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        Lessons of the Pueblo Crisis

        ( Vadim P Tkachenko ) 한국국방연구원 1993 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.5 No.2

        January 1993 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of a crisis in Korea that began with the intervention in North Korean territorial waters by a U S Navy ship. Though the armed clash nearly caused a nuclear-missile conflict, world mass media tended to treat it as nothing more than a regional incident, evidently because the main battles of this Korean crisis, fortunately, took place on the diplomatic front and thus remained in the shade for quite a long time. Returning to this historical subject today seems well-justified for various reasons. First, contemporary researchers cannot ignore that the security system on the peninsula, as had been formed by the time of the crisis, has to some extent been sustained until now. That this security system is not the best is hardly a point of disagreement. However dramatic was the situation in Korea of the 1960s, though, the system as a whole has proved fairly efficient. It prevented another war in Korea, although there have been more than enough pretexts over the last thirty years to unleash a war. Hence comes the natural interest of researchers to see how the security system worked and how its mechanism operated in the past. The earlier-unpublished information used in this article helps in gaining a more objective assessment of the positions and motivations of the Soviet Union as well as the decision-making process and mechanism of political consultations among the Soviet Union, United States, and DPRK during this 1968 crisis. It turned out to be an important landmark in reconstructing Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula because it activated formulation of new approaches to security on the peninsula that became feasible only in the early 1990s. Exploring the circumstances of the conflict off the Korean coast through a new prism and attracting new information (including that related to the Soviet-DPRK relationship) will provide a more objective and fuller picture of what happened on the peninsula twenty-five years ago. Besides, to analyze the lessons of the crisis in 1968 is important for us today because it amply shows the scope of changes that have occurred in the surrounding world, ourselves, and our perceptions of political priorities and moral values. One can hardly provide firm guarantees against armed incidents in Korea, but today because the world itself is. different, obviously their consequences would not drive it to the brink of catastrophe.

      • SSCISCOPUSKCI등재

        A Russian View on Korean Security after the North-South Korea Summit

        ( Vadim P Tkachenko ) 한국국방연구원 2000 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.12 No.2

        For Korea, the year 2000 emerged truly historical. There were events capable of changing relations considerably between the two Korean states and bolstering security on the peninsula. The historical June 13-15 summit will no doubt render essential influence on inter-Korean relations and the situation in the region. Now in turn there are the tasks of adaptation of internal and external policy to the North-South rapprochement. Many on both sides are reflecting upon whether there are pan-Korean national interests for the sake of which it be necessary to change all antagonistic practices existing until now in the international arena, and to try to establish inter-Korean cooperation. Clearly, it is the Koreans who must solve these matters independently, as masters of their own country. Some foreign observers did not assume that the Pyongyang summit would be so significant. Moreover, they have felt for the first time that Korean national interests and priorities could well exceed ROK alliance responsibilities. The political leaders on the peninsula have denied all pessimistic forecasts from the experts and have shown ability and determination to change the course of events in the interests of the nation and peace in Korea. It instills hope that Korean summits will continue well into the future. But if the Koreans really want to pull together, and even unite, they will be compelled to correct internal and external policies. Such updating might be unexpected for Korea`s neighbors, and we are probably beginning to notice it already.

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