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한 · 일과거사 청산과 이행기 정의(transitional justice) 개념의 적용
최철영(Choi, Cheol-Young) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2011 성균관법학 Vol.23 No.2
According to conventional wisdom, the age of empire is over, and the global community exists now in an era of post-colonialism characterized in part by a peaceful relationship of nation-sates and peoples. However, this view is grounded in a wishful historicism. It might be more accurate to say that remnants of colonialism still exist social, political and economic relationships, especially in the current period between Korean and Japanese because of the war crimes of Japan during the World War Ⅱ. The intent of this article is to provide a quasi-judicial institution, the truth commission of two-state parties, on the basis of transitional justice. This kind of hybrid tribunals may offer real potential as a means to facilitate recovery from national feud between Korea and Japan based on the grave violation of human rights such as an act of sexual slavery toward Korean women by Japanese army before and during World War Ⅱ. This argument proceeds in part two with a evolution of the notion of transitional justice and its grounds of legal philosophy. Part three describes the limits of Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the realization of justice. The Tokyo International Military Tribunal failed to throughly address Japanese war crimes in terms of the failure of punishment of the Japanese King Hirohito. As a conclusion, this article suggests to introduce the Truth and Reconciliation Commission between Korea and Japan for the Japanese War Crimes(TRC Korea-Japan) as a transitional justice mechanism. The TRC Korea-Japan will contributes to rebuild the relationship between the two countries and can offer victims the opportunity to share their experience during the war and to recognize the accountability of war crimes toward Japanese Government. This kind of hybrid tribunal has been preceeded by East Timor and Indonesia as a form of the Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-Timor-Leste.
로마법상 무주지(terra nullius) 개념과 실효적 지배를 통한 국가영역획득
최철영(Choi Cheol- Young) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2014 성균관법학 Vol.26 No.1
The most general and definite way of territorial acquisition is the physical occupation to terra nullius based on the discovery. It is known as effective control. The doctrine of effective control, however, is still dispositive of many contemporary disputes over territory. Although the importance of acquiring title through actual physical possession, as opposed to symbolic acts or discovery, has long been recognized, if the term is interpreted as underscoring that the "occupation" must be real and physical possession of the territory in question, not hypothetical possession based on symbolic acts and animus occupandi, it could not play a role as legal criteria to solve territorial disputes because parties of the most territorial dispute cases argue their claim on ancient imprecise documents. Doctrinally, the single most important factor of legal title to land is a "consistent," "actual," "peaceful," and "physical" exercise of power over it. To the extent that simple de facto possession of a particular area is a good in itself, absence of legal title is of diminished importance. In contrast, to the extent that one wishes to gain legal interests in the area one occupies, it is important to have de jure rights as well as physical possession. This article emphasizes that different levels of state activities are appropriate for different types of territory: minimal levels of government activity may be enough to demonstrate sovereignty over the areas which is uninhabited and departed long distance from main land. And when it comes to international legal arena, international tribunals will compare the degree of effective occupation as a sovereign authority demonstrated by each claimant to reach a result. This Kind of balancing test seems to be preferred method of international tribunals and will probably carry the day against contrary arguments based on confusing historical ancient documents.
미국의 UN참여법과 미군의 6.25전쟁 참전의 합법성문제
崔哲榮(Choi Cheol Young) 미국헌법학회 2010 美國憲法硏究 Vol.21 No.3
1950년 6.25 전쟁 당시 미국 대통령이었던 트루먼은 유례없이 신속하게 미군을 한국 6.25전쟁에 파병하였다. 당시 트루먼 대통령은 파병의 근거로 UN안보리의 결의와 미연방헌법에 의한 미군의 최고사령관으로서의 지위 그리고 대통령의 경찰권을 제시하였다. 하지만 미군의 신속한 한국파병은 미국의 국내법인 UN참여법(UN Participation Act)의 위반이라는 논란이 제기되었다. 이글은 제2장에서 트루먼 대통령이 파병의 근거로 제시한 UN안보리의 결의내용에 대한 정확한 분석을 기초로 법적 검토를 하였다. 제3장에서는 미국의 한국 6.25참전 결정의 국내법적 근거인 1945년 UN참여법에 대한 미국 의회에서의 논의 분석과 법적 평가를 통해 미국의 6.25 무력충돌 참전 행위에 대한 미국 국내법적 시각에서의 평가를 시도하였다. 트루먼 대통령은 국제연합 안전보장이사회에서 통과된 결의를 한국전에 미군을 파병하는 법적 근거로 인용하였다. 하지만 트루먼 대통령은 UN참여법의 명백한 규정과 입법연혁을 위반하였다. 트루먼 대통령이 의회의 동의없이 UN의 결의라는 명분으로 한국에 군대를 파병한 것은 특별협정을 무시한 결과이다. 어떠한 대통령의 군사적 조치도 사전에 의회의 동의를 얻도록 하는 수단으로서 특별협정을 체결하지 않음으로서 대통령의 일방적 명령으로 미군을 한반도에 파병한 것이다. 미국의 한국 6.25전쟁 파병과 관련하여 UN의 결의가 의회의 승인행위를 대신 할 법적 근거로 이용될 수 있는가 하는 문제는 매우 중요하다. 만약 가능하다면 대통령과 미국의 상원은 전쟁문제에 있어 하원의 참여 및 결정권이라는 헌법적 역할을 배제한 헌법상의 조약절차를 이용할 수 있게 된다. 이러한 논리에 따르면 대통령과 상원은 조약절차를 통하여 무역과 관세에 관한 문제에 대하여도 하원의 헌법상 권능을 우회하여 UN의 결의에 직접 근거하여 조치를 취할 수 있게 된다. UN의 역사는 아주 명백하게 미국의 입법부 및 행정부의 모든 당사자들이 UN의 결의에 따른 군사력 사용결정이 의회의 상원과 하원 모두의 승인을 사전에 필요로 하는 것으로 이해하고 있음을 보여주고 있다. In June 1950, U.S. President Truman quickly ordered U.S. troops to Korea without congressional authority. For legal footing he cited resolusions which are passed by the UN Security Council, the constitutional status of Commander-in-Chief and the policing power of U.S. President. This action still stands as the single most important precedent for the executive use of military force without first requesting congressional authority. This article examines the legality of President Truman’s decision of U.S. action, in terms of both the U.S. Constitution and the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, which set up the procedure for making American forces available in response to requests by the the UN Security Council. The Korean War case illustrates that when participating states of UN military action seek to escalate warfare in a manner that leads a major change in the political or military objectives that the UN Security Council intended to authorize, they should obtain new authorization and not rely on ambiguous language in the original resolution. A change in objectives causes grave risks of widening the war, a risk that turned out in Korea. Hence, UN Security Council resolutions must be interpreted to authorize what was clearly intended. The history of the UN shows that all parties in the legislative and executive branches understood that the decision to use military force through the UN required prior approval from both Houses of Congress.