This study analyzes the stability of authoritarian regimes during the power succession. The main research question is ‘How was Turkmenistan able to maintain stability during its power succession, in contrast to Kazakhstan, which failed to do so?’ ...
This study analyzes the stability of authoritarian regimes during the power succession. The main research question is ‘How was Turkmenistan able to maintain stability during its power succession, in contrast to Kazakhstan, which failed to do so?’ Based on the question, this study aims to explain the factors that contribute to either stability or instability during leadership transitions in authoritarian regimes. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have cultural, economic, and political aspects in common, moreover, they share considerable similarities in the power transition process. However, the consequences of these transitions were markedly different. In Turkmenistan, the hereditary succession from Gurbanguly to Serdar was followed by a period of continued leadership stability, with no reports of official resistance against either the former or current president. In contrast, Kazakhstan experienced nationwide anti-government protest following the power succession from Nazarbaev to Tokaev, entering a phase of political instability. Then, why did these two countries, which share similar characteristics, experience such different outcomes in their leadership transitions?
To answer the aforementioned question, this study conducts an analysis based on four major considerations. First, taking into account the specific differences in regime type between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. While both states are broadly categorized as authoritarian regimes, Turkmenistan is more accurately characterized as a personalist authoritarian regime, whereas Kazakhstan corresponds to an electoral authoritarian regime. Second, the comparison is focused mainly on three levels, which are the leaders, the elites, and the citizens. Specifically, the analysis examines the power concentration by the leader, elite cohesion, and civic activism. Third, this study aims to construct a comprehensive narrative of power succession by integrating these three levels. Fourth, in order to conduct a comprehensive analysis across the three levels, this study synthesized and applied various theories, with particular emphasis on adopting the power interaction approach as the primary analytical framework.
This approach stems from an effort to address the limitations of existing studies. Prior research tends to assume both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as uniform authoritarian regimes, thereby overlooking the distinct outcomes of power succession each country experienced. Moreover, the analytical focus has largely been confined to either the leader or the elites, treating them as separate units of analysis, which has resulted in fragmented explanations. In addition, contradictory arguments have been made about the same case, a tendency that is particularly evident when leaders and elites are analyzed solely through institutional lenses within the framework of a single theory. In response, this study aims to overcome such limitations by incorporating the four aforementioned considerations into its analysis.
The comparative analysis reveals that Turkmenistan was able to carry out a stable hereditary succession due to the interaction of three key factors: a leader who monopolize the power, a highly cohesive elite, and a citizen with severely limited political activism. The fact that hereditary succession was successfully enforced in Turkmenistan means that Gurbanguly had consolidated overwhelming power within the regime. His monopolization of authority was made possible by the absence of counterbalancing forces, the extensive control over the whole society, and an environment largely insulated from external forces. These conditions effectively precluded the risk of criticism or constraints from other political actors during the succession process, thereby enabling a smooth and uncontested transfer of power. After the transition, Gurbanguly and Serdar established a tandem leadership structure. Despite the split of power, the regime did not descend into instability, primarily because the two were father and son. The familial continuity between the predecessor and successor provided a source of regime stability across all three levels: leader, elite, and citizen. First, from the perspective of the leader, the successor inherited the predecessor’s political base intact, enabling him to exercise broad and stable influence from the early stages of his rule. Additionally, Gurbanguly acted as Serdar’s political patron, ensuring the consolidation of the new regime while simultaneously reinforcing his own authority. As a result, power became increasingly concentrated within the Berdimuhamedov family, creating a structure in which the stability of the ruling family is directly linked to the stability of the regime. Second, from the perspective of the elite, the composition of the ruling coalition remained consistent across both leaderships, preventing the formation of internal factions. Elites remained unified around the Berdimuhamedov family, thereby preserving internal cohesion. Third, from the perspective of the citizen, the preexisting political passivity persisted, and opportunities for meaningful political participation remained extremely limited. Throughout the entire succession process, there was no room for citizens to exert substantive influence. Consequently, Turkmenistan was able to complete a stable hereditary succession.
In contrast, Kazakhstan experienced an unstable power succession due to the interaction of three key factors: a leader who partly monopolizes the power, a fragmented elite, and a citizen with partly tolerated political activism. Nazarbaev chose a conventional succession over a hereditary succession. This decision indicates that Nazarbaev lacked the degree of control necessary to enforce dynastic power transition. This limitation stemmed from the presence of counterbalancing forces, partial control over society, and an environment interconnected with external forces. Consequently, power was transferred to Toqaev, and a tandem leadership structure emerged. However, unlike in Turkmenistan, the tandem in Kazakhstan became a source of regime instability. A key factor was that Nazarbaev and Toqaev were not related by blood. This discontinuity between the predecessor and successor triggered instability across all three levels: leader, elite, and citizen. First, from the perspective of the leader, although the successor inherited the predecessor’s political base, the continued influence exerted by Nazarbaev hindered Toqaev’s ability to exercise independent authority. As a result, the successor initiated measures to build an autonomous power base, which in turn deepened the rift between the two leaders. Second, from the perspective of the elite, the difference between the composition of the former and the new ruling coalitions led to the formation of internal factions. This heightened the potential for elite conflict. Moreover, elites aligned themselves with their own leader and maintained autonomy from the opposing leader and faction. Added to this the presence of opposition elites grounded in a restricted political pluralism forms a limited but functional check on the leadership. Third, from the perspective of a citizen, public dissatisfaction toward the regime that continued to tolerate Nazarbaev’s dominance even after his retirement culminated in mass protests. These collective actions were organized autonomously by an active civil society drawing upon previous experiences and legacies of protest. The internet functioned as an alternative space for political discourse and information dissemination, enabling large-scale political mobilization. This situation further deteriorated when divided elite factions intervened in the citizen-led protest. The Nazarbaev faction attempted to use the protests to constrain Toqaev’s faction and restore its own influence, while the Toqaev’s allies leveraged the unrest as a pretext to purge Narzarbaev’s allies. Consequently, the simultaneous and interdependent actions of leaders, elites, and citizens collectively contributed to a moment of regime instability.
Based on the comparative analysis, the following implications can be drawn regarding the leadership succession in authoritarian regimes. First, given the interactive nature of power, citizens with a certain level of political activism may exert meaningful influence as political actors during a transfer of power, provided that conducive conditions are in place. Second, democratic institutions, as they help create the conditions necessary for citizen mobilization, may increase the likelihood of regime instability during succession periods. Third, hereditary succession can be a reasonable choice for a stable power transition. These findings partly diverge from existing research. However, precisely for this reason, they offer new insights into the power succession in authoritarian regimes.