미국 연방대법원 Lingle v. Chevron 판결의 의미

금태환(Keum Tae-Huan) 행정법이론실무학회 2008 행정법연구 Vol.- No.20

This article analyses Lingle decision(Linda Lingle, Governer of Hawaii v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074(2005), which held that the formula inquiring whether government regulation of private property “substantially advances” legitimate state interests prescribes inquiry in nature of due process, and is not appropriate test for determining whether regulation effects Fifth Amendment taking, abrogating the holding of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, a case involving a facial takings challenge to certain municipal zoning ordinances, the Court declared that “the application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not ”substantially advance“ legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land. This is called two prongs of Agins. Lingle decision’s meaning is to abrogate first prong of Agins for the regulatory taking test. There has been great battles between scholars about the relation between takings review and substantive due process review and the role of the “substantially advances” test. Some have argued it is means-end test appropriate for the substantive due process review. This means some parts of protection for the property which have been reviewed by the takings test should be resolved by the arbitrary test of the due process review. They say although the latter is minimum standard, both are based on the different logics. “Takings clause’s role is barring Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” “It is designed not to limit the arbitrary governmental interference with property rights, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” ““Substantially advances test is appropriate for the arbitrary governmental interference. Lingle’s court has adopted this view. Concludingly I have thought what does this change means in compensatory law. It is the change of the degree of protection for the property rights. It is the reduction of law by the judges who have created regulatory taking by the interpretation of the constitution, and that of the extent of the regulatory taking.

미국 연방행정절차법에서의 실질적 증거 기준

금태환(Keum Tae Huan) 행정법이론실무학회 2007 행정법연구 Vol.- No.18

This article deals with substantial evidence test in American Federal Administrative Procedure Act(APA). The court could set aside agency fact findings, unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 or otherwise reviewed on the record of agency hearing. I comprehend substantial evidence test as a reasonableness review and arbitrary-capricious test as a rationality review. Though reasonableness and rationality can be understood to have the same meaning in the broader sense, the former stresses on the social relations while the latter does on the logics. In the beginning of the APA, substantial evidence test meant a broader scope of the judicial review than arbitrary-capricious test and a narrower one than de novo review and clearly erroneous standard. But gradually in arbitrary-capricious test they have demanded as much degree of rationality as in substantial evidence test. It is a hard look doctrine. In 1970's, substantial evidence test was applied to the informal rulemaking procedure in some statues. These circumstance made it appear that the substantial evidence and the arbitrary-capricious test were converging. As the tests converge, both tests have demanded the higher degree of reasonableness and rationality than ever. So it has been said that the difference of the demanded degree of reasonableness and rationality disappeared. In Korea, there is not deferential review test such as the substantial evidence and the arbitrary-capricious test. But the degree of the demanded reasonableness and rationality of the both country would be almost the same. Finally I suggest that the appropriate degree of reasonableness and rationality should be determined according to the nature of the object, for example according to the rulemaking and adjudication, in Korean judicial review system.

국토의계획 및 이용에 관한 법률 제95조 제1항의 위헌성

금태환(Keum Tae Huan) 행정법이론실무학회 2010 행정법연구 Vol.- No.27

National Land Planning and Using Act § 95(a) authorizes takings for city planning facilities and the golf club is included in the city planning facilities. This means that the takings for golf club are possible. This article deals with the constitutionality of such a clause and concludes that it is unconstitutional, since it lacks the public needs requirement which the Korean Constitution requires for the takings. Public needs should be interpreted basically to protect the right of property, even if they are evolved from public use to economic development nowadays. So the profits of privates or special group can't be public needs. The sport of golf is enjoyed by the only approximately 2% of Korean people and can not be talked the sport of most of the people in the sense of possibility. National Land Planning and Using Act itself does not predict the takings for golf club initially, but the Establishment and Using of Sports Facilities Act make it possible to take other's properties for construction of golf club later. At first, the former Act only regulates city planning facilities and the takings for them. Later, the latter Act names the golf club as city planning facility and the rulemaking of the former Act confirms that the golf club is a city planning facility. Here's first problem. The rulemaking of executive which is not a statute can not deal with such a thing as important as takings. Furthermore it can not be talked that the the construction of the golf club has the character of public needs. The Kelo decision in U.S. Supreme Court tells that the concept of public use can be interpreted broadly and court has to defer to the legislative determination about public use. Diamler-Benz decision in German Constitutional Court says that the public welfare in city planning and takings is different. Determining the validity of National Land Planning and Using Act, Diamler-Benz decision is helpful. In the National Land Planning and Using Act, there are only the regulations that defines the public welfare in the city planning and there are not the regulations that have procedures for determining of public needs for takings. So the clause that authorizes takings for golf club is unconstitutional, not meeting the requirement of public needs for takings.

한국ㆍ중국ㆍ일본에서의 행정입법의 사법심사 대상 적격

금태환(Keum Tae-Huan) 한국비교공법학회 2007 공법학연구 Vol.8 No.3

이 논문은 한국?중국?일본에서의, 행정입법에 대한 사법심사 대상적격을 검토하고 있다. 그 방법은 주로 판례분석이다. 중국 제도의 검토는 행정소송법의 시행초기 단계이어서 “행정입법에 대하여 초기의 행정소송제도가 어떻게 대응하였는가” 하는 연혁적 의의가 있다. 한국은 나름대로의 경험, 특히 헌법소원심판에 의한 행정입법심사가 많이 축적되어 있으며, 이제 새로운 행정소송 모델을 준비 중에 있다. 일본은 2004. 행정사건소송법의 개정으로 행정입법에 대하여 당사자 소송을 이용하려는 새로운 시험을 하고 있다. 이러한 때 3국의 행정입법 심사에 대한 비교는 서로의 위치를 분명히 할 뿐 아니라 서로 시사하는 점도 있을 것이다. 이 논문은 한국에서의 헌법소원심판에 의한 행정입법 심사를 획기적인 계기로 인정하고 헌법소원심판에 의한 것이나, 행정소송에 의한 심사구조가 동일하다고 주장하면서, 법원도 이러한 단계에 까지 이르러야 하고, 행정소송법의 개정 없이도 그러한 단계에 이를 수 있지만 행정소송법의 개정은 이를 명확히 하고 확인하는 것이라고 주장한다. 중국에서의 추상적 행정행위와 구체적 행정행위의 구별은 개별성ㆍ구체성을 징표로 행정행위여부를 결정하는 한국과 일본의 이론과 동일하다고 본다. 일본의 구체적 사례에서는 한국과 입론을 달리하는 점을 주목하며, 당사자 소송에 의한 행정입법의 통제에 의문을 제기한다. This article is examining the judicial reviewability of rulemaking by analyzing the cases in Korea, China and Japan. Although the review of rulemaking in China is starting step, it gives the sense what was the beginning review feature of the rulemaking. Korean court reviews rulemaking only when rulemaking review is needed for the review of the adjudication. There is a narrow exception. The dispositive-rule which has a concrete effect on the public could be reviewed directly. The scope of the constitutional court's direct review is wider than the court‘s. The reason is that it constructs the conception of “dipositiveness” and “directness” more flexiblly than the court. I think that the scope of the court has to reach to the that of constitutional court. Before the revision of the Administrative Action Review Act in 2004, the scope of the court of the Japan is almost as much as that of the Korea. From 2004, Japan started new experiment of the widening the scope of the review by the use of new action-form. But it‘s future would be doubtful.

법정책학연구논문 ; U.S. Safeguards for BSE and U. S. Beef Import Requirements to Korea

금태환 ( Tae Huan Keum ) 한국법정책학회 2012 법과 정책연구 Vol.12 No.4

이 논문은 학문적이고 객관적인 입장에서, 소고기 무역에서 절대적인 중요성을 갖고 있는 광우병 안전 조치 중 미국의 조치를 알아보고, 그것과 2008년 농림수산 식품부 고시로써 공포된 미국산 쇠고기 수입위생조건 상에 나타난 조치를 비교하고 있다. 미국의 여러 조치 중 여기서는 중요한 것으로 생각되는 사료 금지 조치, 조사 프로그램, 특정위험물질의 지정, 주저앉은 소에 대한 제한, 우지에 대한 조치를 검토한다. 미국의 사료금지조치는 1997. 6.에 이루어진, 소를 포함한 반추동물 사료에 포유동물의 단백질 사용금지와 2008. 4. 25. 이루어진, 일부 특정위험물질에 대한 사용금지(이를 강화된 사료금지조치라고 한다)가 있다. 광우병 소를 발견하기 위한조사 프로그램은 정부에 따라 약간의 변화를 보이다가 현재는 고위험군의 소에 대해 년간 4만 마리를 검사하고 있다. 미국의 조사 프로그램에 대한 기본적인 입장은, 조사를 통해 광우병 감염소를 발견하는 것이 아니라 전체적인 경향을 파악하는 것이며, 광우병의 감염이나 소비자의 건강은 사료 금지나 특정위험물질의 지정으로 달성될 수 있다는 것이다. 특정위험물질의 지정은 특정위험물질의 범위와 소의 연령이 문제된다. 2004. 1. 규정은 소장의 일부와 편도선을 제외하고는 모두 30개월 넘는 소의 특정부위를 특정위험물질로 지정하고 있다. 부위와 연령에 관해서는 미국 내에서도 이론이 많다. 주저 앉은 소는 식용으로 사용되지 못하며 일정 우지를 제외한 대부분의 우지도 식용으로 사용하지 못한다. 미국산 쇠고기 수입위생조건 상의 조치는 대체로 미국의 규정과 일치하나 특정위험물질의 지정과 주저앉은 소에 대한 조치, 우지에 대한 제한이 다르다. 특정위험물질에 관하여 부칙 규정에서 미국 규정에 따른 제거의무를 두어 미국 규정과 동일한 효과를 거두려고 하나 실효성이 의심스럽다. 미국의 광우병 안전조치는 광우병의 전파와 소비자의 건강을 보호하고 더 나아가서 소비자의 미국 소에 대한 우려를 불식시키는 것도 큰 목적으로 하고 있다. 광우병이 아직 근본적으로 소멸하지 아니하였다고 보면 미국의 조치는 소비자의 건강보호를 위하여 완전하지 못하다고 보아야 한다. 일부 미국 규정과 차이가 있는 쇠고기 수입위생조건은 시급히 개정될 필요가 있다. This article evaluates the U.S. safeguards for BSE which are critical in beef trade, comparing it with safeguards in the Import Health Requirements (the IHRs) of 2008 for U.S. Beef and Beef Products to Korea. Among various U.S. safeguards for BSE, it examines principally feed ban, surveillance program, designation of special risk materials(SRMs), restriction for downer cattle, and measures for tallow. It argues that in consideration of BSE`s presence even though the number of BSE occurrence has decreased rapidly, U.S. safeguards for BSE cannot be said to be sufficient from the prospective of human health. Especially the numbers of surveillance program in U.S. are so small that it cannot reflect exact possibility of BSE and the validity of designation of SRMs which is based on the surveillance program makes less effective. The differences between U.S. safeguards and the 2008 IHRs are in the designation of SRMs, restriction of downer cattle, and the regulation of tallow.