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Rapprochement between the USA and North Korea : Why It’s Not Happening and How to Get It Started
Timothy Savage 동아대학교 동아시아연구원 2010 동아시아 : 비교와 전망 Vol.8 No.3
Despite the recent trip by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang, US‐DPRK dialogue is proceeding at a glacial pace. The Obama administration’s emphasis on nuclear disarmament in place of the traditional focus on nonproliferation has moved the North Korean issue further down on the US priority list. The two sides are currently at an impasse over the sequencing of the agreement, with the US wanting denuclearization to take place before diplomatic normalization, and North Korea emphasizing a peace treaty as the first step toward denuclearization. While a breakthrough in the short‐term remains unlikely, the US can promote its own interests through lower‐level economic engagement that doesn’t violate the UN sanctions regime.
South Korea-China Relations and the Future of North Korea
Timothy L. Savage 대한공간정보학회 2008 한국지형공간정보학회 학술대회 Vol.2008 No.12
Alone among surrounding powers, China has thus far successfully carried out a two-Korea policy. However, recent reports about Kim Jong-il's ill health have revived debates over the future of North Korea. How China might react to a sudden collapse of the North Korean government is a major concern in Seoul. Many observers fear Chinese intervention to set up a pro-Beijing regime, or even annexation of the northern part of the Peninsula. For its part, China worries about joint US-South Korean intervention bringing American troops to its border. While economic ties between South Korea and China remain strong, and cultural exchanges are rife, some strains have been appearing. Recent incidents, such as clashes at the Olympic torch relay in Seoul, seizures of Chinese fishing boats in South Korean territorial waters, and concerns over the safety of Chinese-made products have contributed to less benign views of China's rise. Historical disputes over the "ownership" of Goguryeo and Korean claims to the Kando region lurk under the surface. To prevent a possible conflict, and secure Chinese support for South Korea's goal of unification, the two sides should begin addressing the issues that divide them.
BENIGN NEGLECT AGAIN? U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM DAE-JUNG
Timothy Savage 통일연구원 2002 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.11 No.2
Behind the arguments between Seoul and Washington over the proper strategy for dealing with North Korea lies a nascent but growing gap in the long-term interests of the United States and South Korea. While both countries want to prevent North Korea from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or launching a war, their larger strategic goals are no longer fully allied. While South Korea seeks reconciliation and eventual reunification to enhance its long-term security and economic prospects, the United States, particularly since President George W. Bush came to power, is concerned with maintaining its global military dominance. These differences not only complicate joint efforts to solve the DPRK problem, but in the long run could also signal difficulties for the continuation of America’s strategic role in Northeast Asia. Given that a military response is not realistic, the only options for dealing with North Korea are either containment or engagement. Should the U.S. pursue the former while South Korea chooses the latter, the U.S. ability to direct events will be seriously challenged. Behind the arguments between Seoul and Washington over the proper strategy for dealing with North Korea lies a nascent but growing gap in the long-term interests of the United States and South Korea. While both countries want to prevent North Korea from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or launching a war, their larger strategic goals are no longer fully allied. While South Korea seeks reconciliation and eventual reunification to enhance its long-term security and economic prospects, the United States, particularly since President George W. Bush came to power, is concerned with maintaining its global military dominance. These differences not only complicate joint efforts to solve the DPRK problem, but in the long run could also signal difficulties for the continuation of America’s strategic role in Northeast Asia. Given that a military response is not realistic, the only options for dealing with North Korea are either containment or engagement. Should the U.S. pursue the former while South Korea chooses the latter, the U.S. ability to direct events will be seriously challenged.
LETTING THE GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE : THE BUSH NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IN ASIA
Savage, Timothy L. 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2003 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.27 No.4
The end of the cold war held out the hope that the nuclear genie could be put back into the bottle and disarmament achieved. Rather than seizing this historic opportunity, the George W. Bush administration has increased the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy. In an era when U.S. conventional military power is both unprecedented and unchallenged, U.S. military planners continue to invent new scenarios for possible nuclear-weapons use. Many of the envisioned nuclear contingencies focus on Asia, particularly Chins and North Korea. In utilizing nuclear weapons to maintain and extend its military dominance, however, the United States ends up encouraging nuclear proliferation in response while simultaneously undermining U.S. political interests in the region. Instead of looking to build newer, smaller nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to reinvigorate global nonproliferation norms by moving toward nuclear disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.