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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : ( Alexandre Y Mansourov ) (검색결과 9 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
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Mercantilism and Neo-Imperialism in Russian Foreign Policy during President Putin`s 2nd Term
( Alexandre Y Mansourov ) 한국국방연구원 2005 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.17 No.1
This article makes the argument that 2004 was a good year both for Russia and for President Putin. Russian national power was measurably enhanced, and the Kremlin`s grip on all aspects of Russian public and private life was further strengthened. Russia largely improved its strategic position in the global environment thanks to internal mobilization of economic resources and political restructuring, favorable external trade conditions, skillful alliance-making, and diplomatic bargaining. Moscow was keen to penetrate the Oriental halls of power and Asian markets in order to use them as a geopolitical and geo-economic leverage against its exposure to and pressure from the United States and Europe. In Asia, President Putin seems to have chosen to give up space in exchange for time and money needed to rebuild the Russian empire. In general, Moscow is adept at pursuing the "divide and rule" strategy and playing all against all. President Putin repositioned Russia in Asia in such a way that Moscow, with its neo-imperial ambitions, is again seen as a ruthless power-balancer and a legitimate and tough contender in its own right for political influence and economic benefits in any power vacuum situation left open by the United States. The author concludes that Putin`s Russia is stronger today than ever, but he questions whether it makes the world a better and safer place.
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Kim Jong Un’s First 500 Days: Consolidating Power and Clearing Political Space for National Revival
Alexandre Mansourov 통일연구원 2013 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.22 No.1
This article assesses the leadership changes in North Korea since Kim Jong Un assumed power after Kim Jong Il’s death on December 17, 2011. The first part addresses three fundamental questions: who really governs the country, how stable is the current North Korean regime, and what lies over the horizon for the leadership transition? Part two analyzes key dynamics within the Kim family, including the rising influence of Kim Jong Un’s uncle Jang Song Thaek and the emergence of Kim’s wife, Ri Sol Ju as a factor in family politics, as well as the regime’s efforts to preserve and modernize the Kim monarchy. The article will also discuss how the regime seeks to strengthen the socialist party-state, reinvigorate the party’s central leadership institutions, tighten the party’s control over mass public organizations, and watchfully manage the party’s center-periphery relations. Part three analyzes the main drivers and direction behind Kim Jong Un’s transformation of the legacy government he inherited from his father, focusing on his overhaul of the national security establishment and party-military relations, restructuring of the socio-economic team, and adjustment of the foreign policy team.
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NORTH KOREA’S ROAD TO THE ATOMIC BOMB
Alexandre Mansourov 통일연구원 2004 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.13 No.1
Despite its considerable age, the DPRK’s nuclear program has progressed slowly and has accomplished relatively little since its inception in the mid-1950s. All major breakthroughs in the nuclear field seem to have been achieved either as a result of official foreign technology transfers (for instance, from the former Soviet Union, China, and Pakistan) or on the basis of stolen foreign blueprints and reverse-engineering, rather than indigenous research and development efforts. Whenever the North Korean leaders experienced some insurmountable difficulty in overcoming the opposition from a foreign government to its nuclear expansion plans, they just patiently waited and waited until eventual regime change in the hostile foreign land brought a new friendlier government in power that was willing to satisfy their nuclear requests. But, the on-again off-again development of the DPRK’s nuclear program under the gathering clouds of international suspicion about the strategic intentions of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il could do little but exacerbated the energy crisis and put in jeopardy the country’s national survival, by alienating the world community and inviting near-unanimous international condemnation and openended sanctions. The making of the ultimate weapon, the Atomic Bomb, requires the ultimate aggregate national power to succeed, which North Korea does not possess at present. North Korea may never become an internationally recognized nuclear weapon state, even despite its strong political will and single-minded determination to pursue the nuclear Holy Grail, absolute individual sacrifice for the sake of the government, and glorious self-image of the day as being “the great prosperous powerful nation.” Despite its considerable age, the DPRK’s nuclear program has progressed slowly and has accomplished relatively little since its inception in the mid-1950s. All major breakthroughs in the nuclear field seem to have been achieved either as a result of official foreign technology transfers (for instance, from the former Soviet Union, China, and Pakistan) or on the basis of stolen foreign blueprints and reverse-engineering, rather than indigenous research and development efforts. Whenever the North Korean leaders experienced some insurmountable difficulty in overcoming the opposition from a foreign government to its nuclear expansion plans, they just patiently waited and waited until eventual regime change in the hostile foreign land brought a new friendlier government in power that was willing to satisfy their nuclear requests. But, the on-again off-again development of the DPRK’s nuclear program under the gathering clouds of international suspicion about the strategic intentions of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il could do little but exacerbated the energy crisis and put in jeopardy the country’s national survival, by alienating the world community and inviting near-unanimous international condemnation and openended sanctions. The making of the ultimate weapon, the Atomic Bomb, requires the ultimate aggregate national power to succeed, which North Korea does not possess at present. North Korea may never become an internationally recognized nuclear weapon state, even despite its strong political will and single-minded determination to pursue the nuclear Holy Grail, absolute individual sacrifice for the sake of the government, and glorious self-image of the day as being “the great prosperous powerful nation.”
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North Korea Stressed: Life on the Hamster Wheel
Alexandre Y. Mansourov 통일연구원 2005 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.14 No.2
In the past decade, Kim Jong Il succeeded in achieving his foremost goal his regime survived, augmented its power capabilities, and is taken seriously by the international community. From the viewpoint of a traditional Korean frog that sees the world only from the bottom of a deep well (“umuranui kkaegurri”), North Korea’s position today may look much stronger both at home and abroad. Pyongyang has few incentives to cooperate or improve relations with the United States because the second Bush Administration is expected to continue to act as the “American empire of evil,” pursuing a “hostile” policy aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime. The DPRK government publicly shifted its stance from a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to a policy of “strategic clarity” with respect to the country’s possession of nuclear weapons in order to cope with the perceived “threat of a US preemptive nuclear strike.” Kim Jong Il’s regime will never give up its newly obtained nuclear credentials and agree to “CVID” or “do a Kaddafi” with respect to its elusive nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang may have decided to turn the clock back to the pre-1991 situation in its relations with the United States, by refraining indefinitely from any substantive contacts with Washington, whipping up anti-American sentiment, and concentrating on enhancing its security through economic restructuring and mobilization of internal military deterrent capabilities, as well as improvement of bilateral relations with its traditional allies and new partners in the region. In the past decade, Kim Jong Il succeeded in achieving his foremost goal his regime survived, augmented its power capabilities, and is taken seriously by the international community. From the viewpoint of a traditional Korean frog that sees the world only from the bottom of a deep well (“umuranui kkaegurri”), North Korea’s position today may look much stronger both at home and abroad. Pyongyang has few incentives to cooperate or improve relations with the United States because the second Bush Administration is expected to continue to act as the “American empire of evil,” pursuing a “hostile” policy aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime. The DPRK government publicly shifted its stance from a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to a policy of “strategic clarity” with respect to the country’s possession of nuclear weapons in order to cope with the perceived “threat of a US preemptive nuclear strike.” Kim Jong Il’s regime will never give up its newly obtained nuclear credentials and agree to “CVID” or “do a Kaddafi” with respect to its elusive nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang may have decided to turn the clock back to the pre-1991 situation in its relations with the United States, by refraining indefinitely from any substantive contacts with Washington, whipping up anti-American sentiment, and concentrating on enhancing its security through economic restructuring and mobilization of internal military deterrent capabilities, as well as improvement of bilateral relations with its traditional allies and new partners in the region.
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