THE COMPARISON OF ENTRY DETERRENCE BETWEEN COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION

왕규호,이진영 한국경제학회 2007 The Korean Economic Review Vol.23 No.1

We compare the incentive of an incumbent monopolist to deter the entry between Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated product markets. It is first shown that unless the products are perfect substitutes, the incumbent can block the entry more easily under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. For the entry deterrence, as long as the products are differentiated to some degree, like the blockaded entry, the incumbent would like to deter the entry more under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. However, if the product differentiation is quite small, the incumbent can deter the entry more easily under Bertrand competition than in the Cournot competition.

과점 시장에서 쿠르노 균형과 버트란드 균형의 비교

왕규호 서강대학교 경제연구소 2003 시장경제연구 Vol.32 No.1

Cournot competition where firms compete with quantity and Bertrand competition where firms compete with price are two major modes of competition in oligopoly market This paper reviews the existing result comparing these two equilibria in the literature and adds some new results Section 2 compares two equilibria in a homogeneous good market with a general cost structure It provides the complete characterization of Bertrand equilibrium. It also provides an example where the Bertrand outcome is less competitive that Cournot outcome. Section 3 compares two equilibria in a differentiated product market It introduces the results by Singh & Vives ( 1984) and Cheng (1985) that in a very general setting, Cournot outcome is always less competitive than Bertrand outcome Section 4 compares two equilibria in the infinitely repeated game It calculates the smallest value of discount factor which supports the collusion using the most severe punishment so-called 'the optimal penal code' developed by Abreu(1986, 1988) With the optima] penal code, collusion is more easily supported in Cournot competition than in Bertrand competition

불완전정보하에서 메뉴를 이용한 순차적 협상모형에 관한 연구

왕규호 한국계량경제학회 2001 계량경제학보 Vol.12 No.4

과점 시장에서의 조세 귀착에 관한 연구

왕규호 서강대학교 경제학연구원, 서강대학교 경제대학원 2005 시장경제연구 Vol.34 No.2

In this paper, we investigate in the oligopoly market the welfare effect of four kinds of taxes, lump sum tax, profit tax, quantity tax and ad valorem tax. It is shown that when the government raises the same amount of tax, the market price is lower in the order of profit tax, ad valorem tax and the quantity tax. Unlike in the monopoly case, the market price under lump sum tax differs from that under profit tax. The market price under lump sum tax is lower than that under quantity tax. However, the market price under lump sum tax may be lower or higher that that under either profit tax or ad valorem tax.

Cheqp Talk and Signaling Games

왕규호 이화여자대학교 경영연구소 1993 신산업경영저널 Vol.11 No.-

Trade Liberalization and Techonoloty Adoption

왕규호 한국무역학회 2011 Journal of Korea trade Vol.15 No.4

We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on technology adoption and social welfare in a world economy consisting of two countries. Before trade liberalization, due to prohibitively high tariffs, one domestic firm in each country behaves as a monopoly. With trade liberalization, each firm can export to the other country with zero tariffs. Each firm produces the final product by combining an input supplied by an international monopoly and the other input supplied in the competitive market. Our results show that with trade liberalization, the technology with a lower marginal cost and higher fixed cost is adopted. Since marginal cost becomes lower, the market price decreases and the output increases. With trade liberalization, the profit of the firm that supplies the monopoly input and the consumer surplus increases. With a sufficiently larger market, the profit of the firm that produces the final goods decreases, but the social welfare increases.

자료 포락 분석을 이용한 OECD 국가의 통신산업 효율성 비교

왕규호,이상철 한국산업조직학회 2002 産業組織硏究 Vol.10 No.4

본 연구는 자료포락분석(Data Envelopment Analysis : DEA)를 이용하여 우리 나라를 포함한 29개 OECD 회원국들을 대상으로 1997년부터 1999년까지 3년에 걸쳐 생산 측면에서 통신산업의 상대적 효율성을 측정 비교하고 있다. DEA 분석 결과 OECD 회원국간에도 국가별로 효율성의 격차가 크게 발생하고 있음을 보여주고 있다. CCR모형에 의한 측정 결과 우리 나라는 효율성이 매우 낮은 그룹에 속하는 것으로 나타났다. BCC모형에 의한 측정 결과도 CCR모형에 비해서는 효율성이 증가하였지만, 여전히 OECD 회원국간에선 효율성이 낮은 국가에 속하고 있음을 보여준다. Using Date Envelopment Analysis(DEA) technique, we measure the relative efficiencies of telecommunication industry in 29 OECD countries during 1997-1999 periods. We apply both CCR and BCC models. CCR model assumes constant returns to scale while BCC model imposes no restriction on technology. First, the result shows that there exists a significant differences in efficiency among OECD countries. Second, according to CCR model, Korea belongs to a group with low efficiency. BCC model shows that there exists some efficiency increases, but Korea still belongs to the group with low efficiency.

인터넷 경매 방식에 관한 연구

왕규호 서강대학교 경제학연구원 2002 시장경제연구 Vol.31 No.2

On-line Auctions performed on Internet differ significantly from the off-line auctions in many ways. In particular, identical objects are listed on many different auctions sites. Consumers usually search the prices of each auction and decide which auction to join. We provide a formal auction model capturing these features. We assume two auctions with identical objects are open with zero reservation prices. N potential entrants sequentially choose one of two auctions to join and bid with the incumbent. The later entrant can observe the current highest bids of two auctions. We provide a full characterization of sequential equilibrium by backward induction. It is shown that all the entrant, in equilibrium, choose the auction with lower highest bids.

On the economic incentives of CBP market in Korean electricity wholesale market

왕규호 한양대학교 경제연구소 2008 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH Vol.13 No.1

We investigate four incentives in CBP(Cost Based Pool) market in the Korean electricity wholesale market: 1) incentive to over-report the variable cost, 2) incentive to withhold the generating capacity, 3) incentive to reduce the cost, 4) the possibility of optimal fuel mix. It is shown that an incentive to over-report the variable cost exists, market power can be exercised through capacity withholding, an incentive to reduce the cost is not fully provided, and finally in case of two kinds of fuels, optimal fuel mix can be attained in the long-run equilibrium. But with more than two kinds of fuels, optimal fuel mix cannot be guaranteed in the long-run equilibrium.

The Resale Royalty Right and its Economic Effects

왕규호 한양대학교 경제연구소 2010 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH Vol.15 No.2

We investigate, by using a 2 period model, the effects of the resale royalty right, also known as the droit de suite or the follower-up right, on an artist, consumers and the society as a whole. We consider two cases separately, depending upon whether the artist behaves as a price taker or a price setter. In both cases, for the artist, the profit in period 1 decreases, but in period it 2 increases and the life time profit increases. However, in case of price taker, the output decreases in both periods. In case of price setter the output in period 1 increases, but in period 2 it decreases and the total output decreases. In case of price taker, consumer surplus decreases in both period, but in case of price setter consumer surplus increases in period 1, but in period 2 it decreases so that the total consumer surplus decreases. In both cases, social welfare decreases.