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Educated but poor: Explaining localized ethnic violence during Indonesia’s democratic transition
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2013 International Area Studies Review Vol.16 No.1
A sudden outbreak of a series of ethnic violence in Indonesia is linked to the country’s critical juncture of embarking on the transition towards democracy and adopting a decentralized polity. While the critical juncture is experienced by the country as a whole, ethnic violence is locally concentrated. This paper looks at the ingredients of the deadly mixture at the district level by examining the grievance and greed explanations of ethnic violence. It conceptualizes and operationalizes across-district measures of relative deprivation. The empirical results show the presence of relative deprivation-related grievance, in the sense of ‘being educated but still poor’. Education raises people’s expectations about earnings and welfare. Failure to realize their expectations leads to a sense of deprivation. The study finds no empirical evidence that the greed of local elites competing for the expected future value of state resources at the local level leads to inter-ethnic violence.
Ashutosh Varshney,Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin,Rizal Panggabean 동아시아연구원 2008 Journal of East Asian Studies Vol.8 No.3
Indonesia has witnessed explosive group violence in recent years, but unlike its plentiful economic statistics, the data on conflict are remarkably sketchy. Because the New Order (1966–1998) wanted to give the appearance of order and stability, it did not believe in publishing reports on group conflict, nor did it allow researchers and nongovernmental organizations to probe the patterns and causes of conflict. This article is based on the first multiyear dataset ever constructed on group violence in Indonesia. Following, and adapting for Indonesian conditions, methodologies developed and used elsewhere, we cover the years 1990–2003, split the data into various categories, and identify the national, regional, and local patterns of collective violence. Much that we find is surprising, given the existing theories and common perceptions about violence in Indonesia. Of the several conclusions we draw, the most important one is that group violence in Indonesia is highly locally concentrated. Fifteen districts and cities (kabupaten and kota), in which a mere 6.5 percent of the country's population lived in 2000, account for as much as 85.5 percent of all deaths in group violence. Large-scale group violence is not as widespread as is normally believed. If we can figure out why so many districts remained reasonably quiet, even as the violent systemic shifts—such as the decline of the New Order—deeply shook fifteen districts causing a large number of deaths, it will advance our understanding of the causes of collective violence in Indonesia.