http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
- 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
- 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Nome, Rene A. (검색결과 2 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
-
When do commitment problems not cause war? Turkey and Cyprus, 1964 versus 1974
Martin Austvoll Nome 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2013 International Area Studies Review Vol.16 No.1
War is often attributed to the fact that parties are unable to commit to an agreement, or have incentives to renege on it. This cause of war is known as “commitment problems”. Yet commitment problems are not in themselves sufficient for war. Parties to a conflict can experience commitment problems and not go to war. Although current theories suggest conditions under which commitment problems should be more or less likely to cause war, these conditions are rarely empirically specified. The paper rectifies this important omission by empirically evaluating hypothesized scope conditions of commitment problems-driven war. Specifically, I analyze the effects of the extent to which power was redistributed prior to war; the speed with which power was redistributed; and the current and anticipated future relative capabilities of the parties. I compare a positive and a negative case of homeland military intervention in support of co-ethnics abroad, using evidence on homeland leaders’ perceptions, reasoning and behavior. The evidence supports the hypotheses. Commitment problems cause military intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are large and rapid, and when their current military capabilities favor intervention. Commitment problems do not cause intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are small and incremental, and when their current military capabilities are poor War is often attributed to the fact that parties are unable to commit to an agreement, or have incentives to renege on it. This cause of war is known as “commitment problems”. Yet commitment problems are not in themselves sufficient for war. Parties to a conflict can experience commitment problems and not go to war. Although current theories suggest conditions under which commitment problems should be more or less likely to cause war, these conditions are rarely empirically specified. The paper rectifies this important omission by empirically evaluating hypothesized scope conditions of commitment problems-driven war. Specifically, I analyze the effects of the extent to which power was redistributed prior to war; the speed with which power was redistributed; and the current and anticipated future relative capabilities of the parties. I compare a positive and a negative case of homeland military intervention in support of co-ethnics abroad, using evidence on homeland leaders’ perceptions, reasoning and behavior. The evidence supports the hypotheses. Commitment problems cause military intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are large and rapid, and when their current military capabilities favor intervention. Commitment problems do not cause intervention when leaders anticipate shifts in the distribution of power that are small and incremental, and when their current military capabilities are poor.
-
연관 검색어 추천
이 검색어로 많이 본 자료
활용도 높은 자료
