미국의 전후 구상 속에서의 원폭투하 결정 = (The) decision to drop the atomic bomb in the U. S. postwar plan

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

On August 6 and 9, 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on the People of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first bomb helped end the war in the Pacific, and most Americans enthusiastically welcomed the use of nuclear weapons against the hated enemy. Few citizens then questioned the morality or necessity of these two attacks. Most Americans believed, as president Harry S. Truman explained, that the bombs were used "in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans." However, in the years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some Americans have contended that policy-makers knew that Japan was near surrender and that both bombs were unnecessary.
Regarding the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, the reason for the emphasis on military solutions, as opposed to diplomatic efforts, may lie in the emotionalism and the desire for revenge that accompanies war. Many found the revenge satisfying, regardless of the loss of additional American lives spent to achieve it. However, the vase majority of the people killed and injured by the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not fall into those categories.
By the Spring of 1945 a crippled Japan was no longer a significant military rival to the U. S., whose strength had expanded dramatically through the war effort while all rivals and potential rivals suffered heavy damage. Nevertheless, while the U. S. military had destroyed Japan's capacity to fight aggressive war beyond her borders, devastated major cities, and blocked access to critical materials, it had neither secured Japan's surrender nor broken the Japanese military's will to fight.
On the one hand, this was a blow to the Japanese government's peace-seeking effort. The Japanese government had been pursuing Soviet mediation to end the war in response to the Emperor's request of June 22, 1945, a fact often overlooked today. Having broken the code Japan's efforts to end the war as it intercepted the messages between Foreign Minister Togo and Japan's Ambassador to Moscow Sato. The messages were sent as the result of the June 22, 1945 Japanese Cabinet meeting. The conditions under which Japan was willing to surrender were not clearly spelled out in the messages, aside from a willingness to give up territory occupied during the war and a repeated rejection of "unconditional surrender."
The factors that led to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima certainly included, but cannot be reduced to, the desire to preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and to demonstrate the unrivaled might of the U. S. in the postwar era. They also included the goal of forcing the immediate surrender of a gravely weakened enemy that faced certain defeat yet still retained the capacity to inflict heavy losses in the event of a U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands. Neither factor in my view justifies the decision to drop the atomic bombs with their deadly impact on the large noncombatant populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And neither, alone, constitutes an adequate explanation of the reasons for the U. S. resorting to the bomb.
The atomic bomb thus simultaneously punctuated the end of World War Ⅱ, including Japanese subordination to the U. S., and provided the opening salvo in U. S. - Soviet conflict. From the perspective of establishing U. S. supremacy, the atomic bomb served a triple purpose: It contributed to a swift end to the war on U. S. terms; it forestalled a possible Soviet invasion of Japan, leaving the U. S. free to unilaterally shape Japan's postwar course under the Occupation; and it sent and electrifying signal to the world, particularly to deploy it ruthlessly in the service of its global ends.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목차
• Ⅰ. 머리말 = 1
• Ⅱ. 원자탄 개발과 태평양전의 양상 = 7
• Ⅲ. 원자탄 사용의 필요성과 정당성에 대한 검토 = 20
• Ⅳ. 미국의 원폭투하 결정과 전후 구상 = 41
• Ⅴ. 맺음말 = 53
• 참고문헌 = 55
• Abstract = 64