미국의 서브프라임 금융위기와 헤지펀드 규제 동향

윤성승 국제거래법학회 2008 國際去來法硏究 Vol.17 No.2

Hedge funds are a type of private equity funds. During the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, big hedge funds with huge loss from the investment to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) were collapsed. Since hedge funds are located in the center of the crisis, there are still debates whether hedge funds were the cause of financial crisis or hedge funds just increased the effects of the subprime financial crisis. The subprime financial crisis was caused by the melting down of the value of subprime mortgage loans and assets. It was triggered by the decreased residential housing value and the increased default rates of loan payments. The collapse of some hedge funds is the result of such changes of housing market. Thus hedge funds are one of the victims of the subprime crisis. After some huge hedge funds were bankrupted or suspended redemption, the market for transactions of RMBSs or CDOs based on RMBSs was almost stopped. This made impossible for the financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime mortgage loans to meet the depositors’ demand when the deposit run happened because they could not sell their loans using RMBSs to make liquidity. Even though hedge funds are not the cause of the crisis, the impact of super huge hedge funds’ collapse was very strong to other financial institutions such as banks. Thus the issue of hedge fund regulation attracted attentions from many commentators after the subprime mortgage crisis. However, there are still pros and cons about the hedge fund regulation. Major issues related to the hedge fund regulation are leverage level, transparency, and fraud by hedge fund. Highly leveraged hedge funds increase the risks as well as the potential of high return. Since hedge funds are investing to the assets with high risk to get high absolute returns, the fund managers must provide to the investors the information regarding the changes of the strategies, valuation, and composition of their portfolio assets with timely basis. If hedge funds’ managers do not provide material information or provide untrue information to the investors about the hedge funds, the investors will receive loss by the fraudulent act. Even though several years before the subprime crisis, there were recommendations by the U.S. President’s Working Group and by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), respectively, after the Long-Term Capital Management’s collapse, both reports did not recommend direct regulation on hedge funds. Instead they recommended increasing transparency and enforcing counterparties risk management. After the subprime financial crisis, FSF still recommended indirect regulation of the hedge funds even though it added some additional items such as changes in role and uses of credit rating agencies regarding structured products. Recently, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) made recommendations regarding possible future IOSCO works in the report on the subprime crisis. It recommended indirect regulations such as increase of transparency in structured finance transactions, improvement of risk management practices and valuation of structured finance products, and increase of quality and integrity of the rating process on structured products by credit rating agencies. Before the subprime crisis, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried to regulate hedge funds by requiring registration using Rule 203(b)(3)-2(Hedge Fund Rule) under Investment Advisors Act of 1940. However, such rule was invalidated by the court decision because it is against the purpose of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Nevertheless, SEC introduced alternatively new Rule 207(4)-8 (Anti-fraud Rule) to regulate hedge fund fraud by the investment advisor of the fund. This year SEC filed a civil suit against the managers of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns Asset Management, when they was collapsed and incurred huge loss to the inve... Hedge funds are a type of private equity funds. During the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, big hedge funds with huge loss from the investment to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) were collapsed. Since hedge funds are located in the center of the crisis, there are still debates whether hedge funds were the cause of financial crisis or hedge funds just increased the effects of the subprime financial crisis. The subprime financial crisis was caused by the melting down of the value of subprime mortgage loans and assets. It was triggered by the decreased residential housing value and the increased default rates of loan payments. The collapse of some hedge funds is the result of such changes of housing market. Thus hedge funds are one of the victims of the subprime crisis. After some huge hedge funds were bankrupted or suspended redemption, the market for transactions of RMBSs or CDOs based on RMBSs was almost stopped. This made impossible for the financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime mortgage loans to meet the depositors’ demand when the deposit run happened because they could not sell their loans using RMBSs to make liquidity. Even though hedge funds are not the cause of the crisis, the impact of super huge hedge funds’ collapse was very strong to other financial institutions such as banks. Thus the issue of hedge fund regulation attracted attentions from many commentators after the subprime mortgage crisis. However, there are still pros and cons about the hedge fund regulation. Major issues related to the hedge fund regulation are leverage level, transparency, and fraud by hedge fund. Highly leveraged hedge funds increase the risks as well as the potential of high return. Since hedge funds are investing to the assets with high risk to get high absolute returns, the fund managers must provide to the investors the information regarding the changes of the strategies, valuation, and composition of their portfolio assets with timely basis. If hedge funds’ managers do not provide material information or provide untrue information to the investors about the hedge funds, the investors will receive loss by the fraudulent act. Even though several years before the subprime crisis, there were recommendations by the U.S. President’s Working Group and by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), respectively, after the Long-Term Capital Management’s collapse, both reports did not recommend direct regulation on hedge funds. Instead they recommended increasing transparency and enforcing counterparties risk management. After the subprime financial crisis, FSF still recommended indirect regulation of the hedge funds even though it added some additional items such as changes in role and uses of credit rating agencies regarding structured products. Recently, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) made recommendations regarding possible future IOSCO works in the report on the subprime crisis. It recommended indirect regulations such as increase of transparency in structured finance transactions, improvement of risk management practices and valuation of structured finance products, and increase of quality and integrity of the rating process on structured products by credit rating agencies. Before the subprime crisis, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried to regulate hedge funds by requiring registration using Rule 203(b)(3)-2(Hedge Fund Rule) under Investment Advisors Act of 1940. However, such rule was invalidated by the court decision because it is against the purpose of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Nevertheless, SEC introduced alternatively new Rule 207(4)-8 (Anti-fraud Rule) to regulate hedge fund fraud by the investment advisor of the fund. This year SEC filed a civil suit against the managers of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns Asset Management, when they was collapsed and incurred huge loss to the investo...

금융부실조사 제도의 발전방향

윤성승 한국금융법학회 2022 金融法硏究 Vol.19 No.1

금융부실의 사후처리를 위한 금융부실조사 제도는 금융환경의 변화에 대응할 수 있도록정비될 필요가 있다. 특히 금융부실조사 제도의 ‘신속성’과 ‘효율성’ 확보를 위한 제도적 개선이 필요하다. 현행 예금보험공사의 부실조사제도는 민사적 책임추궁을 전제로 한 부실조사제도이므로 조사과정에서 조사대상자가 협조나 출석을 거부할 경우에 직접적인 강제조사가 불가능하여 효율적이고 신속한 조사가 어렵기 때문에, 강제수사가 가능할 수 있도록 특별사법경찰 제도의 도입을 고려할 필요가 있다. 예금보험공사의 부실관련자 조사 대상인 제3자의 범위가 ‘공인회계사 또는 회계법인’으로한정되어 있어서, 감정평가법인, 법무법인 등 전문용역제공자의 조력을 통해 불법행위가 다양화·지능화되고 있는 상황에서 효과적인 조사업무를 수행하는데 한계요인으로 작용하므로, 그 범위를 변호사, 감정평가사 등 전문용역제공자 및 전문용역자로 구성된 법인을 포함할수 있도록 관련 규정을 개정할 필요가 있다. 또한 각종 금융부실이 새로운 암호화폐나 선불전자지급수단과 관련하여도 발생할 수 있으므로, 새로운 금융현상에서 나타나는 부실문제에 대해서도 부실조사제도를 확대할 수 있는방안을 모색할 필요가 있다. 이를 위하여 필요한 경우에는 예금보험의 부보대상 기관을 확대하는 것도 검토할 필요가 있다. 우리나라의 경우도 암호화폐나 선불전자지급수단의 수탁계좌 등에 대해서는 동일 금융기관이라도 계좌의 성격에 따라 각각 예금보험금 지급한도를설정하는 방법을 이용하게 되면, 새로운 금융현상에 따라 개설되는 계좌에 대하여도 예금보험 부보대상에 추가할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 암호화폐를 새로운 투자자산으로 보게 되면, 그 투자자산을 거래, 중개하는 암호화폐 거래소 자체를 부보대상 기관으로 추가할 수도 있다. 새로운 금융사업자 또는 기관이 부보대상으로 추가되면, 예금보험공사가 그러한 기관에대하여 부실조사제도를 적용할 수 있게 될 것이다. 새로운 금융사업자가 예금보험의 부보대상으로 추가되기 전이라도, 다수의 금융소비자 피해발생이 우려되고 피해발생 금액이 클 것으로 예상되는 비부보금융사에 대해서도 예금보험공사의 조사참여 및 공동조사를 제도화하는 하는 것을 고려할 필요가 있다.

기업지배구조와 주식회사 이사의 책임의 상관관계에 관한 비교법적 고찰 -민사책임을 중심으로-

윤성승 한국상사법학회 2022 商事法硏究 Vol.41 No.1

Depending on the size or governance structure of a corporation, the power and influence that directors actually exercise in the decision-making process of the company may differ. Such differences need to be taken into account for the standard of directors liability. The reason why it is necessary to classify the types of corporate governance and reflect the difference in the exercise of powers by the directors according to the type of governance is to reflect the responsibilities of directors according to the powers actually exercised. It will ensure that the liability of the director is appropriate without being excessive or underestimated. This article reviewed the factors to be considered in classifying corporate governance types first, and then analyzed the corporate governance types in the United States, and examined precedents to determine whether there is a difference in the civil liability of directors among the governance types. Based on this, I tried to find out whether and how to reflect the differences in the responsibilities of directors in Korea depending on the corporate governance structure. The role of directors is closely related to corporate governance such as whether the company is a public company or a closed company, the mutual relationship between shareholders and directors within the company, the ratio of institutional and individual investors, whether the companies are in the process of merger or acquisition, and internal control procedures and reporting system, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the structure and scope of directors' responsibilities based on their relationship to corporate governance. The liability of a director is to ensure and control the directors behavior in the company's decision-making process. However, since the role of a director is determined within the structural framework of corporate governance, it need to be considered the relationship between the structure of corporate governance and the director's responsibility in order to decide the directors liability. It can present realistic standards commensurate with corporate governance in the liability of directors, such as business judgment rule. In this article, based on empirical analysis I tried to find a way to increase the fairness of directors' liability by considering the correlation between corporate governance and directors' liability. In order to prevent distorted decision-making related to corporate management and ensure rational decision-making in complex and diverse companies, it cannot be achieved only by increasing the ratio of outside directors or heightening the liability of directors. It is necessary to consider the role of directors in the corporate governance structure to ensure that they are held accountable for their duties. Under a certain corporate governance structure, either imposing excessive liability on directors or imposing too little responsibilities on the directors is not fair. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure appropriate liability considering corporate governance. By presenting the standards of liability corresponding to the roles of directors within the corporate governance structure, it can help to establish realistic standards for the conduct of directors that can clarify the predictability and fairness of the liability of directors. 주식회사의 규모나 지배구조에 따라서는 당해 회사에서 이사가 회사의 의사결정과정에서 실제로 행사하는 권한과 영향력은 차이가 있을 수밖에 없으므로, 이사의 책임을 판단하는 데 있어서도 각 회사의 지배구조에 따른 실제적인 차이를 반영할 필요가 있다. 회사의 지배구조의 유형을 분류하여, 지배구조 유형에 따른 이사의 실제적인 권한 행사에 차이를 이사의 책임에도 반영하여야 하는 이유는, 이사가 현실적으로 행사하는 권한에 따라 책임도 그에 상응하도록 하는 것이 이사 행위의 적법성을 도모할 수 있을 뿐 아니라, 위법행위를 한 이사에 대한 책임이 과다하거나 과소하지 않고 적절하게 되도록 할 수 있기 때문이다. 본 논문에서는 먼저 회사의 지배구조 유형을 분류함에 있어서 고려해야 할 요소를 검토한 다음, 미국에서의 주식회사의 지배구조 유형을 분석하고, 이에 따라 이사의 민사책임에 대한 차이가 있는지를 살펴보았다. 이를 토대로 우리나라도 이사의 책임에 있어서 회사의 지배구조에 따른 차이를 반영하여야 할지, 반영한다면 어떠한 방법으로 반영할 수 있을지를 모색해 보았다. 이사의 역할은 공개회사인지 폐쇄회사인지 여부, 회사 내에서 주주와 이사의 상호관계, 기관투자자와 개인투자자의 비율, 인수합병 과정 중에 있는지 여부, 내부통제절차 및 보고체계 등 기업지배구조와 밀접한 관련이 있으므로, 이사의 책임의 구조와 범위도 기업지배구조와의 관계에 기초하여 세밀하게 분석할 필요가 있다. 이사의 책임은 이사 개인에 대한 책임으로 회사의 의사결정에 대한 통제가 이루어지도록 하는 것이나, 이사의 역할은 기업의 지배구조라는 구조적인 틀 안에서 결정되므로 기업지배구조라는 구조적인 문제와 이사의 책임의 상관관계를 모두 고려하여야 할 필요가 있다. 이를 통하여 경영판단의 원칙 등 이사의 책임에 있어서 기업지배구조에 상응하는 현실적인 기준이 제시될 필요가 있다. 본고에서는 실증적인 자료를 토대로 회사의 지배구조와 이사의 책임이라는 양자의 상관관계를 고려하여 이사의 책임에 대한 구체적 타당성을 높이는 방법을 모색해 보았다. 복잡하고 다양한 기업이 존재하는 현실에서 기업경영과 관련된 왜곡된 의사결정을 방지하여 합리적인 의사결정과 통제가 이루어지도록 하기 위해서는, 이사의 책임을 강화하는 것만으로는 해결될 수 없으며 실증적 연구를 바탕으로 당해 기업의 지배구조하에서의 이사의 역할까지 고려하여 이사가 책임을 지도록 하여야 할 것이다. 특정 기업지배구조하에서 이사에 대한 과중한 책임을 강요하거나 반대로 과소한 책임을 부과하는 것 양자 모두 문제가 있으므로, 기업지배구조를 고려한 적정한 책임을 지도록 하는 것이 필요하다. 회사의 지배구조 내에서 이사의 역할에 상응하는 책임의 기준에 의하여, 이사 책임의 예측가능성 및 구체적 타당성을 분명히 할 수 있는 현실성 있는 이사의 행위기준이 제시될 수 있다.

집행임원의 법적지위 및 책임의 비판적 고찰

윤성승 한국기업법학회 2006 企業法硏究 Vol.20 No.4

A Critical Analysis on the Legal Status andLiability of Corporate Officers

[칼럼] 국제물품매매에 있어서 지식재산권 관련 권리하자 담보책임

윤성승 한국특허신문사 2023 특허 뉴스 : 특허기업의 길라잡이 Vol.- No.203

[Column] 특허 라이선스 계약에서 보상(Indemnification) 조항

윤성승 한국특허신문사 2022 특허 뉴스 : 특허기업의 길라잡이 Vol.- No.194

키코계약의 구조와 키코사건의 재조명 - 대법원 판결을 중심으로

윤성승 한국상사법학회 2014 商事法硏究 Vol.32 No.4

KIKOs are the over-the-counter derivatives actively sold in Korea during2007 to the companies by the commercial banks in order to hedgeexchange risk. However, the exchange rate of Korean Won was raisedunexpectedly to the buyers of KIKOs, many small and medium sizedcompanies. The buyers could not bear the burden of obligations to payunder the KIKOs and started litigation to avoid the paying obligations. After long period of legal disputes on KIKOs, recently the Supreme Courtof Korea decided four en banc decisions on KIKOs on September 26, 2013. The court gave more clearer direction on the legal issues on KIKO cases. The court denied the unsuitability of hedge, unconscionable contracts,adhesion contracts, and mistake or fraud, which were asserted by the buyersof KIKOs, but only granted the duties of suitability and explanation basedon the facts. The implications of such decisions are that the seller can sellsimilar derivatives only if they do not violate the suitability principle andduty to explain. The decisions are very favorable to the seller since they aremainly based on the self responsibilities of the parties. However, somereasons of the court decisions still need to reexamine. This article reviewedwhat the fundamental problem of selling of KIKOs was and whether thecourt decisions were reasonable and fair to allocate KIKO loss between theparties. This article focuses on the characteristics of the structure of KIKOs asderivatives. KIKOs are designed to function as exchange risk hedge only ifthe buyers’ amount of having foreign currency is exactly twice as put optioncontacts under KIKO. This means KIKO has two variables : It hasexogenous variable, the amount of foreign currency having or expected tohave as well as endogenous variable, change of exchange rate. Thus KIKOs’hedge functions are conditional only when the buyer keeps the designedratio one to two between put option and the retained amount of realforeign currency. Thus all the reasoning needs to based on such designed characteristics ofKIKOs. The court and the parties should have focused on the exactcondition of hedge, instead of general suitability of hedge. When the sellersells KIKOs, he should have explained such characteristics to the buyers onthe functional condition of KIKOs. This is related to the issues on suitabilityprinciple and duty to explain. Thus explaining that buyer can have lossesaccording to the movement of exchange rate is not the suitable explanation. Rather, the seller should explain buyer very clearly to understand the riskwhen buyer do not maintain proper amount of foreign currency asdesigned. All the legal issues need to be interpreted based on the suchKIKO's structural characteristics. KIKO disputes and cases show the typical example of regulation risk. Thelegal standard regarding the selling of derivatives was ambiguous whenKIKO was sold. Financial supervising authorities and banks did notconcerned seriously such regulation risks until the huge financial loss wasoccurred to the buyers and disputes were raised. Thus based on thethorough analysis on the reasons of KIKO cases, improvement of thefinancial and legal standard is required to prevent similar disputes as KIKOs.

[Column] 특허 라이선스 계약에서 개량기술 관련 사항

윤성승 한국특허신문사 2022 특허 뉴스 : 특허기업의 길라잡이 Vol.- No.195-196

[Column] 국제화 시대에 특허영어의 중요성

윤성승 한국특허신문사 2022 특허 뉴스 : 특허기업의 길라잡이 Vol.- No.191

[Column] 특허 라이선스 계약에서 기술료(Royalty) 지급방식

윤성승 한국특허신문사 2022 특허 뉴스 : 특허기업의 길라잡이 Vol.- No.197