憲法上 Privacy 權利

沈景秀 충남대학교 법률행정연구소 1986 논문집 Vol.14 No.-

제3자 증여재산의 상속재산합산과세의 위헌성- 헌재 2006. 7. 27. 선고 2005헌가4 결정에 대한 분석

심경수 충남대학교 법학연구소 2007 法學硏究 Vol.18 No.1

This paper aims to analyze the case of 2005Hun-Ka4 which the ConstitutionalCourt issued on July 27, 2006. The subject matters of review are 1)the oldSuccession Tax and Gift Tax Law Article 13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2 whichstipulates that the succession property including the property given the personother than the inheritor within 5 years before the start of succession should betaxation standard of Succession Tax, and 2)Succession Tax and Gift Tax Article28 Paragraph 1 which stipulates that the gift tax amount on given property addedto succession property should be deducted from the succession tax amount. TheConstitutional Court ruled that the above articles are not unconstitutional. The conclusions of this research are as follows. First, the judging proposition of Succession Tax and Gift Tax Article 28Paragraph 1 can not be recognized. Therefore it should be rejected. The reasonsare as follows. 1) The above article just mitigates the unconstitutionality of Succession Taxand Gift Tax Law Article 13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2, not infringing thefundamental rights of the plaintiffs in the original case. 2) If the above article is unconstitutional, the legal status of the plaintiffsweakens. 3) If the unconstitutionality decision is made on Succession Tax and Gift TaxLaw Article 13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2, all the objective of the plaintiffs inthe original case can be achieved. Second, Succession Tax and Gift Tax Law Article 13 Paragraph 1Subparagraph 2 can be considered unconditional. The reasons are as follows. 1) Estate duty method itself is contradictory to equal taxation. 2) Succession Tax and Gift Tax Law Article 13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2includes the property given to the person other than the inheritor in successionproperty, therefore more unconstitutional than estate duty method. 3) Succession Tax and Gift Tax Law Article 13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2does not contribute much to equal taxation, while making taxpayers' tax burdenand more additional burdens heavier. 4) The constitutional basis is that Succession Tax and Gift Tax Law Article13 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2 is contradictory to equal taxation

독일과 유럽에 있어서의 외국인의 지방참정권

심경수 한국공법학회 1996 公法硏究 Vol.24 No.2

미국 헌법상 인사의 본질

심경수 헌법재판연구원 2017 헌법재판연구 Vol.4 No.2

미국헌법 제2조 제2항에 규정된 인사에 관한 조항도, 헌법의 다른 조항과 마찬가지로 타협으로 이루어진 것이고, 채택된 이후 200년이 넘는 기간 동안 다양한 해석의 여지를 만들어 냈다. 대통령은 사법부의 모든 연방법원 판사, 각료급 부서, 독립기관, 군사기관, 외교관, 민간서비스부문의 지정된 관리뿐만 아니라 연방 검사 및 보안관 후보자를 지명한다. 상원의 인준은 그 지명하는 자리의 중요성, 후보자의 자격, 특정한 시기의 정치적 환경에 영향을 받는다. 상원의 ‘적절한 역할’에 대한 견해는, 좁게는 후보자의 능력이 명백히 부족하지 않고 성격에 특별한결함이 없는 이상 상원은 인준해야 한다는 의견부터, 넓게는 대부분의 상원의원이 적당하다고 생각하는이유를 근거로 거부할 수 있는 권한이 주어진다는 해석이 있다. 대통령이 특정 후보자를 선택한 이유를설명하지 않아도 되는 것처럼, 상원이 후보자를 거부하는 것에 대한 이유를 제공할 의무는 없다. 관례적으로 행정부 인사는, 임기가 정해진 독립기관의 공무원을 제외하고, 대통령의 임기 마감과 함께끝이 난다. 반면, 사법부 임기는 종신이며, 오직 시간이 많이 걸리는 국회 탄핵 절차를 통해서만 끝낼 수있다. 역사적으로 대법관 지명 후보자들은 그들 숫자와는 아주 어울리지 않게 상원의원, 언론, 학자들의관심을 받았다. 1789년 이래로 모든 각료 지명자 중 상원에서 거부한 경우는 2% 미만이었지만, 대법관지명 후보자의 경우는 25%에 해당하는 후보가 거부, 철회, 사퇴로 인준에 실패했다. 장관과 대법관에 대한 임명을 제외하고, 근대에 일어난 대부분의 인준부결은 위원회가 활동을 하지 않거나 혹은 투표로 지명안을 상원에 보내지 않거나 하는 등 위원회 수준에서 일어났다. 1860년대 이전에는 상원은 대부분의 지명을 공석에 대한 관할권을 갖고 있는 위원회에 회부하지 않고 처리했다. 1868년에야 처음으로 지명안을 “적절한 위원회”에 회부하는 상원규칙이 규정되었다. 그러나 20세기 중반이후비로소 위원회가 주요 공직후보자에 대한 직접 출두를 요구하는 것이 일상화 되었다. 1955년 아이젠하워 대통령은 로버트 잭슨(Robert H. Jackson)의 후임자로 존 할란(John Harlan)을연방대법관에 지명하였고, 상원은 인준하였다. 이후 모든 대법관 후보자는 법사위원회에 출두하여야 했으며, 인사청문회는 이때부터 자리를 잡게 되었다. 이는 또한 현장을 생중계하는 통신기술의 발달에 힘입어 상원의 인준이 곧 인사청문회와 동의어로 사용될 만큼 인사청문회의 역할이 확대되었다. 즉 현재의인사청문회는 이때부터 실질적인 제도로 자리매김 되었고, 상원의 견제가 중요한 요소로 작용하고 있다. 미국 인사제도를 전반적으로 살펴보면, 미국 대통령의 지명과 상원인준의 공직인사는 헌법제정자가고민했던 입법부와 집행부 간 균형성에 근거하고 있다. 공직에 대한 인사(Appointments)는 의회에서 공직을 설치한 이후, 다음과 같은 3가지 단계가 필요하다. 1) 대통령의 후보자 지명(nomination), 2) 상원의 인준(confirmation), 3) 대통령의 위촉(commissioning)이다. 하급 공무원의 경우, 의회는 인준 절차를 생략하고, 공무원 임명권을 직접 대통령, 법원 혹은 장관에게 줄 수 있다. 요컨대, 미국 대통령제에 있어서 공직인사권의 본질은 대통령과 의회 간의 상호 협력과 견제를 반드시함께 요구하는 상대적 권력분립으로서의 ‘결합된 권한’으로 보아야 한다. The United States Constitution provides that the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for...” (Article Ⅱ, section 2). This provision, like many others in the Constitution, was born of compromise, and, over the more than two centuries since its adoption, has inspired widely varying interpretations. The president nominates all federal judges in the judicial branch and specified officers in cabinet-level departments, independent agencies, the military services, the Foreign Service and uniformed civilian services, as well as U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. The importance of the position, the qualifications of the nominee, and the prevailing political climate influence the character of the Senate's response to each nomination. Views of the Senate’s “proper role” range from a narrow construction that the Senate is obligated to confirm unless the nominee is manifestly lacking in character and competence, to a broad interpretation that accords the Senate power to reject for any reason a majority of its members deems appropriate. Just as the president is not required to explain why he selected a particular nominee, neither is the Senate obligated to give reasons for rejecting a nominee. Executive branch appointments customarily end with the departure of the president who made them, except for those independent agencies whose officials have fixed terms. Judicial appointments, however, are for life and can be terminated only through the time-consuming congressional impeachment process. Historically, Supreme Court nominations, in great disproportion to their number, have attracted the close attention of senators, the media, and scholars. While the Senate has explicitly rejected fewer than 2 percent of all cabinet nominees since 1789, nearly a quarter of all Supreme Court nominations have failed to be confirmed, their nominations rejected, withdrawn or declined. In 1925, the Senate for the first time summoned a Supreme Court nominee to testify before its Judiciary Committee. Harlan Fiske Stone’s appearance was brief, but the senatorial questioning was vigorous. The next five nominees escaped this personal interrogation, but in 1939 the committee requested Felix Frankfurter to appear. Although he eventually complied, Frankfurter complained that his views were a matter of public record. Since the 1955 nomination of John Marshall Harlan, all Supreme Court appointees have appeared before the Judiciary Committee. In general, the appointment of the President of the United States and the office of the Senate are based on the balance between the legislative and executive branches of the Constitution. Appointments for public office require three steps after the establishment of public office in Parliament. 1) nomination of the President, 2) confirmation of the Senate, and 3) commissioning of the President. In the case of lower civil servants, Parliament can omit the approval process and give the president, court or minister the right to appoint a public official. In short, the essence of public office personnel in the US presidential system should be viewed as ‘united power’ as a relative power separation demanding mutual cooperation and containment between the president and the legislature.

미국헌법상 대통령의 공무원해임권에 관한 법리

沈景秀 忠南大學校 法學硏究所 2004 法學硏究 Vol.15 No.1

This paper reviews several cases such as Myers v. U. S., Humphrey's Executor v. U. S., Wiener v. U. S., Buckley v. Valeo, INS v. Chadha, Consumer Energy Council of America V. FERC, Bowsher v. Synar and Morrison v. Olson, and comes to the conclusions of the President's removal power. First, even though there is no express provision of removal power, considering the relationship between executive power and the duty to faithfully execute the laws under article 2, the removal power is the necessary incidental power to or part of them. Second, basically, as removal power is the President's exclusive right which covers only purely executive officers, it is independent of any department of the government. However, although an executive officer who also exercises a quasi-legislative or quasi-judiciary duty cannot be an purely executive officer, the President's removal power is not automatically restricted. In that case, it must be reviewed whether the officer has a policy-making power which is critical to President's executive power and then, the President must has a discretion to remove him. If the officer does not have such a power, he is not a purely executive officer and Congress can restrict exercise of removal power over the officer. Third, Congress must not interfere with the power and duty exercised under article 2 of U. S. Constitution in limiting President's removal power. Congress can limit reasons exercising removal power, but cannot limit the power itself.

영토조항의 통일지향적 의미와 가치

심경수 한국헌법학회 2001 憲法學硏究 Vol.7 No.2

日本國憲法上「象徵」 天皇의 地位에 관한 考察

沈景秀 大田産業大學校 1993 한밭대학교 논문집 Vol.10 No.1

This paper deals with the status of the symbolic Emperor system in the Japanese constitution. The principal content is as follows ; ① the status and function of symbolic Emperor, ② the foundation and structure of symbolic Emperor, ③ the meaning of the "symbol", ④ the affairs of state of symbolic Emperor.

蘇聯憲法의 原型

沈景秀 忠南大學校 法學硏究所 1990 法學硏究 Vol.1 No.1

미국 부통령제의 재조명

심경수 법제처 2022 법제 Vol.696 No.-

The Vice President of the United States has long received low marks for the importance of his position. The Vice Presidents remembered by the American people are those who have succeeded to the presidency. The Vice President serves as Senate Chair and becomes President when the President is arrested. The main reason for the intersection of Vice President's potential and reputation is the Vice President's election system. Each party uses the Vice Presidential office to balance votes. And each party uses the vice presidential post to compensate. The reason is that the constitutional responsibility of the Vice Presidential office is not great. The Senate is a constitutional body with a tradition that the Senate must respect. The Vice President of the Senate will vote only if there is a tie and play a fair role. Presidential candidates hold a Hall of Fame tournament that specifies who will be a running mate. The people chooses a person who balances power. This connects them from campaigns to cooperative relationships. The Vice President will be provided with a legation and a special plane. The Vice President is a standing member of the National Security Council (NSC) and is continuously informed on defense and diplomatic issues. The Vice Presidential office in the United States shows another appearance that is clearly distinguished as it is today. Namely, the Vice President is important constitutional body. Unlike the parliamentary cabinet system, in the presidential system, the fact that the vice president succeeds to the presidency itself means a change of presidency. Stability is an important core issue in the constitutional device where the head of state and the administration change. This is the importance in ensuring stability of the vice presidential system. In countries that have a presidential system, the point is that the administrative gap must be minimized and the stability of the government must be maintained. In this point of view, it is necessary to consider the introduction of the US Vice Presidential System.

社會主義國家憲法上의 民族對應規定構造와 現狀에 관한 考察 : 특히 蘇聯憲法을 中心으로

沈景秀 충남대학교 법률행정연구소 1989 논문집 Vol.17 No.-