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허만호(Heo, Man-ho),엄정섭(Eom, Jung-sup),김종달(Kim, Jong-dall),김미란(Kim, Miran) 동아시아국제정치학회 2015 국제정치연구 Vol.18 No.1
In the context of the carbon CER(Certified Emission Reduction) system, the South Korean government and enterprises are under an obligation to search for offset forests, and North Korean forests represent a potential option. Yet, negotiating and fulfilling an agreement with the North Korean authorities entails many difficulties. Negotiation theories assume the parties are “cooperative antagonists”, which falls between “strident antagonists” and “fully cooperative partners.” However, these roles are not reflected in the existing inter-Korean negotiations, where the parties are instead non-credible quasi “strident antagonists” that can deceive each other with an ill-will. Hubert Touzard defines negotiation as pseudo-negotiation if one party does not recognize the other party as an autonomous interlocutor or when neither party has the will to reach an agreement. Thus, the forthcoming inter-Korean negotiations on forest carbon offset will most likely be a pseudo-negotiation. Plus, even if the North Korean government concludes an agreement with the South Korean government and/or enterprises on forest carbon offset, the damage to the offset forests by the neighboring area residents for daily survival will ultimately play a decisive role in the fulfillment of the agreement. Therefore, the current study searches for referential variables, stakes and chips of negotiation, and attention points referring to North Korean negotiating behavior and the negotiation model explored during the Netherlands international negotiation workshop in 1978.