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범주의 선험적 연역 : 칸트 순수이성비판 제1판의 경우
김위성 부산대학교 사회과학대학 1981 社會科學論文集 Vol.20 No.-
The present paper concerns itself with the interpretation of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Categories as a case of reason experiment, which I proposed in my former paper last year. The whole structure of the Deduction is analyzed into experimental elements according to the viewpoint of reason experiment. They are experimental principles, hypothesis of experiment, unity of hypothesis and its experiments. The hypothesis of experiments is that the Transcendental Deduction of Categories is proved if apprehension, reproduction and recognition are ascertained in the experiment process. The first experiment from transcendental apperception justifies the validity of categories. The second experiment proves the right of application of categories to experience. The third experiment from imagination may be supposed from the reconstruction of the implicit description of the text.
김위성 釜山大學校 1983 人文論叢 Vol.23 No.1
This paper deals with the comaprison of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of categories and Popper's Falsifiability of scientific theory. The characteristics of the former are shown distinctly in the two steps of argument of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason. The latter is necessarily produced by the transformation of Kantian philosophy of consciousness into the Popperian system of statements. We can find these following three common features between Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Popper"s Falsifiabilily, in spite of many differences between them. 1. experimental character which is found in Kantian process of Transcendental Deduction , and in Popperian hypothetical proposal of scientiflc theory and its decision by falsification. 2. emphasis on coherence in the first step of argument in Kant, and in exclusion of contradictions from scientific systems in Popper. 3. importance of acquiring reality in the second step of argument in Kant's Deduction, and in the perceptual experience of Popper's basic statement.
김위성 釜山水産大學校 1975 論文集 Vol.14 No.-
In dieser Abhandlung ist "Begriffsschrift" 1879, das erste Werk von G. Frege, aus dem heutigen Standpunkt analysiert und interpretiert. Wenn man auch als klassisch absehen kann vonden technischen Teilen, die jetzt alle Logistiksteme fast unverandert in sich akzeptieren, haben doch groβen Wert der Analyse die noch nicht viel beachteten teile, wo die Grundideen der Logikkalkul beruhrt sind. Hier sind davon die folgenden Ideen hauptsachlich untersucht: die Variable, der Urteilsstrich und die Inhaltsgleichheit. 1. Die Variable, die haufig in Mathematik und Logik erscheint, fuhrt uns in den Irrtum, der etwas Unveranderliches ins Veranderliche macht. Muβ man einen neuen Weg finden, der ohne die Variable eine strenge Logik ermoglicht. 2. Der Urteilsstrich spielt die Rolle, daβ der begriffliche Inhalt als wahr zuerkannt wurde. Also kommt der Ausdruck "der Umstand, daβ" oder "der Satz, daβ" nur vom Zweck der Erklarung, nich aus eigentlicher Absicht. 3. Die Inhaltsgleichheit hat die Verworrenheit zwischen Verwendung der Worter und deren Erwahnung mitgebracht. Aber kann man darin auch den Ansatz von deren Unterscheidung finden und fuhrt er zum Gedanken uber Sinn und Bedeutung.
金渭星 釜山水産大學校 1974 論文集 Vol.13 No.-
This paper is concerned with the problem of the nature of geometry as knowledge. It analyzes the nature from epistemological and logical viewpoints. According to the dichotomy of knowledge into the empirical and the a priori, firstly the systematization of geometry on the foundation of the former is pursued in vain for inseparable non-empirical elements within the axioms and definitions. And then the way of the latter is followed in Kantian Philosophy of Mathematics, which sees geometrical knowledge as synthetic judgment a priori. He presupposes the a priori and synthetic character of geometry as the fact found in our knowledge and seeks its source in the pure intuition. Another dichotomy of analytic-synthetic distinction in Kant contributes to the a priori geometry, but becomes outdated because it disregards that subject-predicate relation is not universal in the judgments. It comes out that explicit definitions are ambiguous and confounded in facing the adequate definitions. They are revealed as implicit definitions which Formalism uses in making geometry strict and consistent. Formalism makes it possible to comprehend non-Euclidean geometries in compatible way with the Euclidean in their formal logical structures. Pure geometry is uninterpreted and founded only on Formalism. But the choice of geometry asks criteria by which a geometry is found most adequate to explain and describe the world of experience. Conventionalism holds that all systems of geometry are only conventions and they are chosen only by the principle of simplicity in application to the facts. But it fails to make strict distinction between mathematical geometry as pure and physical geometry as applied.