아시아 태평양 지역 다자간 공조에 대한 러시아의 입장

Artyom LUKIN 제주평화연구원 2012 JPI Peace Net Vol.2012 No.25

아시아태평양 지역 다자간 공조에 대한 러시아의 입장

Artyom LUKIN 제주평화연구원 2011 JPI Research Series Vol.2011 No.12

Russia’s Priorities and Approaches to Issues Regarding the Korean Peninsula

Alexander Lukin,Oksana Pugacheva 한국국방연구원 2022 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.34 No.1

Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula has occupied an important place in Russia’s foreign policy strategy, due both to its geographical proximity to Russia’s Far Eastern borders and to its geopolitical role. The circumstances on the Korean Peninsula have a direct influence on the security of Russia’s Far East and North– East Asia (NEA) as a whole, making the Peninsula naturally one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. Officially and unofficially, Russia has two underlying interests in the Korean Peninsula, as stated repeatedly by Russian officials. Firstly, Russia has no interest in seeing weapons of mass destruction appear anywhere in the world, least of all on its borders. Consequently, Russia has consistently taken the position that international nuclear non-proliferation should be preserved, including preventing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, Russia is worried about an outbreak of hostilities in Korea. There are reasons for this. Such a war would be a genuine catastrophe near Russia’s borders, replete with radioactive contamination of the area and movement of refugees to the Russian Far East, and it would complicate severely the implementation of Russia’s development strategy for its Far Eastern regions. Consequently, Moscow is, instead, interested in maintaining peace, stability and an atmosphere of cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in NEA, which would provide an environment conducive to developing Russia’s economy. Russia is interested more than anyone else in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and resolving the problems of the Peninsula, including the nuclear issue, by exclusively peaceful political and diplomatic means, whilst respecting the sovereignty and interests of all states involved.

Russia's Korea Policy in the 21st Century

Alexander Lukin 통일연구원 2009 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.18 No.2

This paper studies Russia’s policy toward the two Koreas and its approach to the Korean WMD crisis, and on this basis makes a prognosis on Moscow’s future approach to the peninsula. It begins with an analysis of the evolution of Moscow’s relationships with Pyongyang and Seoul respectively, studies the approaches of various groups in Russia toward the prospect of Korea’s reunification, describes the Russian approach to the Korean WMD crisis and Moscow’s possible role in its resolution, and then makes some conclusions about the possible future trends in Moscow’s Korea policy.

Russia, China and the Korean Peninsula: A Post-Ukraine Assessment

Artyom Lukin 통일연구원 2015 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.24 No.3

The paper deals with Russia’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula in the post-Ukraine strategic environment. The article begins with the analysis of how Russia is drawing closer to China due to its ongoing confrontation with the West and the Ukraine crisis. The article then reviews three distinctive periods in Russian post-Cold War strategy toward the Koreas: the 1990s; the 2000s and the early 2010s; and 2014 onward. The author argues that Russia’s current policies toward the Peninsula are being increasingly driven by anti-Americanism and the rising dependence on China. Russia’s ties with the North are experiencing a renaissance, while the relations with the South have soured. Russia’s growing deference to China’s interests in East Asia will result in Moscow closely aligning with Beijing on the Korean Peninsula issues. In case of a North Korean contingency, this may lead to a Sino-Russian coordinated intervention in the North.

Russia and the Balance of Power in Northeast Asia

Artyom Lukin 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2012 Pacific Focus Vol.27 No.2

The article attempts to examine the emerging balance of power system in Northeast Asia (NEA) that is replacing America’s hegemony. A multipolar balance of power is beginning to take shape in the region. Within this new regional order, China and the U.S. are the strongest players. There are also other poles, which, albeit less influential than America and China, are still significant enough. Russia is the most important among them, as it is a fully independent actor with considerable strategic capabilities. Although NEA is still very much ripe for rivalry, there exist powerful forces and trends that raise the prospects for a stable and relatively peaceful regional system. These pacifying factors are nuclear weapons, demographics, and multilateral institutions. A multipolar balance of power, which has sufficient flexibility, can be another contributor to stability in NEA. By pursuing smart balance of power diplomacy, Russia would be able to secure its national interests in the region as well as promote peace and security. Moscow will have to make its strategic moves in the context of rising geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. One possible future option for Russia would be to end its present de-facto alignment with China and establish entente with America. Rather than hard balancing against Beijing, the Russian-American alignment is likely to represent some form of coordinated hedging vis-à-vis China. So far this is just a scenario that might or might not materialize. Yet its very possibility could affect the calculations and behavior of NEA’s players.

The Emerging Anti-American Axis of Russia and China: Implications for Asia

Artyom Lukin 서울대학교 미국학연구소 2014 미국학 Vol.37 No.2

Russia and China may now be experiencing a pivotal moment in their post‐Cold War relationship, which will determine whether their relations will shift from a non‐committal partnership to a strategic alliance. Being the two strongest powers on the Eurasian landmass, the state of Russia – China relationship is of profound significance for the world’s largest continent, and particularly for its Asian wing where Beijing displays growing ambitions. The paper investigates the evolution of Russo‐Chinese strategic relationship– from its beginnings in the mid‐1990s to the present, focusing on the motives that have lately been driving Beijing and Moscow ever closer, above all their respective antagonisms with Washington. It then goes on to assess possible implications that Sino‐Russian entente may have for Asian security order. In conclusion, three basic scenarios are sketched of future configurations in the Russia‐China‐US strategic triangle and their impact on Asia.

Eurasia – From confrontation to partnership

Alexander Lukin 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2018 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.9 No.2

Russia’s Options for Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation

Artyom LUKIN 제주평화연구원 2011 JPI Research Series Vol.2011 No.12

Russia’s Policy in Northeast Asia and the Prospects for Korean Unification

Alexander Lukin 통일연구원 2017 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.26 No.1

Russia’s policy towards Northeast Asia cannot be understood independently of its general Asian strategy, primarily its pivot to Asia, which has practically become an official policy after 2014. There are various views about when this pivot actually began. Some see it in the distant past; others claim it dates back to the second half of the 1990s when Russia’s leadership became disappointed with the one-sided policy of the West; still others link it to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Russia’s general strategy is based on the fact that the international system is gravitating towards multipolarity. It is trying to create its own independent Eurasian center of power in the multipolar world of the future and build constructive and equidistant relations with other major powers. For Russia, the maintenance of security and stability in East Asia is not only a foreign policy goal, it directly involves the resolution of an internal strategic problem—the development of its Far Eastern regions. It will be easier for Russia to deal with the new “leftist” government in Seoul. Most Russian experts do not share the opinion of some of their Western colleagues who expect an imminent collapse of the North Korean regime. It is hard to say what the relationship between Russia and the United States will be like. On the whole, it is clear that Russia will continue to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. It will have no major objections to reunification and, regardless of its confrontation with the West, will closely work on this issue with China, which is unlikely to be happy about reunification for its own reasons.