하이라이트 1 공정거래법상 집단소송제 도입 검토 - 집단소송제도 도입에 관한 기초적 이해

김차동,Kim, Cha-Dong 한국공정경쟁연합회 2012 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.164

창조적 고급 과학기술인력 양성

김차동,Kim Cha-Dong 한국공학기술학회 2001 공학교육과 기술 Vol.8 No.4

공정거래법의 사적(私的) 집행제도의 변경 및 그 보완방안 - 2000.5.7.자 및 6.23.자 정부제출안 및 2000년도 정기국회에서 통과예정인 안을 중심으로 -

김차동 ( Cha-dong Kim ) 한국경제법학회 2004 경제법연구 Vol.3 No.-

According to the proposed amendment bill, preliminarily announced by the Korea 亡air Trade Commission ( ‘KFTC’ ) on May 7, 2004, (KFTC revised the presumption clause for the amount of damages, from the proposed amendment bill of May 7, 2004, when submitting the revised proposal on June 23, 2004),one of the essential features of the proposed amendment bill is the dramatic improvement of the damage compensation system, the aim of which is to promote a system of private enforcement. This amendment bill has passed the competent standing committee, that is, the National Policy Committee in its original form as presented, as well as the Legislation and Judiciary Committee on November 30, 2004, and is awaiting the approval of the plenary session which is close at hand. The current system for damage compensation under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law ( ‘FTL’ ), which is a separate system from that under Article 750 of the Civil Code, is understood as providing a separate right to compensation, independent from the right to compensation under the Civil Code. This is because the former acknowledges strict liability, the principle that a corrective order should be final and conclusive, and a separate system of statute of limitation which period is shoter than that in the Civil Code, and it has been well established that the two claim rights, the damage compensation right in KFTL and in the Civil Code, are concurrent. However, the proposed amendment bill has induced the fundamental change of characteristics in the damage compensation system under FTL, by converting it into the same right to compensation as that under Article 750 of the Civil Code thus getting out of the current differences of the two rights to make an integrated right, although there has been an amendment which transfers the burden of proof for intentional and negligent conducts, which is different from the general principle of Article 750 of the Civil Code. In the course of this process, the provisions pertaining to the principle that a corrective order should be final and conclusive and the system of shorter period of the statute of limitation, as well as strict liability have all been removed. In addition, the system of the determination of damage amount awarded at the court’s discretion is to be newly established under the proposed amendment bill. This shows the legislative intention to promote private enforcement by the increasing of antitrust suits, thus extending the court’s discretionary power with respect to the acknowledgement of damage amount, as many have pointed out that the reason why there has only been a few antitrust suits claiming damages under the FTL, lies in the fact there have been many instances where it was impossible to meet the strict burden of proof required by the existing case law, regarding the calculation of damages. I, as a member of the TF Team for Study of System for the Promotion of Private Actions, organized under the initiative of the KFTC around 2002, have participated in a study for promotion of private antitrust suits under the FTL, such as improvement of the compensation system and introduction of claim for injunction, for a period of one year. With the knowledge gained from such activities, I would like to add some comments which may be helpful, regarding how the proposed amendment bill at hand will change the antitrust damage compensation, and whether such changes will fit the legislative intention to promote private actions, and thus provide an introduction to the many discussions interpretation thereof, which will no doubt arise during the process of execution of the amendments. Various proposals for revision to the amendment bill have been presented in the course of deliberation of the foregoing proposed amendment. Among them, the proposal by National Assembly member Seung-min Yu includes a clause concerning claims for injunction. There has been a doctrinal dispute concerning whether, even under the current system where no explicit provisions allow for injunction claims, it would be possible to claim for an injunction against conduct which is in violation of the FTL. The prevailing view, under Japanese influence, is that such claim is not allowable. Cases that acknowledge such claims coexist with those repudiating it in first instance cases, without any precedent at the level of the Supreme Court in this respect. The foregoing proposed revision to the amendment bill submitted by Mr. Yu, is a very desirable attempt which meets the current necessity of avoiding the uncertainty of these theories and precedents, while at the same time taking into account the need for the proper protection of the victims of FTL offenses. Nevertheless, because this proposed revision consists a single clause, it has resulted in an inadequate provision lacking in sufficient review concerning the appropriate procedures and supplementary provisions pursuant to the introduction of an injunction claim. Thus his proposal has failed in achieving its genuine intention, and is very unlikely to be legislated. Having reviewed the proposed amendment bill, it seems that as a result of being overly conscious of the criticism directed at the principle that a corrective order should be final and conclusive, before a damage claim by FTL is filing, it is attempting a fundamental reform by integrating the compensation system for antitrust damages under the FTL, which has so far been a separate claim, into the claim for compensation under Article 750 of the Civil Code, with the proviso of the acknowledgment of the transfer of burden of proof. Of course, in circumstances where one cannot but rely on Article 750 of the Civil Code to make a claim for compensation of antitrust damages, the proposed amendment bill is not without positive aspects that contribute to the promotion of private antitrust suits, through the transfer of the burden of proof. However, the current compensation system under the FTL has some advantages such as strict liability, acknowledgment of de facto power to presume offensive acts as illegal which are accused by the conclusive corrective orders, and a longer short-term statute of limitation, unlike that of Article 750 of the Civil Code, and thus is able to protect the victims more effectively than that of Article 750 of the Civil Code. It is regrettable that the original amendment prepared by the FTC, that is, the proposal of taking down the ‘final and conclusive corrective measures’ to the completion of the decision process at the level of the FTC, has been handed down during the negotiations among Ministries, in order to resolve the current problem that one may not claim for antitrust damages until the final judgment of the Supreme Court, which has been the biggest target for criticism. Given that the chief reason why the damage compensation system has not been actively in use lies in the difficulty of proving the amount of damages, the newly introduced system acknowledging the amount of damages is epochal event. It is the most prominent one among the amendments to the private action system. From the perspective that it is difficult to abstractly regulate diverse methods of estimation for the amount of damages, the amendment at hand places quite a large portion of it in the court’s discretion, that is the weight of evidence is to be determined at the court’s discretion, through the legal procedures. Thus, such matter has been left behind to be developed through the accumulation of judicial precedents. In the meantime, the amendment regarding injunction claims, despite the urgent necessity of its introduction, is required to be modified and supplemented, as it is too simple to provide details and still has many problems. In conclusion, in the case of the U.S., as the private enforcement sector, which enforces the fair trade law through claims for compensation and injunction, has been in active use, the private antitrust enforcement cases reportedly accounted for more than 90% of all enforcement cases. As such, I hope that our private enforcement system will also be activated through improvement so that market competition may thrive in our society.

집단소송제 및 징벌적 손해배상제도 도입시 증가될 것으로 예상되는 공정거래법 위반행위 억지효과에 관한 실증적 분석

김차동 ( Cha Dong Kim ) 한국경쟁법학회 2014 競爭法硏究 Vol.29 No.-

Under the Korean antitrust jurisdiction, the administrative fine by the Korean Fair Trade Commission(hereinafter, “KFTC”) has played a major role on deterring the violations of antitrust laws. But, the average amount of fine was imposed as a very lower level as 1.4% of the affected commerce. It is estimated not to have a sufficient deterrence effect. Except for this fine, there are two more other sanctions such as criminal fines and damages, which have no sufficient deterrence effects at all. To reform the structure of Korean antitrust enforcement against the antitrust violations, two tracks may be offered. Firstly, some insist on raising the amount of administrative fine. Secondly, others insist on the introduction of class action and/or punitive damages systems. After reviewing all the strength and drawbacks of two way reforms, I can say that there is no royal way to get rid of all prospected drawbacks, and only ‘second best solution’ may be offered. Under the reform, enforcement costs.

이행이익 및 신뢰이익

김차동(Cha-Dong Kim) 한국비교사법학회 2010 비교사법 Vol.17 No.1

A damages claim on the breach of a contract is governed by the legal doctrines including general damages, special damages and foreseeability in Korea. These three concepts are originated from the article 393 in the Korean Civil Code. The Korean Supreme Court held that proximate cause limitation is said to complement these three legal doctrines to limit the coverage of injury. The article 535 of the Korean Civil Code stipulates that reliance interest will be compensated within the limitation of expectation interest in the instances when a contract is not consumated. The Korean Supreme Court literally applied the article to the cases to breach a contract before the its consummation. However, it extended the application of the article to the instances in 1992 on the case of 91da29972 on which contracts are consumated and rescinded afterward. It upheld that the reliance interest will be used to account the damage in the instances of the rescission of contracts. It is reasonable to apply the reliance interest on all the rescission cases. It also upheld in the same ruling that the reliance must be recovered within the limitation of expectation interest. The ruling in this part is partially correct and partially wrong. To evaluate the ruling, we need to define the exact concept of reliance and expectation interest and explore the historical origination of these definition. When the court of king's bench confirmed the complaint filed by victims, it compensated them with damages based on reliance interests in the early enforcement era. But, expectation interest became dominated because it was very effective and simple to apply. Whenever we make a contract, we evaluate and specify the value of its enforcement. In spite of its merits, expectation interest is not perfect. After a contract is made, we need to invest in trusting its full performance, before it is not performed. As capitalism grows its power in the economic system, the investment should be protected. Reliance interest plays a good role to protect the trustworthiness of economic system. Professors, Mr. L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue Jr. published their paper, the Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, in 1936. They insisted that reliance interest should be protected as damages of breach of contracts. As explained, the Korean Supreme Court recognized the concept of reliance interest on the breach of contracts. We need to research fully the true concept of reliance interest and the role on the damages.

공정거래법 위반행위에 관한 손해배상제도의 의의와 그 개선방향 -대법원 2017. 5. 31. 선고 2015다17975 판결-

김차동 ( Kim Cha Dong ) 한국상사판례학회 2017 상사판례연구 Vol.30 No.3

독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률(이하 `공정거래법`이라고 함) 제56조에서는 공정거래법 위반행위로 피해를 입은 자에게 손해배상청구권을 행사할 수 있도록 규정하고 있다. 이러한 공정거래법상의 손해배상제도는 민법 제750조에 규정된 불법행위에 의한 손해배상제도와는 독립된 별도의 제도로서 피해자가 그 선택에 따라 그 중 어느 하나의 청구권을 행사할 수 있다. 최근 영화상영업자들이 무료입장권을 발행하여 한 불이익 제공에 의한 불공정거래행위에 관해 영화제작자들이 손해배상청구를 한데 대하여 1심판결 에서는 일부 인용판결을 하였다가 항소심에서는 이를 취소하고 전부 기각하였는데 대법원에서는 항소심 판결을 그대로 유지하여 원고들의 상고를 기각한 대상판결이 선고되었다. 대상판결에서는 공정거래위원회의 심판이후에도 여전히 무료입장권을 발행 할 수 있도록 영화배급계약·영화상영계약이 체결되었고, 표준영화상영계약에도 같은 취지의 무료입장권 발행규정이 삽입되는 등 대등한 입장에서 교섭을 통해서도 동일한 취지의 약정이 이루어지는 점 등에 비추어 부당성이 인정되지 않는다며 원고들 청구를 기각한 취지는 이해된다. 하지만 공정거래법 위반 행위 억지를 위한 행정적·형사적 법집행 수단은 물론 민사법적 법집행수단을 도입하여 전방위적으로 공정거래법 위반행위를 억지하고자 한 취지를 반영하여 무료입장권 3.3% 발행과 같은 규모가 큰 위반행위에 대하여는 그 부당성을 인정하였으면 하는 아쉬움이 있다. 더구나 불이익 제공에 의한 불공정거래행위의 피해자를 직접 거래상대방으로 한정한 항소심의 법해석은 기존 대법원의 판례에도 어긋나고 법논리적으로 문제가 많았음에도 불구하고 이에 관한 분명한 판단이 없었던 점은 대상판결의 문제점 중 하나라고 할 수 있다. 나아가 행정심판의 판단이 후속 민사소송의 수소법원을 구속하는 힘의 정도나 불법행위를 원인으로 한 손해배상액의 산정에서 약정의 불이행으로 인한 손해배상액 산정방식의 원용가능성에 관한 추가적인 판단이 없었던 점이 아쉽다. The Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter “MRFTA”) provides Damages against the violation of the Korean MRFTA in its Article 56, 56-2, 57. Under the Korean legal system, the Korean Civil Code provides Damages as a general protection on the entitlements in the article 750. Therefore, the victims of the violation of the MRFTA can exercise both claims. The Korean Supreme Court made a ruling on the damages claim in 2017. In the case, the plaintiffs insisted on the compensation of the losses caused by the dependants` issuing free movie tickets as a violation fo the Korean MRFTA. The plaintiffs succeeded in the trial level but lost the claims subsequent appeal and last resort. The appeal court on the case dismissed the case because the dependants` issuing was not undue after it considered the several evidences including plaintiffs agreed with the same types of agreements even after the initial decision by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. The Korean Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the plaintiffs on the case and approved the ruling of the appeal court. However the ruling may correct on the conclusion but may still have a few points which needs some comments and correction. Especially even though a provision on the MRFTA should be interpreted into not privies, the mistake the appeal court did on the interpretation was not corrected on the Supreme Court` ruling. And the ruling did not include the binding effect on the subsequent civil case by the ruling of an administrative case`s ruling on the same matter of facts and how to assimilate the way to calculate the loss of the damage suit on the entitlement interference with that on the damage suit on the breach.

과점시장의 규제법리에 관한 연구

김차동 ( Cha Dong Kim ) 한국경쟁법학회 2014 競爭法硏究 Vol.30 No.-

There are almost no perfectly competitive markets and also few monopolisticmarkets. However a huge number of oligopolistic markets which we have metin the real life may be a very important topic on the competition lawjurisdiction. A core characteristic of the oligopoly, interdependency, has beentold. Therefore oligopolists will make their own decisions considering theircompetitors`` reaction. It is very natural that the market``s interdependencycauses a kind of an equilibrium without any explicit or implicit agreementwhich is also Nash one. The Cournot oligopoly theory may give us a bestunderstanding on the Nash equilibrium. But oligopolists may try to exploittheir consumers more by taking more strategic tactics beyond the equilibrium. We need to fully understand the difference between the oligopolistic Nashequilibrium and strategic behaviours to pursue additional profits up to themonopolistic one. The trigger``s strategy, one of gorgeous game theories,makes us know the strength of the strategy``s incentive. Two legal approaches, a structural approach and a behaviour approach, toregulate the oligopolistic markets have been made. Almost all competitionlaws throughout the world provide some clauses to condemn the abuse ofmarket dominating positions and concerted practices which are considered astwo legal methods to get rid of some detriments caused by oligopolists. Tocondemn oligopolists as a abusive market dominance two elements, collectivemarket dominant position and its abuse, are asked to prove whereas asconcerted practices, their strategic behaviours in the market. Base on the above analysis, we need to make a stress on the difference betweenthe Nash equilibrium and strategic behaviour. While we interpret the relevantlegal methods in the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fare Trade Act, we need to make sure it.

사법 : 손해배상(損害賠償)의 범위(範圍)중 책임제한(責任制限)의 원리(原理) -대법원 2007.10.25. 선고 2006다16758 판결과 관련하여-

김차동 ( Cha Dong Kim ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.27 No.1

A plaintiff has a great concern not only on whether he/she can deserve to win compensatory claims but on how much he/she collects through the action. The latter issue has not been drawn any attraction by scholars despite of its practical importance. Case laws have evolved on the area. Among torts cases, the comparative negligence rule was firstly recognized because it is articulated in the article 396 of Korean Civil Code. But, there are several considerations except for the plaintiff`s negligence which courts should take into account to calculate actual damage. Since several years ago, the Korean Supreme Court stated to accept some considerations to limit liability except for comparative negligence. In 2007, it rendered two very crucial judgments concerning to the issue on the former Securities and Exchange Act. This paper is dedicated to the analysis on one of these two cases to reveal the importance of the case. After a sincere analysis, the ruling is said to be a good news and bad news. For a good news, it established a new way of limiting the amount of liability in addition to comparative negligence which is derived from the statute. The Korean Supreme Court didn`t recognize a proportional causation because of a great burden of administering costs. However, damage is composed of an actual harm inflicted by the illegal act and a previously existing defect which the defendant is not liable for. When a proportional causation is not recognized, a supplementary rule is required to differentiate the actual harm from the previously existing defect. It was the limitation of liability that the Korean Supreme Court tried to develop to resolve this issue since 10 years ago. The case analyzed in this paper is evaluated to be of a great importance in that the Korean Supreme Court explicitly declared to establish a new consideration to limit liability without any statutory authority. For a bad news, it made the benefit of an article of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act weak. The article was introduced to give an incentive to the plaintiff, investors of securities, to file lawsuits against directors/officers and their accountants who reviewed financial reports.

사법 : 상호주식보유의 함의와 의결권 행사

김차동 ( Cha Dong Kim ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2008 법학논총 Vol.25 No.3

회사는 주식인수대금을 지급한 주주들에 의하여 지배된다. 지배권은 각 주식에 비례하여 주주에게 평등하게 배분된다. 따라서, 지배주주는 회사의 발행주식 중 50% 이상을 취득하여야 지배가 가능하게 된다. 하지만, 그 정도의 주식을 취득하기 위하여는 거대한 자금이 필요하다. 어떤 개인도 이를 감당할 수 없는 경우가 많다. 오늘날 공동지배의 기술이 발달되어 왔고, 이와 같은 기술에 대하여 법적규율이 뒤따르게 되었다. 상호주식소유와 순환주식소유는 공동지배를 위한 좋은 방법이 되었다. 상호주식소유는 자기의 주식을 소유하고 있는 다른 회사의 주식을 소유하게 되는 것이다. 상호주식소유의 폐단은 자본의 공동화, 현재의 경영자에 의한 의결권의 행사 및 경제력 집중의 심화와 같은 것이다. 그래서 어떻게 상호주식소유를 규율할 것인가가 점점 중요하게 되었다. 거의 모든 나라들에서 상호주식소유의 폐단을 제거하기 위하여 이를 규율하고 있다. 순환주식소유도 상호주식소유와 거의 같은 폐단이 있다. 그러나 상호주식소유와 같은 주목을 받지 못하고 있다. 특히 대한민국에서는 상호주식소유에 대한 제한은 엄격하나, 순환주식소유에 관한 제한은 전혀 없다. 출자총액제한제도의 폐지가 입법예고 되었고, 곧 폐지될 예정이다. 따라서 순환주식소유에 대한 중요성이 커지고 있다. 앞서 검토한 바와 같이, 상호주식소유에 관한 제한은 어느 나라에서나 존재한다. 그러나 그 규제방법은 나라에 따라 다르다. 영미법국가에서는 경영진이 출자없이 또는 자신의 출자분을 초과한 상호주식의 권리행사를 허용하지 않는다는 정책이 규제의 중심축이다. 상호주식소유는 회사의 지배에 이를 정도가 되었을 때에는 의결권이 정지된다. 이때 지배권이란 50 이상의 주식을 소유하는 때에 발생하나 집중된 소수의 주식소유만으로도 경우에 따라서는 지배권을 행사할 수 있고, 이러한 경우에는 상호소유주식의 의결권 행사가 금지된다. 이때 지배권이 발생하였는가의 문제는 입증의 문제이다. 그러나 입증의 비용을 줄이기 위하여 일부 州, 특히 캘리포니아주에서는 일정한 비율의 주식을 상호소유하는 경우에는 의결권이 금지되도록 입법화하였다. 캘리포니아주에서는 25% 이상의 상호주식소유를 이러한 경우로 규정하고 있다. 그러나 그 비율에 언제나 통용되는 적절한 숫자는 없다. 캘리포니아의 경우는 25%를 투자회사법과 은행지주회사법의 관련규정을 참조한 끝에 결정한 것이다. 미국에서는 순환주식소유도 상호주식 소유와 같은 원리 하에서 규율하고 있다. 만약 지배력을 초래할 만한 순환주식을 소유하게 되었다면 그 순환주식의 의결권이 금지된다. 이에 대한 사례가 Speiser v. Baker의 판결이다. 그러나 대륙법 국가들에서는 상호주식보유의 경우에는 비율기준에 의하여 규율하고 있다. 만약 10% 이상의 주식을 상호보유하는 경우에는 의결권이 금지된다. 그러나 10%만으로는 지배권을 의미하지 않기 때문에 영미법의 기준에 비하여 엄격하다고 할 것이다. 하지만, 조문해석의 한계상 순환주식보유의 경우를 포함하고 있지 아니하여 상호주식보유의 제한에 대한 규정을 회피하기 위한 순환주식보유를 만연하게 하는 원인이 되고 있다. 이러한 상호주식보유의 함의는 출자총액제한제도가 폐지될 예정인 대한민국에 큰 의미를 갖게 된다.

기업집단(企業集團) 이익추구행위(利益追求行爲)와 이사(理事)의 선관주의의무(善管注意義務)

김차동 ( Cha Dong Kim ) 한국상사판례학회 2006 상사판례연구 Vol.19 No.4