日本近代

趙明哲(Cho Myung-chul) 역사학회 2000 역사학보 Vol.167 No.-

러일전쟁과 영토확장 : 사할린 점령작전의 재검토 조명철

조명철(Cho, Myung-Chul) 일본사학회 2021 일본역사연구 Vol.56 No.-

봉천회전 후, 러일 양국의 전력이 소진됨으로써 일본 육군은 더 이상 추격전을 벌일 수 없었고 러시아군도 대규모 반격을 시도할 수 없었다. 이런 이유로 봉천회전의 승리에도 불구하고 전쟁은 종료되지 않았다. 봉천회전 이후 일본 육군은 새로운 작전을 기획했다. 보통 ‘제2기 작전계획’으로 불리는 이 작전계획은 러시아군의 주력을 섬멸시 킴으로써 전쟁을 끝내겠다는 초기의 작전계획과는 전혀 다른 것이었다. 그것은 전쟁의 승패와는 무관한 특정 지역을 영구히 점령하기 위한 작전계획이었다. 먼저 ‘제2기 작전계획’에서 작전의 방향이 갑작스럽게 변경된 과정과 이유를 면밀히 살펴보았다. 다음으로 ‘제2기 작전계획’에서 언급된 점령 대상 중에서 군사적 점령에 성공한 곳은 사할린이 유일했다. 결과적으로 사할린은 ‘제2기 작전계획’의 목적이 가장 충실하게 실현된 지역이었다. 지금까지 사할린 점령작전은 전투의 규모나 치열함, 전략적 중요성 등에 비추어 러일전쟁 연구에 있어서 크게 주목받지 못했지만 전쟁을 통해 자국의 영토를 확장하고자 일본의 욕구가 완전하게 실현되었다는 점에서 새로운 접근이 필요하다. After the Battle of Mukden, the Japanese Army could no longer pursue and the Russian army could not attempt a large-scale counterattack as the power of the two countries was exhausted. For this reason, the war did not end despite the great victory of the Battle of Mukden. After the battle, the Japanese Army planned a new operation. This, commonly referred to as the Second Operation Plan, was a completely different plan from the earlier one to end the war by destroying the Russian military s main power. It was a plan to permanently occupy a specific area unrelated to the victory or defeat of the war. First, the process and reason for the sudden change in the purpose and direction of the operation in the Plan were closely examined. Next, Sakhalin was the only region that actually succeeded in military occupation among the objects of occupation mentioned in the Plan. As a result, Sakhalin was the region where the purpose of the Plan was most faithfully realized. So far, the Sakhalin occupation operation has not received much attention in the study of the Russo-Japanese War in light of the size, fierceness, and distance from Manchuria. But it needs to be reviewed anew in that Japan’s desire to expand its territory through the war has been fully realized.

일본의 軍事戰略과 ‘國防方針’의 성립

Cho Myung Chul(趙明哲) 일본사학회 1997 일본역사연구 Vol.5 No.-

After the Russo-Japanese War ended, there began a movement in Japan to unity nation’s external strategy by the army. As a result, the Defense Plan of the Japanese Empire was enacted in April, 1907. It was for the first tirre since the Meiji Restoration that an overall long-term direction in the defense affairs was decided The Defense Plan stipulated such items as the unified political and military strategy, offensive strategy, presumed enemy-nation, the size of military armaments. Although it contained unrealistic items, it is viewed a cornerstone in the establishment of the military circles (‘gunbu’) because it aimed at the military’ s predominance in the military-cabinet relationship. Previous studies on the Defense Plan has focused on the political, military and financial aspects. However, this study focused on the process in which the unified political and military strategy and the principle of offensive strategy developed into the central concept in the military strategy of the Defense Plan. As a result, it reached the following conclusions: the Defense Plan was not a temporary phenomenon resulting from the intoxication of war victory; it came into reality thanks to the continuous demands from the mid-level officers who voiced for offensive strategy since the prewar period; consequently, unlike the political interests of the upper-level officers, the mid-level officers intended to solve the military-strategic problems such as the disagreement of political and military strategies, the absence of unitied operations between the army and the navy, and the delay of Manchurian operations due to defensive strategy through a special remedy, that is, the Defense Plan.

근대일본의 전쟁과 팽창의 논리

조명철 ( Myung Chul Cho ) 고려대학교 역사연구소 2008 사총 Vol.67 No.-

일본의 러일전쟁에 대한 인식

조명철(Cho Myung Chul) 한림대학교 아시아문화연구소 2004 아시아문화 Vol.- No.21

Regardless of the purpose and reason, Russo-Japanese War was a general war which determined the destiny of the involved countries and as the result, Japan colonized Korea and made inroads to Manchuria. The international standing of Japan skyrocketed far beyond that of its diplomacy or commerce and joined the world Powers. In addition, there were great changes, what can be called structural changes, in every aspect of politics, economy and social situation. So there has been many researches studying Russo-Japanese War from not only the military angle but also viewing from various standpoints such as foreign policy, its connection with domestic politics, the Japanese Capitalism, and social thought having power over the people and the ideology in control. Also there has been various methods to study on Russo-Japanese War. There were theoretical approaches, positive analyses, studies of the war itself and applications of the war as a standard to define the era. The bulkier the study of Russo-Japanese War the less all-out researches are. The main current of the study is to view a specific area.

러일전쟁기 일본육군의 대러시아 작전 계획과 사할린 점령 문제

조명철 ( Cho Myung-chul ) 고려대학교 글로벌일본연구원 2019 일본연구 Vol.31 No.0

의화단 사건 이후 러시아군이 만주의 요지를 점거하자 일본의 참모본부는 대러시아 작전 계획을 수립하기 시작했다. 당시 대러시아 작전계획에는 연해주 방면 작전은 삽입되어 있었지만 사할린 점령 작전은 전혀 포함되어 있지 않았다. 영일동맹 이후 러일간의 위기가 고조되던 시기에도 대러시아 작전계획은 더욱 구체화되어 갔지만 사할린 작전은 언급되지 않았고 오히려 한반도에 대한 작전 비중은 높아져갔다. 전쟁 초기에 일본군의 작전계획이 모두 수립될 때까지도 사할린 점령작전은 대본영, 만주군총사령부, 육군성 어디에서도 정식으로 검토되지 않았다. 사할린 점령 작전계획은 러일전쟁 초기까지 전혀 존재하지 않았다는 사실을 확정지을 수 있다. 사할린 점령작전은 나가오카 대본영 참모차장의 개인적 차원에서 반복적으로 주장되고 요청되었다. 결국 나가오카의 집요한 설득작업으로 대본영은 사할린 점령 작전이 수면 위에 떠올랐으나 주위의 비협적인 분위기 속에서 쉽게 실행에 옮기지 못했다. 결국, 발틱함대의 괴멸 이후 일본의 승리가 확정적으로 되면서 사할린 점령작전은 추진되었다. 아무리 전시라 하더라도 전쟁의 목표와 무관한 작전은 절실한 정치적 외교적 필요성을 동반하지 않으면 성립하기 힘들다는 사실을 알 수 있다. 즉 순수한 군사적 이유만으로 성립할 수 없는 작전이 사할린 점령작전이었다. 이점에서 스스로 정치적 판단을 내리고 그것을 근거로 작전계획을 수립하고자 했던 나가오카의 의도는 성공하지 못했다. 즉 나가오카는 정부의 정략적 요구에 대응하는 군사적 작전만을 검토해야 할 참모본부 본연의 권한을 벗어나고 있었다. 이러한 돌출 행동은 전시이기 때문에 용납될 수 있었겠지만 나가오카는 이미 군의 영역을 벗어나 정치의 영역에 들어서고 있었다. 정치적 판단에 신중하지 못한 나가오카의 행동에 대해 전후 비판적인 시각이 나타나지 않았다는 사실도 1930년대 군의 일탈행위를 예고하고 있다고 하겠다. 러일전쟁에서의 승리가 나가오카의 일탈 행위에 대한 비판의식을 무디게 만들었을 가능성도 배제할 수 없겠다. After the Uihadan incident, when Russian troops occupied the main strategic area of Manchuria, Japan’s chief of staff began to devise a plan to counter Russia. At that time, military operational strategy related to the coast of Primorsky was incorporated into the plan, but no considerations related to the desired occupation of Sakhalin were included. At a time of escalating crisis in Russia after the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the plan for counteroperations against Russia became more concrete, but the Sakhalin operation was not discussed, and instead the proportion of planned operations on the Korean peninsula increased. Even by the time the Japanese military’s operational plans had been established in the early days of the war, no operational plan to occupy Sakhalin was formally reviewed by the authorities in Daesung, the Manchurian Army General Command or the Army Department. Therefore it is clear that a plan for the occupation of Sakhalin did not exist during the early days of the Russo-Japanese War. Such a plan was repeatedly requested by Daesung Deputy Chief of Staff Sun-young, Nagaka. In the end, through Nagoya’s persistent efforts at persuasion, a draft plan to occupy Sakhalin came to the surface, but it was not easy to put it into practice amid the uncooperative atmosphere. After all, Japan’s victory was confirmed after the destruction of Russia's Baltic Fleet and the invasion of Sakhalin was pushed forward. Even in wartime, operations unrelated to the goals of the war could hardly be carried out without the impetus provided by urgent political and diplomatic necessity. In other words, the Sakhalin occupation could not be established on the basis of purely military factors. As a result, Nagaoqa’s intention to establish an operational plan was unsuccessful. He was deviating from the original authority granted to staff headquarters, which meant that it could only consider military operations in response to the government’s political demands. Such an overreach could have been acceptable because it was an exhibition of power, but Nagaoqa was already entering the political arena, advancing beyond the military's remit. The fact that his behavior, which was lacking in political judgment, did not suggest any criticism of postwar views, also heralded a departure from the military in the 1930s.

근대 일본의 대외정책과 동아시아 : 의화단사건과 동아시아의 정세변화 - 일본의 외교전략을 중심으로 -

조명철 ( Myung Chul Cho ) 이화사학연구소 2002 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.29

일본의 대외전쟁과 대본영의 운영실태 - 청일, 러일전쟁을 중심으로 -

趙明哲(Cho, Myung Chul) 동양사학회 2019 東洋史學硏究 Vol.147 No.-

The script was created during the creation of the Navy’s military command, the Navy’s military command. Through this, the Army wanted to take the initiative in wartime. In other words, the script was the product of a conflict between the army and the navy over the military’s desire to create an independent agency that could not reach interference from the government and politicians under the pretext of the emperor’s control. Although the organization was purely for the military, the first of its kind was the one in which a civilian politician representing the government took part, which did not carry out its original intention. However, the first scriptwriter played a very successful role, including the cooperation of the military, the cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the connection with the military. Most of all, it is noteworthy that civilian control has been compromised in the war map. In this process, it is very meaningful that the “coordination of political strategy” has won the consensus of the government and the military as a great principle in conducting the war. After the Sino-Japanese War, the Army wanted to create an army-oriented system in peacetime, but was frustrated when it faced strong opposition from the Navy. The Navy took a step further, saying, “The wartime headquarters ordinance should be revised because it is on a par with the Army, Navy and Army.” The Army, which could no longer pressure the Navy to revise its wartime headquarters ordinance with the Bolmo War, accepted the Navy’s demand just before the opening of the war with Russia and created a war zone ordinance in which the Army and Navy were equal. This earned the Navy equal status with the Army in peacetime and wartime, but there was no institutional mechanism for reaching an agreement between the Army and Navy in the script. Fortunately, by the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the systemic flaws of Scrippyong had been resolved relatively smoothly by experienced and experienced human resources.

역사교육의 제도와 이념

Cho Myung Chul(趙明哲) 일본사학회 2003 일본역사연구 Vol.17 No.-

Although most Meiji leaders shared the view on the importance of education, education policy was rarely on top of their policy lists. One of the reason was that the investment on education was very late in return. Still education reflected the ideology of the nation as the strengthening of the Emperor system proceeded in close relations with the changes in education. In particular, historical education played a big part in sustaining the state. Most societies have put importance on historical education as a means of accomplishing national integration because it gives reassurances on national bondage and patriotism. The problems in prewar Japan was that it removed scientific and rational thinking from historical education and only emphasized patriotism and loyalty to the emperor. Although historical education went though critical changes in the postwar period, the system of textbook certification contains the element of prewar historical education by allowing the state to influence the contents of the education.

러일전쟁기 일본 육군의 만주전략

趙明哲(Cho, Myung-Chul) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2004 군사 Vol.- No.51