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최의현 ( Eui Hyun Choi ),요순 ( Shun Yao ) 한중사회과학학회 2013 한중사회과학연구 Vol.11 No.3
Loan platforms set up by local governments are doing a construction business with financial loans from banks instead of government themselves. Loan platforms can be classified by unit model, multi model and 1+N model. Some studies argued Shanghai model, Chongqing model and Sichuan model etc., however we cannot classified over Chinese ten thousands platforms into several name of cities. The unit model is a common type of loan platform and would set up by any level of local government regardless their size. Also it has low debt ratio and low possibility making bad loans. Multi model is suitable method for big cities which want to do operating large projects. A local government set up lots of construction companies and operates many projects in same time. However in this type is easily making bad loans like Chongqing case. Final type of loan platform is called 1+N model. In case of local government do not have enough budget to do multi projects in the same time, it set up a control tower platform and make several specific construction companies. This control tower platform mixed profitable projects and unprofitable public projects to borrowing money from bank for passing the loan screening of bank. So in this type can make more non-performing loan than other types.
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최의현 ( Eui Hyun Choi ),요순 ( Shun Yao ),이지 ( Zhi Li ) 현대중국학회 2013 現代中國硏究 Vol.14 No.2
2008년 금융위기 이후 중국정부는 성장전략을 수출주도형에서 내수주도형으로 전환하였다. 내수경제의 부양을 위해 중앙정부는 덜 발전된 내륙지역을 발전시켜야 했고, 이 과정에서 지방정부의 역할이 중요해 졌다. 하지만, 경기부양 정책을 사용하기에는 충분한 재정여력을 갖지 못한 중국 지방정부는 융자플랫폼이란 조직을 만들어 은행 대출을 이용한 투자 확대 정책을 사용하게 된다. 융자플랫폼은 지방정부 산하의 국유기업으로 정부를 대신하여 고정자산투자를 집행하는 기관이다. 그런데 융자플랫폼의 투자에는 수익성 투자도 있지만, 정부가 응당 행해야할 사회간접자본 건설 투자도 상당부분 포함되어 있어 투자의 효율성이 떨어진다는 지적을 받고 있다. 본 연구에 따르면 2011년 기준으로 융자플랫폼의 부실대출 비율은 연간 은행 신규대출의 1.5∼4.8% 정도로 추산된다. 전체 규모가 아직 큰 편은 아니지만, 융자플랫폼이 본격적으로 설립 된지 2∼3 밖에 되지 않은 점을 고려하면 향후 지방발 금융부실화 가능성을 배재하지 않을 수 없다. 융자플랫폼의 설립 목적이 내수경기 부양에 있지만, 만일 지방에서의 투자가 효율성을 잃게 된다면 중국 경제에 심각한 부정적인 영향을 줄 수도 있다. Since global financial crisis in 2008, Chinese government has tried to change their economic development policy from export-led growth to domestic demand-driven growth. For the boosting domestic market, central government needs to push less developing inland regions. Local governments should undertake as key players to drive their economies under this macro policy. Generally Chinese local government are struggling under the budget constriction, so they set up loan platforms as sub-companies for boosting their fixed investment and economy instead of themselves. According to this research, the level of bad loan would become 1.5%∼4.8% (based on 2011) of the annual fresh loan in the banking sector. The amount of bad loan would occupy a small potion comparing to the volume of total banking loan because the loan from loan platform has occurred just 2 or 3 years ago and central government hardly allowed the local level loans until now. Therefore, if Chinese central government manages the loan of local loan platform more strictly, local government could easily avoid the default situation. China can strategically use a loan platform as a trigger to motivate their growth engine in a short term. However, Chinese government would approve the loan schemes indiscreetly when the Chinese economy do not revive as fast as they expected, the fiscal soundness of local government might be worsened.
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