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임수환(Su Hwan Lim) 한국부패학회 2002 한국부패학회보 Vol.6 No.1
Most of new democracies have not made progress in terms of legitimation since their transition in the third wave of democratization One of the paramount obstacles to the legitimatization is the political corruption that is not reduced with the democratic transition. Why does political corruption not go away with the authoritarian government but remain after the democratic transition? How can we control post-transition corruption? There are two approaches on the problem. Populistic approach regards the post-transition corruption as an authoritarian leftover. Populistic approach calls for more democracy to clear up authoritarian elements as well as corruption itself. The approach is based upon normative view of democracy, which orders common good and general will realized. Normative view of democracy used to become popular during the democratic transition due to its ideological power. The normative view of democracy and populistic approach to political corruption predominates the contemporary Korean society. However this paper argues that Koreans cannot control the post transition corruption without the help of institutionalist approach. Institutionalist approach is based on the empirical view of democracy, which characterize democracy with the rule and procedure ensuring political competition, mass participation, and civil liberty. Political corruption will be under our control as we achieve democratic institutionalization according to the intstitutionalist approach. New democracies are not capable of keeping civil society stable due to the low level of institutionalization. The unstable party system and the post-transition politics of redistribution destroy state capacity to control corruption. This paper recommends start with the strengthening policy capacity of the legislative for the control of corruption.
서유럽 근대농업의 전개와 정치적 근대화: 15-19세기 영국, 프랑스, 독일 사례의 비교
임수환 ( Lim Su Hwan ) 한국정치평론학회 2022 정치와 평론 Vol.30 No.-
Agricultural and political modernization had proceeded in very different ways in Britain, France and Germany. Capitalist farms and parliamentary democracy resulted in prosperity and stability in Britain. Peasant economy stagnated and parliamentary democracy vacillated in France. Germany had supported peasants and Junker farms to improve productivity through public institutions. British landed aristocrats partnered with capitalists to develop capitalist farms and lead parliamentary democracy. French landed aristocrats lost political leadership through the great revolution. Kaiser and Junker class-based high officials divided and ruled the peasants and labor during industrialization. Landed aristocrat-capitalist coalition in Britain can be characterized liberal while that in Germany authoritarian. The French experienced agricultural stagnation and political vacillation without such a ruling coalition. Modern dictatorship filled in for the ruling coalition in France. Napoleon Bonaparte rationalized bureaucracy and mobilized sons of peasants to conquer the continent. Napoleon III were elected president based on the support of peasants and intervened in the market to facilitate industrial development. German Government facilitated agricultural growth through public institutions that imported new technologies from Britain. Kaiser initiated the reform of 1807 to liberalize serfs in order to emulate French national army. Liberation of the serfs resulted in the modernization of Junker farms.
임수환 ( Su Hwan Lim ) 한국정치평론학회 2015 정치와 평론 Vol.16 No.-
As the US Army Military Government in Korea failed to implement their original plan of trusteeship on Korean Peninsula, Korean leaders who fought against trusteeship made substantial influence in building institutions of the new Korea. This paper argues that the concept of land reform presented by the Provisional Republic of Korea Government in 1941 was carried by the influential Korean leaders when they designed institutions of the new Korea. The Provisional Government in Chongqing pronounced the Principles and Plans for National Reconstruction in 1941 with principles of land reform included. Principles of land reform consisted of nationalization of lands, prohibition of labor- employment in private farms, land-to-the-tillers. Leaders of Provisional Government carried the PPNR on to the policies and constitutional proposals, prepared by the Representative Democratic Council under the US Army Military Governmant in Korea. Later, the US Military Government wrote its own land reform bill, which conforms market value in compensation to the landowners. The land reform law passed by the ROK legislature prohibited private farms from hiring labor and distributed lands to the tillers, but did not nationalize lands. The land reform law cut compensation rate for landowners by half from the US Military Government’s reform bill. Korean leaders did away with the conformation to the market value as soon as the US influence weakened at the withdraw of forces. Korean government even failed in due compensation to the landowners during the Korean war. The tiny family farm system, created by the land reforms, provided material base for children of poor farm families with opportunity to attend school: equal opportunity for schooling was one of three principles to be achieved in the newly independent State according to the PPNR. There were many factors pressuring the new Korean government for the land reform around the time of independence; the distribution of lands owned by the US Military Government, The land reform in the North Korea, demands of Peasants Union. But not every government actively respond to the political demand for land reform. It was the presence of conceptual framework of land reform agreed upon by the Cabinet Committee of the PROK Government that enabled leaders of newly independent government to go forward to make reforms.