공법 : 배아와 인간존엄

방승주 ( Seung Ju Bang ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2008 법학논총 Vol.25 No.2

As a result of the remarkable developments in biotechnology and biomedicine, it has become an important issue whether an embryo in vitro should be afforded human dignity and the right of life. In Korea, ``The Law of Bioethics and Safety`` was enacted to resolve conflicts between bioethics and biotechnology. Since section 17 of the law holds that supernumerary embryos, which elapsed more than 5 years of preservations-period or fewer than 5 years of this period, if the parents give consent, can be used in research for the treatment of sterility and contraceptive measures, muscle dystrophy, or a rare or incurable disease. Two embryos, their parents and other people (law professor, philosophers, doctors, lawyer etc.) have brought constitutional complaint against the law in the Constitutional Court, for the reason why the section violates their human dignity and the embryos` right of life. In this case, the most important points are whether an embryo could be the subject of human dignity and the right of life on the one hand, and whether sections 16 and 17 of the law violate human dignity and the right of life, as the embryos and other people including their parents articulated, on the other hand. There are many theories about when human dignity and the right of life begin: from the time of fertilization, implantation, building of the brain, development of the human shape, or birth, among other time points. In my opinion, the embryo is the subject of human dignity from the time of fertilization, even before it is implanted in the mother`s womb (fertilization`s theory). Nevertheless, from the perspective of the protect-intensity of human dignity, embryos before implantation could be treated differently than the embryo after implantation. In other words, the human dignity of the embryo before implantation could be restricted by the fundamental rights of the mother like the rights of self-decision (Article 10 Constitution). 배아와 인간존엄 37 The conclusions that follow from the recognition of embryos as the subject of human dignity and the possibility of restricting dignity-protection, which the author formed in this article, are as follows: First, except for the purposes of childbirth, supernumerary embryos in vitro should not be created. Second, nevertheless, in the case of creating supernumerary embryos according to the current law, the woman should not be obligated to implantation, if the woman no longer desires pregnancy. Third, if the woman dies or has no intention for childbirth while the supernumerary embryos are being preserved, the state should search the chances of implantation like a surrogate mother, for the purpose of protecting human dignity and the right of life. If not, the state should preserve the embryos permanently in principle until it finds the possibility of implantation. Fourth, the embryo not only should not be abolished, but also should not be used for research, even if the 5-year period of preservations has passed, lest the creation of embryos for research should be legalized in practice. Fifth, so-called "somatic cell nuclear transfer embryos" are also the subject of human dignity, because they could develop into a human being, on the condition that they would be transplanted into the wombs. Therefore, the creation of somatic cell nuclear transfer embryos should not be permitted, even if they are made for therapeutic purposes. In conclusion, sections 16 and 17 of the law, which prescribe that embryos should be abolished after 5 years or less period, if the parents consent to it, to be preserved, so that they may be used for research, are unconstitutional, because they violate the human dignity clause and the rights of life for embryos in vitro.

인간복제를 규제하는 국제규범 -「생명윤리 및 안전에 관한 법률」의 문제점과 개정방향 모색-

류병운 ( Byung Woon Lyou ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2014 홍익법학 Vol.15 No.1

Human cloning is a very difficult problem staying on a coordinate which includes human lives and the need for regulation against cloning activity to avoid any disaster caused by the birth of cloned offspring. The human fetus is originated from the early stage of a life, a human embryo. Thus the national obligation to protect lives should be logically expanded to the protection of human embryos as well as the effort to eliminate any risk intimidating sound existence of them. The possible methods to regulate cloning activities divide by ① the total ban on any kind of embryo production or cloning ② the partial permission of embryo production or closing for the purpose of biomedical technology research which still prohibits implanting a cloned embryo into a woman`s uterus or other cultivation environment like pregnancy. As a result the method of ② means the utilization of cloned embryo for the purse of treatment, which accompanies the controversies against balance and conflict for interests between a life and a life. 「United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning」demands UN member countries to adopt all necessary methods for proper protection of human lives, to prohibit human cloning (including embryo cloning) which is not matched with the dignity of man as well as life protection, to ban genetic engineering against human dignity, and to adopt any method protecting the utilization of women as domestic law. Under Article 1 of the 「Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings」, “Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited.” Most of countries currently prohibit human cloning including treatment purpose as a domestic law. Jumping on the vague hope of general public which was created by the fabrication of experimental results done by Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk and the exaggeration of treatment effects using by somatic cell cloning embryo, it is a big problem to legislate 「the Life Ethics and Safety Act」which restrictively allows embryo cloning. Especially the embryo exchange done by a researcher in Hwang Woo-Suk case practically shows the possibility that embryo cloning for treatment purchase could be abused as reproductive human cloning. According to the international rule or the legislative examples of other countries, 「the Life Ethics and Safety Act」should be reformed as strictly banning human cloning. To prohibit reproductive human cloning, all kinds of human embryo cloning would be completely banned. It would not be late to review the amendment of this law later when the need of embryo cloning for treatment purpose is clearly proved. As another alternative, embryo cloning for treatment research purpose would be limitedly allowed however the enforcement of the legislation would be deferred until it is proved that ① embryonic stem cells are overwhelmingly superior to non-embryonic stem cells for the treatment of intractable disease ② embryonic stem cells have more outstanding biomedical value than the embryonic stem cells formed from IVF.

영국의 배아관리체계와 공공 정책의 선택

황만성 ( Man Sung Hwang ),한동운 ( Dong Woon Han ) 한국보건행정학회 2004 보건행정학회지 Vol.14 No.3

Recently, human embryonic stem cell research raises exciting public expectation on medical possibilities as well as ethical debate. Embryo management has become an integral part of the management of infertility treatment, researches on embryo and human embryonic stem cells and so on. Britain has permitted the research on stem cells derived from human embryo which made the first nation to allow the cloning of human embryo for the stem cell research. However, new technologies such as the assisted reproductive technologies and human embryonic stem cell research continue to pose an increasing source of ethical dilemmas for physician, scientists, legislators, religious authorities and the general publics to deal with. None the less, the United Kingdom has adopted the most liberal policies regarding human embryo and human embryonic stem cell research. The implication of the British embryo management system are as follows: 1) the development of reproductive technologies and new stem cell research technologies continue to pose legal and ethical debates, since those involve several parties; 2) the UK has taken the legal and institutional approaches to cope with those serious issues; 3) the UK adopted most liberal policies regarding embryonic and human embryonic stem cell researches; 4) the British HFE Act is consistent with the existing Acts related to human embryo management and researches; 5) through amending the HFE Act to accomodate the changes of technologies, the UK try to minimize the legal and ethical burden on undertaking research regarding embryo. The debates about the researches on human embryo and human embryonic stem cells is likely to continue in the Korean society. Because of the controversy and competing ethical values, as well as the evolving technologies, so far no consensus exists in our society. It suggest that it is premature to bring closure by ruling out any particular approaches. Thus our society needs to make an efforts to find a basis which could resolve the societal controversies through enriching the societal conversation about the profound ethical issues regarding embryo management.

운영 관련 법규정 개정에 대한 제언 : 배아생성의료기관, 인체유래물은행, 배아연구기관 등의 기관생명 윤리위원회를 중심으로

김은애 이화여자대학교 생명의료법연구소 2015 생명윤리정책연구 Vol.9 No.1

Under the Bioethics and Safety Act, to ensure bioethics and safety, the Institutional Review Board(hereinafter referred to as ‘IRB’) has to be established not only the Human Research Institution and the Human Material Research Institution, but also the Medical Institution Producing Embryos, the Human Material Bank, the Embryo Research Institute, the Somatic-cell cloning embryo research institute, and the Parthenogenic Embryo Research Institute. The functions of the general IRBs such as the IRB of the former research institutions are to review the research whether to decide the approval and to inspect and supervise the progress and outcomes of the IRB approved research. But, in Korea, some IRBs such as the IRB of the latter medical institution and research institutes have the distinct characteristics of its roles, so these IRBs are different from the general IRBs. First, the Medical Institutions Producing Embryos mainly provides the medical treatment for the infertile persons, so it obtains the human gametes to create the human embryos. And, if necessary, it obtains the donated human gametes(especially, women’s oocytes) for the infertile persons. Also it can serve the residual human embryos and gametes to the research institutes. Second, the Human Material Bank secures the donated human materials and related information for the research to supply them to the researchers. Therefore, the IRBs of the Medical Institutions Producing Embryos and the Human Material Bank have to perform the roles related to these works. Third, the researches conducted in the Embryo Research Institute, the Somatic-cell cloning embryo research institute, and the Parthenogenic Embryo Research Institute are very special because the residual human embryos and oocytes containing the ethical issues have to be used. So, the IRBs of these research institutes must have the capacity to review and to inspect and supervise these researches more professionally. But, some provisions of the Bioethics and Safety Act related to these IRB’s distinct characteristics and its roles are a little incomplete and inadequate to support these IRB’s activities as the voluntary self-regulation. Of course, it is a false belief that everything can be solved by the law. However, the law, especially the Bioethics and Safety Act has to be able to present standards to ensure bioethics and safety because both the establishment of these IRBs and the conduct of its roles are based on the law in Korea. So, some provisions related to these IRBs will be able to be amended to support the remarkable activities of these IRBs. 우리나라에서는「생명윤리 및 안전에 관한 법률」에 규정된 바에 따라 인간대상연구기관과 인체유래물연구기관 외에 배아생성의료기관, 인체유래물은행, 배아연구기관, 체세포복제배아연구기관, 단성생식배아연구기관도 기관생명윤리위원회(IRB)를 설치하여 운영하여야만 한다. 일반적인 IRB는 기관에서 이루어지는 연구에 대해 심의하고 연구의 진행과정 및 결과에 대해 조사·감독하는 역할을 주로 수행한다. 그런데, 배아생성의료기관에서는 연구가 아니라 체외수정시술을 받는 사람들을 위해 생식세포를 채취하여 배아를 생성하는 일, 임신을 위해 자신의 생식세포를 사용할 수 없는 사람들을 위해 다른 사람들로부터 생식세포를 기증받고 이를 제공해주는 일, 그리고 배아연구, 체세포복제배아연구, 단성생식배아연구를 위해 사용될 잔여배아와 잔여난자를 제공해주는 일이 이루어지고, 인체유래물은행에서는 연구도 이루어지지만 주로 연구를 위해 인체유래물과 관련 정보 등을 제공해주는 일이 이루어진다. 그러므로, 이들 기관의 IRB는 이러한 일들과 관련된 역할을 주로 수행하여야 한다는 점에서 일반적인 연구기관의 IRB와는 차이점이 있다. 그리고, 배아연구기관·체세포복제배아연구기관·단성생식배아연구기관에서는 배아와 난자를 이용하기 때문에 일반적인 연구보다 윤리적 쟁점이 더 많은 특수한 연구가 이루어진다. 따라서 이들 기관의 IRB는 일반적인 연구기관의 IRB에 비해 보다 전문적인 심의를 할 수 있어야 한다. 이 글에서는「생명윤리법」에 규정되어 있는 배아생성의료기관의 업무, 인체유래물은행의 업무, 배아연구기관·체세포복제배아연구기관·단성생식배아연구기관에서의 연구 및 관련 법적 기준 등을 확인하여 이러한 기관들의 IRB가 일반적인 연구기관의 IRB와 달리 가지고 있는 특수성이 무엇인지에 대해 살펴보고, 이러한 특수성에 맞게 IRB로서의 역할을 수행함에 있어 고려하여야 할 사항과 이와 관련한 법적인 측면에서의 개선사항에 대해 알아보고자 한다.

인간 배아의 인격 지위에 관한 고찰

홍석영(Suk-Young HONG) 한국생명윤리학회 2002 생명윤리 Vol.3 No.2

The actual scientific and technological progress in the life science field offers many possibilities of intervention in the initial phases on human life. But are the techniques of intervention in pre-natal human life also ethically permissible and juridically permissible? Have the human zygotes, embryos and fetuses the person status? In the debate on the person status of the human embryo, there are two main tradition: the personalism and the non-personalism. According to the non-personalism, the embryo is considered as a 'human being', but is not recognized as a 'person'. The human embryo is not yet a person; it becomes a person in some subsequent moment after conception. In this context, the description of the biological status of the human embryo becomes irrelevant to the definition of a person. The non-personalism challenges some critical questions. How does one become a person without already being a person? What justifies the qualitative leap from the biological status to the person status of the human life? Why does a human life which has lived for a shorter time have less value? How can we safeguard human life 'after' the manifestation of certain capacities and functions if it is not safeguarded 'before'? We can witness at the same time a 'restriction' and an 'expansion' of the concept of person, as a result of the separation of the 'human being'; not all human beings are persons (for instance, embryos); certain non-human beings are persons (for instance, animal with sensitivity). This carries the paradoxical consequence that certain superior mammals would seem to be more worthy of respect than the human embryo. A possible way to overcome this paradox may be found in the return to the human. This means returning to the common understanding (which has always identified the human being and the person, the personalism), and to what is affirmed in the statement on human rights. The embryo is biologically human, and is entitled to rights. The embryo being de facto human is also a person. Being a person is a radical ontological condition. The human being does not 'become' a person, gradually acquiring certain capacities; the human being 'is' a person. We must extend universally recognized human right to the initial confines of life. Today we are faced with new forms of discrimination in the differing importances attributed to the various stages and modes of manifestation of human life. But even the embryo, although quantitatively small, infinitesimal and imperceptible, is qualitatively human, and thus worthy of respect and protection.

뇌 과학의 관점에서 본 배아의 생명권

유경동 이화여자대학교 생명의료법연구소 2014 생명윤리정책연구 Vol.8 No.2

인권은 인간의 속성과 연관된 권리이며 기본권은 헌법이 명시한 권리이다. 따라서 인권이 자연법적인 권리라고 한다면 기본권은 실정법의 권리인 것이다. 중요한 점은 기본권이 인권에 의하여 추론되는 권리임으로 생명을 중시하는 인권의법 해석은 매우 중요하다. 그러나 생명의 개념이 광의적임에도 불구하고 한국의 헌법에 근거한 생명권과 기본권에 대한 적용은 그 영역이 매우 협소하다. 헌법재판소는“구 생명윤리 및 안전에 관한 법률”제13조 1항인“누구든지 임신외의 목적으로 배아를 생성하여서는 아니된다.”라는 법률과 연관된 초기배아의 기본권과 배아연구와 연관된 위헌소송에서 인간의 생명과 연관된 기본권과 생명권을 정의하고 판시한 바 있다. 필자는 이 글에서 헌법재판소에서 판시한 배아의 생명권을 살펴보고 판시의 문제점을 지적하고, 그리고 뇌과학의 관점에서 생명윤리정책에서 고려되어야 할 요소들을 고찰하고자 한다. 필자가 다루고자 하는 주요 쟁점은 배아의 생명권과 이와 연관된 뇌과학의 관점이다. 뇌 과학의 기본적인 입장에서 보면, 생명의 시작은 뇌가 만들어지는 순간, 즉 수정부터 시작된다. 특히 배아 이전의 정자나 난자와 같은 유전적 요인을 통하여 임신 3-4주부터는 배아가 본격적으로 두뇌를 생성하기 시작한다. 필자는 이 글에서 배아의 연관된 뇌의 사유능력을‘기능’과‘의식’의 구분 없이 사용하며, 다만 인간의 사유는 뇌의 시작과 연결되며, 배아의 능력이 뇌를 좌우한다는 관점에서 논지를 전개한다. 인간 개체의 생명은 뇌를 통하여 항상성을 유지하기 때문에 뇌가 없는 인간은 상상할 수 없다. 이 항상성을 지키기 위한 뇌의 목적은 바로 생명의 보호에 있으며 우리가 법에서 말하는 자유나 평등과 같은 개념 또한 인간의 뇌에서 작동하는 정신작용이며 또한 생명의 특징이기도 하다. 물론 인간의 생명은 유전인자와 같은 일차적인 요소와 신체의 외부적인 사회 환경의 상호작용에 의하여 지속되기때문에 생명을 뇌의 기능적인 관점에서 보는 뇌결정론의 한계는 있지만 뇌를 구성하는 배아단계부터 인간의 기본권과 생명권을 인정해야 한다는 입장에서 뇌를 강조하는 것은 의미가 있다고 본다. 뇌의 항상성은 생명권뿐만 아니라 인간의 존엄성에 기초가 되는 자아개념이나 의지와 같은 정신작용과 관계가 있다. 필자는 이점을 부각시키기 위하여 뇌과학의 이론 중에서“해방생물학(liberation Biology)”을 강조하며, 배아단계부터 형성되는 뇌의 도덕적 주체성을 고찰한다. 이를 뒷받침하는 이론들은“부수적 현상론(epiphenomenalism)”, “이원적 상호론(dualistic interactionalism)”, “실체이원론(substance dualism)”, “심신일원론(mind/brain identity theory)”과“유심론(mentalism)”등이다. 이러한 이론을 소개하는 목적은 인간의 도덕적 주체성에 대한 뇌과학의 해석을 통하여 배아초기부터 작동하는 뇌의 정신 활동과 이에 따른 인간의 주체성에 대한 이해에 다양한 해석이 공존하고 있음을 살펴보기 위함이다. 다양한 관점의 공통성은 배아의 유전적 정보로 말미암아 인간은 인간다운 항상성을 유지하며 사유와 자기책임의 도덕적 특징을 가진다는 점에 있다. 한편, 결론으로 필자는 생명윤리정책에 있어서 법의 사유의 확장과 도덕적 능력의 배양을 강조하면서 생명윤리와 같은 영역에 인간의 책임과 생명에 대한 두려움과 경외의 필요성에 대하여 강조한다. According to the main purpose of Bioethics and Safety Act, “no one shall produce embryos other than for the purpose of pregnancy.” However, under the current Act, the human embryo should not be regarded with the same legal status as a human being. It does not admit the right to life of the human embryos. But the increasing knowledge of the human brain has opened a new horizon for the understanding of human beings and found that the human embryos can be treated with the same legal standard as a human being because they are linked to the origins of the human life. In this regard, neuroscience encompasses various issues in connection with the brain and the embryo, allows us to understand how the human embryos contribute to the moral and ethical judgements in the course of the early stage of the brain growth. In the discussion of neuroscience in regard to the issues of moral potential of the human embryos, the theories of epiphenomenalism, dualistic interactionalism, substance dualism, mind/brain identity theory, and mentalism are engaged to explore the meaning of human life, free will, and moral subjectivity. After considering all the factors of the above issues briefly, this paper comes to a conclusion that the right to life of the human embryos must not be limited but be considered as valuable as that of a human being. To achieve this goal, the government and scientific communities are encouraged to revise the standard of the right to life for the human embryos, earliest forms of human beings, and reestablish supervision on life ethics.

인간배아 재정의의 기원 및 확산과 그 의미

윤성혜(Yoon, Sung Hye) 가톨릭대학교(성심교정) 인간학연구소 2021 인간연구 Vol.- No.43

이 연구는 인간배아 물질의 사용이 개인의 ‘사회적 의무’가 된다 하여도 윤리적 판단을 멈출 수밖에 없는 오늘의 사태에 대한 문제의식에서 비롯된 것이다. 이 글은 인간배아에 대한 ‘가치 인식 오류’의 기원 및 확산 과정을 천착하고 그 의미를 분석해 보려는 시도이다. 인간에 대한 생물학적 정의는 새로운 과학적 발견에 따라 끊임없이 변해왔고 또한 언제든지 바뀔 수 있다. 단, 반복된 검증을 통해 정립된 과학 이론에 근거할 때만 그러하다. 그러나 현재 배아 연구를 위해 규정된 배아의 정의는 과학적 진실에 근거하지 않는다. 배아 연구가 “정치적 옳음”과 “더 큰 선”을 위한다는 명분 아래 허용되고 있다. 그렇다면 그러한 목적과 수단은 과연 옳은가? 인간 발생학자들은 그에 대한 답이 모두 “아니오” 라고 증언한다. 이에 본고는 이를 바탕으로 인간배아를 이용하려는 목적과 그 ‘수단의 도덕성’을 검토하였다. 이를 위해 “생존력” “전 배아” “착상 전 배아” 등 20세기 말 인간배아에 대한 재정의의 역사를 돌아보았다. 과학적 근거도 없는 인간배아에 대한 그처럼 ‘터무니없는’ 재정의들이 어떻게 사람들의 의식을 파고 들어 공공정책에까지 스며들 수 있었는지 그 과정을 추적함으로써 오늘날 인간 배아의 사태 해결을 위한 방안을 모색해 보았다. This study came from by my sense of problem of today’s reality in which our ethical judgment has to be stopped even if the use of human embryonic material becomes an individual’s ‘social obligation’. This paper attempts to explore the origin and diffusion process of the ‘value recognition error’ of the human embryo and to analyze its meaning. The biological definition of human-being has changed over time and may change again as new scientific discoveries are made, but only in condition that they are based on scientific theories established through repeated verifications. However, the actual legal definition of human embryo for the purpose of the human embryo research is not based on scientific truth. Embryo research is permitted under the pretext of “political rightness” and “greater good”. If so, are those purposes and means right? Human embryologists testify that the answer to this question is “no”. In this context, based on this, this study reviewed the purpose of using human embryos and its ‘morality of the means’. To this end, this study looked at the history of redefinition of the human embryo such as “viability” “pre-embryo” “pre-implantation embryo” at the end of the 20<SUP>th</SUP> century. By tracing the process of how such ‘outrageous’ redefinitions of the human embryo without a scientific basis could penetrate people’s consciousness and even permeate public policy, the study tried to find a solution to the situation of the human embryo today.

인간의 존엄과 가치, 그리고 胚芽 - 생명윤리및안전에관한법률 제1장을 중심으로

박선영(PARK Sun-Young) 한국헌법학회 2007 憲法學硏究 Vol.13 No.1

  Nowadays biotechnology or bioengineering is being rapidly developed offering many possibilities in the life, including human embryonic researches, on the other hand, constitutional approach on the scientific studies, in particular, on the focus of ‘human dignity’ are still ambiguous. This article recognizes that scientific and technological developments have been, and can be, of great benefit to humankind in increasing inter alia life expectancy and improving quality of life, and emphasizes that such developments should always seek to promote the welfare of individuals, families, groups or communities and humankind as a whole in the recognition of the dignity of the human person and the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.<BR>  Human embryo is an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights and protection granted by substantive law, composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified and organized that it will develop in uterus into an unborn child. Nevertheless the human embryo research raises many bioethics problems and violates the dignity of human being, the Korean Bioethics and Biosafety Law(Law No. 7150, hereafter the Bioethics Law) doesn"t works at all because of the inappropriate aim of the law. The Bioethics Law ought to serve and protect the dignity of human being than any other related laws.<BR>  In this thesis, I attempted to make a study of the Bioethics Law from a viewpoint of human dignity in the constitutional law. With respect to the human dignity, this essay tried to critical analyse of the Chapter I in the Bioethics Law in effect from 2005 allowing cloning of human cells if it is carried out for pure research purposes to find remedies for incurable diseases. The most problematic aspect of the Bioethics Law is that embryos tissue would be allowed to used for research purposes. This article frames human dignity, specially focusing on at first, the concept and the legal status of human embryo as a potential human being, and secondly ‘informed consent’ that are worldwide declared such as N?remberg Code and Helsinki Declaration which stress that human subject should be never measure and voluntary consent is absolutely important. It is no surprise that these international norms for protection of bioethics have been developed and some progress has been achieved, serious dispute of human rights and biosafty.<BR>  Human Dignity in the constitutional law should be the extreme measure of the biotechnological norm and the powerful sanction, because the human embryo is de facto biologically human being, gradually acquiring certain capacities, namely entitled to rights worthy of respect and protection, namely human dignity of embryo. So the constitutional concerns involving the application of technology to humans should be of utmost concern, as the area is extremely complex, but the concept of human dignity should be based upon an acceptance of fundamental and superior values within the bioethics.

인간배아의 도덕적 지위

박재현,신민선 한국기독교사회윤리학회 2005 기독교사회윤리 Vol.10 No.-

Embryonic stem(ES) cell research is regarded as a promising research to treat the incurable diseases. But it is unavoidable to destroy the human embryo to gain the pluripotent stem cells from the embryo for cell therapy. So the ES cell research provokes intense ethical debate among not only the professionals including scientists, physicians, ethicists, and theologians but also the policy makers and the lay people. There are many ethical issues on the embryonic stem cell research. But the most important and crucial issue is the moral status of the human embryo. If the human embryo has the full moral status same as us, the ES cell research will be an unethical behavior. And if the human embryo is just a cluster of cells and has lesser moral status it is possible to regard the ES cell research as an ethical and noble effort to overcome human sufferings and diseases. In this paper, we review the moral status of the human embryo according to the capacities of the human beings and the stages of the human development. Some groups hold that embryos do not have the full moral status as a human being because they lack specific capacities, including consciousness, reasoning and sentience. But it is clear that every human being does not have these capacities fully along the whole stages of life. Human beings in the embryonic, fetal, and early infant stages lack immediate exercisable capacities and most human beings at the later stages of life also lack these capacities(e.g., severely retarded and comatose persons). Still, they possess the radical form of these capacities and which develops over time. There are various embryonic milestones from the fertilization to the birth. Among these, implantation, twinning, and the '14 days after fertilization' are not critical moment to decide the distinct, whole, independent being, it is merely the one moment on the continuum. Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because a new, genetically distinct human organism is formed when the chromosomes of the male and female pronuclei blend in the oocyte. Fertilization is the one and only, critical point to get a full moral status as a human being.

인간배아연구의 도덕성 논란과 인간생명의 시작

최경석 ( Kyung Suk Choi ) 한국의료윤리학회 2005 한국의료윤리학회지 Vol.8 No.1

The main moral dispute on human embryonic research lies in the status of embryo. Embryo means actually pre-embryo here. Proponents for the research argue that an pre-embryo is not an human being because it does not have any personality. But I argue that this argument is too weak to fall down because it must be applied to a new-born baby. But we consider a new-born baby as an human being. A strong argument for the research is to claim that a human life begins at the formation of primitive streak because this streak indicates the establishment of an individual identity. Proponents for the research based on this argument claims that there is no person to hold any rights because there is no entity to establish any individual identity. They consider this argument to fall down the view that human life starts at the conception. But I argue that the above argument only shows when an individual identity is established, rather than when an human life starts. The reasons are as follows. First, biological identity, that is, genetic identity as an human species is formed in zygote at the conception. Second, the potentiality to grown up into an adult is developed from the conception while the same genetic identity is kept. The reason we think that human life is respected lies in the potentiality. The numbers of individuals is not important in considering this potentiality. Therefore, despites discontinuity in individual identity we have to think that human life begins at zygote from which genetic identity and potentiality to build up an individual or individuals are continuously kept. The same view can be applied to cloned human embryo through implanting the nuclear of a somatic cell. So, the research of cloned human embryo is not morally justified. The current Korean law to allow this research should be reconsidered.