企業刑事責任에 대한 比較法的 연구 : 특히 監督責任에 관한 독일과 일본의 판례에 대한 비교연구

조병선 청주대학교 학술연구소 2004 淸大學術論集 Vol.4 No.-

Each State Party undertakes to impose penal sanctions on persons who participate in illegal acts committed by or on behalf of corporate entities. Whether corporate entities can be penalized, civilly or criminally, varies among nations. In some nations, corporate entities can be penalized for engaging in environmental crimes. This raises an issue of whether a corporation may be penalized for the activities of its personnel or agents, despite the absence of an overt act on the corporation's behalf. At minimum in nearly all nations, the director, officer, or agent's actions must be within the scope of their employment. Furthermore, there usually must be evidence that the unlawful activities were directed by or with the consent of a senior corporate official and that the direction or consent was given within the scope of that official's authority. Here, the criminal liability of enterprises will be discussed firstly in connection with the criminal liability of individual officers or employees, and secondly in the context of the enterprise as such. 1. Activities in corporate bodies are typically the result of many interlocked decisions, with a tendency for wide delegation of responsibilities. As a result, where there is "organizational wrongdoing" a criminal system based upon personal fault has difficulties identifying and successfully prosecuting the individual person's responsible. This can lead to an "organized irresponsibility"of individual employees. Therefore, as to perpetrators, both statutory and case law are in the process of extending individual criminal liability especially in the area of entrepreneurial activity. What is the theoretical basis of the criminal liability of corporate officers who in fact are regarded as "responsible persons"? In this case, the vicarious criminal liability of a director, a representative and a manager is avoided because the doctrine of a criminal responsibility is increasingly emphasized. They are to be punished, only when they themselves commit an alleged crime. In general, there are now three approaches: (a) The basis of liability of corporate officers may be a corporate criminal act by them within their knowledge and control even if the individual has not performed the unlawful act, at least when such individual ordered or authorized the activity. (b) A broader basis of liability may apply to situations where the corporate officer knows of a subordinate's unlawful activity and does nothing to prevent it. If the corporate officer stands in a position of responsibility over the act in question, liability may be predicated on the failure of the corporate officer to adequately supervise subordinates. (c) A still broader basis of liability is similar to strict liability: the corporate officer may be liable even without evidence of the officer's direct participation or acquiescence in a subordinate's unlawful behavior if the corporate officer holds a responsible position. Only an officer who exercises a high degree of care in attempting to prevent the illegal activity will avoid liability. Approach (a) can be reached by the traditional criminal theory of alders and abettors, but approach (b) or (c) is beyond the reach of this traditional theory. The international trend is to reduce the requirements for intentional behavior when dealing with industrial perpetrators, to create a presumption of intent or to change the burden of proof (approach (b) or (c)). Faced with the above-mentioned difficulties as "organizational wrong-doing" or "organized irresponsibility", it is not surprising that, in many countries, adherence to the traditional principle that criminal liability requires personal fault (approach (a)) is being sacrificed in an effort to secure greater environmental protection. 2. When a corporate behavior has been determined to constitute a crime, it is possible to punish not only an individual perpetrator but also an enterprise itself. Several ways of punishing the enterprise itself exist. In the United States, for example, sanctions include putting the corporation in the custody of a U.S. Marshall, requiring reforms of operations, forcing community service by the corporation and/or individuals, fining, imposing substantial restitution, and providing notice to victims. Punishments can be cumulative. In the case of fining, the estimation of the illegal gains is not admitted generally, but in some countries there are special regulations where such estimation is deemed necessary. For example, in the case of surcharge in the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, the law can deprive illegal gains through imposing a certain rate of the turn over of the enterprise with a clear numerical formula.If national law does not permit corporate culpability,then the implementing legislation should reflect that limitation. However, worldwide there is a tendency to attribute responsibility on an impersonal basis. Even in states that have traditionally adhered to the principle of societas delinquere non potest (enterprises cannot be criminal) Other countries adhere formally to the principle that an enterprise cannot be criminal, but there is a growing tendency toward imposing criminal liability on enterprises.they have looked for ways to impose non-criminal sanctions on those enterprises. 3. However, in countries like Korea or Japan, the difficulty is not in imposing criminal penalties against the enterprise itself, but rather, in the determination of personal fault. For example, the Korean legislature provides as does the Japanese that a corporate entity is imputed liability if its representative or agent commits a crime under its implementing legislation. According to this provision, however, one should prove who in fact violated the alleged regulation, because that provision requires only that an individual perpetrator acted illegally. Therefore, to prove the illegal conduct of an individual perpetrator is a necessary condition to punish an enterprise. It often happens that the individual perpetrator is difficult to find, especially in the case where the enterprise is a large organization. After the individual perpetrator has been found, it needs to be proved that the conduct of the enterprise is somehow negligent. That is: the enterprise did not meet the duty of care to keep the employee from committing a crime. This omission constitutes a crime of the enterprise. In order to solve this difficulty of evidence, the Korean judiciary has adopted the co-called theory of fault-presumption that allows for finding that a supervisorial duty has been violated within a certain circle of persons. This idea reflects the present difficulty of punishing a large and complicated organization, but has met strong criticism because of the doctrine of guilt ("Schuldprinzip") recognized by the Korean Constitution. As Heine offers, "guilt", as the specific responsibility of the enterprise, should be understood in the sense that the material disposition of the firm prevented it from making legal coordination and reorganization decisions and allowed defective risk management with serious socially detrimental effects to prevail. Faulty decisions over time replace individual guilt.

동일시이론에 기초한 양벌규정 법인처벌의 해석론

김웅재 서울대학교 법학연구소 2023 서울대학교 法學 Vol.64 No.2

The Criminal Code of South Korea is silent on whether corporations and other legal persons can be held criminally responsible. Countless other statutes, however, carry so-called “joint penalty provisions” which stipulate that when an agent or employee of a corporation or other legal entity acting within the scope of their employment commits a criminal offense prescribed in the given statute, the corporation, in addition to the offending agent or employee, shall be criminally liable for the offense. The standard text format of the current joint penalty provisions, which came into form after the Constitutional Court declared the former version of joint penalty provisions as unconstitutional in 2009, does not distinguish between cases where it is the representative of the corporation who commits a violation and cases where it is an employee who does so. Therefore, when looking at its text only, it seems that the elements of corporate criminal liability under joint penalty provisions are identical regardless of the status of the person who committed the violation. But at the same time, the text does not preclude distinguishing corporate liability according to the status of the offender by way of interpretation. There has been a long-standing and complicated debate among criminal law scholars on joint penalty provisions and corporate criminal liability. The debate has traditionally focused on four main issues: (a) whether to recognize the criminal capacity of corporations; (b) whether joint penalty provisions were to be understood as punishing the corporation for its own fault or the fault of another person; (c) whether the corporate criminal liability regime created by joint penalty provisions included holding corporations directly liable for committing the relevant statutory violations, or was limited to holding corporations liable for failing to prevent its agents and employees from committing the violations; and (d) whether the corporation's failure-to-prevent offense is to be understood as a crime of omission or a crime of negligence. In addition, comparative reviews of major models of corporate criminal liability such as the identification model, the vicarious liability model, and the organizational model were also conducted. The highest Courts of Korea have also weighed in on the issue of corporate criminal liability over the years, although their positions have sometimes been somewhat unclear. The Constitutional Court, through a series of major decisions since 2009, adopted a version of identification theory that restricts the class of natural persons that are identifiable with the corporation to representatives and recognized the criminal capacity of corporations to be held liable for the offenses prescribed in joint penalty provisions. The Constitutional Court interpreted joint penalty provisions as creating a dual liability system of direct violation liability and failure-to-prevent liability. The Supreme Court, pushed by the Constitutional Court decisions, sorted out its once unclear stance on joint penalty provisions and endorsed the same approach as the Constitutional Court. While both Courts have recently issued decisions that seem to not conform to the basic interpretive framework established by previous decisions, these recent decisions do not provide enough evidence of the Courts making fundamental changes to the basic framework. The corporate criminal liability model adopted by the Courts-a dual system of corporate liability regime based on identification theory-seems to be the most reasonable option as an interpretive theory of currently existing joint penalty provisions. The model can be theoretically justified based on the nature of the institution of legal persons, provides a logically coherent explanation of the text of the law, and also provides enough flexibility to produce reasonable results when applied in practice. 종래 법인을 처벌하는 양벌규정에 관한 학설상의 논의는 ① 법인에게 범죄능력을 인정할 수 있는지, ② 양벌규정에 의한 법인처벌이 법인의 독자적인 귀책근거에 의한 것인지, ③ 법인이 부담하는 책임의 내용을 감독책임으로 파악할 것인지 행위책임까지 인정할 것인지, ④ 법인이 부담하는 감독책임의 범죄형태를 부작위범으로 볼 것인지의 서로 차원을 달리하는 네 가지 쟁점들을 둘러싸고 전개되었다고 할 수 있다. 입법론적 논의로서 법인처벌의 규율방식인 동일시이론 모델과 대위책임 모델, 조직모델에 대한 비교⋅검토도 이루어졌다. 그러나 종래의 논의는 법인의 범죄능력에 관한 이론적⋅추상적 차원의 논의 또는 현행 양벌규정의 개선을 위한 입법론에 주로 집중되었다는 한계가 있다. 이 글은 현행 양벌규정의 문언과 관련 학설⋅판례를 분석하여 합리적인 법 적용결과를 낳을 수 있는 해석론을 정립하는 것을 목표로 한다. 먼저 헌법재판소의 위헌결정 후 자리잡은 현행 양벌규정의 표준적인 문언을 살펴보면, 위반행위자가 대표자인지 그 외의 종업원인지를 특별히 구분하지 않고 형사책임 및 면책요건을 정하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그러나 양벌규정의 문언구조가 이와 같다고 하여 해석론으로 위반행위자의 지위에 따라 이원적인 규율체계를 수립하는 것이 불가능하다고 할 수는 없다. 우리 사법기관의 판례들을 살펴보면, 먼저 헌법재판소는 양벌규정 중 법인처벌 부분에 관한 일련의 위헌결정을 통해 동일시의 범위를 대표자로 한정하는 동일시이론을 채택하여 법인의 범죄능력을 적어도 부분적으로 긍정하는 입장을 취하고, 이러한 입장을 기초로 양벌규정을 행위책임⋅감독책임의 이원적 규율체계로 해석하였다고 이해된다. 대법원도 헌법재판소의 위헌결정들을 계기로 종래 불분명하던 입장을 정리하여 헌법재판소와 같은 견해를 채택하였다고 볼 수 있다. 다만 대법원과 헌법재판소 모두 최근 일부 결정⋅판결에서 이러한 기존의 견해와 조화되지 않는 듯한 판시를 한 바 있으나, 그러한 최근의 일부 재판례들이 다양한 이론적 검토 끝에 채택한 종전의 견해를 변경하는 취지라고 보기는 어렵다. 현행 양벌규정의 해석론으로는, 헌법재판소와 대법원과 마찬가지로 동일시이론에 기초하여 법인의 범죄능력을 부분적으로 긍정하고, 이를 기초로 동일시의 범위를 대표자로 한정하는 행위책임⋅감독책임 이원설을 채택하는 것이 타당하다. 이렇게 함으로써 문언의 한계를 벗어나지 않는 범위 내에서 이론적 일관성을 유지하며 본문과 단서를 해석해낼 수 있고, 실제 운용에 있어서 처벌의 공백을 최소화하면서도 구체적 사안에 유연하게 대응함으로써 합리적인 결과를 도출해낼 수 있다.

헌법재판소 결정에 나타난 책임원칙에 관한 연구 - 논증 및 논증구조를 중심으로 -

박달현 단국대학교 법학연구소 2018 법학논총 Vol.42 No.1

Principle of criminal liability is one of the most important principles of criminallaw. This means: “without the criminal liability, there is no crime”. According to thisprinciple, event if someone has been committed very serious crime, the criminalcould be not punished if no criminal liability. Because of this nature of principle ofcriminal liability, this principle is functioning as a standard of whether someprovision of criminal code will be unconstitutional. In order to accomplish this function of principle of criminal liability, the meaningof principle of criminal liability have to be clear. But the meaning of that areunderstood in different way, that is, the principle of criminal liability are understoodas three meaning. First, ‘without criminal liability, there is no crime’, second,‘amount of punishment can not exceed criminal liability of criminal about his/hercrime’, third, ‘amount of punishment have to be fit amount of criminal liability ofcriminal about his/her crime. Respective meaning of principle of criminal liabilityhave not been exactly used in the decisions of the Korean ConstitutionalCourt(=KCC). Another problem of decisions of KCC about principle of criminalliability is that KCC has not understand the background of principle of criminalliability. And its problem is that KCC has not clearly differentiated the principle ofcriminal liability from other principle, concretly speacking, principle of proportion, principle of equality, principle of excess prohibition, even if they are theoreticallyclearly differentiated. The white in the living room here is that KCC, according tothe principle of criminal liability, have been decided without demonstration leading tothe decision. ‘책임 없이 형벌 없다’는 책임원칙은 ‘죄형법정주의’와 함께 형법의 가장 중요한 기본원칙 가운데 하나이다. 책임원칙의 의미나 그 기능에 대해 이론적으로 다소 논란이 있긴 하지만, 책임은 ‘형벌(부과)의 근거’이자 ‘한계’이며, 나아가 ‘형벌은 책임에 비례해야 한다’는 비례원칙에 대해 별 다른 이견이 없다. 헌법재판소도 종업원의 범죄행위에 대해 영업자가 선임⋅감독상 주의의무를 다하지 않는 위법이 전혀 없음에도 불구하고 ‘영업자를 종업원과 같이 처벌하는 양벌규정’에 대해서는 ‘책임원칙’을 논거로, ‘종업원의 범죄행위에 대해 영업자가 선임⋅감독상 과실 밖에 없음에도 불구하고 종업원과 마찬가지로 고의범으로 처벌하는 양벌규정’과 같이, 책임에 비해 기본적으로 과잉처벌되는 법정형을 갖는 형벌규정에 대해서는 ‘비례원칙’을 논거로 위헌결정을 해 왔다. 이렇듯, 책임원칙 내지 책임주의는 헌법재판소 결정례에서 위헌논거로 매우중요한 역할을 하지만 그것의 의미나 법적 근거는 결정례마다 조금씩 달리할뿐만 아니라, 비례원칙, 평등원칙, 과잉금지원칙 그리고 형법체계상의 균형성및 정당성과 ‘이론적으로’ 명백히 구별됨에도 불구하고 유사하게 이해되기도하고, 그것도 일관성 없이 결정례마다 달리 이해되기까지 한다. 이러한 문제의식에서 이 글을 준비하였다. 따라서 이 글은 책임원칙의 이론적 의미나 기능과 같은 ‘순수이론적 측면’이 아니라 헌법재판소 결정례에서 ‘책임원칙이 어떻게 이해되고 기능하는지여부’를, 특히 ‘논증 및 논증구조의 관점’에서 검토하였다. 검토한 중요 내용은다음과 같다. 먼저 ‘책임’을 ‘형벌의 근거와 한계’로, 그리고 ‘형벌과 책임의비례성의 근거’로 보고 있지만 결정례마다 약간씩 그 내용을 달리하는 점을지적하였으며, 이어 책임원칙의 법적 근거도 어떤 경우는 ‘법치국가원리 및죄형법정주의’로 이해하는가 하면, 다른 어떤 경우는 ‘헌법 제10조’로 이해하기도 하고, 또 다른 어떤 경우는 ‘법치국가원리 및 헌법 제10조’에서 유래한다고 보는 등 일관되지 않는다는 점을 지적하고 분석하였다. 마지막으로 비례원칙, 평등원칙, 과잉금지원칙, 형벌체계상 균형성과 정당성은 ‘이론적으로’ 책임원칙과 명백히 구별됨에도 불구하고 헌법재판소 결정례에서 양자가 매우 유사한 의미로 사용되고 있는 점을 논증적 측면에서 지적하고 검토하였다. 여기에다 헌법재판소 결정례는 많은 경우, 아니 거의 대부분 – 상세한, 결론에 수긍할수 있는 충분히 설득력 있는 – ‘논증 없이 결론만 내리는’ 논증형태를 취한다는 점을 지적하고 검토하였다. 이렇듯, 이 글은 책임원칙에 대한 헌법재판소결정례의 논증 및 논증구조에 ‘초점’을 맞추어 논의하였다. 이렇게 한 이유는한편의 논문에서 ‘책임원칙에 관한 순수이론적 논의’와 ‘책임원칙에 관한 헌법재판소의 논증구조에 관한 논의’를 함께 다루게 되면, 이 글의 주제의식과 목적 및 방향성이 이원화되어 논문의 집중도를 떨어뜨릴 수 있다는 데 있다.

이사와 회사의 형사책임에 관한 고찰 -미국의 사례를 중심으로 회사의 지배구조를 고려한 비교법적 고찰-

윤성승 한국경찰법학회 2022 경찰법연구 Vol.20 No.2

According to the Korean Commercial Code, the liability of directors of a joint stock company is mainly stipulated for civil liability, and only Chapter 7 of the Company's Penal Provisions have provisions on criminal punishment for directors, etc. The commercial code does not directly punish corporations, but only criminalizes actors such as directors. It is the traditional theoretical basis of the civil law countries that corporations have no criminal capacity. However, even in civil law countries, which traditionally did not recognize the criminal capacity of corporations, there is a trend to change legislation to enable criminal punishment against companies and criminal liability of the corporations has been widely recognized according to precedents. In view of this practical global trend, this paper comparatively examined the examples of criminal liability against directors and corporations in the United States and presents implications related to criminal liability of directors and corporations in Korea. In large-scale incidents, there are many cases where a large number of human casualties or environmental damage is caused by the company, and in such cases it is necessary that not only the actors within the company but also the company should directly bear criminal responsibility. In the event of a major accident or damage related to the provision of goods and services due to the expansion of the company's social roles, the company should be able to directly admit criminal responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a regulation that directly recognizes the criminal liability of vaccine manufacturers and household goods manufacturers, etc., which have a large social ripple effects in addition to the punishment laws such as the Serious Accident Punishment Act. Considering company's functions in modern society and the American legal principles and grounds for acknowledging the company's criminal liability from a practical point of view as well as international trends, it needs the introduction of the company's criminal capacity and corporate criminal liability to the extent possible in Korea. It is necessary to consider to introduce corporate criminal liability to prevent and punish systemic and repetitive corporate crimes under the corporate governance. 상법상 주식회사 이사의 책임은 주로 민사책임에 관하여 규정되어 있고, 회사편 제7장 벌칙 조항에서만 이사 등에 대한 형사처벌에 관한 규정을 두고 있다. 상법이 법인인 회사에 대해서 직접 처벌하지 않고 이사 등 행위자에 대해서만 형사처벌하는 것은 회사는 범죄능력이 없다는 대륙법계의 전통적인 이론적 근거한 것으로서 우리나라의 대법원 판례도 회사의 범죄능력을 인정하지 않고 있다. 그러나 전통적으로 법인의 범죄능력을 인정하지 않아 왔던 대륙법 국가에서도 최근 회사에 대하여 형사처벌이 가능하도록 입법을 변경하는 추세에 있고, 미국은 일찍부터 간접책임(vicarious liability: respondeat superior) 이론에 의하여 입법 및 판례에 의하여 회사의 형사책임을 폭넓게 인정하여 오고 있다. 본고는 이러한 실용적인 세계적인 추세를 감안하여, 이사뿐만 아니라 회사에 대한 형사책임에 관한 미국의 예를 비교법적으로 고찰한 후, 우리나라에서 이사 및 회사의 형사책임과 관련한 시사점을 제시하였다. 대규모 사건 등에서 많은 인명피해 또는 환경피해가 회사에 의해서 일어나는 경우가 많고, 이 경우 회사 내의 행위자뿐만 아니라 회사도 직접 형사책임을 부담하여야 하여야 할 필요성이 제기되고 있다. 회사의 사회적 역할 확대로 인해 재화와 용역의 제공과 관련하여 대형사고나 피해가 발생한 경우 회사에 대해서도 직접 형사책임을 인정할 수 있어야 한다. 따라서 중대재해처벌법 같은 양벌규정에 의한 처벌 법규 이외에도 사회적 파급효과가 큰 백신제조 회사, 생활용품제조 회사 등에도 회사의 형사책임을 직접 인정하는 규정을 도입할 필요가 있다. 회사의 현대 사회에서의 기능과 회사 차원에서 ‘조직적 또는 반복적으로’ 이루어지는 범죄행위에 대한 대응의 필요성을 고려할 때 실용적인 입장에서 회사의 형사책임을 인정하는 미국의 법리와 근거 및 국제적 추세를 감안하여, 우리나라에서도 가능한 범위 내에서 회사의 범죄능력과 형사책임의 도입을 적극적으로 고려할 필요가 있다.

‘불법행위책임’과 ‘형사책임’ 체계의 분별에 대한 필요성 연구* - ‘책임능력’을 중심으로 -

가정준(Ka, Jung-Joon) 한국재산법학회 2018 재산법연구 Vol.35 No.2

This paper emphases that tort law should be different from criminal law. This is because the tort law should be framed based on victims while criminal law based on actors. ‘Criminal Liability’ is based on the principle of contra value behavior , which determines how to decide whether to punish an act. Tort Liability’ is based on the principle of ‘contra value consequence’ which determines who is burdened with damages. In other words, Criminal Liability is focused on whether it is rational to punish an actor for his action regardless of outcome. It can be said that ‘Criminal Liability’ is a system based on the perpetrator. ‘Tort Liability’ is focused on whether it is rational to impose liability regardless of whose action. It can be said that ‘Tort Liability’ is a system based on the victim. This paper is centralized with the defense of tort liability, the competency of ‘Tort Liability’. It is started with the comparison to the competency of ‘Criminal Liability’. The competency of ‘Tort Liability’ is supposed to differ from the competency of ‘Criminal Liability’ because of their characteristics. In fact, tort law and criminal law are similar to each in the point of view that both of them have played a role to interfere with socially unaccepted behaviors. Futhermore, tort law has traditionally followed the frame and interpretation of criminal law. Because of these, it is likely that the issue of competency in tort law is based on the stance of criminal law. Eventually, tort law in other countries has been independent of criminal law in a different and diverse ways. The regulation and interpretation for the competency of ‘Tort Liability’ is an excellent example how much tort law is different from criminal law. It comes from the competency of ‘Criminal Liability’ such as the minority and insanity. This issue in criminal law makes it likely to exempt from criminal liability because it is about the blamefulness of an actor. If he or she is not qualified to understand penal penalty, his or her criminal liability is unlikely imposed. The competency of ‘Tort Liability’ is supposed to be totally different from one of ‘Criminal Liability’. This is because the victim must be endured with his or her damage if the actor is excused with his or her tortious liability. Two kinds of responses are shown in most of jurisdictions. First, the competency of ‘Tort Liability’ has basically followed with the competency of ‘Criminal Liability’. The minor or insane actor is excused with his or her tortious liability like in criminal law and his or her legal supervisor is vicariously liable for his or her protege instead. Second, the competency of ‘Tort Liability’ is not allowed contrary to criminal law. Basically the actor is liable for his or her tortious outcome regardless of his or her age or mental deficiency and additionally his or her legal supervisor is jointly and severally liable for his or her protege. The second option is more likely to protect tortious victims than the first option. The second one is based on the protection of victim while the first one on the protection of actor. The first one is a traditional point of view based on criminal law while the second one is an independent point of view from criminal law. European law and common law is close to the second option while Korean and Japanese law to the first option. This article has studied to find out how much tort law in Korea is different from criminal law and what tort law in Korea has pursued by comparing other jurisdictions. 본 논문은 ‘불법행위법’상 ‘책임능력’을 비교법적으로 고찰함으로써 ‘불법행위법’의 의미를 다시 한 번 깊게 고찰해 보고자 하였다. 무엇보다도 ‘불법행위법’은 피해자를 중심으로 구성되어야 하는 법이고 ‘형법’은 행위자를 중심으로 구성되어야 하는 법이라는 시각 에서 출발한다. 우리 민법에서 ‘책임능력’은 가해자의 불법행위를 원인으로 발생한 피해 자의 손해를 배상받기 위한 전제 조건으로 작동한다. 이러한 ‘책임능력’의 존재는 ‘불법행 위법’이 ‘형법’과 같이 가해자 중심의 법체계를 이루고 있는 증거라고 할 수 있다. 본 논문은 ‘책임능력’과 관련하여 일본, 대만, 독일, 프랑스 민법, ‘DCFR’, 그리고 영미 법을 비교 고찰해 보았다. 이러한 비교법적 고찰을 통해 프랑스의 민법이 피해자 중심의 ‘불법행위법’ 체계라는 것과 우리나라와 일본 민법은 가해자 중심의 ‘불법행위법’ 체계라는 것을 알 수 있었다. 반면 ‘DCFR’의 내용은 가해자와 피해자 측면을 중립적으로 반영 하였으나 그 중심은 피해자 보호였다. ‘불법행위법’은 가해자 중심의 법체계가 아님은 주지의 사실이기에 우리 민법의 ‘불법행위법’은 ‘책임능력’에 관하여 ‘형법’과 다른 기준과 해석을 나름 제시하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 우리 민법은 적극적으로 가해자가 아닌 피해자 중심의 규정과 해석을 제공하지 못하는 것 같다. 이를 다른 법계에서의 ‘책임능력’ 과 비교․분석하여 보았다. 최근 미성년자의 불법행위의 형태는 좀 더 성인화될 뿐만 아니라 좀 더 이른 나이에서 성인들의 불법행위 모습이 발견된다. 따라서 미성년자의 경우에는 그 감독의무자의 주의 의무와 감독자책임은 좀 더 가중되어야 피해자 보호에 도움이 될 것이다. 스트레스와 정신질환의 증가 그리고 기대수명이 늘어나면서 심신장애는 과거보다 늘어날 것으로 예상된다. 이러한 심신장애의 원인은 일시적인 경우, 예상치 못한 경우, 심지어 예상이 가능한 경우 등으로 다양하다. 다양한 원인의 심신장애와 높아질 발생 가능성 등을 고려해 보았을 때 심신장애자의 ‘책임능력’을 강화하는 것이 그 감독자에게 책임을 가중시키는 것 보다 피해자 보호에 도움이 될 것이다. 본 논문은 미성년자와 심신장애자의 ‘책임능력’을 기본적으로 부인하는 ‘형법’의 태도를 ‘불법행위법’에서는 어떻게 수용해야 하는 것이 합리적인지를 비교법적 검토를 통해 살펴보았다. ‘불법행위법’은 불법행위를 원인을 발생한 손해를 가해자, 피해자, 제3자 중누가 부담하는지를 결정하는 법체계이다. 많은 부분 규범적인 내용을 담고 있지만 경우에 따라 ‘불법행위법’은 가해자의 책임을 규범적으로 결정하지 않는 경우도 있다. 미성년자와 심신장애자의 ‘책임능력’을 정책적으로 접근해 나아가는 것은 규범적 측면에서 불편할수 있다. 하지만 ‘불법행위법’을 규범적 측면에서 바라보지 않아야 하는 분야를 빨리 찾아 내어 이를 발전시키는 것이 ‘불법행위법’의 역할을 확대하는데 큰 도움이 될 것이다. 본논문이 ‘불법행위법’을 바로 보는 기본적인 시각을 재정립하는 데 일조하는데 도움이 되었기를 바란다.

기업형사책임(企業刑事責任)에 대한 비교법적(比較法的) 연구 -특히 감독책임(監督責任)에 관한 독일과 일본의 판례에 대한 비교연구-

조병선 ( Byung Sun Cho ) 청주대학교 법학연구소 2004 法學論集 Vol.21 No.-

Each State Party undertakes to impose penal sanctions on persons who participate in illegal acts committed by or on behalf of corporate entities. Whether corporate entities can be penalized, civilly or criminally, varies among nations. In some nations, corporate entities can be penalized for engaging in environmental crimes. This raises an issue of whether a corporation may be penalized for the activities of its personnel or agents, despite the absence of an overt act on the corporation`s behalf. At minimum in nearly all nations, the director, officer, or agent`s actions must be within the scope of their employment. Furthermore, there usually must be evidence that the unlawful activities were directed by or with the consent of a senior corporate official and that the direction or consent was given within the scope of that official`s authority. Here, the criminal liability of enterprises will be discussed firstly in connection with the criminal liability of individual officers or enployees, and secondly in the context of the enterprise as such. 1. Activities in corporte bodies are typically the result of many interlocked desisions, with a tendency for wide delegation of responsibilities. As a result, where there is "organizational worngdoing" a criminal system based upon personal fault has difficulties identifying and successfully prosecuting the individual person`s responsible. This can lead to an "organized irresponsibility" of individual employees. Therefore, as to perpetrators, both statutory and case law are in the process of extending individual criminal liability especially in the area of entrepreneurial activity. What is the theoretical basis of the criminal liability of corporate officers who in fact are regarded as "responsible persons"? In this case, the vicarious criminal liability of a diretor, a representative and a manager is avoided because the doctrine of a criminal responsibility is incereasingly emphasized. They are to be punished, only when they themselves commit analleged crime. In general. ther are now three approaches: (a) The basis of liability of corporate officers may be a corporate criminal act by them within their knowledge and control even if the individual has not performed the unlawful act, at least when such individual even if the individual has not performed the unlawful actm at least when such individual ordered orauthorized the activity. (b) A broader basis of liability may apply to situations where the corporate officer knows of a subordinate`s unlawful activity and does nothing to prevent it. If the corporate officer stands in a position of responsibility over the act in question, liability may be predicated on the failure of the corporate officer to adequately supervise subordinates. (c) A still broader basis of liability is similar to strict liability: the corporate officer may be liable even without evidence of the officer`s direct participation or acquiescence in a subordinate`s unlawful behavior if the corporate officer holds a reponsible position. Only an officer who exercises a highdegree of care in attempting to prevent the illegal activity will avoid liability. Approach (a) can be reached by the traditional criminal theory of aiders and abettors, but approach (b) or (c) is beyond the reach of this traditional theory. The international trend is to reduce the requirements for intentional behavior when dealing with industrial prepetrators, to create a presumption of intent or to change the burden of proof(approach (b) or (c)). Faced with the above-mentioned difficulties as "organizational wrong-doing" or "organized irresponsibility", it is not surprising that, in many countries, adherence to the traditional principle that criminal liability requires personal fault (approach (a)) is being sacrificed in an effort to secure greater environmental protection. 2. When a corporate behavior has been determined to constitute a crime, it is possible to punish not only an individual perpetrator

법인의 형사책임에 관한 미국법제의 검토

지유미 ( Yumi Jee ) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2013 법학논총 Vol.37 No.3

This Article examines corporate criminal liability in the United States. Under the common law, corporations could not commit crimes. Since the U.S. Supreme Court`s New York Central decision, however, it has been recognized that corporations may be held liable even for crimes requiring criminal intent. There have been two corporate criminal liability standards under which corporations may be held criminally liable for the actions of their officers, agents, or employees: the doctrine of respondeat superior and the Model Penal Code standard. First of all, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation may be held liable for the crime of its officer, agent, or employee provided that the officer, agent, or employee acted within the scope of his or her employment and acted with the intent to benefit the corporation. Here, the agents and the employees for whose conduct the corporation may be held criminally liable are not limited to high-level agents or employees. Additionally, it is irrelevant whether the corporation has designed and implemented compliance policies in determining corporate criminal liability. Secondly, the Model Penal Code standard treats corporate criminal liability differently based on whether the offense is defined by the Criminal Code or not. According to the Model Penal Code §2.07(1)(a), a corporation may be held criminally liable for a regulatory offense that is defined by a statute other than the Criminal Code only when legislative purposes to impose criminal liability on corporations plainly appears in the statute, and its officer, agent, or employee committed the offense on behalf of the corporation within the scope of his or her employment. The Model Penal Code §2.07(5), however, allows a due diligence defense against corporate criminal liability for regulatory offenses. When it comes to crimes defined by the Criminal Code, the Model Penal Code §2.07(1)(c) provides that a corporation may be held criminally responsible only when its board of directors or high managerial agent got involved in such crimes in the form of authorization, request, command, performance, or tolerance. These two standards, however, have not been free from criticism. Especially, the doctrine of respondeat superior has been criticized in that it does not consider whether a corporation has designed and implemented effective compliance policies when determining the criminal liability of such corporation. It could be problematic with regard to deterrence that is a central justification for criminal liability in general. As a result, many legal scholars and practitioners have argued that corporate criminal jurisprudence should be improved, and thereby the existence of corporate compliance policies should be considered in determining corporate criminal liability.

미국에서의 법인에 대한 형사책임귀속 모델과 그 시사점

최대호(Dae Ho Choi) 중앙법학회 2015 中央法學 Vol.17 No.2

This Article examines corporate criminal liability in the United States. Under the common law, corporations could not commit crimes. Since the U.S. Supreme Court``s New York Central decision, however, it has been recognized that corporations may be held liable even for crimes requiring criminal intent. There have been two corporate criminal liability standards under which corporations may be held criminally liable for the actions of their officers, agents, or employees: the doctrine of respondent superior and the Model Penal Code standard. First of all, under the doctrine of respondent superior, a corporation may be held liable for the crime of its officer, agent, or employee provided that the officer, agent, or employee acted within the scope of his or her employment and acted with the intent to benefit the corporation. Here, the agents and the employees for whose conduct the corporation may be held criminally liable are not limited to high-level agents or employees. Additionally, it is irrelevant whether the corporation has designed and implemented compliance policies in determining corporate criminal liability. Secondly, the Model Penal Code standard treats corporate criminal liability differently based on whether the offense is defined by the Criminal Code or not. According to the Model Penal Code §2.07(1)(a), a corporation may be held criminally liable for a regulatory offense that is defined by a statute other than the Criminal Code only when legislative purposes to impose criminal liability on corporations plainly appears in the statute, and its officer, agent, or employee committed the offense on behalf of the corporation within the scope of his or her employment. The Model Penal Code §2.07(5), however, allows a due diligence defense against corporate criminal liability for regulatory offenses. When it comes to crimes defined by the Criminal Code, the Model Penal Code §2.07(1)(c) provides that a corporation may be held criminally responsible only when its board of directors or high managerial agent got involved in such crimes in the form of authorization, request, command, performance, or tolerance. These two standards, however, have not been free from criticism. Especially, the doctrine of respondeat superior has been criticized in that it does not consider whether a corporation has designed and implemented effective compliance policies when determining the criminal liability of such corporation. It could be problematic with regard to deterrence that is a central justification for criminal liability in general. As a result, many legal scholars and practitioners have argued that corporate criminal jurisprudence should be improved, and thereby the existence of corporate compliance policies should be considered in determining corporate criminal liability.

법인의 형사책임에 관한 현행법제의 개선방안 -형법전상 법인의 형사책임귀속을 위한 기준 정립을 중심으로-

지유미 ( Yu Mi Jae ) 경상대학교 법학연구소 2014 法學硏究 Vol.22 No.2

오늘날 법인에 의한 법익에 침해 또는 위태화 우려가 증가함에 따라 법인의 활동을 통제할 필요성 또한 그만큼 강조되고 있다. 형사제재는 이와 같은 법인을 통제할 하나의 사회적 통제수단이 될 수 있는데, 우리 형법전에는 법인의 범죄능력에 관한 명문의 규정이 존재하지 않는다. 그럼에도 불구하고 형사제재라는 가장 강력한 사회적 통제수단을 이용하여 법인을 통제할 필요성에 직면하여, 우리 현행법제는 개별법상의 양벌규정이란 입법형식을 통해 법인에 대해 형사제재를 가하고 있다. 하지만 이러한 양벌규정은 법인 처벌의 현실적 필요성에는 얼마간 부합하는 것일지는 몰라도, 다양한 형법 이론적 문제점을 내포하고 있다. 따라서 본고에서는 법인의 형사책임에 관한 우리 현행법제의 현황 및 문제점을 검토해 보고, 오랜 기간에 걸쳐 법인의 범죄능력을 인정하면서 법인에 대한 형사 책임의 귀속을 위한 독자적 기준을 마련해 온 미국법제에 대한 비교법적 검토를 바탕으로, 우리 현행법제에 대한 개선방안을 마련해 보았다. 먼저, 다양한 형법 이론적 문제점들을 갖고 있는 양벌규정을 통해 법인을 처벌하기 보다는. 형법전상에 법인의 범죄능력을 인정하는 명문의 규정을 두고 법인에게 형사책임을 귀속시키기 위한 기준을 마련하는 것이 바람직해 보인다. 법인의 존재론적 특성을 고려할 때, 법인에 대한 형사책임귀속의 기준을 마련함에 있어서는 법인의 업무와 관련하여 범죄행위를 한 자가 법인의 ‘실질적’ 기관인지 아니면 단순한 대리인 또는 종업원인지를 구분하여야 할 것이다. 법인의 업무에 관하여 범죄행위를 한 자가 법인의 ‘실질적’ 기관이라면 그와 같은 ‘실질적’ 기관의 범죄행위를 법인의 범죄행위로 보아 법인에 대해서도 형사책임을 부과하는 것이 가능할 것이다. 반면에, 법인의 업무에 관하여 범죄행위를 한 자가 단순히 법인의 대리인 또는 종업원에 불과하고, 이와 같은 대리인 또는 종업원의 범죄행위에 대해 법인의 ‘실질적’ 기관이 허락, 요구, 또는 부주의하게 용인하는 등으로 관여한 바도 없다면, 법인은 이와 같은 대리인 또는 종업원에 대한 감독의무를 이행하지 않은 경우에만 형사책임을 부담하도록 해야 할 것이다. 따라서 법인이 효과적인 준법감시제도를 도입하고 이를 충실하게 시행해 오고 있다는 사실은, 그 법인의 대리인 또는 종업원이 법인의 업무에 관해 범죄행위를 했음에도 불구하고 그에 대한 법인의 형사책임을 부정하는 기제로 작동할 수 있을 것이다. In the Korean Criminal Act, there is no provision stating that corporations can commit crimes. As the necessity of punishing corporations has been growing, however, the corporations have been criminally punished through the joint punishment provisions in a number of statutes other than the Korean Criminal Act. However, such provisions have been regarded as highly problematic. So, this Article deals with how to improve the Korean laws on corporate criminal liability. In so doing, this Article examines both the current Korean laws and the U.S. laws on corporate criminal liability. Such U.S. laws are distinguished from the Korean laws in that the U.S. laws have recognized that corporations can commit crimes and have established two standards under which corporations can be held criminally liable: the doctrine of respondeat superjor and the Model Penal Code standard. When considering the problems with regard to the current Korean laws on corporate criminal liability and the comparative analysis with the U.S. laws on such liability, it seems more proper for the Korean Criminal Act to include the provision stating corporations can commit crimes and the standards for imposing corporate criminal liability as well. A corporation should be held criminally liable for the crime of its directors or high-managerial agents when they acted within the scope of their employment. On the other hand, a corporation should be held criminally liable for the crime of its mere agents or employees only when the corporation failed to supervise the agents or the employees. As a result, the fact that the corporation has designed and implemented effective compliance program to deter and detect the crime of its agents or employees would constitute an affirmative defense against the corporation`s criminal liability.

환경법에서의 기업책임 -개정된 양벌규정과 질서위반행위규제법에 근거한 새로운 이론구성의 시론

조병선 ( Byung Sun Cho ) 한국환경법학회 2009 環境法 硏究 Vol.31 No.1

In Korean environmental law there is in general the possibilty of corporate criminal liability persuant to `joint penal provision (two-sides penal provision)`. Recently in November 2007, the Korean Constiutional Court held that a joint penal provision in which the individual employer is punished when his or her employee is determined to have committed a crime was unconstitutional, because the joint penal provision had no contents for the culpability of an individual employer and thus violated the constitutionally protected principle of culpability. Therefore, it is today impossible to try to explain `joint penal provision` with using the idea of vicarious liability. After the Korean Constitutional Court`s expression of the unconsitutionality over joint penal provision in November 2007, since December 2008 the Ministry of Justice began to change the old joint penal provision into the new revised joint penal provision. On 26 December 2008, the old joint penal provisions of 69 laws were revised. The new revised jointpenal provision adds only an additional sentence: "If a juristic person, an entity or an individual perform due care and supervison over its employee for the prevention of such a crime, it will be exempted from the punishment". The new rivised joint penalprovision seems to declair that the criminal liability of employer is based on the presumption of negligence, because the inserted sentence means the presumption of negligence. Probably the new form of penal provision, that is understood to be a kind of the presumption of negligence, could let the burden of proof be changed from the public prosecutor to the accused, in other words employer-side. My paper raises the question of how we could determine who is perpetrator in an organizational hierachy, and how we should restrict the number of individuals whose actions may trigger the corporation`s liability. A dicision of the Korean Supreme Court provides a useful example for such difficulties. The Supreme Court justified the punishment of two-sides with the following explanation: When the actor is a representative, his acts are presumed to be the conducts of a corporation itself and thus a corporation has to be punished. When the actor is not a representative, his conduct cannot be presumed to be the conduct of a corporation. However, when the actor who is not a representative violates a law, he should be still `additionally` punishedbesides a corporation persuant to joint penal provision. Therefore, the punishment of a representative means the `expansion` of punishment that is based on the joint penal provision. When the actor is not a representative, the actor is punished because of his own criminal conduct and a corporation is fined because of its negligence of the supervisional duty. At first glance, the argument of the Supreme Court seems to be sufficient for those cases. However, this argument has a premise that it is not difficult to find an actor. The fine against a corporation is usually not sufficient to deter corporate misbehavior. The orientation of this way of thinking lies merely in an individual (natural person) from the naturalistic point of view. Recent Korean courts` precedents have affirmed the possibility of co-perpertrator based on negligence. In 1994, a middle section of Seongsu Bridge fell into the Han River in Seoul during the morning rush-hour, killing 32 people and injuring 17. The bridge was built by Dongah Construction. Investigators found that the company made many omissions in the welding and its construction management and inspection methods were remarkably slipshod. The Korean Supreme Court stated in the case of Seongsu Bridge Accident that criminal liability of several perpetrators could be based on joint previous omission of `direct and concrete` due care as long as the casual nexus was given. Another disaster hit the construction industry less than a year later.Sampoong Department Store in southern Seoul collapsed on June 29, 1995. With 501 killed and 937 injured, it was the worst peacetime disaster in South Korean history. Again, shoddy engineering practices and government corruption were blamed for the accident. In this case the Korean Supreme Court accepted the concept of `negligent co-perpetrator`, as long as there exist two important premises: the joint previous omission of `direct and concrete` due care and the casual nexus. However, corporate criminal liability pursuant to joint penal provision is quite different from typical criminal negligence. We need to change from a point of individualistic view to a point of collectivistic view. Because a criminal corporate attitude would pervade the `team spirit` of the corporation, a general, as well as a specific preventive effect is extremely unlikely if the members of a corporation have been influenced and reflected by a criminal corporation attitude. In my opinion, therefore, a corporation could be held liable for the crime its employee committed because of an organizational failure of the corporation. In order to determine corporate criminal liability, it should not focus on individual behavior but rather on collective mechanisms of control. My explanation on joint penal provisionrequires both the commission of an offense in the interest of the corporation and an organizational failure on the part of the corporation. In my opinion, the new approach I described so far, though not complete, is much more comprehensive than the other approaches that have been developed under the limitation of the classical criminal law theory.