensation for executive officers under the proposed executive officer system in Korea. I also introduce the U.S. regulations which has been recently promulgated as a part of TARP to prevent excessive payments to poorly performed executives in U.S. publicly-held corporations, such as EESA, ARRA, and CFA. Among these regulations, my article focuses on the compensation-related provisions under ARRA which is affecting most of the TARP recipients under the U.S. stimulus plan. According to the ARRA, corporations which received a significant taxpayer fund under the TARP, must observe stricter compensation policies mandated under the ARRA, such as prohibition of certain types of compensation -bonuses, retention awards, incentive compensation, golden parachutes and luxury expenditures-, improved compensation committee requirements, Say-on-Pay and compensation clawback. Among these requirements, Say-on-Pay policy has been considered most effective method to curtail excessive executive compensation practices. Specifically, in the wake of recent financial crisis and global economic crisis, the growing public criticism on the incessant upward trend of executive compensation demands more fundamental remedy to curb compensation problems. Recognizing that there are several systemic flaws in current compensation system, such as lack of linkage between compensation and performance, executive`s short-termism, and lack of director`s accountability to shareholders, shareholder activists as well as many politicians have suggested the adoption of Say-on-Pay policies. After a full discussion on the details of the executive compensation provision under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code (§ 408-2(3)(6)), I recommend that the Korean Commercial Code implement more detailed executive compensation provisions regarding compensation setting process and the disclosure of each executive`s detailed payments, not the total amounts paid to all directors and executives. In addition, after adopting a executive officer system in Korea, the Code should also maintain current compensation approval system in which shareholders should approve the compensation plan for directors with binding effect. Without the approval by shareholders, we may confront the same compensation crisis like the U.S. and Eurpope. Finally, I stress in this article that well-established executive compensation system would function as a fundamental basis to improve our corporate governance structure.

      • KCI등재

        A Review on the Relationship between A Ratio of Corporate Women Officers and Firm Performance

        Sang-Il, Moon(문상일) 한국기업법학회 2020 企業法硏究 Vol.34 No.1

        최근 기업지배구조 논의에 있어 중요한 주제 중 하나가 이사회 구성에 있어 여성이사비율을 확대함으로써 이사회의 기능을 제고할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 장기적으로 지배구조의 선진화를 도모할 수 있다는 것이다. 그 일환으로 이미 외국의 선진법제에서는 과거 여성처우에 대한 형식주의(Tokenism)에서 탈피해서 적극적으로 여성의 이사회 진출을 보장하기 위한 입법적 노력을 경주하고 있으며, 여성이사의 적극적 이사회 활동을 통해 이사회의 경영감독기능 및 의사결정기능을 제고함으로써 종국적으로 기업지배구조를 개선할 수 있는 효과를 기대할 수 있다고 보아 노르웨이를 비롯한 유럽 선진국은 여성이사할당제를 법제화하고 있다. 미국 역시 SEC 공시규칙을 통해 간접적으로 여성이사비율을 확대해 오다가 최근 캘리포니아 주에서는 SB 826을 정식으로 법제화함에 따라 일정 규모 이상의 상장기업은 의무적으로 법상 여성이사비율을 단계적으로 확보하도록 강제하고 있다. 반면, 아직 우리나라 법제에서는 이러한 논의조차 진행되지 않고 있어 지배구조 선진화작업에 커다란 장애요소가 되고 있다. 이러한 시각에서 이 논문에서는 이사회 구성의 다양성과 기업경영성과간의 상관관계에 관한 과거 선행연구 결과를 분석하고 긍정적 상관관계가 있다는 결론을 기초로 하여, 유럽을 비롯한 미국에서의 법제 도입 현황을 소개하고 국내 법제에의 시사점을 도출하였다. 특히, 세계에서 가장 먼저 본 제도를 법제화한 노르웨이의 40% 여서이사 할당제의 내용과 그 효과를 살펴보았고, 유럽뿐 아니라 미국에서의 도입논의 과정과 입법내용을 상세하게 소개하였다. 결론적으로 이러한 논의를 통해 국내 상장기업의 지배구조 개선작업의 일환으로 단계적 여성이사 할당제의 법제화가 필요하며, 이를 위한 구체적 논의가 요구된다는 점을 강조하였다. One of the most significant governance issues currently facing the corporate managers, directors, and shareholders is the gender composition of the board of directors. In the same context, the relationship between a ratio of corporate women officers and the firm’s performance also has taken on a high public attention as a result of reports in the popular press, shareholder proposals, and policy statements from major institutional investors in U.S. and European countries. Specifically, in recent years, boardroom gender diversity issue has become a key policy focus in many countries such as U.S., Norway, Spain, and French etc. In particular, Norway has enacted a gender regulation in 2003 requiring corporations to have 40 percent women directors by 2008. Spain passed a guideline in 2007 to encourage companies to increase the share of women directors to 40 percent by 2015. Also, French National Assembly proposed a law on January 20, 2010, in which imposed 20 percent gender quotas on boards of listed French companies within 3 years of the adoption of the law, and 40 percent quotas after 6 years. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands also have prepared similar regulations for enactment. Additionally, on September 30, 2018, California in U.S. became the first U.S. state to introduce a mandatory board gender quota for all companies headquartered in California. Before this enactment, in the U.S., support for diversity has grown in principle, but progress has lagged in practice, and most of controversy has focused on whether and why diversity matters. From this perspectives, this article seeks to evaluate the case for gender diversity on corporate boards of directors in order to develop corporate governance system in Korea. As a conclusion, despite the similarity of economic environment and governance regime to these developed countries, Korea has not yet implemented regulation which mandate female board seats in listed company. Thus, I recommend that policymakers and legislators in Korea should seriously consider the adoption of women allocation system on boards in the future.

      • KCI등재

        면세점 사업규제 현황과 개선방안에 관한 소고

        문상일 ( Sang-il Moon ),김혜림 ( Hye-lim Kim ) 한국유통법학회 2016 유통법연구 Vol.3 No.2

        2015년부터 국내 유통시장의 큰 이슈가 되었던 쟁점의 하나인 면세점 사업자에 대한 특허제도에 관한 현행법상 규제가 과연 국내 경제 전체의 이익에 부합하는 합리적이고 타당한 규제인지에 관해 이 논문에서는 주요 선진국들의 면세점 관련 정책과 법제를 비교분석함으로써 현행 국내법상의 규제적 문제점과 글로벌 면세점 유통시장에 미치는 부작용들을 지적하면서 향후 개선방안에 대해 고찰하였다. 특히 최근 국민경제의 장기침체 현상에 즈음하여 그나마 글로벌 경쟁력이 인정되어 왔던 국내 면세점 사업자에 대한 개정 관세법상 면세점 사업자에 대한 특허제도가 대기업에 대한 과잉규제로서 고용불안, 투자불안 등 여러 문제를 야기하고 있다는 점과 이로 인해 전체 국민경제에 심각한 부작용이 초래되고 있다는 측면에서 현행 사업자선정제도의 타당성 및 절차의 투명성 등의 문제들을 극복할 수 있는 몇 가지 규제개선방안들을 제시하였다. 면세점시장은 유통시장에서 중요한 한 축을 담당하고 있고 국민경제 활성화에도 많은 기여를 할 수 있는 시장임에도 불구하고, 현행 면세점 관련 정책들은 독과점구조 해소나 상생협력이라는 명문을 앞세워 면세점강국의 지위마저 위협하고 있는데, 지금과 같은 면세점 사업자에 대한 5년이라는 단기특허제도는 해외에서는 찾아 볼 수 없는 강력한 규제에 해당한다. 특히 정책당국에서 내세우는 세수확보나 공평과세 논리는 기존 사업자의 사업권을 다른 사업자에 넘겨주는 것에 불과하다는 측면에서 규제의 합리성을 안정하기 어려운 과잉규제에 해당한다. 사업불안정에 따른 투자축소, 글로벌화 지체, 고용불안 조장, 고비용사업비 부담, 과도한 특허수수료 등은 해당 기업의 주주이익을 침해함은 물론 소비자의 부담마저 증가시키는 부작용이 발생하게 되어 전체 국민경제의 후퇴를 초래할 위험성마저 있다. 이런 취지에서 이 논문에서는 국내 면세점 사업자의 글로벌 경쟁력을 제고하고 규제에 따른 부작용을 해소할 수 있는 방안으로 현행 면세점 관련 규제의 완화를 위해 사업자에 대한 특허제도의 폐지를 비롯해 사업기간의 연장, 합리적인 수수료 부과기준을 마련할 것을 제안하였다. Recently, the regulatory scheme regarding Korean duty-free shop has been one of the hotly debated issue in Korea, Under current regulations on duty-free shop, the operating party has to be approved from the government by getting patent license, Furthermore, the patent period is restricted under 5 years term, Due to these kind of strong regulatory restrictions, many licensees in Korea which has held strong competitiveness in global duty-free market are going through, From this perspective, this paper tries to figure out regulatory improvement plan finally in order for Korean business players acting in this field to recover their global competitiveness, First suggestion is abandonment of current patent licensing process similar to other competing countries, Furthermore, we recommend the extension of the business period in that currently approved period of 5 years is not fit to the duty-free shop business because the business requires in its characteristic of business long-term period investment, Finally, current business charging standard needs to be reformed to secure the rationality, Considering current economic crisis in Korea, the duty-free shop regulations need to be improved in order to mitigate the business parties`regulatory burdens, We are sure that this regulatory reform would also contribute the vitalization of Korean national economy in the future.

      • KCI등재

        대표이사 책임범위에 관한 최근 판례동향 -대법원 2010. 9. 30. 선고 2010도6490 판결을 중심으로-

        문상일 ( Sang Il Moon ) 한국상사판례학회 2012 상사판례연구 Vol.25 No.2

        Recently, one of the hotly debated issues in Corporate Law which has been dealt by Korean Supreme Court is the responsibilities of the Representative Director(in Korea, the Representative Director, the Chair of Board amounts to the CEO in U.S. Corporations, hereinafter ``CEO``). Additional issue with this is whether CEO can be charged with malfeasance in office in criminal perspectives. The reason of the increasing phenomenon regarding this kind of corporate action were mainly based on the growth of the modern corporations in our economy. Generally, the CEO has a wide range of corporate power & authorities to make a day to day business decisions as well as to manage her corporation by doing actual activities with third party. Korean Commercial Code has several provisions regarding the power and legal responsibilities of Corporate CEO. The legal rule is that the result of the CEO`s activities with third party should bind her corporation, but there are some exceptions in order to protect the corporation`s and its shareholder`s interests. One of the important exception among these is the case when the CEO abuses her representative power which is set by Law, corporate articles, and bylaws. In particular, however, the problem might be serious when the CEO exercise her power within the scope of her legal authority, but for the purposes of her own interests or other`s. In this case, the third party who did a business with the CEO could not figure out the CEO`s misuse of her authorities, so the result of the abusing activity should bind her corporation in order to protect her counterparty. However, Korean Supreme Court has denied the corporation`s liabilities in this case. From the perspectives to protect the reliability in business, in other words, to protect third party`s interests, I suggest the Korean Supreme Court to change its long-term position by removing the negligence element in deciding the invalidity of the transaction, which can also charge the CEO with malfeasance in criminal cases. Additionally, the definition of monetary ``damages`` in malfeasance in office should include damages derived from the depreciation of the corporation`s market share price, shareholders` monetary damages from the disclosure of the bad news as well as the infringement of corporation`s trade name which also can be regarded as property rights.

      • KCI등재

        미국법상 이사 의무론의 전개와 신의의무의 독자성

        문상일 ( Sang Il Moon ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2015 홍익법학 Vol.16 No.1

        Under U.S. corporate legal system, a corporate director, as a fiduciary for his corporations, generally owes a fiduciary duties, such as traditionally a duty of care and loyalty. Originally, most of director`s duties have been developed by the common law and then states` statutes and courts` decisions have dealt with this issues. The policy issue on director`s duty has focused on the fact that those who manage and control corporations need flexibility to make business decisions and take risks that hopefully will benefit the corporation and the shareholder. In addition, a company needs to attract outside directors which may be discouraged by shareholder litigation and the possibility of paying damages. In most situations, the interests of the directors and the shareholders are aligned because a successful business benefits both parites. However, inherently, there are times when directors will not act diligently or will seek to self-dealing unfairly. The debate over corporate director`s duty involve whether the director violates any kind of her duties and the extent to which the courts should scrutinize her transactions. Additionally, it has also been significantly debated on the detailed constituency of director`s fiduciary duty. Delaware legislation and case law developed a duty of good faith as a one of the triads of director`s duty concept. In Stone v. Ritter, decided in 2006 after the decision of Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that the fiduciary duty of good faith is a subsidiary component of the duty of loyalty. Until recently, the manner of this court decision has been maintained This article scrutinizes the historical background regarding the fiduciary duty for corporate directors based on the important court`s cases and Delaware`s corporate legislation. In sum, the academic achievement resulted from the director`s duty debates has significant developments in that such debates and case law identify the detailed contents and components of director`s duties. Such a result also may have a meaningful implication on the future debates regarding this issue in Korea.

      • KCI등재

        TV홈쇼핑산업 활성화를 위한 제도개선방안에 관한 소고

        문상일(Sang-Il Moon) 한국기업법학회 2016 企業法硏究 Vol.30 No.3

        1995년 시작한 국내 TV홈쇼핑 산업은 사업자에 대한 승인제를 유지하며 현재 7개 사업자가 국내·외 시장에서 활동하고 있다. 이러한 TV홈쇼핑산업은 TV라는 방송매체를 이용해 상품 등을 판매한다는 측면에서 공익성 우선이라는 방송적 측면과 상품 유통시장에서의 영리극대화를 추구하는 상행위를 영위한다는 점에서 방송산업과 유통산업이라는 두 가지 특성을 모두 가지는 독특한 영역에 해당한다. 특히 최근 들어서는 방송적 측면보다는 유통시장 참여자로서의 역할이 점차 중요성을 가지게 됨에 따라 현재와 같은 해당 산업에 대한 규율방식의 적절성 여부에 대해 재고할 필요가 강하게 되었다. TV홈쇼핑산업에서의 주된 규제방식은 제조납품업체, TV홈쇼핑사업자 및 채널플랫폼사업자 사이에서 발생하고 있는 시장참여자간의 이해관계를 행정수단을 이용해 조율하는 수준에 그치고 있는데, 이러한 규율방식은 최근 해당시장에서 도출되고 있는 각종 문제점들을 효율적으로 해결하기에는 충분하지 못하다. 이러한 시각에서 국가 정책적 차원에서 산업계의 상생협력의 중요성이 강조되는 상황에서 중소기업과 대기업간 상생협력, 콘텐츠사업자와 플랫폼사업자간의 상생협력, 납품업체와 TV홈쇼핑사업자간의 상생협력의 중요성이 날로 커지고 있고, 국내시장 포화 및 경기침체에 따라 TV홈쇼핑 시장의 해외시장 진출을 활성화 할 필요성이 대두되는 현 시점에서 국내 유통시장에서 큰 비중을 차지하고 있는 TV홈쇼핑산업을 활성화시킬 수 있는 새로운 정책방향을 수립하고, 더불어 TV홈쇼핑산업의 특수성을 고려해 이를 뒷받침 할 수 있는 체계적인 법제를 마련해야 할 필요성이 높다는 입장에서 본 논문에서는 먼저 국내 TV홈쇼핑 시장의 현황 및 사업자의 해외진출 동향을 살펴보고, 해당 산업의 국내 경제적 기능과 해당 시장에서의 제반 문제점들을 분석하였다. 이를 통해 마지막으로 TV홈쇼핑산업의 특수성을 고려하여 이러한 문제점들을 해결할 수 있는 제도개선방안으로서 특별법을 제정할 것을 제안하였다. TV Home shopping service of Korea started at 1995 by CJ and GS Home shopping which got the licence from the government. After then, 7 Home shopping companies has currently provided their services to consumers. Home shopping industry is a particular market because the market has mixed characteristics of the broadcasting and distributional market. From this characteristic, the MSIP(Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning) that has the authority to provide license for business, has suffered in regulating the business until recently. This paper suggests the reforming recommendation focusing on the distributional market player of the business toward the vitalization of the Home shopping industry and the national economy. Most of all, it suggests that the government enact the special regulation which may fix the inherent problems in the Home shopping industry. The regulation should include the provision to solve the market’s oligopoly structure, the provision for the business to advance the foreign market and the provision to support the Win-Win Partnership between the Large and small businesses. I also suggest that the MSIP implement the detailed reforming plan by the foundation of the new ‘TV Home Shopping Policy Department’which may has the exclusive rights to set the related policy. Through the reforming method I provided in this paper, the TV Home shopping industry and the small business in Korea would develop the coexistent cooperation relationship in the future.

      • KCI등재

        스톡옵션의 인센티브효과에 관한 고찰 : 미국의 옵션남용 사례를 중심으로

        문상일(Sang-Il Moon) 한국비교사법학회 2010 비교사법 Vol.17 No.2

        Stock-option plans have become one of the most important components of executive compensation packages of U.S. public corporations, currently accounting for over half of total executive compensation. Under the typical Stock-option plans, they provide grantees with the right to exercise their options and purchase the stock of their corporation at a predetermined exercise price. The rationale for granting Stock-options is to provide executives with retention incentives and incentives to create long-term corporate value as well as shareholders'. This rationale cannot, however, have been accomplished through several abusing methods of Stock-options as we can recognize from recent option backdating scandals and other abusing cases, such as Spring-loading and Option repricing. Several empirical studies have shown that these types of option practices would not create any incentives for corporate executives to improve corporate value, rather current practices provide them an incentive to focus only on maximization of their personal benefit at the expense of companies and shareholders. From this perspectives, this article analyze current option practices which is planned to serve executives' interests, not shareholders', and further discuss the limitations of current regulatory approach by U.S. governmental entities. In addition, I propose some recommendations which remedy above-mentioned problems derived from current option practices, which include as following; first, Executives should not be free to unload stock-options as soon as they vest. Rather, executives should be prohibited from cashing out their vesting options for a specified period of time after vesting; second, the timing of option awards to top executives should not be discretionary. Rather, such awards should be made only on pre-specified dates. third, executives should be required to announce their intention to cash out their vested shared in advance, and corporations should implement certain policies in which allow executives to sell their shares only gradually to the market. Finally, all these debates and my proposals are worth to consider in Korea because the regulations and their contents regarding Stock-Options under Korean Commercial Code are similar to those of U.S.

      • KCI등재

        이사보수 개별승인제도의 도입필요성에 관한 연구

        문상일 ( Sang Il Moon ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2014 法學硏究 Vol.24 No.2

        This paper intends Section 388 of Korean Commercial Code to be revised from current Shareholder approval system on total amount of director compensation to separate approval system as like U.S. Say-on-Pay system. As widely known, since the recent financial crisis, many developed countries, such as U.S. and U.K. etc, have tried to change their compensation regulations toward increasing shareholder intervention power into compensation setting process and board of directors’ decision making process on compensation. As the result of such regulatory efforts, the Dodd-Frank Act of U.S., which took effect July 21, 2010, mandated all public companies listed in U.S. securities market to adopt shareholders’ advisory vote on executive compensation plans. Many corporate scholars have said that his method will be more effective one to curve excessiveness of executive compensation along with SEC’s disclosure rules. Against these trends of other countries, in Korea, most of current regulatory effort to address excessive compensation problems has been focusing on disclosure method under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act. However, such an approach cannot sufficiently achieve its regulatory purpose. From this perspectives, I suggest to revise Section 388 of KCC in order for corporate shareholder to input their influence on board of directors in the compensation setting process. By regulatory shifting to separate approval system on compensation, which means changes from ex-ante regulatory approach to ex-post regulation, I might expect shareholders’ monitoring function in compensation setting process would be effectively increased. In addition, corporate board or top managements might also try to make a proper decision on their directors’ compensation level.

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