Do Foreign Vehicle Manufacturers Delay Recalls? The Case of the Korean Car Market

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2018 응용경제 Vol.20 No.4

This paper investigates vehicle manufacturers' recall decisions, and their determinants in Korea. In particular, it identifies why some manufacturers are slow to issue recalls, while others are quicker. We find that vehicle manufacturers make recall decisions based on the degree of risk, expected liability, and recall costs from defective vehicles. We also find that all foreign manufacturers have longer pre-recall periods in the Korean market. They delay their recalls for about one to four years, compared to Korean manufacturers' faster-recalls. European manufacturers do not show any procrastination in the US market, but do in the Korean one; US manufacturers show the same pattern. Korean exporters do not procrastinate in the US market; however, US exporters do in the Korean one, and Japanese manufacturers have longer pre-recall periods in both markets. The fact that emission-related recalls have longer pre-recall periods than safety-related recalls could be indirect evidence on manufacturers' reluctance in recall issuance whenever possible.

Can Primary Seat-Belt Laws in the U.S. Alter Drivers' Behavior? : Synthetic Panel Data Analysis

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2014 산업경제연구 Vol.27 No.2

This paper investigates the offsetting effect theory using individual-level accident data to analyze how drivers respond to seat-belt laws. Using synthetic panel data, I find that drivers are more careful when the laws are enforced more strictly, and that careful driving does not necessarily result in more pedestrian involvement in accidents. I also find that the change in the laws results in an increased number of careful drivers and a decreased number of careless drivers in accidents. The results show that the offsetting effects are weaker than expected or may not exist in accidents, and that the laws are effective in reducing accidental harm on the roads.

Ex Post Liability, Ex Ante Safety Regulation, and Impending Product Recalls

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2016 산업경제연구 Vol.29 No.1

This paper investigates how potential defects in automobiles lead to vehicle recalls. Using data on vehicle recalls in the United States in 2014, I identifies how vehicle manufacturers make their recall decisions and what factors they consider to issue recalls. Using both a unique data and an empirical model, this paper finds that manufacturers issue recalls when higher expected liability costs are anticipated. In particular, vehicle manufacturers use information on the damages that have occurred in previous accidents reported to either the regulatory agent or themselves. I also find that the regulatory agent’s investigative actions are positively associated with more recall issuance, which implies that their investigative activities send manufacturers a strong message to correct problems, given that recall issuance is basically voluntary. If there is a model change in a new-year model, then there are more recalls during the first year of sales. This shows that it is inevitable for manufacturers to issue more recalls because more defective parts are found in the process of adopting and introducing new features from facing competition in the automobile market. In conclusion, manufacturers, facing severe competition, issue more recalls to avoid expected liability costs from defects.

Delaying Vehicle Manufacturers' Recall Decisions- Risk, Vehicle, and Manufacturer Attributes

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2016 응용경제 Vol.18 No.4

This paper investigates the determinants of vehicle manufacturers’ decisions on recall timing. In particular, it identifies why some manufacturers delay in issuing recalls, while others issue them fast. This paper finds that the regulator mandates a recall if the recall is delayed. If recall costs are substantial and the defects are hazardous, then the recall is delayed. We also find that manufacturer and vehicle characteristics affect the timing of recall issuance. In particular, Japanese manufacturers tend to delay their recall issuance compared to U.S. manufacturers. Both Korean and European manufacturers are similar to U.S. manufacturers in deciding the recall timing.

How Do Influenced Recalls Have Lower Vehicle Owners’ Correction Rates?

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2022 응용경제 Vol.24 No.3

This paper investigates why influenced recalls have lower consumers’ correction rates. Risk from vehicle defects positively affects correction rates, while recall initiation negatively affects them. Furthermore, the risks directly affect the correction rates and indirectly affect them via recall initiation. For our analysis, we use linear regression and probit models to obtain consistent estimators of interest. We find that recalls with riskier defects raise the correction rates, particularly if the consumer recall notification letter contains an alerting expression such as “death,” whereupon the correction rate increases by 10%. We also find that the government often initiates more hazardous recalls. Those influenced recalls are negatively associated with the correction rate because vehicle owners often delay repairs, or their vehicles’ defects are revealed after a long time.

Consumer Protection and Product Safety Quality under Market Competition

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2014 산업경제연구 Vol.27 No.3

This paper investigates economic outcomes that occurred when firms facing oligopolistic competition sell potentially risky products. I show that a high safety quality firm can earn greater profits when there are substantial safety quality differences among competitors, because the firm with high product safety quality gains a greater demand for its products. By raising the safety quality, the high-safety firm is able to dominate the market and earn greater profits than the low-safety firm. The profitability of the low-safety firm becomes substantially lower because it loses its market share, even though it reduces its safety level to avoid severe price competition. As a result, the market becomes monopolized and consumer welfare decreases when there is no regulation for product safety. Therefore, the existence of potentially risky products in a market justifies governmental regulation to protect consumers and improve their welfare. The regulation must improve safety in the use of products, and also improve competition through antitrust measures.

Is Cell Phone Use During Driving Under-Reported in Accident Data? : Detecting Drivers Falsehoods in Existing Data

배용균(Yong Kyun Bae) 한국경제통상학회 2016 경제연구 Vol.34 No.3

본 논문은 사고를 유발하는 행위에 관한 데이터가 관측되지 않거나 왜곡되어 있는 경우에 운전자의 특정 행위를 어떻게 효과적으로 밝혀 낼 수 있는가를 연구하였다. 특히, 운전자의 운전 중 핸드폰 사용이 사고에 미치는 영향에 대해 연구하였다. 본 논문은 2014년에 미국에서 일어난 자동차 사고 자료를 이용하여, 운전자의 핸드폰 사용 사실이, 사고가 발생할 때 경찰에 과소 보고된다는 사실을 확인하였으며 이는 운전 중 핸드폰 사용이 실제로 유발하는 안전에 미치는 위험을 과소평가하게 만든다. 특히, 경찰이 운전자의 핸드폰 이용사실을 확인할 수 없는 경우에 운전자들은 거짓보고를 할 충분한 인센티브를 갖게 된다. 또한 젊은 운전자들이 그들의 핸드폰 사용을 부인할 가능성이 더욱 크다는 점도 밝혀내었다. 마지막으로, 본 논문은 운전 중 핸드폰 사용이 사고 발생 시 부상의 정도를 크게 증가시킨다는 점도 아울러 확인하였다. We investigate how effectively researchers detect drivers specific behavior when data on the behavior that leads to accidents is not observable or is distorted in the data set. In particular, we focus on the effects of drivers cell phone use. Using data on accidents in the United States in 2014, we find under-reporting of driver cell phone use in accidents, which causes underestimation of the threat to safety that cell phone use while driving actually creates. In particular, drivers have a strong incentive to make false statements about their cell phone use in situations where the police do not have any direct evidence. We also find that young drivers have a greater probability of denying their cell phone use to the police in accidents. Finally, we find that cell phone use while driving increases the severity of injuries in accidents.

자동차 리콜과 시정행위 : 정보전달 메카니즘을 중심으로

배용균 ( Yong-kyun Bae ) 한국경제통상학회(구 한국경상학회,한국국민경제학회) 2016 경제연구 Vol.34 No.4

본 논문은 결함이 있는 차량들에 대한 정보가 자동차 제조회사들로부터 차량 소유자들에게 얼마나 효율적으로 전달되는지, 차량 소유자들이 결함이 심각할 경우, 결함을 시정하려는 노력을 얼마나 기울이는지에 대해 연구하였다. 본 저자는 2008년도부터 2012년까지 미국의 자동차 리콜에 대한 데이터를 토대로 차량결함의 심각성이 차량소유자들이 기울이는 시정노력에 영향을 주지 않는다는 점을 통계적으로 확인하였으나, 리콜통지서에 나타난 정보가 시정노력에 미치는 영향은 실존한다는 점을 밝혀내었다. 저자는 또한 차량소유자들은 그들이 위험을 대하는 태도에 따라 다른 행동 패턴을 보인다는 점도 아울러 밝혀내었다. 어떤 차량 소유자들은 리콜통지서에 담긴 정보와 관계없이 결함제거를 위해 신속한 행동을 취하였다. 반면에 다른 차량소유자들은 통지서의 내용에 따라 리콜과정의 마지막 단계에서 지체된 움직임을 보였다. 이러한 점에서 차량소유자들은 위험에 대응하는 방식에 있어서 서로 상이하다는 것을 보여 주었다. 리콜통지서의 내용은 특정 차량소유자들에게는 결함제거율을 증가시키는 데에 중요한 역할을 하였다. 이러한 결과들로 볼 때, 특정 차량소유자들이 실제 위험보다는, 리콜 통지서의 내용에 반응한다는 점에서 리콜에 대한 정보전달 메카니즘은 보다 명확하게 규제되어야 한다는 결론에 도달하였다. I investigate how effectively recall information on defective vehicles is transmitted from manufacturers to vehicle owners and whether vehicle owners repair defects when the defects are more serious or not. Using data on vehicle recalls in the United States from 2008 to 2012, I find that the severity of the defect has no statistically significant impact on whether people get their cars fixed or not, but the language of the recall notification letter does. I also find that owners show different corrective patterns, depending on their attitudes to risk. Some owners take their corrective actions quickly, once they know that their cars are recalled, regardless of the information conveyed in owner notification letters. On the other hand, others take their actions at later stages of the recall process according to the contexts of the letters. In this sense, vehicle owners are heterogeneous in dealing with risks. The content of the letters plays an important role in increasing correction rates to certain owners. From this finding, I conclude that information transmission to owners regarding recalls should be more clearly regulated, since some drivers respond to the context of the letters, not the actual risks.

고체산화물 연료전지의 동적 응답성 해석

배용균(Yong Gyun Bae),이상혁(Sang Hyeok Lee),윤경중(Kyung Joong Yoon),이종호(Jong Ho Lee),홍종섭(Jong Sup Hong) 대한기계학회 2018 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.2018 No.4

에어컨 실내기 내부의 압력 요동에 의한 소음 분석

배용균(Y.G. Bae),박정택(J.T. Park),문영준(Y.J. Moon) 한국전산유체공학회 2015 한국전산유체공학회 학술대회논문집 Vol.2015 No.10