Russia`s Approach to Nonproliferation

( Stephen Blank ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2010 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.15 No.2

This article questions the presupposition of the Obama Administration that not only does the US need Russia to achieve nonproliferation outcomes in North Korea and Iran, but also that Russian policy on nonproliferation converges with that of the United States. The essay examines Russia`s policy towards these two proliferation issues and finds that while there are points of accord with Washington, Moscow follows a very different calculus of interests that in many ways is opposed to if not antithetical to the US policy. As a result this finding calls into question the validity of the Administration`s thinking.

Russia, China and the Arctic: Birth of an Alliance?

Stephen Blank 동아시아재단 2022 Global Asia Vol.17 No.2

Liberalism’s Puzzle: The Russo-Chinese Alliance in the Light of Russian Aggression against Ukraine

( Stephen Blank ) 한국국방연구원 2022 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.34 No.4

Sino-Russian relations evidently present a puzzle or quandary to foreign observers. In the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, China has opted decisively to offer Russia limited but substantial political and informational support. But it has continued joint drills and exercises with Russia. The argument presented here states initial that despite an equivocation, these actions reveal that this relationship amounts to a de facto alliance of the two governments. The article begins with an analysis of China’s reaction to the war in Ukraine, proceeds to discuss the issue of the nature of this relationship and the view that it is an alliance, and then proceeds to discuss the benefits of this alliance to both sides in regard to their defense industrial sectors and for China in regard to Taiwan.

Is the Northern Alliance Making a Comeback? Do Russia, China and North Korea Constitute An Alliance?

Stephen Blank 한국국방연구원 2019 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.31 No.2

In light of a second Kim–Trump summit this article reviews the posture of Russia and China and suggests that not only do they have an alliance but that it also includes to some degree North Korea. Moscow and Beijing have endorsed Pyongyang’s negotiating posture and much evidence suggests a Russo–Chinese alliance, albeit an informal one. Such an alliance possesses immense implications for the ongoing efforts to nd a negotiated path out of the Korean nuclearization crisis and for regional security in general. But in the meantime the advent of such an alliance imparts a quality of regional bipolarity to the Northeast Asian security agenda that could obstruct further progress towards peace.

A (Multi) Polar Bear? Russia’s Bid for Influence in Asia

Stephen Blank 동아시아재단 2012 Global Asia Vol.7 No.2

Whither the new great game in Central Asia?

Stephen Blank 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2012 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.3 No.2

This paper represents an assessment of the present great game or new great game in Central Asia among the major external and internal political actors three. It finds that the game is probably intensifying and at the same time serves the purposes of Central Asian governments in helping them preserve domestic security. Thus the foreign rivalry serves multiple and paradoxical purposes. On the one hand states like Russia and China pursue great power aggrandizement and even neo-imperial policies there and on the other hand Central Asian states attach themselves to these countries in the hope of obtaining resources form them with which to augment their independence. At the same time as the United States announces its impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is already evident that the rivalry among the other major actors is heating up. Moscow is pursuing military bases the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of members of the CSTO and its customs union and China is strengthening its commercial primacy in the area. And while all this is occurring simultaneously we see concern over succession issues in several states, the possibility of something resembling the Arab spring occurring, an outcome that greatly alarms Russian, Chinese, and local leaders, and of course, the uncertain prognosis in Afghanistan. Thus the international competition within and around Central Asia is likely to intensify.

The Arctic and New Security Challenges in Asia

Stephen Blank,김연규 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2013 Pacific Focus Vol.28 No.3

The most under-reported aspect of the Arctic’s growing importance is its impact upon Asia’s international relations. There is an enormous need for energy due to the rise of China and other Asian countries as the most dynamic region of the global economy. The introduction of the Arctic into the Asian equation could enhance Russia’s role. This article explores a process of interaction between the Arctic and Northeast Asian issues, like Sino–Russian relations, and between the Arctic and Southeast Asian issues, like the struggles over the South China Sea. In Southeast and Northeast Asia, local governments from South Korea to India are all building up their fleets. We can also see a generalized trend in tying fleet construction to missions connected with the defense of energy sources or of energy transit through international and national waters.

Russia’s Strategic Dilemmas in Asia

Stephen Blank 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2008 Pacific Focus Vol.23 No.3

Russia sees itself and wants to be seen as a great Asian power playing a major role in East Asian security. The main and perhaps only instrument for this is its energy resources which it hopes to convert into a means for economic and infrastructural development as well as defense reconstruction in the Far East. However, it is not keeping pace either in energy shipments to Asia or in internal reconstruction and is failing to redress its strategic economic problems. Neither is it fully able to cope with the challenges of hostility to America and the problems posed by Korean proliferation and a rising China’s economic and military capabilities. Though it may be flush with energy money today, these shortcomings and intractable problems do not augur well for Russia realizing its ambitions.

Outsourcing Korea

( Stephen Blank ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2006 Pacific Focus Vol.21 No.1

The Six-party agreement on North Korea`s nuclear program on September 19-20, 2005, despite its insistence upon an end to North Korea`s nuclear activities, is in reality a major sign of significant regional trends that betoken a significant loss of U.S. power over the issues connected with security on the Korean peninsula. This agreement represents the first tangible outcome of the growing distancing of the ROK and the United States, and thus the fraying of their alliance. It also signifies a major diplomatic triumph for China which has forged an apparent alliance with Russia against American policy in Northeast Asia and is becoming increasingly closer to South Korea on issues relating to the Korean peninsula`s security, than America. This agreement could thus represent a milestone in China`s efforts to multilateralize security on the peninsula and effectuate a corresponding reduction in U.S. power in Asia. This outcome owes much to the American failure to understand and take account of regional dynamics, namely, that to be an effective player here one must have a relationship with North Korea. It also stems form the excessive partisan politicization of this issue in Congress and the Bush Administration`s inability to overcome its unilateral and moralizing tendencies to forge a coherent policy among all branches of the government. Indeed, Washington spurned its interlocutors` pleas to engage North Korea directly, an engagement that would have allowed it to retain the preponderant position vis-a-vis Korean security issues that it has enjoyed since 1953. Although these talks are hardly concluded and the outcome remains uncertain, even somewhat precarious, it is clear that the prospects for a new security system in Northeast Asia, built at Washington`s expense are very much in sight.

Restarting the Six-Party Talks: Russia’s Dilemmas and Current Perspectives

Stephen Blank,김연규 한국학술연구원 2012 Korea Observer Vol.43 No.2

The stagnation of the six-party process has produced great anxiety in Russia over the future of the Korean peninsula. Indeed, in September 2010, even before the attack on Yeonpyeong and the announcement of a uranium enrichment facility, Moscow’s representative to the sixparty talks stated that Korea was on the brink of war. This anxiety reflects that perhaps Russia, of the external non-Korean members of the six-party process, has the most to lose. Russia lacks leverage on any other power and confronts the danger of marginalization. War would only aggravate all its concerns and derail any hope of developing the Russian Far East, a development that is the precondition for an effective Russian presence in Asia. For these reasons Russia,perhaps more than any other country, shows the greatest anxiety about the developing trends on the Korean peninsula.