ILO 제102호 사회보장 최저기준 협약상 정기적 급부 산정방식에 관한 검토

차성안(Cha, Sungan) 한국사회보장법학회 2021 사회보장법학 Vol.10 No.2

배상명령 활성화 입법에 대한 평가와 그 시사점

차성안(Sungan Cha) 한국법학원 2021 저스티스 Vol.- No.182-1

배상명령은 1981년 도입된 이후 약 40년 동안 계속 저조한 활용도를 보였다. 이에 대한 지속적인 비판이 있었고 그 활성화를 위한 여러 제안이 있었다. 이런 제안들은 주로 형사절차에서 피해자가 손해배상명령을 얻을 수 있는 외국의 유사한 제도에 대한 비교법적 검토를 통해 나온 것인데, 대부분 실현되지 않았다. 학계와 시민단체의 지속적인 비판은 배상명령 활성화를 위한 적지 않은 입법으로 이어졌다. 그러한 입법의 구체적 내용과 그것이 배상명령 활성화에 미친 실제 영향을 살피는 연구는 많지 않았다. 이 글에서는 배상명령 활성화를 위한 여러 입법의 구체적 내용을 살핀 후 통계와 판결문 분석 등을 통하여 그것이 실제 배상명령 활용도에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지에 관하여 살펴본다. 배상명령 도입 후 약 40년 동안 배상명령 활성화를 위하여 취하여진 다양한 입법들의 가장 큰 특징은 배상명령의 기본구조를 의미 있게 건드리는 개정이 없었다는 점이다. 대상범죄의 한정적 열거, 추상적이고 광범위한 재량각하 사유, 유무죄 · 양형심리와 배상명령 심리의 병행 원칙 및 유죄판결과 배상명령의 동시 결정 원칙, 불복절차의 부존재와 이유 기재의 생략 및 민사절차로의 이행을 인정하지 않는 것 등이 그러한 기본구조이다. 기본구조를 변경하지 않는 개정들은 대부분 큰 효과가 없었다. 정보제공형 개정이나 법원이나 검찰의 행정 차원의 노력과 결부된 개정이 제한적 또는 일시적으로나마 큰 효과를 나타내었다. 위자료를 손해항목에 추가하고 성폭력범죄를 대상범죄에 추가한 것은 의미 있는 개정이었으나, 광범위한 재량각하 사유와 법관의 업무과중 등 근본적 한계요인의 지속으로 인하여 크게 활용되지는 못했다. 배상명령 접수율과 인용률은 반비례 관계가 보통인데, 접수가 늘면 법관들은 재량각하 등을 더 많이 활용하기 쉽다. 2017~2019년의 기간 동안 배상명령 접수율과 인용률이 큰 폭으로 동반상승하였으나, 이는 인터넷 사기, 보이스피싱 사기 범죄 등이 급증하면서 배상명령 제도를 활용하는 피해자도 급증한 것에 기인한 현상으로 보인다. Criminal compensation order introduced in 1981 has been in force for nearly 40 years, but continued to be underutilized. The compensation order system has been criticized continuously, and there have been various proposals for activating the compensation order. These proposals were made through comparative legal review with similar systems that allow victims to obtain compensation orders in foreign criminal proceedings, but most of them have not yet been realized. The continuous criticism by scholars and civic groups has led to several legislative measures to activate the compensation order. However, there have been few studies examining the details and the actual effect that these legislative measures had on the activation of compensation order. This article looks into the details of several legislative measures to activate the compensation order. Through statistics and analysis of compensation order cases, the extent to which these legislative measures influenced the actual use of compensation order was also examined according to several periods. For about 40 years since the compensation order was introduced, various legislative measures were taken to activate the compensation order. Its most important feature is that there were no revisions that meaningfully touched the basic structure of the compensation order, which are ‘limited enumeration of crimes for which the compensation order is possible’, ‘abstract and broad grounds for discretionary dismissal’, ‘the principle of simultaneous progress of fact-finding, sentencing hearing and hearing for compensation order’, ‘the principle of simultaneous judgment of sentence and compensation order’, ‘the absence of appeal system’ and ‘the omission of reasons for compensation order’, and ‘the absence of transition to civil proceedings’, etc. Revisions that did not change the basic structure did not show much effect. Revisions for providing informations or revisions in which judicial administration or prosecutors were involved with administrative efforts had some limited effect. It was the most meaningful revision that added solatium to the category of compensation and added sexual violence crimes to the listed crimes for which the compensation order is possible, but it was not used much largely due to the wide range of reasons for discretionary dismissal and the overwork of judges in the criminal division. There is an inverse relationship between the rate of application for compensation order and the permission rate for compensation application. Judges tend to use the discretionary dismissal more to increase dismissal as the number of cases requesting compensation orders increases. In recent years, both of the rate of application for compensation order and the permission rate for compensation application from 2017 to 2019 have risen significantly together, but this seems to be an unusual phenomenon that was caused by much increased use of the compensation order system as the number of internet frauds and voice phishing scams increased rapidly.

법원 절차상 수어통역비용 국고부담화 등을 위한 입법방안

차성안(Cha, Sungan) 한국법학원 2020 저스티스 Vol.- No.178

장애인차별금지법, 유엔 장애인권리협약 및 한국수화언어법의 해석상 재판절차에서 청각·언어장애인 등을 위한 수어통역이나 속기 방식의 문자통역 등이 이루어지는 경우 그 비용은 국고에서 부담하여야 한다. 그러나 기존의 민·형사소송법은 이러한 규범적 변화를 반영하지 못하였다. 기존 소송비용 법제와 장애인차별금지법, 장애인권리 협약 및 한국수화언어법 사이에서 수어통역비용의 무상성을 둘러싼 규범충돌이 발생하였다. 이러한 규범충돌 상황을 해소하기 위해서는 기존 소송법제에서 소송비용으로 포함시키던 통역비용이나 속기비용에, 수어통역비용이나 속기 방식의 문자통역 비용은 포함되지 않는다고 규범조화적으로 해석할 필요가 있다. 근본적인 해결을 위해서는 수어통역비용의 국고부담화와 이와 밀접하게 연결된 속기사를 통한 문자통역이나 기타 청각장애인을 위한 다양한 의사소통지원 보장을 위한 구체적 입법이 법률, 대법원규칙, 예규 등의 다양한 수준에서 이루어져야 한다. 이 글에서는 이러한 입법에서 고려할 입법의 원칙과 핵심적 쟁점을 제시하고 그에 따른 법률, 대법원규칙, 예규 등의 구체적 개정안을 부록 형태로 제시하여 보았다. According to the interpretation of the Anti-Discrimination against and Remedies for Persons with Disabilities Act(ADRPDA), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities(UNCRPD) and the Korean Sign Language Act(KSLA), the state shall bear the cost in cases where sign language interpretation or CART(Communication Access Realtime Translation) is conducted in court proceedings. However, the normative structure of the existing civil procedure act and criminal procedure act on how to pay for sign language interpretation costs had not reflected the normative changes in these disability-related statutes. Conflicts of norms arose between the existing law on the cost of litigation and the ADRPDA, the UNCRPD, and the KSLA. In order to resolve the conflict of these norms, it is necessary to harmoniously interpret that sign language interpretation or CART costs are not included in the cost of interpretation or stenographic reporting, which were included in the costs of litigation under the existing law. Fundamentally, legislation to prohibit imposing surcharges for sign language interpretation and legislation on various communication methods for deaf or hearing impaired persons such as CART must be made. This article discusses principles and key issues to be considered in these legislations, and presents legislative proposals in the appendix at various levels such as laws, Supreme Court rules, and regulations.

해외의 전관예우 규제사례와 국내 규제방안 모색(2) - 해외사례를 토대로 한 퇴직법관의 변호사 개업 규제방안 -

차성안 ( Cha Sungan ) 사법정책연구원 2019 연구보고서 Vol.2019 No.9

본 보고서와 함께 출간되는 ‘해외의 전관예우 규제사례와 국내 규제방안 모색(1)- 퇴직법관의 변호사 개업에 대한 해외 규제사례’ 보고서에서 살펴본 해외의 규제사례들은 한국전관예우 문제해결에 여러 가지 시사점을 준다. 한국은 퇴직법관의 변호사활동으로 인한 사법불신이 ‘우려’를 넘어 ‘현실화’된 매우 심각한 상태이다. 매년 법관들이 정년 한참 전인 40대, 50대에 대량 정기 조기사직해 변호사로 개업하고, 최고법원인 대법원의 법관들까지도 퇴직 후 개업해 대법원에서 소송대리를 한다. 반면 1년짜리 수임제한으로 대표되는 한국의 전관예우 규제는 그 기간, 지역적 제한 범위면에서 세계적으로 약한 수준이다. 기피, 회피 제도도 거의 활용되지 않으며, 전화변론, 기일 외 변론 등 비정상적 변론활동에 대한 규제도 매우 약하다. 40대, 50대 법관들의 대량 정기 조기사직의 원인을 찾을 때, 금전적/비금전적 처우를 모두 합한 법관에 대한 총체적 보수(overall compensation) 개념이 유용할 수 있다. 해외에 비하여 낮은 법관의 보수, 연금 수준과 함께, 안정성, 업무 자율성, 근로시간, 여가, 전국단위 순환전보인사 등 비금전적 혜택(nonpecuniary benefits) 측면에서의 어떤 문제점이 조기사직에 기여하는지 실증적 연구가 필요하다. 이런 처우를 개선하는 처우개선형 대책과 규제형 대책의 균형을 통해, 40대, 50대의 사직을 줄이고, 규제형 전관예우 대책의 위헌성을 감소시키는 노력이 필요하다. 다만, 법관들의 조기사직의 가장 큰 동기는 전관 변호사 개업소득과 법관 보수와의 막대한 격차이다. 강력한 규제형 대책은 전관 변호사 개업소득을 줄여 조기사직 동기를 줄일 수 있는 가장 효과적 수단이라는 점에서, 우선적으로 고려되어야 한다. 해외에서, 전관 변호사가 소송대리 시 현직 법관에 의하여 유리한 대우를 받을 수 있다는 우려는 부당한 오해가 아니라 합리적 의심이라고 평가된다. 퇴직법관의 변호사 개업은 법관경력의 상품화, 사법적 비밀성(judicial confidentiality)의 부당한 활용이라는 부정적 현상으로 여겨진다. 다만 전관예우 규제의 강화는 우수한 변호사의 법관 지원감소를 초래할 가능성이 존재하므로, 이러한 부작용과 규제의 정당성의 비교형량이 필요하다. 이러한 비교형량 후 전관예우 규제를 강화할지 여부는 정책적 판단의 영역이다. 그 결정은 사법부, 입법부의 몫이나 만약 규제 강화를 위한 결단이 내려지는 경우, 채택할 만한 실효적인 전관예우 규제책을 단계별로 제시하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 1단계 진입 사전봉쇄와 관련하여, 변호사 개업 금지방안을 대법관, 헌법재판관 등 최고위직 법관부터 도입하는 것을 검토해 볼 수 있다. 고위법관에 대한 로펌 취업제한 기준을 강화하고, 현직 법관의 로펌 등과의 고용교섭 제한에 관한 구체적 기준을 영국이나 캐나다의 예를 참고해 마련할 필요가 있다. 로펌이 다수의 퇴직법관을 정기적으로 영입해 포트폴리오를 구성해 맞춤형 전관 변호사 서비스를 제공하는 현실에서 로펌에 특화된 추가적 전관예우 대책이 필요하다. 둘째, 2단계의 법원 사건 수임·소송대리 제한 등과 관련하여, 1년짜리 수임제한 기간을 2~6년 범위에서 대폭 늘리고, 최종근무지가 아니라 퇴직 5~7년 이내 근무했던 모든 법원들을 기준으로 수임을 금지해야 한다. 가장 효과적인 대책을 원한다면, 전국단위 순환 전보인사를 고려하여, 퇴직 후 3~5년간 전국의 모든 법원에서의 소송대리를 금지할 수 있다. 전관 변호사의 소송대리가 금지되는 사건에 대한 같은 로펌 소속의 다른 변호사의 소송대리도 금지하되, 전관 변호사가 수임제한 사건에 관여하지 않을 수 있는 확실한 스크리닝 장치를 전제로 예외적으로만 허용해야 한다. 셋째, 3단계의 사건배당 관련하여, 사문화된 기피, 회피 제도를 대신해 기능하고 있는 연고관계 재배당 제도의 확대가 필요하다. 적용범위를 형사단독재판, 민사재판에도 확대하고, 그 사유를 ‘같은 재판부’에서 근무한 경우 외에 ‘같은 법원’에서 근무한 경우에까지 확대할 필요가 있다. 연고관계를 진술할 의무를 법관에게 부여하고, 고소·고발인이나 검사또는 상대방 당사자에게 연고관계 재배당 신청권을 부여해야 한다. 넷째, 4단계 비정상적 변론의 규제 관련하여, 우선 상대적으로 전관 변호사가 활용하기 좋은 전화변론, 기일 외 변론 등의 비정상적인 변론활동 규제에 관한 구체적 규정을, 일방당사자 의사소통 제도를 참조하여 도입해야 한다. 위반 시 회피의무의 부과, 위반한 법관이나 변호사에 대한 확실한 징계 등의 실효성 확보방안도 필요하다. 판사나 변호사의 부적절한 변론이나 의사소통을 다른 법관, 변호사가 알게 되었을 경우 신고의무 부과도 필요하다. 전관 변호사가 사법적 비밀(Judicial confidences)을 이용하여 불공정한 변론을 하는 것 관련하여서는, 캐나다에서의 최근 논의처럼 사법적 비밀에 대한 유지의무를 변호사윤리 장전에 신설해야 한다. 전관 변호사가 이를 위반하는 경우 엄정한 변호사 징계절차를 진행할 필요가 있다. 다섯째, 5단계의 정보제공형 규제는 잠재력이 큰 규제방안이다. 즉 전관 변호사의 담당현직판사와의 연고관계 등의 정보에 대한 접근성을 보장하여, 상대방 당사자, 대중 또는 시민단체, 사법행정권자 등이 전관 변호사의 활동을 관심을 가지고 지켜볼 수 있게 하는 것이다. 이러한 방식은 매우 큰 효과를 낼 잠재력을 가지지만, 동시에 그것은 전관을 선호 하는 기존 경향을 부추길 위험을 가지고 있다. 이에 관하여는 추가적 연구가 필요하다. 이러한 규제형 대책들은 국회 입법을 통하여 실행하는 것이 가장 확실하겠지만, 법원의 규칙, 정책이나 변호사 단체의 자치규정, 정책을 통하여 실현가능한 부분들은 입법 전이라도 시도될 필요가 있다. 10년 이상의 경력을 가진 변호사 등을 법관으로 임용하는 법조일 원화 시스템으로의 변화과정에서, 전관예우 규제강화가 능력있는 변호사들의 법관지원 감소 등의 부작용을 초래하지 않도록 처우개선형 대책들도 함께 마련된 필요가 있다. Examples of overseas regulations on former judges returning to practice after retirement, as discussed in the research report, “Comparative Study on Former Judges Returning to Practice and the Implications for Korea (1)-Examples of Overseas regulations-”, which accompanies this research, have several implications for addressing Korean issues on this topic. Korea is in a very serious situation where the public’s distrust towards the judiciary bred by retired judges frequently returning to practice has been realized beyond concern. Every year, large numbers of judges resign and return to practice regularly in their 40s and 50s, long before their retirement age, and even Supreme Court justices return to practice after retirement to represent litigants before the Supreme Court. The current regulation on former judges returning to practice in Korea, namely a one-year cooling-off period prohibiting representation for the parties in the final court where former judges served, is weak compared to many countries in the world in terms of its duration and scope of regional limitation. Recusal and disqualification systems are rarely used, and regulations on abnormal advocacy, such as ex parte telephone communication or communication outside a court hearing, are very weak. When looking for the reason why a large number of judges in their 40s and 50s resign regularly, a review of the total compensation for judges, which encompasses both monetary reward and nonpecuniary benefits, may be useful. An empirical study is needed to analyze how the levels of nonpecuniary conditions, such as stability, autonomy, working hours, leisure time, and nationwide circular transfer of judges, contribute to early resignation, along with lower judges’ remuneration and pension levels compared to foreign countries. Efforts to reduce the number of resigning judges in their 40s and 50s and reduce the unconstitutionality of regulatory measures on former judges returning to practice by balancing regulatory measures with measures to improve the treatment of judges are necessary. However, the biggest motivation for judges to resign early is the huge gap between the income of judges-turned-lawyers and the remuneration of sitting judges. Strong regulatory measures should be considered in the first place as they are the most effective means of reducing early resignation motives by reducing the income of judges-turned-lawyers. Across foreign jurisdictions, concerns that judges-turned-lawyers may be favorably treated by sitting judges in litigation are viewed as reasonable doubts, not unfair misunderstandings. Former judges returning to practice is regarded as a negative phenomenon representing the commercialization of a judge’s career and an unfair use of judicial confidentiality. Strengthening regulations on former judges returning to practice may, however, lead to a reduction in applications of competent attorneys for judicial posts, so it is necessary to weigh these effects with the intended policy objectives of any regulation. After this assessment, whether to tighten regulations on former judges returning to practice is an area for policy decisions. The decisions must be made by the judiciary or the legislature, but if a decision is made to strengthen regulations, the following steps outline some possible options that may be effective in regulating former judges returning to practice. First, with regard to first-level regulatory measures, such as prohibition of entry, introducing measures prohibiting the highest level of judges such as Supreme Court Justices and Justices of the Constitutional Court from returning to practice after retirement may be considered. It is necessary to strengthen the restrictions on employment of senior judges in law firms and to establish specific criteria for restricting employment negotiations between sitting judges and law firms. Examples from the UK and Canada would inform this policy decision. In our reality where law firms regularly recruit large numbers of retired judges to form a portfolio so that tailored legal services may be provided by former judges, additional regulatory measures on former judges returning to practice focusing on law firms are needed. Second, with regard to second-level regulatory measures, such as the restriction on representation by judges-turned-lawyers before courts, the existing one-year cooling-off period should be extended to the range of two to six years, and representation should also be banned not only in the final court where they served but also in all courts where they served for five to seven years before their retirement. If the most effective regulatory measures are desired, representation may be banned in all courts throughout the country for three to five years after retirement, taking into account the nationwide circular transfer of judges. Representation by another attorney in the same law firm that a judge-turned-lawyer belongs to should also be prohibited in cases where the representation of the judge-turned-lawyer is prohibited. Exceptions should only be made on the condition that tight screening measures preventing the involvement of the judge-turned-lawyer are provided. Third, with regard to third-level regulatory measures, such as case allocation, it is necessary to expand the re-allocation system based on the relationship between sitting judges and attorneys, which functions instead of the recusal and disqualification system that have become a dead letter relating to the representation before courts by judges-turned-lawyers. It is necessary to extend the scope of the re-allocation system to criminal litigation before a single judge and civil litigation, and to extend the grounds for re-allocation from having sat together ‘in the same judicial panel’ to having worked ‘in the same court’. Judges shall be obliged to state their relationship with attorneys, who come before them, and the right to apply for the re-allocation of cases based on relationship between sitting judges and attorneys shall be granted to the complainant, the accuser and the prosecutor of the criminal procedure and the other party of civil procedure. Fourth, with regard to fourth-level regulatory measures, such as the regulation of abnormal advocacy, specific provisions on the regulation of abnormal advocacy, such as ex parte telephone communication or communication outside a court hearing, which are relatively easy to be used by judges-turned-lawyers, should be introduced. In case of a breach of the above regulations, it is also necessary to improve the effectiveness by stipulating the consequences of such violations, such as imposing a duty of recusal to judges and strong disciplinary measures on judges or lawyers. If a judge or an attorney finds that another judge or attorney has engaged in such improper abnormal advocacy or ex parte communications, a duty to report should be required. Relating to unfair advocacy by judges-turned-lawyers using judicial confidences, as in recent discussions in Canada, the obligation to maintain ju dicial confidences should be imposed in the Lawyers Code of Ethics. If a judge-turned-lawyer violates it, strict disciplinary measures must be taken. Fifth, with regard to fifth-level regulatory measures, such as information disclosure regulation, there is a potential regulatory option. By ensuring access to information with regard to the relationship between judges-turned-lawyers and sitting judges in specific cases, the other party, the public or civil society, and the judicial administration can carefully monitor the activities of judges-turned-lawyers. This approach can be very effective, but at the same time it risks encouraging the existing tendency for clients to unduly prefer judges- turned-lawyers. Further research is needed to explore this approach. Legislation through the National Assembly is the most certain way to implement these regulatory measures. However, even before legislation, parts that can be realized through rules or policies of courts or self-governing regulations or policies of lawyers’ organizations need to be tried in advance. In the process of transition to the integration of the legal profession, where lawyers with not less than 10 years of practice are appointed as judges, there is also a need to take measures to improve the nonpecuniary benefits and monetary reward of judges so that strengthening regulations on former judges returning to practice will not cause side effects, such as a reduction in applications of competent attorneys for judicial posts.

노동위원회 대체론에 기반한 노동사회법원 도입론에 대한 비판적 검토 - 독립성, 공정성, 전문성을 중심으로 -

차성안(Cha, Sungan) 한국법학원 2022 저스티스 Vol.- No.188

노동(사회)법원 도입론은 노동위원회의 부당해고, 차별시정 등에 관한 심판기능을 폐지하고 노동(사회)법원으로 이를 대체하는 형태로 주로 주장되어왔다. 행정부 소속인 노동위원회의 독립성은 법원에 비하여 약할 수밖에 없고 이는 노동사회법원을 통한 노동위원회 대체론의 가장 큰 논거 중 하나이다. 조사관이 결정권을 갖지는 못하고, 결정권을 가지는 공익위원의 선발이 노사 양측의 참여로 이루어지는 구조는 노동위원회의 독립성을 높여주는 요소이다. 공정성의 외관 차원에서 노동위원회 절차상 일방 당사자 의사소통 등에 대한 규제가 없는 등의 한계가 있기는 하나, 절차형성 권한(조사관)과 판단 권한(공익위원)이 분리되고, 대부분 비상근인 공익위원들이 사건마다 추첨에 따라 참여하는 구조는 노동위원회 심판절차상 비정상적인 의사소통의 가능성과 필요성을 줄여준다. 노동위원회의 위원과 조사관 사이의 긴장관계가 가미된 전문가득세형 참심제 요소와 근로자위원, 사용자위원을 통하여 노사의 현장경험에서 오는 전문성을 반영하는 구조도 실보다는 득이 많은 구조이다. 이런 점들을 고려하면, 노동위원회의 심판기능이 독립성, 공정성, 전문성 차원에서 폐지되어야 할 정도의 심각한 문제점을 갖고 있다고 보기 어렵다. 대체론과 결별하고 노동사회법원과 노동위원회의 경쟁‧보완관계 설정을 고민할 필요가 있다. 상호경쟁 메커니즘에 기반하는 경우 독립성, 공정성, 전문성 차원에서 양 절차의 발전방안을 보다 구체적이고 심도 있게 고민할 수 있다. 예를 들어 조사관에 대한 제척, 기피, 회피규정과 관련 윤리규정의 마련, 심판절차상 일방 당사자 의사소통 등 비정상적 접촉에 대한 규제 신설 등의 문제는 노동위원회가 법원과의 경쟁‧보완관계에서 영감을 얻을 수 있는 부분이다. 반대로 노동위원회가 형성해 온 전문가득세형 국민의 사법참여 방식은 노동사회법원의 (준)참심제 도입시, 전문가의 전문성과 일반 사용자, 근로자의 노동현장의 경험에서 오는 전문성 중 무엇을 중시할 것인가를 고민하게 해준다. The introduction of the Labor (Social) Court has been mainly argued as a form of abolition of the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission regarding unfair dismissal, correction of discriminatory treatment, etc and replacing it with the Labor (Social) Court. The independence of the Labor Relations Commission, which is part of the executive branch, is inevitably weaker than that of the courts, and this is one of the biggest grounds for claiming to replace the Labor Relations Commission by the Labor and Social Court. The structure of the Labor Relations Commission, in which investigators do not have the right to vote, but public interest members who have the right to vote are selected through the participation of the trade union and the employers" association, is a factor that enhances its independence. In terms of the appearance of fairness, there are limitations such as the absence of regulation on ex parte communication in the Labor Relations Commission procedure. However, the structure of the Labor Relations Commission, in which the authority to form the procedure (of the investigator) and the authority to judge (of the public interest member) are separated, and most part-time public interest members participate in the judgment by lottery for each case, reduces the possibility and necessity of abnormal communication in the procedure. The expert-led lay judge structure, which contains a tension between the Labor Relations Commission members and the investigators, and the structure that reflects the expertise gained from the experiences of workers and employers in the workplace through workers’ members and employers’ members have more advantages than disadvantages. Considering these factors, it is difficult to conclude that the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission has such serious problems in terms of independence, fairness, and expertise that the abolition of that function is necessary. It is necessary to give up the argument that the Labor Relations Commission should be replaced by the Labor and Social Court, and to consider establishing a competitive and complementary relationship between the two institutions. If it is based on the mutual competition mechanism, more detailed and in-depth consideration can be given to how to improve both procedures in terms of independence, fairness, and expertise. For example, the Labor Relations Commission can be inspired by the competitive and complementary relationship with the court in relation to issues such as the establishment of disqualification regulations for investigators, the enactment of related ethical regulations, and the establishment of regulations on abnormal contacts such as ex parte communication in procedures. On the other hand, the expert-led civil participation in the commission procedure developed by the Labor Relations Commission enriches the analysis on what should be emphasized among the expertise of experts and the expertise of employers and workers obtained from experience in the workplace when the (quasi-)lay judge system of the Labor and Social Court is introduced.

노동사회법원과 노동위원회의 경쟁·보완관계의 설정방안 - 심판기능을 중심으로 -

車城安 ( Cha Sungan ) 법조협회 2021 法曹 Vol.70 No.6

기존의 노동사회법원 도입 논의는 노동위원회 심판기능의 폐지 내지 대폭 축소, 그에 기반한 노동위원회의 조정기관화 등을 전제로 이루어진 경우가 대부분이었다. 그러나 노동분쟁해결절차의 발전을 위해서는 오히려 현재의 노동위원회 심판기능의 구조를 유지한 상태에서, 노동위원회와 경쟁하고, 일정 부분은 보완하는 형태의 노동사회법원이 도입될 필요가 있다. 법원의 노동사회법원 도입에 관한 최근 움직임은 이론적 근거가 좀 더 갖추어진다면 노동위원회 심판기능의 유지를 전제로 한 노동사회법원 도입론으로 전환될 가능성을 지니고 있다. 법원은 노동위원회 대체형이 아닌 노동위원회와 경쟁·보완하는 형태의 노동사회법원에도 별다른 반대를 하지 않을 가능성이 크고, 오히려 초기 노동사회법원에 투입할 법관 숫자의 확보 문제로 인하여 경쟁·보완관계를 선호할 가능성도 적지 않다. 노동위원회의 심판기능을 유지하면서 노동사회법원을 도입하여 노동사회법원과 노동위원회 사이에 경쟁ㆍ보완 관계를 설정하는 것은 노동사회법원과 노동위원회 각각의 노동분쟁해결절차를 더 효과적으로 발전시키는 방안이 될 수 있다. 노동사회법원와 노동위원회의 상호경쟁메커니즘은 신속성, 비용, 심리의 충실, 권한의 측면에서 양 기관의 노동분쟁해결절차 모두를 개선시키는데 도움이 될 수 있다. 현재 상황에서 노동사회법원 도입론이 노동위원회 심판기능을 폐지하고 이를 대체하는 의미로 논의되는 것은 비현실적이고, 노동사회법원의 도입에 별다른 도움이 되지 않을 뿐만 아니라 오히려 해롭다. 노동사회법원을 도입하더라도 노동사회법원으로 노동위원회의 심판기능을 대체할 가능성은 최소 10년 이상의 경쟁·보완관계를 거친 후에 양 기관의 성과를 비교해 검토하는 것이 타당하다. Most of the existing discussions on the introduction of the Labor and Social Court were based on the premise of the abolition or significant reduction of the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission and the conversion of the Labor Relations Commission into a mediation and reconciliation agency. However, in order to improve the labor dispute resolution procedure, it is necessary to introduce the Labor and Social court that competes with and complements the Labor Relations Commission while maintaining the current structure of the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission. The recent position of the court on the introduction of the Labor and Social Court has the potential to be converted into an argument for the introduction of the Labor and Social Court, which is premised on the maintenance of the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission, if the theoretical basis is more established. It is highly likely that the court will not object to the Labor and Social Court, which competes with and complements the Labor Relations Commission rather than substitutes for the Labor Relations Commission. Rather, it is highly likely that competition and complementary relations will be preferred due to the difficulty of securing a large number of judges who should be assigned to the Labor and Social courts in the early stages. Establishing a competitive and complementary relationship between the Labor and Social Court and the Labor Relations Commission by introducing the Labor and Social Court while maintaining the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission would be a more effective way to improve the labor dispute resolution procedures of the Labor and Social Court and the Labor Relations Commission respectively. The mutual competition mechanism between the Labor and Social Court and the Labor Relations Commission can help improve both labor dispute resolution procedures in both institutions in terms of speed, cost, sufficient hearing and adjudication authority. In the current situation, it is unrealistic to discuss the introduction of the Labor and Social Court as a means to abolish and replace the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission, and it is rather harmful to the introduction of the Labor and Social Court. Even if the Labor and Social Court is introduced, it is reasonable to compare and review the performance of the two institutions after undergoing at least 10 years of competitive and complementary relations to determine whether the Labor and Social Court will replace the function of adjudication of the Labor Relations Commission.

장애인학대범죄의 형사법적 쟁점과 개선방안

차성안(Cha, Sungan) 충남대학교 법학연구소 2021 法學硏究 Vol.32 No.1

이 글에서는 장애인학대범죄의 개념, 구성요건, 법정형 등 장애인학대범죄의 형사법적 쟁점을 살핀 후 개선방안을 제시한다. 장애인학대범죄에는 형법상 학대죄가 적용되어 처벌되기도 하였는데, 형법상 학대죄는 그 적용범위가 포괄적이기는 하나 그 주체가 보호, 감독자로 한정되고, 학대의 수준이 생명, 신체의 안전에 위험을 초래할 정도에 이를 것을 요하며 법정형이 획일적으로 낮게 정하여져 있다는 등의 한계를 갖는다. 이후 장애인복지법상 장애인학대를 금지하는 규정이 도입되면서 장애인학대의 개념이 세분화되었고, 이러한 금지행위를 위반하는 자를 다양한 법정형으로 처벌하는 규정이 도입되었다. 장애인복지법상 장애인학대범죄는 신고의무의 범위와 장애인권익옹호기관의 개입권한의 범위를 확정하기 위한 개념으로 사용되고 있는데, 구체적인 죄명을 열거하는 방식으로 입법되지 않았다는 점에서 한계를 갖는다. 최근에 도입된 장애인학대관련범죄 개념이 사실상 대부분 장애인학대범죄와 겹친다고 보아야 할 것이나, 명확한 해결을 위해서는 장애인학대범죄를 구체적으로 정의하는 법개정이 필요하다. 장애인 성폭력 유형이 다양함에도 획일적인 같은 법정형으로 처벌하는 것은 문제이다. 장애인 성희롱, 정서적 학대 등은 기존에 처벌되지 않던 행위를 새롭게 처벌하거나 그 처벌범위를 확장한 것이이므로, 이에 관한 구체적인 사례들을 다양하게 수집하여 그 구성요건을 소개, 분석할 필요가 있다. 장애인에 대한 노동력 착취, 경제적 착취형태의 장애인학대범죄의 심각성을 담아낼 수 있는 새로운 구성요건에 대한 입법이 시도될 필요가 있다. This article examines the criminal law issues of the abuse of persons with disabilities, such as the concept, requirements and the punishment of crimesof abuse of persons with disabilities, and explores ways to improve them. The crimes of abuse of persons with disabilities have been punished by applying the crime of abuse under the Criminal Act, but this has the following limitations. Although the scope of abuse is comprehensive under the Criminal Act, the subject of the crime is limited to those who protect and supervise persons with disabilities. The level of abuse is required to reach a level that poses a risk to life and physical safety, and the statutory sentence is uniformly set very low. Subsequently, the concept of abuse of persons with disabilities was subdivided with the introduction of provisions prohibiting the abuse of persons with disabilities under the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities(AWPD). Under AWPD, crimes of abuse of persons with disabilities are used as a concept to determine the scope of the reporting obligation and the scope of the rights to intervene of the Advocacy Agency for Persons with Disabilities, but it has a limitation in that it was not legislated by listing specific crime names. The recently introduced concept of crimes related to the abuse of persons with disabilities substantially overlaps with crimes of abuse of persons with disabilities, but for a clear solution, an amendment that specifically defines the crimes of abuse of persons with disabilities is needed. Despite the various types of sexual violence crimes against persons with disabilities, it is a problem to punish them with the same uniform sentence. Since sexual harassment and emotional abuse of persons with disabilities are newly punished or the scope of related punishment is expanded, it is necessary to introduce and analyze various specific cases. There is a need to attempt to legislate on new criminal requirements that can cover the seriousness of the abuse of persons with disabilities in the form of labor and economic exploitation.

해외의 전관예우 규제사례와 국내 규제방안 모색(1) - 퇴직법관의 변호사 개업에 대한 해외 규제사례 -

차성안 ( Cha Sungan ) 사법정책연구원 2019 연구보고서 Vol.2019 No.9

Judges returning to legal practice after leaving the bench could cause a situation that possibly raises doubts about the impartiality and fairness of the judiciary in many countries around the world. Many jurisdictions have discussed and enforced different regulations to address controversies surrounding judges who return to practice. This research first provides an overview of regulations for former judges returning to practice in many other countries, and then pays particular attention to the relevant regulations of the United Kingdom and Canada in which concerns about judges returning to practice have been raised and extensively discussed. The United States has adopted ethical rules governing judges returning to practice, which include rules on conflicts of interest, rules on the sitting judge’s negotiation of employment terms when seeking post-bench employment opportunities, and rules limiting the use of judicial titles or honorifics by former judges. According to U.S. ethics rules, if a former judge appears as counsel before courts where he/she served, sitting judges are advised to recuse themselves, for one or two years following the judge’s retirement date. Even though a fixed period may have expired, a judge may be required to recuse herself/himself in a case where counsel for a party is a former judge with whom the sitting judge had a particularly close association. In addition, telephone communications or communications outside a court hearing with former judges are strictly regulated by the ethics rules that prohibit ex parte communications. In rare circumstances, such as New York Court of Appeals or New Jersey’s courts, a former judge may not serve as an attorney before the court at all. It is also noteworthy that the introduction of the ban against the return to practice of former Article III federal judges has been discussed but not yet resolved. Commonwealth countries (including former Commonwealth countries) have varying levels of regulation on former judges returning to practice after retirement. In Ireland, according to tradition and the code of conduct for the Bar, judges of the Irish Courts, following retirement or resignation, who return to the Bar may not practice in a court of equal or lesser jurisdiction than the court of which they were members. In Hong Kong and Singapore, by statutes or understanding upon appointment all judges or judges of certain upper courts shall not practice as a barrister or solicitor after they have completed their service. In Nigeria, the Constitution prohibits former judges from appearing or acting as a legal practitioner before any court of law or tribunal completely and permanently. In Germany, the Federal Civil Servants Status Act enables state law and administrative measures to prohibit former judges with paid pensions from appearing for up to five years as counsel before the court where they served. In Taiwan, former judges and prosecutors are prohibited for three years after leaving office from taking cases in jurisdictions where they have served. In China, judges-turned-lawyers are prohibited for two years after leaving the bench from representing litigants before any court and permanently from representing or practicing as lawyers before the courts where they served. In England, Wales, and Canada, there have been long and lively discussions over the regulation of former judges returning to practice. In England and Wales, former judges returning to practice is completely prohibited through the uncodified convention, which is reflected in the terms and conditions of judicial office to which each judge shall agree upon appointment. Between 2004 and 2006, the Lord Chancellor proposed removing the prohibition in order to increase diversity in the judiciary. Safeguards such as a prohibition on conducting oral and/or written advocacy for two years after retirement before any court and a prohibition for five years on the provision of advocacy services before judges at the same or at a lower tier were proposed in order to reduce possible risks of removing the prohibition of former judges returning to practice. As a quarantine period, it was also proposed that a former judge should not take up employment with any firm or individual who, in the preceding two years, has appeared before him/her for a final decision in a matter. The proposal to remove the prohibition on a judge’s return to practice, however, was with-drawn due to strong opposition from judges concerned about weakening the status of the judiciary and judicial independence. In Canada, the regulation governing former judges returning to practice and the limitation on their appearance before courts are governed by self-governing regulations or rules established by the Law Society of each Province or Territory under the delegation of the law. The Model Code of Conduct, which is drafted and approved by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, has a strong influence on these self-governing regulations. The current Model Code of Conduct prohibits a former judge from appearing as a lawyer before the court of which he/she was a member or before any courts of inferior jurisdiction to that court for three years. At the end of 2018, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada proposed to permanently prohibit all former judges from appearing before or communicating with any court in Canada. The prohibited “appearance” includes both signing materials submitted to the court or tribunal and any communications with the court or tribunal. Amendments have been proposed that would bar lawyers and law firms from soliciting sitting judges or from entering into discussions with a sitting judge about post judicial employment and allow them to discuss employment and business relationships only with a former judge after retirement. A new amendment was also proposed that imposes an obligation not to use or disclose judicial confidences for former judges who return to practice after retirement. Such examples of regulating former judges returning to practice across various jurisdictions may shed light on how Korea could improve its regulations. For specific implications to Korea, it is advised to refer to a separate research report called, “Comparative Study on Former Judges Returning to Practice and the Implications for Korea (2) - How to Regulate Former Judges Returning to Practice in Korea”, which is published with this research report.