중앙-지방 관점에서 바라본 스탈린 시기 전쟁의 기억

송준서(Joonseo Song) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2013 슬라브학보 Vol.28 No.1

This paper focuses two main points. Firstly, the way that Soviet local officials and elites of the front region, especially Leningrad and Sevastopol, commemorated World War II during the postwar Stalin years. Secondly, the way that Stalin regime responded to the practice of commemorating the war. Both Leningrad and Sevastopol located in the wartime front region, experienced a siege by the Nazi German army from the beginning of World War II. While Leningrad was liberated by the Soviet army in 1944, after the 900-day-siege, Sevastopol, a home port of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet located in the Crimean Peninsula, was occupied by the German army after the 250-day-siege for two years. By the end of the war Leningrad party and governmental officials had a strong sense of local patriotism, because of their own sacrifices and ability to survive without military or material support from Moscow during the siege. Based on the local patriotism, the local elites frequently eulogized the effectiveness of their wartime leadership, however remained silent on the role of Stalin and the central government during the siege of Leningrad. The Stalinist leadership, which could not allow such “anti-party” behavior from the local elites, persecuted them by using coercion, such as imprisonment. In contrast, the Stalinist leadership agreed to Sevastopol officials’ reconstruction plan, which was heavily drawn from history and culture, while it criticized a Moscow officials" reconstruction plan that emphasized socialist ideology and the victory of war. Therefore, it has been shown that the Stalinist leadership controlled war memories of local elites not only by using coercion, but also through accommodation, only when the local memories of the war would not undermine the authority of the Stalinist government.

A Systematic Study on the Korean Anthozoa

Song, Jun-Im(宋浚任) 한국동물분류학회 1988 Korean Journal of Systematic Zoology Special Issue Vol.- No.2

First Report of a Tube Anemone, Cerianthus filiformis Carlgren, from Korean Waters, Including Comparison of Cnidae in Adults and Planulae

Song, Jun Im(宋浚任) 한국동물분류학회 1986 Animal Systematics, Evolution and Diversity Vol.2 No.2

First Report of Pseudocladochonus hicksoni Versluys from Korea

Song, Jun-Im(宋俊任) 한국동물분류학회 1992 Animal Systematics, Evolution and Diversity Vol.8 No.1

A Systematic Study on the Korean Anthozoa

Song, Jun-Im(宋浚任) 한국동물분류학회 1987 Animal Systematics, Evolution and Diversity Vol.3 No.1

Three New Records of Actiniaria (Anthozoa: Zoantharia) from Korea

송준임(Jun-Im Song),차하림(Ha-Rim Cha) 한국동물분류학회 2004 Animal Systematics, Evolution and Diversity Vol.20 No.2

러시아와 포스트소비에트 신생독립국의 기념비 전쟁과 타자인식

송준서 ( Joonseo Song ) 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 러시아연구소 2021 슬라브연구 Vol.37 No.1

소련 붕괴 이후 러시아를 ‘우리’에서 ‘남’으로 타자화한 포스트소비에트 신생독립국들은 국가정체성 정립 과정에서 2차 세계대전의 기억을 놓고 러시아와 충돌하면서 더 적극적으로 러시아 타자화 정책을 수행하였다. 하지만 그러한 정책이 해당 국가 국민의 러시아에 대한 타자인식을 동일한 정도로 강화시킨 것은 아니었다. 각국의 지정학적, 지경학적 특성에 따라 타자인식 정도는 상이했다. 반면 러시아의 경우 대조국전쟁의 기억은 1990년대를 거쳐 2000년대에 이르러 러시아 국민들 사이에 가장 신성한 집단기억으로 자리 잡았다. 따라서 러시아는 국가정체성의 근간인 그 기억을 모욕하는 국가에 대해 좌시하지 않고 기억 전쟁을 수행하였으며 러시아 국민들 사이에서는 해당 국가에 대한 타자의식이 높게 표출되었다. This paper examines the ways that Russia and the post-soviet independent nations conducted memory wars over the Soviet monuments of World War II in Estonia and Georgia, in the process of establishing their post-soveit national identities. In doing so, this study aims to answer the following questions: 1) how the policy of otherization in Estonia and Georgia affected the development of sense of otherness among citizens; 2) how Russian government and citizens reacted to the war of memory that those two former Soviet republics initiated. This study implies that the policy of otherization by the newly independent countries did not always yield a universal extent of popular support. The degree of recognition of Russia as “other” was different according to the geopolitical and geoeconomic characteristics of each country. Reacting to the denial of the Soviet war memory in Estonia and Georgia, Russia, which firmly had established the Soviet victory of World War II as the most sacred collective memory, conducted memory wars either by sending warnings of breaking diplomatic relations off or by restoring a demolished Soviet war monument in Moscow while the citizens of Russia expressed high sense of otherness toward those two former Soviet republics.

전후 스탈린 시기 사회주의적 경쟁의 퇴조와 ‘대협약’의 성립, 1944-1953

송준서(Song Joonseo) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2009 슬라브학보 Vol.24 No.1

Drawing on the experiences of Magnitogorsk, a steel town in the Urals, and other heavy-industry enterprises and factories in the Cheliabinsk oblast of the Ural region, this case study examines Stalin regime's efforts to boost productivity after World War Ⅱ. Socialist competition that valued speed of labor and quantitative achievement was rejuvenated briefly in the early years of the war by the Stalin government; but competition began to lose its momentum again by the end of the war. Although the local party tried to emphasize the significance of competition, the factory officials and the technical personnel in Magnitogorsk depended much less on competition as a tool for raising productivity. Accordingly, workers' wage determination and the provision of incentives came to depend more on the significance of work in production rather than the extent of the achievement of output quotas. Surely these changes began to appear before the war, but came to be more consolidated after the war as the regime relied more on professionalization and rationalization than voluntarism to raise labor productivity. Under this circumstance, industrial managerial personnel's indifference to trainees in vocational schools and young unskilled workers was a very expectable consequence. During the hard times of the immediate postwar years, enterprise management "abandoned" the relatively easily replaceable work force. With the decline of voluntarism in production lines, workers were left with few practical chances to be promoted or to be better paid through governmental supported policies, such as the Stakhanovite movement. Not surprisingly, young and unskilled workers were the greatest victims of the Big Deal, characterized by the regime's preferential treatment of the technical intelligentsia.

19세기 신슬라브주의자 니콜라이 다닐렙스키의 유럽 인식과 러시아

송준서 ( Joonseo Song ) 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2022 국제지역연구 Vol.26 No.1

19세기 러시아의 신슬라브주의자 니콜라이 다닐렙스키는 1871년 출판된 그의 저서 『러시아와 유럽』에서 러시아의 숙명적인 ‘타자’인 유럽 문명과 러시아와의 차이점을 밝히면서 러시아가 속한 슬라브 문명은 본원적으로 유럽 문명과는 별개의 문명이라고 주장하였다, 또한 그는 유럽 문명은 이미 쇠락의 길로 들어선 반면, 러시아가 선도하는 슬라브 문명은 곧 부흥할 것이라고 예견했다. 다닐렙스키는 이 과정에서 유럽과 러시아의 충돌은 불가피하다고 보았다. 국수주의적이고 제국주의적 팽창주의 성격을 지닌 다닐렙스키의 사상은 소비에트 공식 이데올로기와 공존할 수 없었다. 반면 소련 붕괴 이후 급속히 도입된 서구 제도에 대한 실망과 국제관계에서 서방의 일방적 독주에 대한 지정학적 위기감의 확산 속에서 러시아 지식인, 정치인, 지도자들은 한 세기 전 다닐렙스키가 제시한 유럽 문명의 속성과 러시아의 생존전략에 주목하면서 러시아 정체성과 유럽과의 관계 재설정 과정에 적극 활용하고 있다. Clarifying the critical differences between European and Slavic civilizations, Nikolai Danilevskii, a nineteenth-century Russian Neo-Slavophile thinker, contended in Russia and Europe―published in 1871―that Russia, a leading member of the Slavic civilization, was fundamentally separated from the European civilization. He also predicted that Russia along with the Slavic civilization would emerge as the new dominant civilization while Europe, which treated Russia with constant hostility, would continue its decline. According to Danilevskii, a clash with European powers would be unavoidable for Russia due to conflicting geopolitical interests between the two forces. While the Soviet authorities of the twentieth century did not accept Danilevskii’s chauvinistic and imperialist expansionism that contradicted Soviet socialist ideology, his ideas on Europe-Russia relations remain widely circulated in post-Soviet Russia, gaining attention from not only intellectuals but also politicians who strive to reshape Russian identity and its relationship with Europe.

기억과 망각 사이에서 -현대 러시아의 1917년 10월 혁명 기억 -

송준서 ( Song Joon-seo ) 한국서양사학회 2018 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.137

2017년 러시아혁명 100주년을 맞이한 푸틴 정부는 공식 기념행사를 일절 치르지 않았다. 사실 푸틴 정부는 최근 10월 혁명에 대해 일관되게 부정적 평가를 내려왔다. 즉, 10월 혁명은 국론을 분열시키고 곧 이어진 내전으로 수많은 러시아 국민의 희생을 가져온 불미스러운 사건으로 묘사했고 혁명 직후 볼셰비키 지도부의 무자비한 살상을 비난함과 동시에 초기 실책이 훗날 러시아 영토의 분열을 초래했다고 비난했다. 이러한 소위 혁명에 대한 ‘망각 정치’는 1990년대 공산주의 세력을 억누르기 위해 노력했던 옐친 정부시기부터 체계적으로 시작된 것이었다. 하지만 일반 시민들의 혁명에 대한 기억과 평가는 정치 지도부의 견해와는 달랐다. 정권 유지와 안정을 추구하는 정치 지도자에게 혁명은 망각되어야할 사건이었지만 민중들에게 10월 혁명은 현재적 의미를 지닌 사건으로 국가 발전에 긍정적 영향과 부정적 영향 모두를 끼쳤던 아직은 기억되어야할 역사적 사건으로 남아있다. The contemporary Russian government led by President Putin did not officially celebrate the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution by claiming that the revolution mostly produced negative impact on the country and its people, including collapse of the old regime, division of the nation, and enormous human losses from civil war. Indeed, this practice of “forgetting” memories of the October Revolution is a continuing one. It started from the previous government under Yeltsin leadership (1992-1999), which tried to remove ideological symbols of socialist past that could be used by supporters of the Communist party, the Yeltsin government’s key political rival. Thus, the Yeltsin government shortened the holiday of the October Revolution and changed the name of the holiday from ‘Day of Great October Socialist Revolution’ to ‘Day of Accord and Reconciliation’ to redefine the meaning of the anniversary. The Putin government, pursuing social and political stability and unity of the nation, has continued to follow the so-called forgetting-policy of the previous government while criticizing the Bolshevik leadership, especially Lenin, as the force that conducted meaningless slaughter and laid a seed of future disunion of Russia. In contrast, citizens of contemporary Russia do not fully agree with the historical perspective ‘from above.’ Rather, ordinary Russian citizens still remember the October Revolution as a historical event that has contributed to socio-economic development of Russia while recognizing its negative impact on culture and religion. Unlike the political leadership, the ordinary people in Russia not only recognize damages, but also benefits brought by the revolution because they believe in the usefulness of historic lesson of the revolution in contemporary Russia.