RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      검색결과 좁혀 보기

      선택해제
      • 좁혀본 항목 보기순서

        • 원문유무
        • 원문제공처
        • 등재정보
        • 학술지명
          펼치기
        • 주제분류
          펼치기
        • 발행연도
          펼치기
        • 작성언어
        • 저자
          펼치기

      오늘 본 자료

      • 오늘 본 자료가 없습니다.
      더보기
      • 무료
      • 기관 내 무료
      • 유료
      • KCI등재후보

        朴順東의 항일투쟁과 美 전략첩보국(OSS)의 한반도침투작전

        鄭秉峻(Jung Byung-Joon) 역사문화학회 2003 지방사와 지방문화 Vol.6 No.2

        There is a mysterious character in the two famous novels. One is Kim Bumwoo in Taebaek-Sanmack(Mountain Taebaek) written by Cho Jung-Rae, the other is Chang Harim in Yeomyungeui-Nundongja(Eyes in the Dawn) written by Kim Sung-Jong. Two novels are very well known and be a dispute point in 1990s. The heroes of two novels are described very similarly. They were student soldiers who desert from Japanese Army during the Pacific War, joined the Office of Strategic Service(O.S.S), the famous U.S. intelligence agency to serve as an agent who volunteerly penetrate into Korea and fight against Japanese. They have been trained very hardly as an special agent who oath their lives to death for the freedom of Korea. Everybody thought that the two heros are just the result of the imagination of authors. But they were not fictional characters. Soondong Pak is the real hero of two novels. Personally he is a maternal uncle of Cho Jung-Rae and wrote nonfiction story of his experience that became the plot of above two novels. He was forced conscripted in January, 1944 as a student soldier. At that time Japanese Imperialist conscript Korean youngman who have education above college level. Pak Pak Soondong was dispositioned at Kume, the countryside of Burma. He escaped from Japanese army with his friend, Chongsil Rhee in April, 1945 to British Army. Shortly after their surrender, the third escapee Pak Hyungmu joined them. They became prisoners of war and transferred to India. During the interrogation, they expressed strong anti-Japanese feeling and attracted the attention of O.S.S. At that time, O.S.S. Washington branch prepared a special project, named NAPKO to penetrate into Korea for collecting information and establishing radio station. It was inevitable to recruit Korean patriots to fight against Japanese. There were three categories of Korean volunteers who joined O.S.S. NAPKO project. The first one was Koreans who lived in U.S. The second one was Korean paws who were hold at McCoy POW camp, Wisconsin. The third one was the student soldier escapees who were in India. Pak Soondong and his friends, fled to Washington D.C, and moved to the training camp at Santa-Catalina Island, California in May, 1945. They finished training and well be prepared to penetrate into Korea. But the Japanese surrendered suddenly, so their mission was canceled. After the victory of Allied Powers, the status of Pak Soondong and his friends returned to theirs former one, the paws. They were detained Hawaiian POW camp and returned to Korea in January, 1946. Soondong Pak entitled his experience as “the period scorn.” He did his best for the liberation of Korea and died in 1968 as a normal citizen. Nobody knows or remembers his fascinating and patriotic story.

      • KCI등재

        R을 활용한 조건부 가치 측정법: 정보 가치 측정 사례 연구

        정병준,박노진,Jung, Byung-Joon,Pak, Ro-Jin 한국데이터정보과학회 2011 한국데이터정보과학회지 Vol.22 No.6

        The development of information technology provides us with more useful information but it arose to protect such information from inappropriate users. In the course of analyzing and managing the risks associated with information, it should be needed to accurately measure the value of information. We try to consider the contingent valuation method for this purpose. The contingent valuation method which is used to assess the value of public goods or nonmarket goods makes an statistical estimation for the willingness-to-pay. We show with an example how we can estimate the value of information by calculating the amount we are willing to pay the value of information that exists on the information system. Calculation is carried out by using R. 정보기술의 발달은 인간에게 많은 유익한 정보를 쉽게 제공하고 있으나 그 유익한 정보를 부적절한 사용자로부터 보호할 필요가 생겼다. 정보와 관련된 위험을 분석 및 관리하는 과정에서 정보에 대한 가치를 정확히 측정해야 한다. 한 가지 방법으로 조건부 가치 측정법에 대하여 고찰하려 한다. 공공재 또는 비시장재의 가치를 평가하는 방법인 조건부 가치 측정법을 통하면 관심 대상의 가치에 대한 불용의액수를 통계인 방법으로 추정할 수 있다. 특별히, 지불 용의액에 대한 신뢰구간의 추정에 초점을 맞추어 보았다. 정보시스템에 존재하는 정보의 가치를 보전하기 위해 지불하고자 하는 금액으로부터 정보의 가치를 통계적으로 추정하는 방법을 R을 이용한 사례를 분석하여 소개한다.

      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재

        1940년대 재미한인 독립운동의 노선

        정병준 ( Jung Byung Joon ) 한국민족운동사학회 2004 한국민족운동사연구 Vol.38 No.-

        The three prominent leaders in the Korean society in America were Yongman Park, Changho Ahn, Syngman Rhee. As of 1932 with the turning point, they disappeared ore were less influential on the Koreans in America. New types of leaders emerged in Hawaii and the mainland in the mid 1930s. They were different from the three leaders. They earned their living, carrying out the independence movement at the same time. Just before the outbreak of Pacific War, Koreans in Hawaii and mainland succeeded in: forming United Korean Committee(UKC). They started independence movement against Japanese Imperialist. The main activities of UKC were divided into three parts : support the Korean Provisional Government(KOPOGO); diplomatic and propaganda activities for the cause of Korean independence; and aid the national defense activities of United States. Syngman Rhee took part of the diplomatic mission of UKC, so he formed the Korean Commission. Rhee demanded US recognition of the KOPOGO and military aid to the Korean independence movement. Although the diplomatic approach was not successful, the approach to the military authority and the proposal for the establishment of the Korean guerrilla unit was accepted by the United States to a certain extent. Rhee came into close relations with officials in military intelligence agency and made them his private lobbyist. Kilsoo Haan was the political rival of Rhee during the Pacific War. He was spotlight by the mass media after the Pear Harbor, because he predicted the Japanese attack. He was a white lier for the cause of Korean independence but his conflict with Syngman Rliee and KOPOGO endangered the unity of UKC. UKC was spilt into two parts after the clash between Syngman Rhee and Kukminhur. KOPOGO strongly supported the Syngman Rhee side. Also there was the ideological contradiction between political activists for the independence movement. The revolutionary group were formed and the argument between the conservative group and revolutionary one started. In 1945, the Office of Strategic Service(OSS) prepared special project on the penetration into Japanese territory, named Napko project. It was planned by the special agents who has experienced the detachment 101 in Burma. If it were not for the volunteer Korean agents, Napko project could not be started. At least 19 Koreans in the United States took part in Napko project. Three categories of Koreans joined OSS : thoese who served in US Army or OSS; those who were civilian residents in US; those who were the prisoner of war. They were all volunteers who staked their lives on the battle against Japan. The trained in Santa Catalina island for several months. However, Japan was defeated before they deployed into target point. During the Pacific War, the Koreans in America provided financial and material assistance for anti-Japanese movement. They did their best for the liberation of their mother's land. They sincerely performed as Korean in terms of morale.

      • KCI등재

        1950년대 재미한인 『독립』 그룹의 非美(비미)활동조사위원회(HUAC) 청문회 소환과 추방

        정병준 ( Byung Joon Jung ) 이화사학연구소 2014 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.48

        The Korean radicals who gathered around the Korean Independence news during the Pacific War maintained anti-Syngman Rhee position after Korean liberation. They opposed the policies of the United States Army Forces in Korea (HUSAFI) during the U. S. occupation as well as the establishment of South Korean government in 1948. They supported North Korean regime. After the outbreak of Korean War, the U.S. government and the congress started to investigate Korean Independence group. The leading figures of Korean Independence group were summoned to the HUAC hearings, i.e., Diamond Kimm, Peter Hyun, David Hyun, Harold Sunwoo, and Josel Namkoong. There were three accusations for them. The first one was on the letter written by Samin Lee and Harold Sunwoo to Kim Ilsung and Park Honyoung of North Korea in 1948. HUAC members argued that the summoned Korean witnesses were communist according to the letter of 1948. The second point was on the anti-U. S. position of Korean Independence news during the Korean War period such as withdrawing the U. S. forces from Korea and so called Germ warfare by the U. S. forces. The third one was regarding the activities of Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born which was organized by U. S. Communist Party. HUAC and federal agencies wanted to argue that the leading figures of Korean Independence news were communists and advocators of subversion of the U. S. government by force. After HUAC hearings, some of Korean Independence group were arrested and deported by U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Five Koreans including Diamond Kimm, Choongsoon Kwak, Choonja Kwak, John Juhn, and Anna Song were deported to North Korea and several Koreans such as David Hyun, Doosik Shyn, Sangryup Park, and Josel Namkoong were threatened to be deported by INS. David Hyun was harassed by INS for 16 years. The Korean deportees struggled for years based on U. S. constitution but finally chose the voluntary departure. They thought that North Korea might be their homeland. They arrived at Pyongyang via Prague, Czechoslovakia, but there was no news from them ever afterward.

      • KCI등재

        관동군 밀정 염동진과 독립투사 김혁 - 낙양군관학교 동기생의 엇갈린 운명과 백의사의 기원

        정병준(Jung, Byung Joon) 역사비평사 2021 역사비평 Vol.- No.135

        Lyom Dongjin was a founder of White Shirts Society, extreme-right terrorist organization. There were many assumption on his background during the Japanese colonial period. Lyom was a graduate of Korean special class, Louyang Military Academy and related with Korean independence movement at that time. But Lyom was captured by Tong Hua Kempeitai branch of Japanese Kwantung Army in March 1936 and became spy for the Japanese Kempeitai. He served as professional spy for Tong Hua Kempeitai over eight years and received total 2,418 yen from Kwantung Army Kempeitai till March 1944. He was a professional spy and his spy activity was overt one. After Korea liberation, Lyom assassinated Hyun Joonhyuk, moderate communist in Pyongyang and fled to Seoul. He hide his Japanese spy career and disguised as extreme-right anti-communist fighter. In Seoul, Lyom assassinated Kim Hyuk, an independence fighter as well as his alumnus of Louyang Military Academy who knew Lyom’s back ground and spy activities precisely. Kim Hyuk was apprehended for his independence movement activities and put into Japanese prison for three years. After liberation, Kim assassinated the notorious Japanese detective with the help of Special Squad of Korean Police. Kim Hyuk’s story as well as truth of his assassination fade away from forefront of history. Lyom involved in several important assassinations including Kim Ilsung (March 1, 1946), Lyuh Woonhyung (July 19, 1947), and Kim Koo (June 26, 1949) cases.

      • KCI등재

        경성대학 총장 알프레드 크로프츠와 미군정 초기 대학정책

        정병준 ( Jung Byung Joon ) 한국사회사학회 2021 사회와 역사 Vol.- No.132

        알프레드 크로프츠는 1945년 10월 17일 경성제국대학의 후신인 경성대학 초대 총장으로 임명되어, 12월 7일까지 근무했다. 크로프츠는 미군정 학무국 장교 중 뛰어난 학력(시카고대학 석사, 스탠포드대학 박사), 경력(대학 교수), 성장배경(선교사의 아들로 중국에서 성장 및 교육) 등을 갖추었고, 또한 경성대학의 재건·복구에 진정한 관심과 노력을 기울였다. 경성대학 총장에 임명된 크로프츠 대위는 경성대학 이공학부와 법문학부에 진주한 미군부대의 철수를 강하게 주장하며, 동양인들에게 대학교육이 필요 없다고 생각하는 주한미군 내 고위 장교들과 마찰을 빚었다. 그의 재임을 전후해 경성제대를 선점하기 위한 경쟁이 경성제대 직원, 학생, 동문들을 중심으로 한 자치위원회와 미군정 학무국, 한국교육위원회 사이에 벌어졌다. 연희전문 출신 백낙준이 경성제대 임시총장이자 법문학부장에 임명되었고, 그를 배척하는 경성제대 출신들의 반대시위가 이어진 끝에 크로프츠가 경성대학 총장에 임명되었다. 경성제대와 사립전문의 주도권 경쟁이자 고등교육의 주도권 경쟁이었다. 총장과 학부장 선임문제에 이어 경성대학 교수임명을 둘러싼 갈등이 이어졌다. 교수 선출·임명권을 둘러싼 갈등이자 경성대학의 권력을 둘러싼 주도권 경쟁이었다. 이어서 1945년 12월 10~11일 경성대학 총장후보 추천 투표가 이뤄졌고, 학무국과 법문학부 교수진이 합의한 홍명희 대신 공산당원 김태준이 추천되었다. 이 시점에 크로프츠는 경성대학과 한국에 대한 양심적이고 자유주의적 견해 때문에 고위 장교들과 마찰을 빚었고, 사실상 해임되었다. 크로프츠는 1946년 2월 초 일본으로 전출되었다. 이후 지속적 갈등을 겪은 경성대학은 1946년 여름에 이르자 국대안파동에 직면했다. 이는 1946년 대구 ‘10월 항쟁’에 필적하는 교육분야의 대폭풍이었다. This research provides a biographical investigation of Alfred Crofts, his role as the president of Kyongsong University and orchestrator of the high education policy of the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). Crofts was raised and educated in China, got his PhD in Stanford University and taught in universities before the World War II. It also analyzes two significant disputes related to his university-related work in Korea. After being appointed president of the university, Crofts argued for the withdrawal of USAFIK units stationed in colleges at Kyongsong University. Before his appointment, there was a dispute between the Korean employees, students, alumni, and the Education Bureau of USAFIK over the control of Keijo Imperial University after Japan left. When George Paik of Chosen Christian College was nominated as the acting-president of Keijo Imperial University and the dean of Law and Literature College, wide-spread anti-Paik rallies followed, which led to Crofts serving as Kyongsong University’s new president. A second dispute was the power struggle between faculty, employees, students, alumni, and the Education Bureau to nominate the president candidate of the only university in South Korea at the time. Eventually, the USAFIK dismissed Crofts due to his liberal views and enthusiasm for the rehabilitation and rebuild of Kyongsong University. However, after Crofts’s transfer to Japan in early February 1946, the dispute within the Kyongsong University worsened and eventually helped to instigate a nationwide student strike in the summer of 1946 against USAFIK’s plan to create a new university, Seoul National University.

      • KCI등재

        카이로회담의 한국 문제 논의와 카이로선언 한국조항의 작성 과정

        정병준(Jung, Byung Joon) 역사비평사 2014 역사비평 Vol.- No.107

        The Korea clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration reads:"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Korean problem was discussed during Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting on November 23, 1943. It was the Chinese government and Chiang Kai-shek who focused on the term of "free and independent." Roosevelt thought that the Chinese assertion of Korean independence reflected China"s wide aspiration including the reoccupation of Korea after the war but agreed to put that article into their joint communique. The United States agreed to the independence of Korea as one of the general principles of World War II to let oppressed nations be free. But the official policy of U.S. toward Korea during World War II was a two or three nation international trusteeship, manifested in the Cairo Declaration as "in due course." The U.S. draft of the joint communique was made by Harry Hopkins, Special Advisor to Roosevelt on November 24 and revised by Roosevelt the same day. The United Kingdom rejected inclusion of the Korea Clause into the joint communique and there was dispute over the joint communique between them and China-U.S. between November 24 to 26. The result of this disagreement was that the terms of the Korea Clause became more ambiguous and unclear after Great Britain’s attempt to delete the entire clause had been blocked by the U.S. and China. The Korea Clause in the Cairo Declaration was outcome of discussion, dispute, and agreement by the U.S., China, and Great Britain who all had their own agendas and policies toward Korea. The wording of the Korea Clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration may therefore be interpreted differently by those nations who formulated and signed it.

      • KCI우수등재

        백범 김구암살 배경과 백의사

        鄭秉峻(Jung Byung-Joon) 한국사연구회 2005 한국사연구 Vol.128 No.-

        Two important points regarding the assassination of Kim Ku have been revealed by the report of George E. Cilley. First, assassin Ahn To Hee was an informer and agent for the U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps (hereafter CIC). Secondly, Ahn To Hee was also a member of an ultra-rightist terrorist group, the White-Shirts Society, who swore themselves to life of an assassin. It is not clear to what extent the CIC and the White-Shirts Society played in the assassination of Kim Koo. It was apparent that they were at least informed about the assassination but how much they "intervened, participated and ordered" is unclear. There is little prospect that CIC directly ordered the assassination of Kim Koo. As far as the White-Shirts Society is concerned, the involvement of Ahn To Hee and Kim my?nguk as the main conspirators in the assassination of Kim Koo indicates that this group may have at least silently assisted it. In particular, the White-Shirts Society sympathized with Kim Koo's establishment of triangular anti-communist military alliance through anti-Russia, anti-Communism and anti-North Korea from 1947 to 1948 and its line of bellicose militarism. This line of ultra-rightist anti-communist militarism was promoted individually through changy?ngun of provisional government and paek?igun of White-Shirts Society but ended as Kim Koo opted for the North and South Korea agreement in February, 1948. Kim Koo's shift in position brought the indignation from ultra-right anti-communist militants like Lyoum Tongchin and the White-Shirts Society. The focal point of Cilley's reports is the respect and detestation that Lyoum Tongchin's showed toward Kim Koo. On one hand, Lyoum Tongchin expressed his jealousy and envy toward Kim Koo's fame and reputation while still retaining lingering attachments to a militaristic coup de tat. Both feelings were interlaced toward Kim Koo. Cilley's "Kim Koo's plan for coup de tat" has exposed information regarding the Korean army, their maneuvering, and authorities' suspicions toward Kim Koo as well as the state of their conspiracy. This is only a fabricated accusation and not true. Their skepticism and maneuvering was exaggerated and reproduced by pivotal political potentates and disseminated by hearsay. Ultimately, "Kim Koo's plan for coup de tat" became the basis of his death, and was publicized to legitimize his assassination.

      • KCI우수등재

      연관 검색어 추천

      이 검색어로 많이 본 자료

      활용도 높은 자료

      해외이동버튼