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The Global Welfare of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility
( Senri C. Yoshida ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1996 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.11 No.4
Using the Bond and Chen [1987] model on illegal immigration, we newly examine the effects of internal enforcement by host country`s government on labor-importing country, labor-exporting country and global welfare when capital is allowed to be internationally mobile between a home and a foreign countries. The main results we obtain are that an imposition of the enforcement makes the labor-importing country`s welfare better off under some circumstances and the labor-exporting country`s welfare better off as well, and hence improves the global welfare. Therefore, we can conclude that the enforcement is a Pareto-improving-policy. (JEL Classification No.: F21; F22)
The Global Welfare of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility
Yoshida, Senri C. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1996 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.11 No.4
Using the Bond and Chen [1987] model on illegal immigration, we newly examine the effects of internal enforcement by host country's government on labor-importing country, labor-exporting country and global welfare when capital is allowed to be internationally mobile between a home and a foreign countries. The main results we obtain are that an imposition of the enforcement makes the labor-importing country's welfare better off under some circumstances and the labor-exporting country's welfare better off as well, and hence improves the global welfare. Therefore, we can conclude that the enforcement is a Pareto-improving-policy. (JEL Classification No. : F 21; F22)