국내정치제도와 국제협상의 정치: 양면게임이론을 통한 농산물협상 분석

안용흔 고려대학교 아세아문제연구소 2002 亞細亞硏究 Vol.45 No.4

국제화, 대통령선거제도, 그리고 소득 불평등

안용흔 한국의정연구회 2023 의정논총 Vol.18 No.1

What effect does the external factor of internationalization, such as trade openness and capital mobility, have on the level of economic inequality, that is income inequality? In this paper, we make every effort to address this question, which has been raised a long time ago but is still at the center of the debate in the field of international political economy. This paper presents a hypothesis with regard to the interactive effect of the presidential election system and internationalization factors, which states that the expansion of internationalization can exacerbate or alleviate the level of income inequality depending on whether the presidential run-off system is adopted or not. This research tries to empirically test the hypothesis by conducting panel analyses of cross-national and time-series differences in the level of income inequality in new democracies. The results of the panel analysis with the fixed-effects model support this hypothesis regarding the interactive effect of the presidential run-off system and trade openness. Trade openness intensifies the level of income inequality when the runoff system is not adopted, but on the contrary, shows a tendency to alleviate it when the runoff system is introduced. The expansion of trade openness does not merely exacerbate income inequality, nor does it alleviate it, and its effect varies depending on the type of presidential election system adopted by the country 무역개방과 자본개방이라는 국제화라는 외재적 요인은 일국의 경제 불평등, 즉 소득 불평등 수준에 여하한 효과를 발휘하는가? 이 논문에서 우리는 국제 정치경제학 분야에서 오래전에 제기되었으나 여전히 논쟁의 한복판에 놓여 있는 이 질문에 대한 해답을 찾으려 했다. 논문은 대통령 결선투표제 채택 여부에 따라 국제화의 확대가 소득 불평등 수준을 악화시킬 수도 있고 반대로 완화할 수도 있다는 대통령선거제도와 국제화 요인의 상호작용효과에 관한 연구가설을 제시했다. 이 연구가설은 신생민주주의 20개 국가의 민주화 이후시점에서 2020년까지의 국가별 및 시기별 소득 불평등 수준의 변화에 대한 패널분석을 통해 검증되었다. 대통령 결선투표제와 무역개방 변인의 상호작용 효과에 있어서, 고정효과 모형의 패널분석 결과는 이 연구가설을 지지해주었다. 무역개방 변인은 결선투표제를 채택하지 않았을때는 소득 불평등 수준을 심화시키지만, 이와 반대로 결선투표제가 채택된 경우에는 이를완화하는 경향을 보여주었다. 무역개방 확대는 단순하게 소득 불평등을 악화시키지도 않고그렇다고 완화시키지도 않으며, 그 나라가 채택한 대통령선거제도 유형에 따라 그 효과는달라진다는 것이다

대통령제 국가에서의 연립정부 구성의 정치

안용흔 인제대학교 민주주의와 자치 연구소 2020 비교민주주의연구 Vol.16 No.1

This study is aimed at exploring the mystery revolving around government coalition in the presidential system. This paper strives to address this puzzle not only by examining the impact of presidential legislative powers and the ideological distance among political parties within coalition government that the previous studies place emphasis on, but also by identifying the influence of a new variable of the presidential run-off system measured by the number of effective presidential candidates. By adopting the panel logistic regression method with the random effects model, this paper conducted a statistical test of the institutional effect of the presidential electoral system on the possibility of government coalition, while holding constant the control variables highlighted by the previous studies. The result of the panel logistic regression method revealed that the probability of government coalition had a tendency to increase approximately by 15% on average as the number of effective presidential candidates increased by 1. 이 연구는 대통령제 국가에서 전개되는 연립정부 구성의 수수께끼를 규명하는데에 목적을 둔다. 대통령제에서 연립정부 구성의 어려움을 피력한 대통령제비판론자의 주장과는 달리, 대통령당선자는 소속정당이 과반의석 확보에 실패했을 때 소수정부로 남기보다 정당 연합을 통해 연립정부를 구성하고 있다. 이러한 정치적 현실은 연립정부가 어떠한 정치, 경제적 조건에서 구성되는지에관한 연구를 촉구하고 있다. 이 논문은 이러한 문제의식을 바탕으로 대통령제에서 연립정부 구성 조건을 파악하려 한 기존연구가 간과한 제도적 조건을 찾으려 했다. 이 연구가 주목한 변수는 대통령 결선투표제이다. 신생민주주의국가를 대상으로 이루어진 패널분석결과, 대통령 결선투표제는 유력 대통령 후보 수를 증가시킴으로써 연립정부를구성하는 데에 통계적으로뿐 아니라 실질적으로 매우 중대한 효과를 발휘하는것으로 밝혀졌다.

Politicians, Electoral Law&International Bargaining Approaches: A Case Study of Koea-U.S. Africultural Trade Negotiation

안용흔 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2003 Pacific Focus Vol.18 No.1

The purpose of this paper is to explain the change in the Korean government̂s bargaining approach from a soft‐line to a hard‐line approach. This paper introduced a two‐level explanation to find an explanatory variable. The two‐level explanation concentrates on the ratification process connecting domestic to international politics. This explanation holds that strong domestic pressure forces a negotiator to employ a hard‐line stance, whereas weak domestic pressure makes possible a concessive soft‐line approach. The two‐level theorists suggest conditions that create strong domestic pressure. Those are the features of bargaining issues and the existence of an electoral system that strengthens some domestic constituents' power by over‐representing them. The homogenous bargaining issue and domestic constituents' over‐represented electoral power produce strong domestic pressure. Hence a negotiator is inclined to take a hard‐line stance, when the feature of a bargaining issue is homogenous and a domestic group whose interest is closely related to the bargaining issue is over‐represented by the electoral system. This paper argues that these conditions are not sufficient. Under an electoral law permitting mobilized voting, these variables do not yield strong domestic pressure during the ratification process. It is because politicians, who participate in the ratification process, are able to get votes by means of mobilization, and they, therefore, are less responsive to domestic constituents' demands so as to get their votes. We found this to be the situation in the case of the Korean government̂s adoption of a soft‐line stance. In 1993, a new electoral law was proposed to hinder politicians from mobilizing votes with money. The new law led to changes in politicians' behavior. Politicians had no choice but to appeal to their constituents with a policy consistent with their constituents' interests and demands in order to get their votes. Politicians' changed behavior enabled such variables as the feature of a bargaining issue and a domestic constituent̂s electoral power to produce strong domestic constraints, as the two‐level game theorists argue. As a result, the Korean government changed its bargaining approach from a soft‐line to a hard‐line one after the reform of the electoral law. To show the effect of the change in the electoral law on a negotiator's adoption of a bargaining approach, this paper considers such variables as the nature of a bargaining issue and an electoral system that over‐represents some domestic constituents. The selection of Korean trade negotiation cases allows this paper to put those variables under scrutiny. The cases also enable us to consider the international variable such as the United States' international pressure. There were no variations in those variables in Korean cases. This work has useful implications for cases in which a country undergoing the transition to democracy negotiates with other countries. Democratization creates new democratic laws and institutions. New laws and institutions in countries like Korea may push politicians into responding more to their domestic supporters' demands than before. As a result, they may create a situation in which “domestic politics and international relations become entangled.

The Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral System, Effective Regional Political Leaders, and the Regional Hegemonic Party System: A Panel Analysis of the South Korean Case

안용흔 한국학술연구원 2015 Korea Observer Vol.46 No.2

This paper analyzes the effects of the “mixed-member majoritarian” (MMM) electoral system and effective regional political leaders on the mitigation of the regional hegemonic party system in Korea, while controlling for the influence of regional economic conditions and the 2004 National Assembly election. Previous studies on the effects of the MMM electoral system on the weakening of the regional hegemonic party system had methodological limitations, in that they superficially evaluated its institutional effect, using such criteria as the proportionality index. Unlike these previous studies, this research analyses the institutional effect of the MMM electoral system in a more sophisticated manner, holding constant the influence of effective regional political leaders, which may nullify the effect of the MMM electoral system as an omitted variable untreated by the previous studies. The panel analysis of this paper was able to reveal two crucial findings. Firstly, the MMM electoral system has a statistically significant effect on the alleviation of the regional hegemonic party system. Secondly, the presence of effective political leaders in the regions has a negative determinant effect on the mitigation of the regional hegemonic party system.

재미동포의 민족정체성의 현실과 과제

안용흔 사단법인 한국민족연구원 2013 민족연구 Vol.0 No.56

The purpose of this research paper is to identify crucial factors which have contributed to the preservation of the national identity of Koreans in America. To perform this task, this paper conducted a survey research of Koreans who have lived in the Los Angeles County, and then performed a logistic regression analysis of the survey data in order to figure out which factors exerted influence over the overseas Koreans' national identity. Holding the other variables constant, this research revealed that age, the degree of contact with Korean culture, citizenship, and political ideology have statistically significant effects on the maintenance of their national identity. In particular, this study uncovered that it is very important to provide overseas Koreans with an opportunity for them to be exposed to Korean culture in order to sustain and strengthen their national identity. The purpose of this research paper is to identify crucial factors which have contributed to the preservation of the national identity of Koreans in America. To perform this task, this paper conducted a survey research of Koreans who have lived in the Los Angeles County, and then performed a logistic regression analysis of the survey data in order to figure out which factors exerted influence over the overseas Koreans' national identity. Holding the other variables constant, this research revealed that age, the degree of contact with Korean culture, citizenship, and political ideology have statistically significant effects on the maintenance of their national identity. In particular, this study uncovered that it is very important to provide overseas Koreans with an opportunity for them to be exposed to Korean culture in order to sustain and strengthen their national identity.

비례대표제, 결선투표제, 그리고 무역개방: 무역개방과 의회 및 대통령선거제도 간의 제도적 친화성에 관한 연구

안용흔 고려대학교 평화와 민주주의연구소 2015 평화연구 Vol.21 No.1

This paper is aimed at analyzing the institutional affinity between trade openness and the proportional representation system as a legislative electoral system and the run-off system as a presidential electoral system. In the paper, we intend to theoretically create and empirically test the hypotheses that the closed-list proportional representation system and the run-off system have an institutional tendency to facilitate the representation of the political and economic interests of small groups who are likely to be hurt by opening the trade market to the world. The panel analysis of the newly democratized countries reveals that the legislative closed-list proportional representation and the presidential run-off system play a determinant role in protecting the trade market and curtailing the extent of trade openness, while controlling for such variables as government welfare spending, the size of the national economy, ruling governments' ideology, and the size of the country. The statistical result criticizes Rogowski's argument that the closed-list proportional representation system has a positive relationship with trade openness. The level of trade openness of those countries that adopt either the closed-list proportional representation system or the run-off system is inclined to be lower than that of trade opening of those countries that do not. 이 논문은 무역개방과 정치제도, 특히 비례대표제라는 의회선거제도와 결선투표제라는 대통령선거제도 간의 제도적 친화성의 관계를 분석하려는 데에 연구목적을 두고 있다. 이 연구논문에서 우리는 의회선거제도인 정당명부식 비례대표제와 대통령선거제도인 결선투표제는 무역개방의 확대로 인해 경제적 손실을 입게 되는 사회 내 소수그룹의 이해관계를 잘 대변해주기 때문에 무역개방과 부정적인 친화관계를 지니고 있다는 가설을 구성하고, 이를 신생민주주의국가사례를 패널분석하여 경험적으로 검증한다. 패널분석결과에 따르면, 복지지출 및 국가의 경제규모, 집권정부의 이념, 그리고 국가의 크기와 같은 요인의 영향력을 통제할 때, 정당명부식 비례대표제와 무역개방 간의 긍정적인 제도적 친화성을 주장했던 로고우스키(R. Rogowki)의 연구결과와는 달리, 정당명부식 비례대표제와 결선투표제라는 선거제도는 무역개방의 확대를 저지, 축소케 하는 방향으로 작용하는 데에 결정적 역할을 한다. 비례대표제를 채택한 국가에서는 그렇지않은 국가에 비해 무역개방의 정도가 낮으며, 또한 결선투표제를 채택한 국가에서도 그렇지 않은 국가에 비해 그 수준이 낮게 나타나고 있다.

"김대중, 노무현, 이명박 정부와 영호남 지역주의" 토론요지

안용흔 전남대학교 글로벌디아스포라연구소 2010 전남대학교 세계한상문화연구단 국내학술회의 Vol.2010 No.10

한국 지역주의의 변화

안용흔 전남대학교 글로벌디아스포라연구소 2010 전남대학교 세계한상문화연구단 국내학술회의 Vol.2010 No.10

경제개혁의 당내 정치: 합리적 선택모델을 통한 금융실명제 개혁 분석

안용흔 고려대학교 아세아문제연구소 2002 亞細亞硏究 Vol.45 No.3