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- 저자 : Justin V. Hastings (검색결과 2 건)
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Informal Trade along the China-North Korea Border
Justin V. Hastings,Yaohui Wang 동아시아연구원 2018 Journal of East Asian Studies Vol.18 No.2
Why do Chinese traders along the China–North Korea border turn to informal trade, and what does it provide for them? Using a unique set of interviews with Chinese formal and informal traders operating in North Korea, we argue that the strategies of informal trade are a calculated response to certain types of risk. In doing so, we introduce a typology of risks and the mechanisms by which informal trade allows traders to mitigate those risks. Because informal traders bypass trade regulations and border checkpoints, they are able to mitigate risk more cheaply than formal traders in some cases and can overcome barriers that can cause failure in formal trade. Informal traders can thus maintain trade in many circumstances, including across North Korean personnel instability and policy reversals, Chinese sanctions enforcement, and delays and smuggling crackdowns on both sides of the border.
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North Korea’s Lithium Research Networks and its Quest for a Hydrogen Bomb
( Justin V. Hastings ),( Haneol Lee ),( Robert Kelley ) 한국국방연구원 2018 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.30 No.3
North Korea claims to have detonated a hydrogen bomb twice as of 2017. While any North Korean claim should be greeted with skepticism, it is important to assess whether North Korea actually has the technical capacity to deliver on its claims. If North Korea believes that it has the capacity to build a hydrogen bomb, this is likely to color its behavior and its negotiating strategy with the United States and other countries. Using new data about research subject areas and co-authoring networks taken from North Korean academic journals, we can gain entree into the opaque North Korean scientific establishment, and the progress (or lack thereof) it has made in processes related to the development of different types of nuclear weapons. We argue that a core group in North Korea has long had an interest in scientific research on lithium industrial processes that would be relevant to hydrogen bombs, although with detours. This interest has been ongoing since the mid-1990s, and peaked several years before North Korea’s first claimed hydrogen bomb test. Based on this assessment, it is within North Korea’s capability to produce a boosted fission device, and possibly a two-stage thermonuclear device. As a result, we conclude that North Korea is likely not bluffing when it says that its nuclear program has reached maturity.
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