플랫폼 경제에 관한 헌법적 접근 – 플랫폼 노동의 보호와 플랫폼 사업의 규율 -

장선미 헌법재판연구원 2023 헌법재판연구 Vol.10 No.2

‘플랫폼 경제’는 정보통신기술 발전에 따른 인간의 삶의 변화를 경제라는 측면에서 설명하는 용어이다. 플랫폼 경제는 인간이 노동을 수행하는 방식과 인간의 노동이 매개되는 방식에도 영향을 미쳤다. 그대표적인 예가 알고리듬을 사용하여 노동의 수요와 공급을 매개하는 ‘디지털 노동 플랫폼’과 이를 통해노동을 제공하는 ‘디지털 플랫폼 노동자’의 등장이다. ‘플랫폼 노동’은 정보통신기술을 이용하여 기존 노동법의 인적 적용범위를 결정하는 핵심기준인 ‘사용종속관계’를 해체 내지 배제할 수 있고, ‘표준적 고용관계’를 기초로 하는 기존 노동법의 한계를 명징하게 보여준다. 또한 현재 사회의 전 영역에서 진행되고 있는 ‘디지털 전환’과 그에 따른 플랫폼 경제의 발전은 플랫폼 노동이 노동의 전 부문에서 가능하고 기존 근로자의 비전형 노동자로의 전환이 가속화될 수있다는 것을 보여준다. 이러한 플랫폼 노동은 기존 노동법의 적용범위에 포섭되지 못했던 비전형 노동문제의 일부이며, 비전형 노동은 노동법제에서 더 이상 예외적인 것으로 취급해서는 안 된다는 것을 우리에게 더 구체적으로 상기시켜주는 계기이다. 플랫폼 노동은 개별 사건에서 해당 플랫폼 노동자가 근로자인지 여부를 판단하는 기준 제시를 넘어, 그 이상의 인간 노동 보호, 즉 인간의 존엄한 노동의 보호를국가에 요청한다. 본 연구는 헌법현실로서 분절된 노동시장에서 소외된 비전형 노동인 플랫폼 노동에 대한 헌법적 보호방안을 모색하기 위한 것이다. 이를 위해 플랫폼 노동의 사실적 측면, 사법적 측면, 입법적 측면 등 다양한 각도에서 분석하였으며, 비교법적 연구를 함께 수행하였다. 이러한 분석을 바탕으로 플랫폼 노동자의노동이 존엄한 노동이 될 수 있도록 보호하는 헌법적 근거로 헌법 제32조 제3항과 제33조를 비롯한 노동기본권, 플랫폼 노동에 대한 알고리듬에 의한 노무관리 관련 개인정보자기결정권, 헌법 제11조의 평등및 기타 헌법상 기본권을 검토하였다. 또한 플랫폼 노동자의 보호는 플랫폼 사업의 규제를 요청하므로, 플랫폼 노동 보호를 위한 플랫폼 규제의 헌법적 근거를 함께 검토하였다. 플랫폼 노동 보호를 위한 플랫폼 규제의 헌법적 근거로 헌법상 경제질서로서 사회적 시장경제와 헌법 제119조 제2항을 제시하였다. 헌법상 경제질서에 대한 검토를 통해플랫폼 경제에서 디지털 노동 플랫폼을 통한 표준적 고용관계 해체 및 노동조건 악화로부터 노동자를 보호하기 위한 국가의 법적 보호 장치 마련이 헌법적 의무임을 확인하였다. 즉 모든 노동하는 인간의 노동조건을 위한 법적 규율의 마련, 즉 자유, 평등, 안전, 인간 존엄이 보장되면서도 생산적인 노동조건을 위한 입법은 관련 기본권뿐만 아니라 헌법상 경제질서의 요청이다. 따라서 헌법상 경제질서는 플랫폼 경제에서 국가에 대하여 디지털 노동 플랫폼을 통한 표준적 고용관계 해체 및 노동조건 악화로부터 노동자를보호할 수 있는 장치를 마련하도록 요구한다. 이 연구는 헌법상 기본적 인권과 경제질서라는 두 축을 통해 플랫폼 노동과 디지털 노동 플랫폼에 접근하였다. 이를 통해 디지털 전환으로 인한 플랫폼 경제의 등장과 노동 패러다임의 전환 또한 헌법적 한계 내에 있음을 확인하였다. 즉 인간의 ‘존엄한 노동’ 보장이 플랫폼 노동과 디지털 노동 플랫폼에 대한헌법적 한계임을 확인하였다. 이러한 ... The platform economy refers to the impact of the development of information and communication technology on the economy. Furthermore, this impact has also affected the way human perform labor (and vice-versa). A specific example of this can be seen in the emergence of ‘digital labor platforms’, these platforms mediate the supply and demand of labor, and the ‘digital platform workers’ that provide labor through them. Digital labor platforms expose the limitations of the labor laws based on ‘standard employment relationships.’ Strategies made by digital labor platforms can exclude ‘subordination’ that stem from managerial controls based on technologies. The growth of digital labor platforms entails an increase in labor that cannot be subsumed into a standard employment relationship based on full-time labor on the premise of subordination between users and workers, thus it is pushed out of legal protection. The growth of digital labor platforms refers to an increase in labor that cannot be subsumed by a standard employment relationship based on full-time regular labor on the premise of subordination. This platform labor is the product of a digital transition taking place in various areas of society, the root of this shift comes from an unprecedented development of communicative technology. Furthermore, this dynamic shift has caused a change in the labor paradigm. The platform labor specifically calls upon the state for its protection over human dignified labor, going beyond the classification of workers and individual cases. As a result, research was conducted to address the current status of platform labor and legislation in relation to constitutional reality. Based on this, the constitutional request is to protect the labor of providers so that it shifts into something more dignified. This can be alluded to in the Constitution, where there specific passages detailing basic labor rights (Articles 32 and Article 33). Further analyzation of the Constitutional articles would reveal that there is a right to self-determination of personal information related to algorithmic management on the platform labor. Furthermore, Article Eleven’s equality under the constitution, Article Fifteen’s freedom of occupation, and the right to live a (human) life and the right to receive social security as stated under Article Thirty-Four were all reviewed. In connection to the protection of platform workers (which pushes for regulation of platform business), the constitutional basis for the platform regulation for labor protection was re-examined. As a result, it was confirmed that the social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) as the economic system under the Article 119 (2) of the Constitution serves as the constitutional basis for platform regulation. Under Constitutional protection, the establishment of legal regulations human working conditions and their right to freedom, equality, safety, and human dignity are guaranteed. Consequently, in a platform economy, it is a obligation to establish a nationalized legal protection mechanism to protect workers from deteriorating working conditions, as well as the dissolution of standard employment relations through digital labor platforms. In this way the establishment of legal regulations demonstrates an interplay between the constitutional economic order and basic human rights.

유럽연합 및 일본의 온라인 플랫폼 규율과 국내 추진법안의 비교 및 시사점 - 온라인 플랫폼과 영업적 이용자 간의 법률관계를 중심으로 -

김진우 한국소비자법학회 2021 소비자법연구 Vol.7 No.1

Platforms offer unparalleled efficiencies in access to cross-border markets and are crucial for millions of successful firms. While the gateway position of online platforms enables them to organise millions of users, it also opens the possibility unilateral trading practices that are harmful, and against which no effective redress is available for the businesses using these platforms. The EU Regulation on platform-to-business relations (P2B Regulation), which entered into force in July 2019, is the first-ever set of rules creating a fair, transparent and predictable business environment for smaller businesses and traders on online platforms. Online platforms can be crucial for the commercial success of companies that use them to reach consumers. However, the providers of those platforms often have superior bargaining power, which enables them to unilaterally impose practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, or are contrary to good faith and fair dealing. The objective of the P2B Regulation is to address such potential frictions in the online platform economy. Platform and search engine operators tend to use pre-formulated general terms and conditions and define them unilaterally. The P2B Regulation aims to curb the unfair business practices of the platform operators – such as unannounced changes to terms and conditions, the sudden deletion of dealer accounts or non-transparent rankings. On May 27, 2020, the National Diet of Japan enacted the Act on Improvement of Transparency and Fairness in Trading on Specified Digital Platforms (the Act). The Act requires digital platform providers to disclose certain terms and conditions to sellers and consumers, develop fair procedures and systems, and submit an annual report on their business operations to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. It also empowers the government to assess compliance, publicize the results of its assessment, and take necessary actions to enforce compliance, including issuing fines for violations. This article covers the EU P2B regulation and japanese Act’s key provisions. It also discusses the similarities and differences between the regulations on digital platforms in Korea. 플랫폼 경제(platform economy)는 기회를 제공하는 데 그치지 않고 플랫폼에서 활동하는 입점업체에 대한 새로운 위험을 초래하기도 한다. 온라인 플랫폼은 물품이나 서비스의 실제 제공자(영업적 이용자, 입점업체)와 고객을 연결하면서 규칙(rule)을 설정한다. 온라인 플랫폼은 이제 거래를 위한 단순한 관문(gateway)이 아니라 문지기(gatekeeper)로서 물품이나 서비스의 선택, 배치 및 검색 순위 결정을 통해 입점업체의 시장 접근 및 사업적 성공 여부를 결정하기에 이르렀다. 결과적으로 플랫폼과 검색 엔진은 실제로 급부를 제공하는 사업자와 고객 간의 인터페이스로서 최근 몇 년간 현저한 시장지배력을 확보하였다. 이러한 상황에서 입점업체는 고객과 직접적인 접촉을 하지 못한 채 디지털 방식으로 고객과 접촉하고 고객과의 거래를 처리하기 위하여 점점 더 플랫폼에 의존하게 된다. 이와 함께 일부 플랫폼의 불공정한 관행에 대한 지적이 증가하고 있다. EU의 ​​입법자는 “역내 시장에서 공정하고, 예견가능하며, 지속가능하고 또 신뢰할 수 있는 온라인 거래 환경을 보장하기 위하여” 2019. 6. 20. 「온라인 중개 서비스의 영업적 이용자에 대한 공정성과 투명성 증진에 규정(P2B 규정)」을 통과시켰고, 그것은 2020. 7. 12.부터 모든 EU 회원국에서 시행되고 있다. 일본에서는 2020. 5. 27. 「특정 디지털 플랫폼의 투명성 및 공정성 증진에 관한 법률(거래투명화법)」이 국회를 통과하였으며, 같은 해 6. 3. 공포되었다. 본 연구는 P2B 분야의 글로벌 차원의 최초 입법이라고 할 수 있는 P2B 규정의 주요 내용을 파악하면서 일본의 거래투명화법, 공정거래위원회 법안, 송갑석 의원안 및 전혜숙 의원안의 내용을 비교하는 형태로 논의를 전개한 뒤 우리 입법에의 시사점을 밝혔다. 특히 시장지배력 임계치의 유월 여부와 관계없이 플랫폼 경제를 규율하기 위하여 경쟁법과 계약법이 긴밀히 협력할 필요가 있다. 입법적 규제는 균형이 잡혀야 하며 혁신을 방해해서는 안 된다. 플랫폼 경제와 같은 비교적 새로운 비즈니스 모델에 관한 법적 틀은 투자 및 혁신이 보장되고, 아울러 궁극적으로 시장지배력의 남용 가능성으로부터의 적절한 보호 및 경쟁시장조건을 제공해야 한다. 이때 유연하고 혁신적인 비즈니스 모델의 특성이 충분히 반영되어야 한다. 새로운 비즈니스 모델에 관한 법적 틀은 과도한 국가 개입을 초래해서는 안 되며, 시장의 적절한 기능에 이바지하는 것이어야 한다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때 P2B 규정은 플랫폼과 이용자 간의 법률관계를 약관법적으로 다룬 것으로 일정 사항에 관하여는 이론적 관점에서 우리 입법의 모범이 될 수 있다. 규범학으로서의 법학은 전통적으로 경험적 방법에 큰 관심을 베풀지 않는 경향이 있지만, 혁신을 기반으로 성장하는 분야의 규제강도는 우리의 시장 상황이 EU의 그것과 유사한지 여부가 면밀히 조사⋅확인된 후 결정되어야 한다. 궁극적으로 P2B 관계에 관한 규율은 당사자의 어느 한쪽의 보호에 치우쳐서는 안 된다. 장래의 글로벌 경쟁력을 확보하기 위하여 우리가 직면한 가장 큰 과제는 영업적 이용자와 소비자의 정당한 이익 보호를 소홀히 함이 없이 이 분야에서 지속적으로 혁신을 촉진하는 것이라고 할 수 있다. P2B 관계의 법적 규제는 여러모로 공정위가 담당하는 것이 적합하다.

온라인 플랫폼의 분류 프레임워크: 국내 플랫폼 사례연구를 중심으로

강형구,강창모,전성민 한국정보시스템학회 2022 情報시스템硏究 Vol.31 No.1

Purpose This paper presents a new method of classifying online platforms. It also explains how to apply the framework using case studies and generate new insight about platform strategies and policy development. Design/methodology/approach This paper focuses on the relationship between platforms, especially the hierarchy and power relations, and broadly classifies platforms as follows: content/services, meta information, app stores, operating systems, and cloud. Both the content/service platform and the meta information platform have matching as their main function. However, most content/services tend to collect and access information through meta-information platforms, so meta-information platforms are closer to infrastructure than content/service platforms. App store, operating system, and cloud can be said to be platforms of platforms. A small number of companies in the US and China dominate platforms of platforms, and become the recent development and regulatory targets of their respective governments. Findings We should be wary of the attempts to regulate domestic platforms by importing foreign regulations that ignore the hierarchical structure that our framework highlights. We believe that Korea's strategy to become a true platform powerhouse is clear. As one of the few countries with significant companies in the area of meta information platforms, it will be necessary to fully utilize the position and advance into the strategically important area of platforms of platforms. Furthermore, it is necessary to encourage world-class companies to appear in Korea in the app store, operating system, and cloud. To do so, the government needs to introduce promotion policies to strategically nurture such platforms rather than to regulate them.

플랫폼 경제에 대한 경쟁법 적용에 관한 고찰 – 시장획정을 중심으로 -

최지현 중앙대학교 법학연구원 2022 法學論文集 Vol.46 No.1

As the digital economy based on the internet has become the center of our lives, a significant number of transactions are already being conducted on platforms. In particular, there is a discussion on whether it is desirable to apply the traditional analysis framework of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act on the definition of relevant markets and the evaluation of restrictions on competition to the platform. This paper especially focused on defining the relevant market in the platform economy. While analyzing the Amex decision of the US Supreme Court, this paper examines two methods of defining the relevant market on a platform that has the characteristics of a two-sided market, namely, a method of defining a single market and a method of defining a related market with two separate sides. In addition, the traditional analysis framework for defining relevant markets was reviewed. And, before examining the definition of the relevant market in the platform economy in earnest, the characteristics of the platform as a two-sided market and the characteristics of the platform market were analyzed, and after analyzing the decision of the KFTC in which the definition of the relevant market in the platform was an issue, the previous studies on the method of defining the relevant market regarding platform were reviewed. From the perspective of platform regulation, it is not appropriate to over-regulate the innovative and dynamic behavior of platform operators until significant monopoly power is established. Unlike the traditional market, monopoly in the platform market has a short period of market dominance, so its negative effects are small. However, this does not mean that platform operators should be allowed to violate the competition law indefinitely. The Amex decision is significant in that the US court recognized the usefulness of the two-sided market theory and put it on the table for full-fledged discussion so that competition authorities could think about it. However, there are still many points to be improved. It is expected that active discussions will take place in the future about what the judgment of the US court will be on similar issues and whether such judgment can be applied to Korea. ICT 기술의 발달로 인터넷을 통한 거래의 거래비용이 낮아지면서 플랫폼에 기반한 거래는 폭증하였고 인터넷을 기반으로 하는 디지털 경제가 우리 생활의 중심이 되었다. 플랫폼에 적용되는 경쟁법의 집행기준에 관하여 지금까지 여러 연구가 진행되어왔다. 특히 관련시장 획정, 경쟁제한성 평가 등에 관한 경쟁법의 전통적인 분석틀을 플랫폼에 적용하는 것이 바람직한지에 관한 논의가 진행되고 있다. 본고는 이 중 특히 플랫폼에서의 관련시장 획정에 초점을 맞추었다. 본고는 미국 연방대법원의 American Express 판결을 분석하면서 양면시장의 성격을 가진 플랫폼에서 관련시장을 획정하는 두 가지 방법 즉 단일시장으로 획정하는 방법과 별개의 두 면의 관련시장으로 획정하는 방법에 관하여 검토하고, 기존의 관련시장 획정에 관한 전통적인 분석틀을 검토하였다. 그리고 양면시장으로서의 플랫폼의 특성과 플랫폼 경제의 특성을 분석하고, 플랫폼에서의 시장획정이 쟁점이 되었던 공정거래위원회 심결례를 분석한 후, 플랫폼에서의 시장획정 방법에 관한 선행연구들을 검토하였다. ‘플랫폼에 대한 규제’라는 큰 시각에서 바라볼 때, 혁신적이고 동태적인 플랫폼 사업자의 행위는 상당한 독점력이 형성되기 전까지는 지나치게 규제하는 것이 타당하지 않다고 본다. 플랫폼 시장에서의 독점은 전통적 시장과 달리 시장지배력이 유지되는 기간이 짧아 그 폐단이 적고, 독점이 장기화되더라도 이는 한 시대에서 독점을 향유한 사업자를 신기술을 가진 사업자가 대체하는 과정의 초입일 수 있기 때문이다. 또한 플랫폼 경제에서의 독점은 기존의 자연독점과는 달리 평가할 요인들이 많으므로, 플랫폼 경제에 경쟁법을 적용하여 플랫폼 사업자의 행위를 규제하는 것은 신중할 필요가 있다. 그러나 이는 플랫폼 사업자의 경쟁법 위반행위를 한없이 허용하자는 뜻은 아니다. 플랫폼의 행위에 경쟁당국이 개입한다면 언제 개입해야 하는지는 매우 중요한 문제이다. Amex 판결은 미국 법원이 양면시장 이론의 유용성을 인정하고, 경쟁당국이 이에 관하여 고민할 수 있도록 본격적인 논의의 장에 올렸다는 점에서 큰 의미가 있다. 하지만 아직 보완되어야 하는 점도 많다. 앞으로 유사 쟁점에서 미국 법원의 판단이 어떠할지, 그러한 판단을 우리나라에는 어떤 방식으로 적용할 수 있는지에 관하여 활발한 논의가 행해지기를 기대한다.

선형 가치사슬과 양면 플랫폼 비즈니스 모델의 확장과 결합 모델

김현수 한국비즈니스학회 2024 비즈니스융복합연구 Vol.9 No.1

Following the traditional linear value chain business model, with the emergence of platform business models utilizing digital technology, how companies should position themselves to secure competitiveness is an important issue linked to corporate innovation and digital transformation. In this study, the company's business model was broadly divided into a linear value chain model and a two-sided platform business model, and the type of direction in which each model would expand and how it would be combined with the other business model was presented through examples. First, the linear value chain model was seen as expanding to a supermarket-type value chain and finally incorporating a consumer-level community platform, while the two-sided platform model was seen as a platform expansion stage in the direction of uniting various platforms by expanding the category range horizontally. It was expected that it would ultimately progress to a value chain combination model that secures sales profits by inserting a value chain model that sells one's own products on one's own platform. In addition, from the perspective of the producer he sees the platform as one of the methods of structuring his value chain and chooses the advantageous alternative between direct selling that forms a direct channel with consumers, utilizing existing distributors, and entering a platform. It was expected that a strategy would be adopted to avoid the pressure of the platform by selling directly against the platform and multihoming between platforms. From the platform's perspective, it was expected that all forms of profit would gradually be taken from the role of only intermediary between producers and consumers to providing paid solutions to producers and selling its own products to consumers. This study provides a concise framework for assessing various business models and how existing companies can innovate their business models through digital transformation. In fact, we aim to provide insight into business innovation that has common characteristics and directions even though it looks different in each case.

실리콘밸리 플랫폼 기업생태계의 성공요인에 관한 탐색적 연구: IPA 분석과 질적 분석을 중심으로

정연승,이성호 한국벤처창업학회 2023 벤처창업연구 Vol.18 No.1

최근 글로벌 시장에서 플랫폼 산업이 급격히 성장함과 동시에 경쟁이 심화되고 있으며, 향후 다양한 산업분야와 접목하여 플랫폼 산업의 영역과 범위는 더욱 확대될 전망이다. 따라서 플랫폼 시장에서 국내 플랫폼 기업들이 글로벌 경쟁력을 갖추기 위해서는 플랫폼 비즈니스 생태계 및 성공요인에 대한 연구가 필요하다. 그러나 최근 플랫폼 관련 연구는 플랫폼 비즈니스 현황분석, 플랫폼 경제, 플랫폼의 간접 네트워크 외부성 등의 특성에 관한 이론적 연구가 대부분을 차지했다. 따라서 본 연구는 기존 선행연구들에서 제안되고 있는 실리콘밸리 기업생태계의 성공요인들을 통합적으로 분석하고, 동시에 실제 실리콘밸리 플랫폼 기업생태계의 이해관계자들을 대상으로 추출된 성공요인들을 분석하였다. 그리고 이러한 요인들을 기반으로 플랫폼 기업생태계 이해관계자들에게 성공방안을 제안하기 위한 방안으로 IPA분석과 심층인터뷰(in-depth interview)를 진행하였다. 분석 결과, 선행연구들을 통해 수집한 성공요인들 중 비교적 현재 실리콘밸리에서 중요도와 만족도가 모두 잘 유지되고 있는 요인은 인력, 자본, 도전문화가 확인되었다. 결국 현재의 실리콘밸리가 우수한 인적자원과 풍부한 자본을 바탕으로 이를 활용해 마음껏 도전해볼 수 있는 환경과 문화가 조성된 것이 실리콘밸리의 플랫폼 비즈니스의 성공에 가장 크게 기여하고 있다는 것을 알 수 있다. 한편, 실리콘밸리의 플랫폼 기업생태계에 있어서 중요도는 높지만, 현재 이해관계자들의 만족도가 상대적으로 낮게 나타나는 요인으로는 ‘활발한 기업 간의 학습과 벤치마킹’, ‘구성원 간의 강한 유대감과 협력관계’임을 확인되었고, 향후 해당 요인들을 강화하기 위한 관심과 노력이 필요한 것으로 분석되었다. 마지막으로 최소한의 관리만이 필요한 요인들은 시장의 자율경쟁에 필요한 제도 및 정책들과 ‘기업지원 서비스 산업’, ‘네임밸류’, ‘분사창업’ 등이었으며, 이러한 요인들은 문헌조사에서는 중요하게 지적되었지만, 시대와 환경의 변화로 인해 그 중요도와 만족도에 있어서 우선순위가 낮아졌다는 연구결과가 도출되었다. 본 연구는 기존 선행연구들에서 제안되고 있는 실리콘밸리 기업생태계의 성공요인들을 통합적으로 분석하고, 동시에 실제 실리콘밸리 플랫폼 기업생태계의 이해관계자들을 대상으로 추출된 성공요인들을 분석하였다는데 이론적 의의를 찾을 수 있다. 또한, 추출된 다양한 요인들을 기반으로 IPA 분석을 통해 중요도 및 만족도를 동시에 살펴보았다는 점에서 또 다른 학문적 의의가 있다 하겠다. 실무적인 시사점으로는 정부 및 기업에게 국내 플랫폼 기업의 성장을 위한 이론적 근거와 플랫폼 기업 생태계의 성공요인에 대한 구체적인 정보를 제공함으로써 국내 플랫폼 생태계 형성에 기여하였다는 점에서 의의를 가진다. Recently, the platform industry is rapidly growing in the global market, and competition is intensifying at the same time. Therefore, in order for domestic platform companies to have global competitiveness in the platform market, it is necessary to study the platform business ecosystem and success factors. However, most of the recent platform-related studies have been theoretical studies on the characteristics of platform business status analysis, platform economy, and indirect network externalities of platforms. Therefore, this study comprehensively analyzed the success factors of Silicon Valley's business ecosystem proposed in previous studies, and at the same time analyzed the success factors extracted from stakeholders in the actual Silicon Valley platform business ecosystem. And based on these factors, an IPA analysis was conducted as a way to propose a success plan to stakeholders in the platform business ecosystem. As a result of the analysis, among the success factors collected through previous studies, manpower, capital, and challenge culture were identified as factors that are relatively well maintained in both importance and satisfaction in Silicon Valley. In the end, it can be seen that the creation of an environment and culture in which Silicon Valley can use it to challenge itself based on excellent human resources and abundant capital contributes the most to the success of Silicon Valley's platform business. On the other hand, although it is of high importance to Silicon Valley's platform corporate ecosystem, the factors that show relatively low satisfaction among stakeholders are 'learning and benchmarking among active companies' and 'strong ties and cooperation between members', and it is analyzed that interest and effort are needed to strengthen these factors in the future. Finally, the systems and policies necessary for market autonomous competition, 'business support service industry', 'name value', and 'spin-off start-up' were important factors in literature research, but the importance and satisfaction of these factors were lowered due to changes in the times and environment. This study has academic implications in that it comprehensively analyzes the success factors of Silicon Valley's business ecosystem proposed in previous studies, and at the same time analyzes the success factors extracted from stakeholders in the actual Silicon Valley platform business ecosystem. In addition, there is another academic implications that importance and satisfaction were simultaneously examined through IPA analysis based on these various extracted factors. As for academic implications, it is meaningful in that it contributed to the formation of the domestic platform ecosystem by providing the government and companies with concrete information on the success factors of the platform business ecosystem and the theoretical grounds for the growth of domestic platform businesses.

LOYALTY TRANSFER IN TWO-SIDE MARKETS: THE CASE OF ONLINE PAYMENT PLATFORMS

So-Young Lee 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2018 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2018 No.07

Introduction With the opening of the 4th revolution era, platform business started to come into the spotlight. It was in the early 2000s that academics started full-scale research on platform based on the two-sided market theory but in fact the two-sided market is a business model that has existed around us since before. Examples include credit card industry, real estate brokering, and auctions. These industries are creating value through the interaction of two markets of different needs through a company that provides a specific platform (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). Recently, with the widespread use of services and products based on high technology, platform business is pouring into our lives at an amazing speed. With a single ID, you can shop, pay for, and receive shipping from a variety of online stores, without having to go through a lot of memberships. You do not have to search every single hotel for the best price, best location. You can even find a room in the house and see the reviews of customers who have stayed there. Compared to traditional pipeline business, one of the key differentiating features of the platform business is a two-sided network effect where consumers and consumers, producers and producers, and consumers and producers interact with each other. This two-sided network effect, with a positive feedback loop, has become a major driver of platform company growth. In the two-sided market, the platform‟s value to any given user largely depends on the size of the users on the other side of the platform due to the indirect network effect (Evans, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Therefore, increasing the size of one side market, including the issue of „chicken or egg‟, is an indispensable task for the platform managers to maximize platform performance. But more important than increasing the size of one side of the market is transforming the new customers to loyal customers and creating positive feedback loops. This study explores the process of online payment platform users signing up, forming user loyalty, and spreading the loyalty to the sellers and platform providers. More specifically, this study examines (1) what causes the consumers to join the online payment platform at the beginning (2) what are the drivers that lead new members to the active, loyal users (3) whether the loyalty to the payment platform has a positive effect on the attitude toward the sellers (the other side market) and the platform company (platform provider). Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Two- Sided Markets and the Platform The definition of the two-sided market is varied by scholars. Chakravoti and Roson (2006) defines the two-sided market as a market where two different groups of users interact through the platform and the value created at this time is influenced by the indirect externalities of the network. Here, the platform is a physical, virtual, or institutional environment that allows different groups of users to facilitate transactions or interactions. According to Evans (2003), three necessary conditions for two sided platform markets are: (1) there are two distinct groups of customers; (2) there are externalities associated with customer A and B becoming connected or coordinated in some fashion; (3) an intermediary can facilitate that coordination efficiently than bi-lateral relationships between the members of the group. For example, we can think of a credit card company. There is a group of card holders and merchants and the demands of these two groups are very different. There is also a network effect between the two groups. Customers will not use credit cards with fewer merchants. The greater the number of merchants, the greater the benefits the customers have. Likewise, the more cardholders there are, the more profitable the merchants can generate. The intermediary role of the two groups of users to interact is a credit card company. Perceived value and Loyalty to the Online Payment Platform The loyalty to the online payment system can be expressed as the level of participation and commitment the member has over other similar payment systems. O‟Brien and Jones (1995) argue the value perception as an important prerequisite factor in developing brand loyalty; that is, only after the customer has perceived the online payment system as valuable, then would the customer become loyal to the system. The expectations that the perceived value can affect the loyalty to the online payment platform may be explained in terms of “Social Exchange Theory” (Thibaut and Kelly 1959). Within this framework, the customer will remain in the platform only when he or she perceives the value, which is defined as a trade-off between costs and benefits (Woodruff and Gardial 1996) is sufficient. Overall, perceived value of the online payment platform would affect customer loyalty. More specifically, it is expected that non-economic values such as simplicity in account setting, convenience in use will have a more meaningful effect than the economic value including sign-up grant at the stage of attracting new customers. But in the process of new customers becoming active and loyal users, the economic value including mileage points, discount coupons and free trial coupons will play a more important role in addition to this convenience. For example, benefit of being able to use the accumulated mileage or discount coupon on any online store within the platform will make consumers to stay on this payment platform and become loyal customers. Based on such argument, we put forward the following hypothesis. H1: Non economic value has a positive effect on online payment platform loyalty H2: Economic value has a positive effect on online payment platform loyalty. Loyalty Transfer According to Eisenmann et al. (2006), the platforms exhibit two types of network effects: A same-side effect, in which increasing the number of users on one side of the network makes it either more or less valuable to users on the same side; and a cross-side effect, in which increasing number of users on one side makes it either more or less valuable to the users on the other side. In case of online payment platform, it is expected that there will be a positive cross-side network effect. As the number of consumers using a specific online payment platform increases, the number of partner shops participating in the platform will increase, allowing consumers to shop in more diverse online stores. Once customers experienced the value of a specific online payment system, they would insist on paying by this method when shopping online (Parker, Alstein and Choudary, 2016), that is, becoming a loyal customer. Oliver (1999) defines customer loyalty as a deeply held commitment to re-buy or re-patronize a preferred product or service consistently in the future, thereby causing repetitive same brand purchasing. The loyal customers will be among the many online stores selling the same products/services at a same price, shopping at stores that show their favorite online payment system logo, and encouraging friends and family to use the payment system. The frequent transactions will affect consumer‟s attitude towards a certain brand or store and diffuse their loyalty. The customers that are loyal to the payment platform will not only actively try to earn points but also be willing to go and shop at the stores participating in the platform. Some customers may prefer a store among many even though they have not used it before because it belongs to the platform. The loyalty to the platform also can be transferred to the loyalty on the platform provider. Customers will have a favorable attitude when the platform providers do other business (for example, online banking, debit card business, etc.). Given the above, we put forward the following 3 hypotheses. H3: Platform loyalty has a positive effect on the loyalty toward the sellers, the other side market. H4: Positive attitude toward the sellers within the platform has a positive effect on attitude toward the platform company H5: Platform loyalty has a positive effect on the attitude toward the platform company. Conceptual Framework Data Analysis and Results The data used in this study were obtained from a survey of 562 online payment platform users. Data analysis shows that non-economic values such as simplicity, convenience, and platform reliability have a more significant impact on platform loyalty than economic values such as sign-up bonus. However, it was found that economic factors such as mileage points, and discount coupons are more influential factors in the process of converting new members to active users. In addition, loyalty to the payment system has a positive effect on attitudes towards sellers where one can use the means of payment. Also, it can be seen that the customer loyalty to the platform and the favorable attitude toward the sellers make a favorable attitude toward the platform company providing and managing the two-sided market. Conclusion and Discussion This study may contribute to a better understanding of platform business in three particular ways. First, understanding the loyalty diffusion mechanisms within the platform can support platform companies to develop effective strategies to attract new consumers to the platform and to transform them into active users. Second, even though the study uses the data collected from individual consumer level, the findings may provide some inspiration for B2B relationships. For example, as the number of loyal buyers and sellers sharing the platform increases, the value of the platform increases and the platform company can use it as a powerful bargaining power when it comes to third business. Third, the study may help us to understand the role of Platform in two-sided market and how the customer loyalty becomes diffused. Although this study explored the loyalty formation and diffusion using the sample of the major payment systems in Korea, it may be premature to generalize the findings at this stage. It is important to note that there may be negative network effects. They need to be evaluated further through careful research.

디지털 플랫폼에 의한 ‘사적 검열(private censorship)’

홍남희 언론중재위원회 2018 미디어와 인격권 Vol.4 No.2

Content moderation is a major activity of digital platforms, performed to block or remove illegal or harmful content freely uploaded by users. Many countries ask digital platforms to employ active moderation to protect their citizens from illicit or harmful content such as hate speech, sexual material, fake news, terrorist propaganda, and child pornography. Some countries recommend self-regulation on platforms to avoid controversies related to censorship and enforce legal responsibilities within their judicial power. Also, the platforms themselves are major actors in the moderation of user content because of growing concerns surrounding the personal rights of users. In this paper, the researcher presents cases to categorize the moderation of user content by private companies as a form of private censorship. First, the researcher summarized discussions about critical features of these platforms. Digital platforms are the media of “peer-to-peer exchange” content that is responsible for the growing need for content moderation. Along with that, global platforms based in the US can be escaped from local jurisdictions. Second, private censorship is related to self-regulation because the subject falls under the “private” sector. This means that platforms function as private actors in censoring user content as delegated by the state. Legal enforcement for platforms to remove or block harmful content is related to the strengthening of moderation actions taken by the platforms themselves. This moderation is essential in the platform society as platforms play the role of censors exercising significant authority over user content. Especially, they may infringe minority groups’ rights of free expression or delete some ambiguous content because they are lack of time and sensibilities to consider local or social context. Therefore, this study aims to identify discreet moderation actions that are adopted by platforms and to categorize them under the concept of private censorship. In particular, the study will present how these moderators serve as alternative censors of the state, and how they infringe on an individual’s right to free speech, particularly its effect on minority groups that have to change their community guidelines or technological affordances. 수많은 개인이 누구나 자신의 콘텐츠를 업로드할 수 있는 디지털 플랫폼 환경은 사회적으로 문제가 되는 콘텐츠의 유통 또한 기하급수적으로 증가할 수 있음을 시사한다. 또한 디지털 플랫폼을 통해 발화할 수밖에 없는 매체 이용 환경은 문제 되는 표현의 관리자가 디지털 플랫폼일 수밖에 없음을 보여준다. 이러한 상황에서 사회적으로 문제가 되는 콘텐츠를 삭제, 차단하거나, 이용자 계정을 정지, 삭제, 차단하는 식의 콘텐츠 ‘모더레이션(moderation)’ 업무가 디지털 플랫폼의 핵심적인 업무가 되어 가고 있다. 콘텐츠 ‘유통’ 자체가 핵심적인 사업 활동인 만큼 이용자 및 콘텐츠를 관리하는 것이 사업의 본질이 되기 때문이다. 이러한 상황에서 이 연구는 민간 사업자에 의한 검열을 의미하는 ‘사적 검열’ 논의를 통해 국가와 플랫폼의 관계, 글로벌-로컬의 관계, 플랫폼-개인의 관계를 개념화하였다. 또한 구체적인 사적 검열의 사례를 국가-플랫폼의 관계, 플랫폼의 모더레이션 강화 유형 및 사례 분석을 통해 살펴보았다. 먼저 이 연구는 개인 간 콘텐츠의 유통을 매개하는 플랫폼의 매체적 특성에 따라 ‘모더레이션’ 업무가 플랫폼의 주요 업무로 부상하는 과정을 정리하고, 자율규제와 사적 검열의 논의를 개념화했다. 이 연구에서는 플랫폼에 의한 사적 검열을 첫째, 국가와의 관계 속에서 국가 검열의 대행자로서의 플랫폼, 국가가 플랫폼 책임을 입법화하는 시도로 정리하였다. 둘째, 각 국가와 사회의 요구에 대응해 플랫폼이 각종 모더레이션 장치와 방식을 강화하는 사례들을 유형화하여 분석하면서 이러한 조치들이 구체적으로 어떻게, 누구의 표현의 자유를 침해하는지 살펴보았다. 이는 사회적 소수자의 표현이 플랫폼 상에 등장할 가능성을 더 축소시키고 있었으며, 자동 차단 장치의 도입이나 제3세계 저임금 노동자들에 대한 외주화를 통해 언어적, 지역적, 역사적, 상황적 맥락을 고려하지 않는 모더레이션을 실행시키고 있었다. 또한 수익화 방식의 변경은 소수자 커뮤니티나 대중적이지 않은 주제의 출현을 차단하고, 혐오발언과 선정적 콘텐츠를 계속 출현시키는 결과로 나타나고 있었다. 이 연구는 이와 같은 분석을 통해서 디지털 플랫폼이 현대 사회의 사적 검열자로 부상하고 있다는 점을 드러냈으며, 플랫폼에 의한 검열을 국가와 개인 이용자와의 관계 속에서 맥락화하였다. 특히 표현의 자유가 단순히 특정한 표현을 행할 자유를 넘어 누구의 표현이 등장하고 배제되는지의 차원에서 확장될 필요성을 제기했다. 이 연구에서는 플랫폼 시대의 문제를 개선하기 위해 다양한 차원에서의 개입이 필요함을 주장했다.

A MODEL OF CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS

Kotaro Sakata 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2014 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2014 No.7

Multi-sided platforms (Hagiu and Julian, 2011) have gotten a lot of attention recently. Multi-sided platform sponsors aspire to open innovation. They link a relationship between multiple groups and construct a mechanism of co-creation. This paper is intended as an investigation of a process to create and develop multi-sided platforms. Specifically, we are concerned with an attractive factor to users in launching stage of platforms and a mechanism of getting an ongoing commitment in developing stage of platforms. The concept of “network externality” is helpful in understanding multi-sided platforms. Network externality is the effect that one user of a good or service has on the value of that product to other people. It works between sides of multi-sided platforms. When network externality is present, the value of a product or service is dependent on the number of others using it. Therefore, a platform become increasingly popular, as numbers of users is becoming above threshold level. It is important to identify an attractive factor to users in launching stage of platforms. Multi-sided platforms form a bridge between multiple sides (markets) and balance the conflicting interests. It can be presumed that interactions among a platform sponsor and multiple sides depend on whether each side is a business (B) or a consumer (C). We have proposed a model of creation and development of multi-sided platforms. As a platform is created, a platform sponsor orchestrates to attract demand side users and supply side users. It fosters trust and provides incentives to demand side users and supply side users. And it seeks to every side users’ retention in developing stage of its platform. As numbers of every side users are becoming above threshold level, network externality works and a platform become increasingly popular. As describe above, it can be presumed that interactions among a platform sponsor and multiple sides depend on whether each side is a business (B) or a consumer (C). Therefore, in this study, multi-side platforms are classified into three categories according to the combination of businesses (B) and consumers (C). As far as BtoB type platforms concerned, every side consists of businesses. In BtoC type platforms, consumers also behave as demand side users. For instance, they create word of mouth in a platform. ICT based Japanese multi-sided platforms were selected as a research site. This study is based on a comparative analysis between three types of multi-sided platforms. Data were collected from multiple sources and multiple viewpoints. Company documents were studied, interviews with key executives and managers undertaken. Through we do a comparative analysis between three types of multi-sided platforms, this study clarified the following three points: 1. BtoC type multi-sided platforms provide “information” as an attractive factor regarding an entry to the platform to demand side users. In contrast, this is not true of BtoB type platforms. “Information” is not an attractive factor to demand side users in launching stage of BtoB type platform. “Information” contributes to demand side user retention in developing stage of BtoB type platform. 2. BtoC type of multi-sided platforms have the higher cost of platform maintenance than BtoB type in that BtoC type manage “information” put out by consumers that is more diversity and emotional than businesses. 3. Platform sponsors do not seek their own gain and they aspire to the total optimization of their ecosystem and industry segments. “Neutrality” is common attitude to all type of multi-side platforms. BtoC type sponsors particularly focus on having a strong commitment to users view and pulling in more customers, not slaving to traditional business practices.

Platform Business Model Map을 활용한 플랫폼 기업의 수익모델 분석 :

정경희(Jung, Kyung-hee),성창수(Sung, Chang-soo) 한국창업학회 2017 한국창업학회지 Vol.12 No.2

본 연구는 최근 급부상하고 있는 플랫폼 기반 비즈니스 모델을 조사, 분석하여 플랫폼 비즈니스 모델의 역할과 중요성을 확인하고자 하였다. 이에 Rogers(2016)의 플랫폼 비즈니스 모델 맵(PBMM)을 적용하여, 국내·외 플랫폼 기반 대표적인 기업 및 창업기업의 사례연구를 진행하였다. 연구 결과, 플랫폼 참여 사용자들의 명확한 구분, 역할 설정 및 가치 교환의 균형에 집중해야하며, 플랫폼 핵심 구성요소인 인터페이스, 통신 지원 인프라 등의 기술적 환경조성과 플랫폼구성요소를 이용하기 위한 규칙 제시 및 플랫폼의 다른 사용자를 유인하기 위한 신규 수익원 발굴이 필요하다는 것을 확인하였다. 본 연구를 통해 플랫폼 비즈니스 모델 맵(PBMM)은 플랫폼 기반 비즈니스 모델을 이해하는 데 효과적인 도구임을 확인하였고 이에 따른 전략적 시사점을 제시하였다. The purpose of this study is to identify the role and importance of the platform business model by investigating and analyzing the emerging platform based business model. Based on the platform business model map(PBMM) of Rogers(2016), we have conducted case studies of leading companies and start-up companies based on domestic and foreign platforms. As a result, it is important to focus on a clear distinction between platform users, role setting and value exchange, and to create technical environments such as interfaces and communication support infrastructure, which are core components of the platform, to present rules for using platform components, we need to find new sources of revenue to attract them. Based on this research, we confirmed that platform business model map is an effective tool for understanding platform based business model and suggested strategic implications.