미국학 : 냉전 ( 冷戰 ) 의 기원론

차상철(Cha Sang Chul) 충남대학교 북미주연구소 1997 북미주학연구 Vol.6 No.-

논문 / 매카시즘과 스탈린주의 그리고 냉전의 심화

차상철(Sang Chul Cha) 한국미국사학회 1999 미국사연구 Vol.10 No.-

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine, analyze, and evaluate the impact of McCarthyism and Stalinism on the growing tension and mutual animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union, which resulted in the escalation of the Cold war in the second half of the twentieth century. The Truman adminstration`s approach to defining, and responding to criticisms of, its internal security policy as well as its external policy led to the evolution of a clearly suppressive domestic atmosphere, which intensified excessive public fears of Communism and utimately contributed to the emergence of Senator Joshep Raymond McCarthy and McCarthyism. American politics and society enormously suffered from the hysteria of $quot;McCarthyism,$quot; a term that meant a ruthless search for Communists, during the early 1950s. Although McCarthy`s accusations of $quot;a lot of Communists$quot; in the federal government proved to be groundless, McCarthyism continued to flourish. The outbreak of the Korean War not only gave new life to McCarthyism but decisively contributed to the spread of it, which eventually made the intensification of the Soviet-American and Sino-American confrontations inevitable after the end of the war. It took more than twenty years for both Washington and Beijing to search for normalization of diplomatic relations. Joseph Stalin made every effort to transplant Stalinism as a system of totalitarian single-party dictatorship on Eastern Europe after World War II. Thus Stalin`s control was extended over Eastern European countries and Stalinist system was imposed in each nation at least by 1948. In order not to repeat the terrible devastation of his country during the Second World War Stalin wanted to make Eastern Europe a buffer zone between the West and the Soviet Union. In resolute response to the European Recovery Program [the Marshall Plan], Stalin established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and aggressively pursued the $quot;Stalinization$quot; of the Eastern European region as well as its economic dependence upon Moscow through the Soviet Union`s military alliances with the East European neighbors. Stalin and McCarthy died in 1953 and 1957 respectively. Both Stalinism and McCarthyism remained alive for a long time, however. The irrational and excessive fear of Communism McCarthy had exploited continued to influence the attitude of the American people toward the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Under these circumstances the growth of productive debate and healthy dissent was almost impossible. The death of Stalin also did not contribute to the coming of the end of the Cold War. Rather his successors including Nikita Khrushchev suffered from a long shadow of uncertainty and fear Stalin left behind. In short, they continued to remain in their mentor`s shadow in their approach and behavior toward the capitalist countries led by their top adversary, the United States. All in all, McCarthyism as well as Stalinism merely prolonged, escalated, and intensified the Cold War.

냉전초기 ( 1945 - 1949 ) 미국의 중국정책

차상철 ( Sang Chul Cha ) 한국미국사학회 1996 미국사연구 Vol.4 No.-

박정희와 1970년대의 한미동맹

車相哲(Cha, Sang-chul) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2010 군사 Vol.- No.75

케네디 · 존슨과 박정희 그리고 1960년대의 한미동맹

車相哲(Cha, Sang-chul) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2006 군사 Vol.- No.58

존 퀸시 애덤스 ( John Quincy Adams ) 와 미국의 팽창주의

차상철 ( Sang Chul Cha ) 한국서양사학회 1994 西洋史論 Vol.43 No.1

제14회 부산아시아경기대회 선수촌병원내 한방진료실 내원환자의 고찰

차상철 ( Sang Chul Cha ),안정란 ( Jeong Lan Ahn ),김철규 ( Cheol Gyu Kim ),이인선 ( In Seon Lee ) 한방재활의학과학회 2003 한방재활의학과학회지 Vol.13 No.1

Objectives : The purpose of this study is to find out characteristic of patients visited oriental medical clinic in athletes` village at the 14th Busan Asian Games and provide basic data for specialization of oriental medicine. Methods : We statistically analyzed study in 507 patients, who had visited oriental medical clinic in athletes` village at the 14th Busan Asian Games from 23, September, 2002 to 16, October, 2002. Results & Conclusions : ①In distribution of sex, the rate of male was 84%, and that of female was 16%. ②In distribution of nationality, most of patients were korean and the patients of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan were also many. ③In distribution of patient`s type, most of patients were athlete, followed by staff. ④In distribution of the first visiting date, the most of patients had visited on 2, October. and then the number of first visiting patient was decreased. ⑤In distribution of the days of treatment, the rate of patients were treated only onetime was 55.2%, and that of patients were treated over-twice was 44.8%. ⑥In the sports event distribution of athletes, the number of shooting was the most, volleyball. ⑦In distribution of disease, the number of lumbar & leg pain was the most, followed by neck & shoulder pain. ⑧In distribution of treatment method, the number of Acupuncture & physical treatment was the most, followed by only physical treatment. ⑨In distribution of treatment effect according to Roubin`s Diagnosis, the rate of `excellent` was 6.2%, that of `good` was 44.1%, that of `fair` was 11.0%, that of `poor`was 0.9%. And the rate of `missing` was 37.9%.

아이젠하워 , 이승만 , 그리고 1950 년대의 한미관계

차상철(Sang Chul Cha) 한국미국사학회 2001 미국사연구 Vol.13 No.-

The 1950s saw the rapid $quot;globalization$quot; and $quot;militarization$quot; of the Cold War which led to the growing ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The decade also witnessed frequent repetition of mutual confrontation, dissension, and ultimate compromise between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Syngman Rhee. The outbreak of the Korean War led President Rhee to believe that the conclusion of a mutual security pact between Korea and the United States was urgently necessary. His argument was based upon the conviction that the renewed Japanese expansionism, not to speak of the Communist aggression, threatened the national security of Korea. Rhee regarded the proposed mutual defense treaty as the most effective remedy to contain these external threats. The Eisenhower administration disagreed. Both Eisenhower and Rhee, however, realized that they had no choice but to depend on each other. The United States ultimately agreed to Rhee`s demand in return for the latter`s promise not to oppose an armistice. While American officials expected that the Mutual Defense Treaty would serve to contain not only the Communist threat but Rhee`s $quot;go-North$quot; policy, the Korean president thought that the treaty would contribute considerably to containing both the Communist and Japanese expansionism. To Rhee, the treaty was a $quot;life line$quot; on which Korea`s national survival depended. The Eisenhower administration considered the cease-fire as an end to hostilities whereas Rhee regarded the truce as a temporary suspension of hostilities. Believing that the mutual defense treaty alone was not sufficient to Korea`s national security, Rhee requested Eisenhower to build up and modernize Korean armed forces. The United States refused Rhee`s demand mainly because of the possibility of his unilateral military action to achieve Korean reunification. Instead American officials emphasized the necessity of early normalization of Korean-Japanese relationship. Rhee responded to the American demand by proposing a tripartite non-aggression pact among the United States, Korea, and Japan as a prerequisite to the Korean-Japanese talks for rapprochement. As far as the normalization issue was concerned, there was little progress. The protracted Korean-American negotiations on the reinforcement of the Korean military, however, ultimately resulted in the Agreed Minutes of Understanding under which the United States would provide military and economic assistance of total $700 million for fiscal year 1955 in return for Korea`s consent to retain Korean forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command. Thus came the end of Rhee`s policy for $quot;marching northward.$quot; American officials thought that it would be unlikely that American forces could become embroiled $quot;against their will$quot; in Rhee`s unilateral renewal of hostilities. By agreeing to the reduction of two divisions, not four divisions demanded by the United States in the late 1950s, in return for Eisenhower`s promise of modern weapons for the Korean military, Rhee successfully negotiated once again a favorable terms for Korea than the Eisenhower administration had originally intended. By so doing, he seemed to believe that Korea`s national security was much more secure than ever before. In shit, despite their frequent antagonistic confrontations in the Korean-American negotiations the intensification of the Cold War of the 1950s forced Eisenhower and Syngman Rhee to maintain the relationship of $quot;interdependent$quot; partners. And the formulation of the U.S. - Korea security system played an important role to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the Korean peninsula throughout the rest of the twentieth century.

한결 김윤경 선생 나신 100돌 기념 : 존 하지 ( John Reed Hodge ) 와 미군정 3년

차상철 (Sang Chul Cha) 연세대학교 국학연구원 1995 동방학지 Vol.89-90 No.-

N/A

이승만의 미국인식 : 형성과 전개

차상철(Cha Sang-chul) 한국인물사연구소 2008 한국인물사연구 Vol.9 No.-

The principal purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate Syngman Rhee's perceptions of the United States of America throughout his entire life (l875~1965). It is already well-known that Rhee was a staunch anti-communist not to speak of a resolute Japanophobe. To say that Rhee maintained a pro-American stand, however, is simply untrue, because his perception of the United States changed remarkably after he knew the existence of the so-called "Taft-Kasura Secret Agreement" between the United States and Japan of July 1905 in which the Theodore Roosevelt administration recognized Japan's right to "establish suzerainty over Korea" in return for Tokyo's abandonment of any aggressive plans upon the Philippines. The American "betrayals" of Korea during the first half of the twentieth century forced Rhee not only to rethink the United States but also to realize the mercilessness and cruelty of international politics. A prominent expert in American way of thinking and behaving, Rhee was determined to make the best of the United States, the only superpower in the world, for the sake of assuring the national survival and security of the new-born Republic of Korea. President Rhee was convinced that the United States is the only country the Korean people should rely on in the troubled waters of the Cold War era. The 1950s saw the rapid "globalization" and "militarization" of the Cold War which led to the growing ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The decade also witnessed frequent repetition of mutual confrontation, dissension, and ultimate compromise between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Syngman Rhee. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led President Rhee to believe that the conclusion of a mutual security pact between Seoul and Washington was urgently necessary. Rhee regarded the proposed mutual defense treaty as the most effective remedy to contain the external threats. The United States disagreed. Both Eisenhower and Rhee, however, realized that they had no choice but to depend on each other. The United States ultimately agreed to Rhee's demand in return for the latter's promise not to oppose the armistice. To Rhee, the Mutual Defense Treaty was a "lifeline" on which Korea's national survival depended. All in all, despite their frequent antagonistic confrontations in the Korean-American negotiations the intensification of the Cold War of the 1950s forced both Rhee and Eisenhower to maintain the relationship of "interdependent" partners. And the formulation of the U.S.-Korea security system played a decisive role to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the Korean peninsula until the present time.