政府政策에 대한 壓力團體 활동의 理論模型에 관한 公共選擇論的 硏究

金幸範,文景柱 인제대학교 1997 仁濟論叢 Vol.13 No.1

The role of interest group in policy process cannot be emphasized too much. But there are variant approaches to this policy subject. Public Choice approach is new promising focus in the study of public administration as was suggested by Vincent Ostrom. This article reviews interest groups(pressure group) which were analyzed by the approach of economic model. We selected four models as a typical topics : (1) Olson Model, (2) Peltzman Model, (3) Virginians Model. (4) Becker Model. all of them were reviewed in desultory fashion by the policy scientist perspective. Each model was reviewed in separate section. We could identify the strength and the shortcomings of the models. Even though 4 models were built on the same economic perspectives, they show different implication, in both description and prescription, some of which are contrasting rather than being just different. Comprehensive comparison of these models needs common standard, so that we could make an useful conclusion on interest group and its role in policy process. But it was difficult to devise such common standard by which we can do comparison. Despite the danger of arbitrariness, five standards were extracted for comprehensive comparison of the models. According to such comparison following conclusion were derived. ① Olson Model is the model focusing on the formulation and establishment of the interest group : It concentrates on internal management of members of group to avoid free riding, and then to establish interest group. All others are models on 'activity', not formulation, of already well-established interest group. ② They suggest disparate preference for the competitiveness of the interest groups. According to Olson model competitiveness of the interest groups harms national economic growth. But Peltzman model does not make clear view on the competitiveness of the interest grouts. Virginians model most strongly emphasizes the harmful effect on the social welfare, by inventing the concept of 'rent-seeking' Becker stands at far different position : he suggests competitiveness of the interest groups results in efficiency, rather than inefficiency, in subsidy and taxation. ③ On the active phase of government which is a supplier of regulatory policies, we could find some difference, too. Olson model ignores the active role of regulator. In Peltzman's model, regulator is not just a captive of the regulated; he considers the both sides of beneficiary group and non-beneficiary group. Peltzman appears to recognize a little more active role of regulator than Olson. Virginians regard government as an active creator of the rent which interest groups are eager to win. Becker model regards role of the government just as that of pluralists. ④ Which interest group is going to be winner in policy benefit distribution? Olson model, when we extend his logic on the formulation of interest group to this problem, seems to consider the small group the future winner. Peltzman model says both producer interest group and consumers interest group can be the winner. Virginians never make it clear which group is going to win ; they just focus on total and mutual activity which result in the harmful effect on social welfare. Becker model suggests relatively efficient group is going to be winner. ⑤ On the prescription to evade undesirable result of. interest groups, Olson suggests restoration of free market. Peltzman model is not sensitive to the possible undesirable effect of interest groups on societal welfare ; he, therefore, does not show clear comment on the prescription to that problem, either. Virginians are easer to devise effective ways to remove inefficiency caused by interest groups and their rent-seeking activity. Their fundamental remedy seems to be constitutional change to decrease the power for government to create rent. Becker suggests perfectly different prescription ; the strengthening of the activity and competition among interest groups.

政府豫算의 效率性 檢定에 관한 硏究 : 公共選澤論的 接近을 중심으로

金幸範 인제대학교 1993 仁濟論叢 Vol.9 No.2

Bureaucrats are not just the decisional transmitter, rather with their own utility calculations they are the actors which possibly get something done in the field of public services. Public Choice analysts, though, don't agree on the efficiency of bureaucratic conduct, either in the output scale or in the budget quantity. 1 reviewed three main theoretical studies on this topic ; study by Niskanen(1971), by Williamson(1964), and by Migue'-Be'langer(1974). Following results were discovered. 1. All have common properties like 'biasing toward the oversupply-theory', ignoring the risk-aversion trend of bureaucrats', 'overestimating asymmetric monopoly'. Thus it is approach is necessary to establish the new approach which compasses both supply and demand side of bureaucratic output. For this purpose game-theoretic approach and/or principal-agent approach deserve much more attention. 2. All assumes different basic motives on bureaucratic conduct. And it looks like that Migue'-Be'langer theory has the further generality. 3. Each theory huts assumes different utility function determinants. As basic factor of such utility function, Niskanen model includes'budge', Williamson model,'quantity of output and staff', and Migue'-Be'langer model, 'quantity of output and discretionary budget'. The last, however, has more generality than others, and therefore with only utility function of Migue'-Be'langer model it is possible to explain all above utitlity functions. 4. The equilibrium output size of each bureaucrat of the three models chooses is summarized in the 〈table 5-1〉. The quantity of output in three types of bureaucrats can be arranged following, Niskanen type bureaucrats>Migue'-Be'langer type bureaucrats>Williamson type bureaucrats. Every type reveals oversupply problem. 5. In terms of price discrimination Williamson type bureaucrat has nondiscriminatory monopoly power. Whereas, both Niskanen type and Migue'-Be'langer type have N degree of discriminatory monopoly power. Therefore Williamson type bureaucrat has lower budget line than ethers, which causes less quantity of bureaucratic output than two other types of bureaucrats. 6. Efficiency problem should be reviewed in two dimensions, namely, technical efficiency and allocative efficiency according to H.Leibenstein(1966). First, in the light of technical efficiency, two type of bureaucrats is found to be efficient : 'low-level bureaucrat'in the Niskanen type bureaucrat,'output-oriented bureaucrat'in the Migue'-Be'langer type bureaucrat. Every type excepting above two is inefficient, and'rentoriented bureaucrat' which is one kind of three Migue'-Be'langer bureaucrats is the worst in the sense of technical efficiency. Second, in the light of allocative efficiency the rent-oriented bureaucrat', one kind of three Migue'-Be'langer bureaucrat, is the only that is efficient in the sense of allocative efficiency. And both 'low-level bureaucrat' in the Niskanen type bureaucrat and 'output-oriented bureaucrat' in the Migue'-Be'langer model are the worst in allocative efficiency. 7. The way bureaucrats reap utility from the organizational resources was analysed with the three models. Only Williamson type bureaucrat uses specific input(staff)-bias as the instrumental method of utility-reaping from the organization. Niskanen does not address the way by which bureaucrat reaps utility from the governmental budget, and Migue'-Be'langer never specify the concrete way of consuming the discretionary budget by which bureaucrat extracts any rents from the organizational resources.

자본에 대한 증오의 이론적 근거와 경험적 검증

김행범 한국제도경제학회 2016 제도와 경제 Vol.10 No.1

자본주의가 우월한 제도임이 확인된 오늘날 자본주의에 대한 증오가 더 심화되는 원인은 무엇인가를 규명하기 위해 광범위한 이론적 근거들을 9개 부문의 연구 가설로 추출하고서 410명의 대학생들로부 터 리커트 척도의 설문지를 통해 이를 검증하였다. 다음과 같은 결과가 확인되었다. 노동만이 가치의 원천이라는 마르크스의 노동가치설은 지지되지 않으며, 노동-자본의 공동 기여로 이윤이 창출된다고 본다. 자본이 도덕적 타락 원인이라는 마르크스의 주장이 아니라 한정적이나마 웨버의 가설이 수용되 며, 자본에게 신뢰를 보임과 동시에 보다 선행을 추구하라는 도덕적 요구를 가하고 있다. 기업가가 궁 극적으로야 공익에 기여한다고 인정하지만, 자본 특히 거대 자본은 소수의 재벌이 장악하고 있으며 이 들은 마음만 먹으면 무소불위의 특권과 힘으로 경제를 좌우한다고 보는 불신이 지배적이다. 대중의 표 를 얻기 위한 경쟁에 몰입하는 정치인은 경제가 어려워진 상황에서 반자본적 정향을 보이고 있으며 자 유 시장 경제보다 재분배 지향적인 입법에 경사된 것으로 보는 인식이 강하다. 종교는 자본주의를 최악 의 질서로 보지는 않지만 자본주의에 대해 대개 적대적 정서를 품고 있다. 대학에서 성공했던 경력이 있는 지식인은 자신이 시장에서는 실패자가 된다는 점 때문에 자본주의를 증오하게 된다는 미제스의 가설도 지지되고 있다. 그것은 대학에서의 성공은 시장이라는 자생적 질서와는 반대되는, 교수가 성적 배분을 주관하는 통제적 질서의 산물이란 점과 관련이 있다는 노직의 가설도 지지되었다. 문학 및 TV 및 영화는 자본가를 아주 악한 사람으로 그리는 경향이 압도적이며 자본가에 대한 반감의 정도는 문학인 -종교인-정치인-연예인의 순이다. 기업가와 자본가를 구분하고 혁신도입자로서의 기업가(entrepreneur as innovator)를 부각하고 기업가에게 가장 많은 보상이 주어져야 한다는 슘페터의 가설들은 대학생들 의 인식 속에서 거의 수용되지 못하고 있다. 오늘날 거액을 지닌 특수 계층만이 아니라 저축을 하거나 연기금 기여금을 내는 모든 노동자 및 ‘우리 사주’의 노동자도 자본가가 되고 있지만, 이 경우에도 당사 자들은 자신의 정체성을 자본가라기보다 노동자로 인식하는 성향이 크다. 그러나 노동자가 곧 자본가가 되어 가는 오늘날 자본에 대한 노동의 증오는 가학(sadism)이 아니라 자학(masochism)일 뿐이다. 전반 적으로 한국에서 자본은 강렬한 증오를 받고 있다. 그런 증오가 도덕적으로 타당한가 보다는 그것이 현 실적으로 얼마나 강하게 작동하고 있는가가 더 중요하다. 자본에 대한 이러한 증오를 충분히 해소하지 않으면 우리 사회의 성숙한 자본주의의 발전은 기대할 수 없다. The logical grounds were tested on the reason of hatred on capitalism through questionnaire by 410 college students. Main results are as follows. Marx’s labor value theory is not supported. Students think that labor AND capital creates profit and capital is entitled to get due share of profit. Students do not support that capital is source of moral degeneration as was observed by Marx. Rather they support, though partly, the notion of Weberian concept capitalist. But they expect capitalists to use the capital for social good doing not for his own re-investment to get private benefits. Though being considered as contributing to social interests, entrepreneurs, especially that of big businesses, are under big distrust. When labelled as ‘Chaebol’(owner of big firms conglomerates in Korea), the distrust is elevated. Politicians usually turn to anti-capitalistic mentality to transform the mass’s hatred toward capitalists to votes, especially under economic depression. They tend to show redistribution-oriented rather than free capitalism-oriented legislation. Religious leaders also are believed to have anti-capitalistic mentality. They do not seem to regard the capitalism as ‘the worst’ as extremists like Coughlin, Huey Long, or Liberation Theologians did. Still, they have hostility in general toward capitalism. Mises’s hypothesis on intellectuals proved to be true. They have resentment for capitalism because they believe their intellectual superiority to ordinary non-learned never get rewarded well under capitalism. The degree of hostility toward capitalists was highest in the world of literature-religion-politicians-and entertainments in a descending order. Schumpeterian hypothesis is not supported that entrepreneurs are different from capitalists and they should be given biggest share of profits for their contribution to innovation. Korean students are unfamiliar with the notion, so their hatred to entrepreneurs are confused with hatred to capitalists. Under today’s labors-capitalists overlap, hatred to capital is not sadism but masochism. Overall, ‘capital’ is under strong hatred in Korea. Whether the reason of hatred is morally reasonable is not the point. Without the substantial clearing up of it, mature capitalism in our society cannot be expected to well develop.

行政規制와 Rent-Seeking에 관한 公共選澤論的 硏究

金幸範 인제대학교 1996 仁濟論叢 Vol.12 No.1

Deregulation of various administrative regulations in Korea stands at the core of reform policies. Before practicing concrete programs should the theoretical rationale for the deregulation be clearly argued. Here in this article I adopted some existing studies on rent-seeking field for the frame of reference. Especially theories of Tullock, Corcoran, Karels were on the main focus of this article. Some suggestions were derived through intensive review of arguments in the rent-seeking literatures. Above all, the critical purpose of rent-seeking should be to find out some leverages to reduce rent-seeking activities and rent-seeking costs. This purpose is far more important in the Asian developing countries, which generally have common administrative phenomena of cultures of corruption, perquisites. Korean adminstration system has leaded the economic development with the tools of so many regulative programs since 60's, and its success of that role brought her good reputation among NIC's. It was inevitable phenomena, however, that administrative regulations also caused so many rent-seeking activities. With the clear theoretical foundation Korea needs to eliminate the sources of rent-seeking around the administrative regulations. Through the previous studies some policy implications were derived as following. 1) Reducing of the numbers of candidates for the rent-seeking is necessary. In a sense, to introduce the notion of nepotism is recommendable in the the distributing process of rents. 2) Establishing the some institutions which enforce steeply rising of marginal costs of rent-seeking activities. 3) Introduction of a certain bias into the selection process of rent-taker reduces rent-seeking expenditures, which, however paralyzed with the equal opportunity. 4) Encouraging existing players to bet at the minimum level between pre-emptory bet range does reduces the rent-seeking expenditures. 5) It can be a recommendable measure to regulate against hardball competition by which entrants forces to gain accommodations from the incumbents. Hit-and-Run competition is preferable to hardball competition. 6) In the case of Hit-and-Run competition, collusion solutions seems marginally preferable to Cournot-Nash solution. In the case of Hardball competition, Cournot-Nash solutions seems marginally preferable to collusion solution. We need to design right institutions along with these different situations. 7) Imposing the lump-sum cost (transaction-costs) on the rent-seeking activities reduces the total expenditures by an equal amount in this sense we need to contemplate to introduce rent-seeking license. 8) More basically, the present settings which enables for administrative systems to have too much powers and resources should be changed in the long-term sense.

政府의 공공서비스 供給論理에 관한 Game 理論的 硏究

金幸範 인제대학교 1995 仁濟論叢 Vol.11 No.2

In the accumulative studies on the inquiry for Logic of Provision of Public Services was so many approaches. One of the approaches is the game-theoretic method. Traditionally, however, dominant fashion of game-theoretic analyses on that subject focused mainly on Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The scheme on provision of public services are not simple. In the light of various contexts under which public service is supplied, other game schemes should be employed. Under different schemes, there should come different solutions for the cooperation. Here I used three basic game-theoretic schemes : Assurance Game(AG), Chicken Game(CG), Prisoner's Dilemma Game(PDG). Some findings were derived to reach the cooperation among members of governmental unit. When service provision is under the condition of AG, it is very important to identify the 'honest non-cooperators' and 'free-riders'. And there should be the assurance for the reciprocal cooperation so that the 'isolators' can continually provide contribution. The small size of governmental unit is far more effective than large one. For the former, it is reportedly very easy to identify the 'honest non-cooperator' and 'free-riders'. As for the scheme of CG, it seems to be difficult to achieve the solution for the The scheme of PDG could be employed to well explain the 'Tragedy of Commons', 'Test-Ban Treaty', 'Market for Lemons'. In PDG scheme, the TFT(Tit-For-Tat) seem to be very effective strategy to induce cooperations. For the TFT to work as effective strategy the discount parameter needs to be high, chance of reunion to be large. This implies the condition for the super game must be established. Under a certain conditions, TFT can spread itself even in the: environment in which the strategy of defection is extremely prevalent. According to eight propositions by Axelrod(1984), I extracted several suggestions for TFT to well work in the real provision of public goods. Partly Axelrod seems to have exaggerated the probability of cooperation. Specifically his 'temptation ratio' has to be modified according to McLean(1987). All above findings can be used as the basis for theory development and practical inference in the field of public services.〈The End〉.

공공선택학파와 오스트리아학파의 지적 관계

김행범 한국제도경제학회 2020 제도와 경제 Vol.14 No.1

공공선택학과 오스트리아학파 경제학은 방법론과 이념을 일부 공유한 학문적 친척이란 점에서 ‘시장경 제연구소’와 ‘공공선택연구소’ 두 기관이 공존했던 80년대 이후 조지메이슨대학 중심으로 “오스트리아 학파식 공공선택학”(Austrian Public Choice)을 형성했지만, 동시에 반목 요소도 보여주었다. 최근 대두 된 두 학문 간 불화를 주관주의·합리성·인식론의 세 국면에서 규명하였다. 첫째, 공공선택학은 뷰캐 넌의 주관주의 선언에도 불구하고 주관주의를 제한하며 사회적 낭비, 사회적 효율성 등의 객관주의적, 총량적 개념에 여전히 사로잡혀 있다. 둘째, 공공선택학은 비현실적이고 이상적이며 합리성에만 좌우되 는 인공적 인간형에 토대하여 ‘합리적 무지’가 아닌 한 그에게는 지식이 있고, 정부에게도 문제해결 능 력이 있다고 본다. 그러나 오스트리아학파는 이성 외에 직관·감성도 가진 현실적 인간을 전제로 하며, ‘진정한 무지’도 나타날 수 있다고 본다. 셋째, 인식론과 관련하여 공공선택학은 정치인이 겉으로 표방 하는 공익과 실제로 추구하는 사익 간 괴리가 정부실패를 낳으며 정치인을 정부실패의 고의범으로 보 지만, 오스트리아학파측은 정치인도 공익을 진정 추구할 수 있고 정부실패는 ‘동기 문제’가 아니라 ‘지식 문제’에서 나타나며, 따라서 정치인을 정부실패의 고의범이 아니라 과실범으로 본다. 동거와 불화를 다 겪어 온 두 학문은 자신의 사고방식과 연구 절차를 상대측에게 요구하거나, 학문적 결혼을 추구하기보다 자신의 연구 성과들로 학문 시장에서 경쟁하는 것이 필요하다. 각 학파는 시장과 정부에 관해 나름 특화된 분산된 지식(dispersed knowledge)을 가지고 있다. 학문 세계 속 그들 간 이 지식의 교환 및 경쟁은 또 다른 의미의 시장과정(market process) 작용이며, 학문 세계의 소비자들은 그 어느 한쪽에 표를 던지는 일종의 공공선택(public choice)을 행할 것이다. 양 학문의 반목 관계는 이런 거시적 맥락에서 새롭게 이해될 필요가 있다. Public Choice school has had long history of relation with Austrian Economics school, with companionship and discord as well. Since 1960s, two formed the intellectual kinship, developing so-called ‘Austrian Public Choice’ with the linking pin of George Mason University’s “Mercatus Center” and “Center for Study of Public Choice”. Namely, Austrian school scholars employ research program on politics, or Public Choice scholars employ methodology or philosophy of Austrian schools. However two tenets also revealed tensions between them, which goes from simple recommendation that Public Choice scholars intellectually accommodate themselves to Austrian philosophy to extreme voice that two schools’ relationship came to an end mainly due to Public Choice scholars. This article treats how are the conflicts between them on three points: subjectivism, rationality and epistemology. First, on dimension of subjectivism, Austrians criticize that Public Choice school has not fully employed subjectivism despite of Buchanan’s proclamation on it. Rather, they relied on aggregation concepts such as ‘social waste’, ‘social efficiency’ etc. incongruent to subjectivism. Second, on dimension of rationality, Austrian school criticize that Public Choice school has assumed unrealistic ideal man solely with reason. It denies no room for irrationality, nor the possibilities that decisions are made without information and knowledge, except it was deliberately chosen by logic of ‘rational ignorance’. But Austrians oppose that kind of rationality sense, assuming model of ‘actual man’ with insight and emotion as well as reason. It accepts the possibilities that ‘irrationality’ happens, even without rational ignorance logic. Third, on dimension of epistemology, Austrian schools criticize that Public Choice school exaggerate ‘incentive problem’, ignoring more fundamental ‘knowledge problem.’ They affirm Public Choice school also attribute gov’t failure to ‘deception’, not ‘error’ of public actors. Given the fact that defensive arguments from Public Choice school is somewhat less than challenges from Austrian school, it seems fair to represent some arguments for Public Choice tenet on why Public Choice has chosen existing way of logic and reality. Buchanan considered full subjectivism would lead intellectual frustration, causing agnosticism. His ‘Insufficient’ subjectivism is not fault nor incompetence as Austrians rebuke, but strategic choice as reasoning method. In the world of ‘political process’, requirement to ‘objectively’ express any evaluation for benefits or for costs on policies is far higher than in the world of ‘market process.’ These features might leave Public Choice school some inevitable room that it cannot fully observe methodological requirements Austrian school has asked for. Both omniscience of market and gov’t have well been denied by both schools. It, then, also should be denied that one of two schools does predominantly better on market as well as politics process. Each school has shown comparatively respective advantageous explanatory power and relevant intellectual works. Requiring Public Choice school to employ Austrians’ full methodology, or requiring Austrians to change its main research programs from market to politics is sort of another ‘intellectual deceit’. Trying ‘General Political Economy’ through ‘intellectual marriage’ or ‘grafting’ also cannot be any solution either. What is vital instead on compatibility issue between Austrian school and Public Choice school is letting each compete for more valid researches whether on market or on politics. That would be another form of ‘market process’ in academic world, for which voters in that world would eventually make public choice on which way of thinking is better supported.

공공선택학파와 오스트리아학파의 연구방법론의 차이

김행범 공공선택학회 2022 공공선택학회 학술대회자료집 Vol.2022 No.-

공공선택학과 오스트리아학파 경제학은 방법론과 이념을 많이 공유한 학문적 친척으로 “오스트리아학파식 공공선택학”(Austrian Public Choice)을 이루기도하면서 동시에 반목도 보여주었다. 이 글은 두 학문 사이 불화를 주관주의·합리성·인식론의 세국면에서 규명하였다. 첫째, 공공선택학은 뷰캐넌의 주관주의 선언에도 불구하고 주관주의를 제한하며 사회적 낭비, 사회적 효율성 등의 객관주의적, 총량적 개념에서완전히 벗어나지 못하고 있다. 둘째, 공공선택학은 비현실적이고 이상적이며 합리성에만 좌우되는 인공적 인간형에 토대하여, ‘합리적 무지’가 아닌 한 정부에게는 지식및 문제해결 능력이 있다고 본다. 반면에, 오스트리아학파는 이성 외에 직관·감성도가진 현실적 인간을 전제로 하며, ‘진정한 무지’도 나타날 수 있다고 본다. 셋째, 인식론과 관련하여 공공선택학은 정치인이 겉으로 표방하는 공익과 실제로 추구하는사익 간 괴리가 정부 실패를 낳고, 정치인을 정부 실패의 고의범이라 보지만, 오스트리아학파 측은 정치인도 공익을 진정 추구할 수 있고 정부 실패는 ‘동기 문제’가아니라 ‘지식 문제’에서 나타나며, 따라서 정치인을 정부 실패의 고의범이 아니라 과실범으로 본다. 끝으로, 동거와 불화를 공유한 두 학파는 자신의 사고와 연구 절차를 상대측에게 요구하거나, 학문적 접붙임을 추구하기보다 특화된 연구 성과들로 각학문 시장에서 경쟁하는 것이 필요하다. 양측은 시장과 정부에 관해 나름 특화된 분산된 지식(dispersed knowledge)을 가지고 있다. 학문 세계 속 그 지식들의 교환및 경쟁은 또 다른 의미의 시장과정(market process) 작용이며, 학문 세계의 소비자들은 그 어느 한쪽에 표를 던지는 일종의 또 다른 차원의 공공선택(public choice)을 행할 것이다.

[서평] Rethinking Public Choice (Richard E. Wagner)

김행범 공공선택학회 2023 공공선택학저널 Vol.2 No.1

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