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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Sabine Kropp (검색결과 2 건)
- 무료
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Reforming German Federalism –Achieving the Impossible? Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence
Sabine Kropp 한독사회과학회 2007 한독사회과학논총 Vol.17 No.3
In summer 2006, after a long period of hard discussions, Germany adopted the most comprehensive reform of its constitution since1949. According to theories on federalism, which build on the idea of rational traps, this reform should not have taken place. Any reform of the constitution, which would aim at separating interwoven responsibilities of the federal government and the Länder and at establishing more competition (decoupling), was predicted to fail. Analysts working from a variety of theoretical perspectives have produced convincing arguments which mainly point to the "stickiness" of institutions. Moreover, political actors occupy decision-making positions just for brief periods of time (Pierson 2000: 481) and, if they act as office-seekers, may care more about reelection and power positions but not about effective institutions. These arguments prompt the question: how is the German reform then to be explained? Contrary to most theoretical approaches, empirical findings verify that constitutional reforms happen more often than it is expected. By applying several theories to the puzzle of the reform of German federalism, my contribution tries to find out why the impossible has taken place. The paper stresses ideas like the window of opportunity, contextual factors and the importance of crises. It also discusses how these notions can be adapted to dominating theories which offer a more precise analytical framework.
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Reforming German FederalismAchieving the Impossible?
Sabine Kropp 한독사회과학회 2007 한독사회과학논총 Vol.17 No.3
In summer 2006, after a long period of hard discussions, Germany adopted the most comprehensive reform of its constitution since1949. According to theories on federalism, which build on the idea of rational traps, this reform should not have taken place. Any reform of the constitution, which would aim at separating interwoven responsibilities of the federal government and the Lnder and at establishing more competition (decoupling), was predicted to fail. Analysts working from a variety of theoretical perspectives have produced convincing arguments which mainly point to the "stickiness" of institutions. Moreover, political actors occupy decision-making positions just for brief periods of time (Pierson 2000: 481) and, if they act as office-seekers, may care more about reelection and power positions but not about effective institutions. These arguments prompt the question: how is the German reform then to be explained? Contrary to most theoretical approaches, empirical findings verify that constitutional reforms happen more often than it is expected. By applying several theories to the puzzle of the reform of German federalism, my contribution tries to find out why the impossible has taken place. The paper stresses ideas like the window of opportunity, contextual factors and the importance of crises. It also discusses how these notions can be adapted to dominating theories which offer a more precise analytical framework.
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