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      • Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizon and Imperfect Public Monitoring

        Yves Gué,ron 한국유통과학회 2015 KODISA ICBE (International Conference on Business Vol.2015 No.-

        We consider a two-player infinitely repeated game with asymptotically finite horizons: discount factors converge to zero over time. The stage-game has a continuum of actions and a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. It is known that when players perfectly observe each oth- ers actions, cooperation can be achieved and equilibrium payoffs will be strictly higher than the stage-game equilibrium payoff. I show that introducing an arbitrarily small amount of smooth noise in the monitoring makes cooperation impossible and players play the static Nash equilibrium of the stage-game forever.

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        Information Transmission in Revision Games

        Yves Gué,ron 서울대학교 경제연구소 2019 Seoul journal of economics Vol.32 No.2

        Revision games model a situation in which players can prepare their actions during a pre-play phase. We introduce one-sided incomplete information in two coordination games, one of common interest and one of opposing interest, and study how the pre-play phase affects coordination. We find that in the common interest game, the unique Bayesian equilibrium is such that the informed player will signal the state of the world through her prepared action, unless the pre-play phase is about to finish, in which case she seeks to coordinate with the other player. In the opposing interest game, the equilibrium is similar when the informed player is the one receiving less opportunity to revise her actions. When it is the uninformed player who receives less revision opportunities, we show that it is possible no information is revealed if both players are initially coordinated, but some information must be revealed if they are initially miscoordinated.

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