한민족문학' 연구 현황과 전망

신경득 韓國批評文學會 1996 批評文學 Vol.- No.10

張龍鶴의 '요한詩集'에 對하여

辛卿得 건국대학교 1983 文湖 Vol.8 No.1

李箱文學의 心理主義的 硏究(Ⅰ)

辛卿得 건국대학교 1976 論文集 Vol.3 No.1

丹齎 申采浩小說의 民族主義的 硏究

辛卿得 건국대학교 1978 論文集 Vol.7 No.1

Shin Chae-Ho was a historian, a revolutionist, a literary critic and a novelist who took an active part during the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in enlightening people to Korean culture. When Korea was in a national crisis due to Japanese Imperial Colonial Policy, he assorted the National Identity and struggled against the Feudalism and Imperialism present at that time. Through his novels and literary criticism, he commented on the current politics and presented Koreans with a vision of Korean culture. He part cipated in Korean Independence Movement and the Anarchist Movement. His charactor was so upright that he had no servile spirit and he wouldn't compromise with others. When Korea was under Japanese Colonial Policy, he fought against the Japanese not only on the culture front, but also on the revolution front. So I am sure that he was one of the most decisive, bravest, passionate heroes of the Korean nation. He was born on Nov. 7, 1880, the second son of a poor scholar. He was educated in Confucianism. In 1898, he entered Sung Gweun University, where he received a doctorate in 1905. At that time he worked as the editor of the Hwang-Sung Paper. In 1910 as the chief editor of the Korean Daily Newspaper, he wrote a political criticism and a historical treatise. He also joined the New People's Assembly and the National Debt Compensation Movement. In April, 1910, he sought refuge in China and there he held a Cheong-Do Meeting, which spreaded partioitc enlightenment and the Korean Independence Movement, and Gweun-Up Newspaper. In 1915, he organized the New Korean Youth Association with Shin Goo-Shik and Bark-Dal Academy Foundation with Moon Ill-Pyoung to educate youths. In 1919, he took pact in establishing the Sanghai Provisional Government. As the Chief editor of the New Korean Newspaper, he led the Anti-Imperalism Movement. In 1923, he drew up the Korean Revolution Declaration at the demand of Justice-hat Party. When he was a member of the Anarchist Movement in 1928 he participated in revolutionary terroism and was arrested. He was to serve a ten year sentence but died in prison, on Feb. 28, 1936. He was 57 years old then. I.Shin Chae-Ho's thought recognized that culture and civilization by themselves were not enough to encourage people in the lower social lives to grow emotionally as ctitizens of a nation. But literature was a prime way to teach these people about their culture and their right and duties to their nation. He asserted literary utility and he would use his novels to enlighten people. II.His idea of Nationalism was not narrow in scope or characterized by egoistic patriotism or chauvinism. Rather it was characterized by his devotion to his nation. III.His idea of Nationalism sought, for the entire nation, the equality of happiness, right, and duty in politics, social life and culture. He appealed for friendship and unity for the whole nation. He thought literature which couldn't obtain these aims, should be condemned. IV.Shin Chae-Ho's novel 'Dream of Heaven' and others were studied synthetically, because they directly expressed his idea of Nationalism. V.Shin Chae-Ho's nationalistic literature gives to Koreans a vision of the today's and the future's Korean nationalistic literature.

李箱文學의 心理主義的 硏究(Ⅱ)

辛卿得 건국대학교 1977 論文集 Vol.5 No.1

It is possible that psychological study of Rhee Sang's literature, by Rene Welleck said, like that psychological study of the writer, as type and as individual, or the study of the creative process, or the study of the psychological tykes and laws present whthin works of literature or finally, the effects of literature upon its readers (audience psychology). In the sense of a conscious and systematic theory of the mind and its workings, psychology is unnecessary to art and not is itself of artistic value. But in itself, psychology is only preparatory to the act of creation ; and in the work itself, psychological truth is an artistic value only if it enhances coherence and complexity. So called, Rhee Sang, but the real name is Gim Hae-Gyang, was born in Seoul on 20 Aug. 1910, under the Japanese ruled. He Wrote in 1931, "Ogamdo. Poetry. No.1" and published "The Wings" Short novel in 1936. He was dead 28 years old young 1937 in Tokyo, Japan. He was stir-realistic poet and psychological novelist in 1930s Korea. The Psychological study of Rhee Sang's literture consist of two part of studies, primary analysis of Rhee Sang'a individual setting : secondary psychological study of Rhee sang's literature. Chap. I. Analysis of Rhee Sang's Setting and Literary Value. 1.The prologue of Psychological criticism for Psychological Introduction is Psychological approach of writer's study and Taine's environmental theory. 2.It is possible that the friend relations, specially "Nine club" members, and the family realations unveiled Rhee Sang's environmental analysis. 3.Rhee Sang's psychoanalysis, analysis of genius and mad-genius. 4.A synetheti study of life for Rhee Sang. Chap. II. Psychological Study of Rhee Sang's Literature. 1.Criticism of the study of Rhee Sang's Literature 2.'The internal monologue' and 'the stream-of consciousness' in 'the wings' 3.Dramatic Theory of the Psychology in 'the wings' 4.Conclusion.

실용작문을 어떻게 가르칠 것인가

신경득 배달말교육학회 1986 배달말교육 Vol.4 No.1

인민해방공간의 종군문학연구

신경득 건국대국어국문학연구회 1997 겨레어문학 Vol.21·22 No.-

6·25 전쟁초기 조선 종군실화로 본 민간인 학살

辛卿得 경상대학교 사회과학연구소 2001 사회과학연구 Vol.19 No.1

The author was greatly shocked to find abundant evidences of civilian massacres that were committed during the Korean War while collecting and organizing seized war documents related to literature in 1997. The author's attention to this matter has lasted until 2001. Unfortunately, however, it is virtually Impossible to get a full grasp of the whole scene of the carnage. much less to conduct organized studies, not only are such discussions treated as taboo in Korea, but also almost all the relevant documents are monopolized by the Korean government and banned for release, On very rare occasions, interested journalists and scholars have conducted on-the- spot investigations to reveal cases of massacres. The purpose of this study is to review documents of Oyeqk and newspaper reports to investigate the true pictures of the nation-wide civilian massacres by the US bombing and gunfire and killings by the US army and police. The number of deaths throughout the Korean peninsula is estimated to total 5 million, of which 1,130,000 are reckoned as deaths by civilian massacres. It is not clear yet why the US military and police had to kill so many civilians early in the Korean War. Of course, the answer might be easily concocted if they insisted that they had to slaughter civilians in a proactive way to prevent the cooperation and conspiracy with the People's Army of North Korea. Given the origin and nature of the war, massacres of leftist suspects were frequently strategical and tactical, and sometimes even anti-nationalistic and anti-humanistic. In this regard, the origin and nature of the South-North Korean war must be elucidated before dealing with the problem of civilian slaughter. This study also performs empirical research and analysis on how US interests and President Rhee's political ambitions led to the carnage of political criminals, suspects, and civilians. It was assumed in the previous study by the author that the reason why merciless massive killings occurred extensively across Korea might be that the Rhee regime, representing US interests, exploited those massacres as a way out of his political crisis. This civilian slaughter may not be regarded as merely revenge or an expression of US arrogance that looked down on Korean people as gooks in pajamas. The massacres of political criminals and suspects had been planned thoroughly and systematically in the beginning of the war On 25, June, 1950, Jang Seok-Yoon, the-then Director General of the National Police, ordered that "all the member of the Bodo federation and suspicious elements be retained and not be released until the next order by the present official." The starting point of this discussion must be a formal and substantive debate on the responsibility of the united States for the massive slaughter. On 13 July, 1950 President .Rhee transferred the directoral authority of the Korean Army to General MacArthur in Daejun, and the general handed it over to Wolton Walker, the-then commander of the US Forces stationed in Korea. It may be argued in reference to the transfer of the directoral authority that all the civilian massacres committed before the transference should be aitributed to President Rhee and that the others that happened in Jeonjoo, Gwangju, and Jinjoo should be attributed to General MacArthur However, a controversy arises if the scope of the responsibility is simply defined based on the time point of the transference., because long before the US Forces got involved in the Korean War, the US Military Committee had ordered the civilian massacre in Incheon, and so had the US Forces in Soowon. And after the official involvement of the US Forces in the Korean War, US bombing planes made a bombing raid on civilians in Ogunjang, and US Forces officials attended, inspected, and took photographs of the slaughter of political criminals in Daejeon Prison. Beginning on 2O July, 1950, when the directoral authority was transferred to the US Forces, they ordered, inspected, and attended the massacres committed in Jeonjoo and Gwangjoo. The US CIC that is alleged to be in charge of the massacre of the political criminals in Jinjoo should be properly recognized as the CIC of the Korean Army. The civilian massacres in Nogunri and Gokgunri are identical in methodology in that US planes made bombardments and slaughtered civilians with heavy machine guns. The Hanbyokdang slaughter shows a similarity with other killings by US bombing. General MacArthur received the reports of the civilian massacres committed during the war, but many cases indicate that the US authority was lukewarm on or overlooked these brutal murders. It follows naturally that the US Forces cannot be exempted from their partial or entire responsibility for civilian massacre cases. The overall responsibility, however, must be attributed to President Rhee. According to the grade-two secret document on'the execution of Korean political criminals,' 1800 political criminals were executed in the mass slaughter of the first three days of July, 1950, ordered by the topmost levels of the Korean government. The following evidence demonstrates that 'the topmost levels' refers to President Rhee who must be held responsible for the order of the civilian massacres. According to the Minjuchosun issue on 6 September, 1950, in the official document to the Gwangioo provost general on the civilian massacre, Song Yo-Chan, the-then provost marshal, wrote that 'the imperial US government and its puppet Rhee Seung-Man made the order'; and in the beginning of the document, Song Yo-Chan wrote that he sent the document 'ordered by the superior authorities'. The final controversial question is to what extent can Korean middle-ranking authorities be held responsible for the massacres. The summary of this discussion is as follows. President Rhee ordered Kim Chang-Ryong, the-then CIC director, to slaughter civilians, and the CIC directed and supervised the massacre. Agents from each of the local CICs were sent to prisons to sort out prisoners and they mobilized the police to transport the inmates to the slaughter spots. On the scene, CIC agents monitored the killings by the MPs and police and even participated in the massacre. The provost general, ordered by Song Yo-Chan, mobilized MPs to transport the inmate suspects in trucks to the slaughter spots, and committed the camage. The issue of the civilian massacres did not die away with the deaths of the siaughtered suspects. Those escapees and family meimbers who survived the killings are still suffering as seriously as the dead from the memory and loss. The Increasingly radicalized anti-communist dictatorship, sponsored by Presidents Rhee and Park, exploited the guilt-by-association system to drive those people related to traitors into the unbearable terror of being labeled 'red elements' of communism. In addition, Korean journalists, scholars, literary writers, and publishers all suffered from committing self-censorship in the aftermath of the 'red' complex. The survivors' society has urged for the following corrective actions: the establishment of a special law to punish those who committed illegal killings; compensation for the survivors; rearrangement of the family registration for the dead; erection of cenotaphs; memorial services; and the excavation of the skeletal remains of the dead. The continuation of the National Security Law may be an obstacle blocking the way to reunification and membership among advanced countries. History Is not only about the living but also about the dead. In the same way, history is about the dead as well as the living. The author wants to be a citizen of a country where there are none suffering from unfair treatment. When a military officer visited Kim Gu in Gyounggyojang to recommend his son (Kim Shin)'s joining the Air Force in February, 1948, the famous Korean Patriot bluntly rejected the offer and he is quoted as explaining the reason in the following passage. His statement represents an Important solution to the problems of the national division and civilian massacres. "Essentially, 1 don't agree with the US involvement an intervention in founding the Korean Army; our army must be organized in our own way I cannot accept the idea that the national defense guard may serve as a foundation for the Korean Army. That's why I don't want my son to be sent to the Air Force. The true Korean Army must be organized by the cooperation of South and North Korean people when the two Koreas are unified."

6.25전쟁 초기 조선 종군실화로 본 토지개혁

신경득 慶尙大學校 經營行政大學院 2004 사회과학연구 Vol.22 No.-

I raised a hypothesis that there are Nominal aspect and actual one to the aims of Land Reform and Raw Crop Tax System carried out in the occupied South Korean Region by North Korea in the early stage of the Korean War. Nominal aspect is the result from the North Korean recognition that the Korean war was for liberating South Korean People from Imperialist America and fascist Lee Sungman regime. It was important for North Korea to liberate South Korean People in the occupied region from the feudalistic oppression and so many unfair taxes. In 1949 the North Korean cabinet made the draft for the Land Reform to be carried in the South Korean occupied region. On July 4,1950 Top People’s Assembly made public an political order ‘Decree on the Land Reform of the South Korean occupied region’. Soon the Assembly make public ‘Concrete Rules for the Land Reform’, and On August 18,1950 it made public ‘Decree on the Raw Crop Tax System on the South Korean Occupied Region’. According to these decrees, Land Reform and Raw Crop Tax System were widely and promptly executed over South Korean occupied region except South and North Kyoungsang province and Jeju province. Actual aspect of those polices was that Kim Ilsung wanted to mobilize labors and by encouraging them as the core power of social revolution in order to win the war by making them help North Korean People’s Army(KPA). That kind of aim was revealed in the address of Kim Ilsung, ‘we have to use peasants as producers of wartime crop and raw material’ spoken in ‘Congratulation Rally of Pyongyang’s People Committee for the 5th anniversary of Liberation’. In the early stage of the war, peasants fulfilled their duty as the core power of social revolution on the war front to help KPA. The conclusion of this article is that those two policies were not ‘revolutionary’ successful but ‘actually’ successful by mobilizing peasants to help KPA. There are several reasons that those two policies were not revolutionary successful. There is a critical viewpoint that the land reform executed by North Korea was almost the same thing from the land reform executed already by South Korean Government. On April 26, 1946 South Korean Assembly passed ‘Land Reform Law’ to be executed by the method ‘paid appropriation, paid distribution’ under the tough urge of peasants. The width of the land distributed to the peasants was 5846km2, among the amount of 5974km2 appropriated land. North Korea distributed 5733km2 to peasants among the amount of 5962km2. But peasants less felt the effect of the land reform because peasants were allowed to harvest the crop if it had been scattered by them. And it was impossible ‘to eliminate classes’ because rich farmers were allowed to possess up to 200,000m2 in order to embrace them. Moreover it was impossible ‘to eliminate shameful history because the land owned by pro-Japan imperialism was not appropriated. Harvest Sampling Method introduced to execute Raw Crop Tax System reasonably and scientifically made Southern Peasants feel disgusting. Though the rate of raw crop tax was just 10-27%, the burden of peasants was not lessened because of various semi-official taxes like ‘Patriotic Rice’, ‘Fund for Airplanes’. Despite these negative aspects, the fact that those two policies were actually successful in mobilizing peasants constituting over 80% of Southern people into war is shown in the reports by professional writers who visited fronts. Peasants to whom land was distributed made their effort in order to secure crop for soldiers in the front of by raising manure, reconstructing irrigation system, helping themselves. About 400.000 peasants volunteered to serve army by August 15, 1950. Many peasants helped soldiers proceed their way by reconstructing roads, bridges and railways and made communication easy by connecting telephone cables. Women whose social status was raised during the war carried bullets and food, sent solacing items to the front and helped wounded soldiers. But we have to pay attention to the fact that these kind of peasants’ activity was driven not solely by these two policies but also by massacres of citizens by American Troops and South Korean Army. We are able to notice that there are several historical meanings in those two wartime policies. First, these kind of reforms executed rashly during the war were ‘liberation of human beings’ from the feudalistic oppression system thousands years long. Second, peasants got special experience of ‘class liberation’ and ‘people’s economy’ in the condition that there were no landlords, pro-Japan imperialism, traitors to the motherland. Third, it was possible to execute these two policies in the occupied region without strong antagonistic activity by landlords and right-wings. Fourth, these two policies urged Lee Sungman government to continue that kind of land reform when they restored Southern region.

6ㆍ25전쟁 초기 조선 종군실화로 본 금강도하⑴

신경득 경상대학교 사회과학연구소 2005 사회과학연구 Vol.23 No.-

Crossing over of Geum River was performed during the Daejeon Battle which was one of the most severe battles during the Korean War. From July 14 to 20 in 1950, the American 24th Division under the 8th Corps and the North Korean 3rd and 4th Divisions under the 1st Corps stood face to face along the Geum River. The North Korean side crossed over the river and occupied Daejeon. According to ≪The History of the Korean War》written by South Korean side, in that battle, Dean, the commander of the American 24th Division, was captivated alive, and a third of the soldiers were killed and most of their equipment was lost. For North Korean part, 15 tanks, 15 mobile guns, and 6 howitzers of 122mm were lost and a lot of soldiers were killed. These are statistics which show how fierce the battle was. By the way, descriptions over the battle from both sides are contradictory. According to 《The History of the Korean War》written by North Korean side, the battle was one of the most splendid ones accomplished by Kim Ilsung's excellent strategy and tactics and by the incomparably brave North Korean People's Army. And its development was cautious and elusive. But American description is different. They say that the battle was not North Korea's lopsided victory. Since, major general, Dean resisted the North Korean troops through July 20, he saved time for the American 25th Division and the 1st Mechanized Division to perform landing operations at Pohang and Busan. So, they insist, the American side got relative victory. These two descriptions are common in both sides each. But my opinion is different from both. I think that obviously it was a failure for the American side. Yet, it was not one of the most splendid battles for the North Korean side. They should have considered some alternative operations. It could have influenced on the whole process of the war. Before the war, the then Chinese leader Mao Tsetung advised Kim Ilsung and Park Heongyeong 'to bypass cities and not to waste time occupying cities'. But Kim and Park ignored his advice, and further more, spent three days when they occupied Seoul. The fact that having spent so much time attacking all the parts of South Korea, including cities, like 'sweeping with a broom' made unexpected obstacles to unifying Korea. This is one of the evidences that support my opinion that some alternative operations were necessary. Considering Mao's advice, we can think of several alternative operations, accepting the operation that the North Korean 3rd Infantry Division would cross over Geum River at Daepyeongri and attack the American 19th regiment like wedging it as given. The first is that the North Korean 105 tank brigade and the 5th regiment which moved north from Daepyeongri on the night of July 15 would debouch and cross over Gabcheon Stream and attack the border between Ogcheon and Yeongdong. Under this operation, sice the American 21th regiment was so weak, there would be no possible powerful counterattack from the regiment. But there was possibility that they would suffer from the possible American bombing. The second is that North Korea's mechanized troop would arrive in Gongju on the night of July 15 and occupy Youseong on the night of July 16 at latest and occupy Daejeon under the combined operation with the 3rd Division. Under this operation, sice Gongju was already occupied by the North Korean 4th Division, there would be no problem for the mechanized troop to break through Mt. Gyeoryong. But it would be a burden for the North Korean 3rd Division to accomplish the Daepyeongri Battle. The last is that the Daejeon Battle would be entrusted to the North Korean 3rd Division and a mechanized troop and the 16th and the 18th regiment of the North Korean 4th Division would advance to Daegu through Nonsan and Ganggyeong from Namwon, Hamyang, and Geochang. This alterative operation that the North Korean 4th Division would occupy Daegu before July 20 when the American 1st mechanized Division and the 25th Division made landings at Pohang and Busan would be possible in the condition that there would be cooperation with another North Korean troop. The North Korean 5th Division which was performing guerilla operations in the Taebag Mountains leaded by Ma Sangcheol would have to advance to Busan through Pohang and Gyeongju along the East Coast. The North Korean 6th Division which crossed Geum River at Janghang on July 18 leaded by Bang Hosan would have to advance to Masan through Jeonju, Gwangju, Suncheon, Hadong, and Jinju. The North Korean 2nd Division which advanced to Boeun from Pibanryeong on July 18 leaded by Choi Hyeon would have to advance to Daegu through Whanggan and Gimcheon. Of course, there would be so many unpredictable variables in any war and if is said that any assumptions can not be allowed to history. But we can derive some strategic lessons from the Daejeon Battle. At any rate, because the North Korean troops wasted 6 days performing the Daejeon Battle, they came to give so much time to the American troops. During that time, the American 25th Division was able to be deployed to Sangju, the American 1st Mechanized Division was able to be deployed to the border of Chupungryeong at Yeongdong, the American 8th Division leaded by Walton Walker was able to construct the defense line along Nagdong River and McArthur was able to map out such a great operation as Incheon Landing. Major General, Dean who used to be Army Minister in the Military Government leaded by Hodge allegedly said that they were not able to see the forest, because it was too close about the Daejeon Battle. All the work that he did in the Daejeon Battle was that he tried to hunt some tanks with several soldiers carrying bazookas. But it was the task that any competent sergeant could do. Obviously, we are able to evaluate that the Daejeon Battle was 'one of the most brilliant battles won by North Korea' as many American scholars has pointed out. In the Daejeon Battle, the American troops were incessantly hit by the North Korean troops, and so it was inevitable for them to run away. But the American troops were able to keep hold of Daejeon until July 20, thanks to the powerful bombing carried out by American Air Force. As depicted in the battlefield reports written by Min Byeonggyun and Kim Saryang, it was thanks to that bombing that the North Korean mechanized troop had to take a roundabout way through Gongju instead of crossing over Geum River at Daepyeongri. As it was the night of July 19 that a North Korean tank brigade arrived at Youseong, crossing over GUm River at Gongju, breaking through Mt. Gyeoiryong, the American troops had succeeded keeping hold of Daejeon for so long 4 days. By the way, from the darly stage of the war, they failed to ger moral support from South Korean people by massacring political prisoners in Daejeon Jail, many civilians as shown at Nogeunri, by raping girls and women. It means that they were so audacious as to ignore any psychological operations towards civilians. It was one of the causes that the American side was defeated in the Daejeon Battle. That is, insufficient soldiers and equipment, low morale can not solely explain their defeat. After being hit many times by the North Korean troops, the American troops were completely sieged in Daejeon. So it was inevitable for them to resist desperately by rushing to the North Korean tanks with grenades. But the strategy of the North Korean troops was not perfect. We can find out a serious strategic fallacy committed by them. They ignored the famous Korean proverb, ""Drive out rats with leaving an escape hole"". If the North Korean troops had left a road for the American troops to withdraw, the former would not have experienced the serious loss of the soldiers. In that situation the latter would not have dared to resist the former. Besides, if the former had traced the latter on the road from Daejeon to Geumsan, the former could have get much greater military achievements. I greatly counted on many battlefield reports written by several North Korean writers, Min Byeonggyoun, Namgung Man, Park Palyang, Kim Saryang, Lee Jeonggu, Kim Namcheon, etc.