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자사주 매입 기회주의 가설과 대주주의 보유주식 매도 거래
변진호(Jin Ho Byun),표민교(Min Kyo Pyo) 한국경영학회 2006 經營學硏究 Vol.35 No.3
This paper examines the managerial opportunism hypothesis of stock repurchase announce-ments by analyzing firms that announced open-market repurchases between 1999 and 2001. Previous studies on open-market repurchases have provided a number of potential explanations for the positive effect to such an announcement, including the tax advantages of share repurchases relative to cash dividends, a signaling of an equity undervaluation, reduction of excess cash flow, takeover deterrence, and stock option funding. Clearly, traditional explanations of open-market repurchase programs such as the undervaluation signaling hypothesis have value and may be a determinant in some cases. However, a question remains regarding open-market repurchases that has rarely been examined in finance literature: are there any firms who announce a repurchase without having either undervalued shares or any real intention of actual repurchasing them? Studies on false signaling of open-market repurchase have not been documented except by Fried (2001). He suggests a managerial opportunism hypothesis based on the agency theory of Jensen & Meckling (1976). Because there are no direct costs of false signaling regarding open-market repurchase, it is possible for majority shareholders including managers to falsely signal their shares to be undervalued. Despite Byun (2004) investigates the market reaction and long-term performance of false repurchasing announcements in Korea, he can not find clear evidence of managerial oppor-tunism. He measures managerial ownership changes between before and after the announcement.
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