특별기고논문 : 회계학회-한국상사법학회 공동학술대회 ; 감사보수 및 재무제표 대리작성의 문제점과 개선방안

노준화(제1저자) ( Joon Hwa Rho ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.3

본 연구는 현행 외부감사의 문제점을 감사보수와 재무제표 대리작성을 중심으로 분석하고 있다. 외부감사와 관련하여 여러 가지 문제점이 있지만 현재 회계업계, 학계 그리고 심지어 규제기관에서도 낮은 감사보수로 인한 문제를 가장 심각하게 받아들이고 있으며, 이로 인해 감사품질이 낮아질 것을 우려하고 있다. 또한 감사인이 재무제표를 대리작성함으로 인해 자기검토 위험이 발생하여 인해 감사인의 독립성이 훼손될 뿐만 아니라 감사와 재무제표 작성의 차별성을 수요자가 제대로 인식하지 못하여 전반적으로 감사가치에 대한 인식이 낮게 형성되어 있다는 문제점이 제기되고 있다. 분석결과 우리나라의 감사보수는 피감사기업의 기업규모 수준에 따라 일본의 11.03%~27.54%, 미국의 7.18%~23.54% 수준이다. 우리나라의 감사 인건비는 오랫동안 정체되었고 이로 인하여 우수한 인력들이 공인회계사 시장에 진입하는 비율이 낮아지고 있다. 다수합격자를 배출한 상위 3개 대학의 공인회계사 최종합격자 수는 2004년 46.3%에서 2013년 28.3%로 약 18% 포인트가 감소하였다. 본 연구에서는 낮은 감사보수의 주된 요인으로 감사인 선임에 대한 주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률 등 법규상 규제(예를 들면 감사인 유지)의 부작용을 들고 있다. 이러한 문제점을 개선하는 방안으로 현재까지 유효한 감사인 유지제도는 재점검되어야 할 필요가 있으며, 또한 향후 감사인의 감사기간에 영향을 미치는 새로운 규제는 장기적인 관점에서 감사인의 입지를 약화할 수 있는지 등에 대하여 고려하여야 할 필요가 있다는 것을 제시하고 있다. 또한 우리나라는 재무제표작성과 관련한 감사인에 대한 의존정도가 높은 실정인데 이는 궁극적으로 감사인의 독립성을 훼손하는 상황을 야기할 수 있다. 재무제표 대리작성의 문제는 기업들이 높은 수준의 회계인력을채용하고 기존의 회계인력을 재교육하는데 추가적인 투자를 함으로써 해결될 수 있다. 재무제표를 감사인이 대리 작성할 경우 내부고발자 (whistle-blower)가 제보할 수 있도록 하며, 내부고발자에게 충분한 보상을 제공하고 이들을 보호할 수 있는 장치를 마련하는 등의 감시망을 구축할 필요가 있다. 또한 감사인에게 제시하는 감사받을 재무제표에 작성실무자의 실명을 명기하고 사인하게 함으로써 작성하지 않은 실무자가 작성한 것으로 사인할 경우 처벌하는 등의 추가적인 규제도 고려할 것을 제시하고 있다. 본 연구는 국내외 선행연구와 법률들을 분석함으로써 현행 외부감사의 주된 문제점인 낮은 감사보수와 재무제표 대리작성으로 나타날 수 있는 문제점을 제시하고, 그 개선방안을 제시함으로써 감사품질을 개선하고 감사시장을 활성화 하는데 기여할 수 있다. This paper investigates issues concerning external audits with respect to audit fees and financial statement compilation services. The current audit fee levels are too low and thus recognized among accounting profession, academia, and regulators as one of the most serious issues affecting audit quality. Auditing is to ensure the integrity of financial data. Audits exist because they add value through easing the cost of information asymmetry, not just because they are required by law. Without the audit, the lending party would not have assurance as to whether or not the company``s financial position is accurate. The current practice where auditors compile clients`` financial statements could seriously compromise auditor independence due to self review threats. Auditor independence is often defined as the probability that the auditor will report a discovered breach in the financial reports. This suggests that auditor independence is synonymous with auditor objectivity and the ability to withstand client pressure to acquiesce to substandard reporting. While nearly all cases involve audit services, several cases entail less than a full scope audit (e.g., review or compilation services). By focusing on audit services supplied to specific clients, the study excludes a variety of litigation against public accounting firms. Also, audit clients view compilation services as part of an auditing service and thus regard audit service as having littleimpact on firm value. There is considerable research on whether the Big N auditors can command an audit fee premium and, if so, whether this premium represents a lack of competition in the audit market or quality differences in the competitive audit markets . Auditor independence is a vital issue in the market for auditing services. Many definitions exist in the literature. It has often been alleged that the competition for audit contracts may enable the manager of an audited firm to entice the auditor to conceal disadvantageous information from or even to misrepresent information to the owners and the general public. As a result, several auditing practices have come under scrutiny for their potential to undermine auditor independence. Somewhat related is the allegation that audit quality would also deteriorate if audit firms used predatory pricing to induce clients to switch from their incumbent auditors. Predatory pricing might be employed with the expectation of receiving either management advisory service contracts from the new clients or higher future audit fees. The lower prices charged for the initial audits of new clients, however, might again motivate audit firms to reduce the quality of early audits to be retained over multiple periods. Analysis shows that average audit fee in Korea is 11.03 ~ 27.54% of that in Japan and 7.18~23.54% of that in the U.S after controlling for firm size. With audit fees remaining at such a low level for so long, the number of those who want to become CPAs is dwindling. Also Korea``s top three universities account for 28.3 % of those who pass CPA exams, down by 18% from 46.3 % ten years ago. This paper reports that the issue of low audit fees is mainly due to the External Audit Act and other regulations governing auditor selection and retention. This paper recommends an overall review of the current auditor retention system and also calls for a deliberation on the future impact of additional regulations on auditor independence. Also, a high tendency for Korea``s audit clients to rely on auditor``s compilation services could adversely affect auditor independence. The issue of auditor independence due to compilation services could be partially resolved by firms`` efforts to hire more competent accounting staff and re-educate their current related staff. Firms may need to establish communication channels and protect and compensate whistle blowers so that they can report practices ofauditor financial statement compilation.without any personal and economic losses. This paper also recommends enacting regulations to punish a practice where financial statements to be audited are signed by a person who is not their genuine preparer. This paper may contribute to improving audit quality and activating the audit market by investigating the issue of excessively low audit fees and auditors`` compilation services, and by recommending solutions to these problems.

품질관리검토시간을 통한 감사위험에 대한 감사인의 차별적대응

배길수(제1저자) ( Gil S. Bae ),이재은(교신저자) ( Jae Eun Lee ),노준화(공동저자) ( Joon Hwa Rho ),최승욱(공동저자) ( Seung Uk Choi ) 한국회계학회 2015 會計學硏究 Vol.40 No.6

본 연구는 외감법 개정에 따라 2014 회계연도부터 감사보고서의 ``감사실태보고자료``에 첨부된 품질관리검토시간 공시정보가 감사위험에 따른 감사인 대응행동의 차이를 나타내는지 조사한다. 선행연구(Francis and Krishnan 1999)에서는 감사위험이 높을 경우,투입시간의 증가, 전문성이 높은 인력의 투입, 감사보수의 증가 등의 대응방법을 감사인이 선택한다고 보고하였다. 이러한 가정에 의하면, 감사위험이 높을수록 품질관리검토시간비율은 증가하고, 높은 감사위험에 따른 감사시간·보수 증가 효과는 품질관리검토시간비율에 따라 차별적으로 나타날 것이다. 본 연구는 이에 대한 실증조사이다. 본 연구에서 높은 감사위험은 전기와 당기 재량발생액(실적대응재량발생액절댓값)으로 측정하였다. 연구대상최종표본은 2014년 12월 결산 코스피·코스닥 상장 비금융업 1,449개 기업이다. 실증조사 결과, 감사인이 인지한 감사위험(전기 또는 당기재량발생액절댓값)이 높을수록 품질관리검토시간비율이 대체로 높았다. 또한 품질관리검토시간비율이 높아지면 감사위험(전기 또는 당기재량발생액절댓값)이 높을 경우의 감사시간 증분차이는 이에 따라 함께 증가하고, 감사보수 증분차이는 유의한 차이가 없으며, 시간당감사보수 증분차이는 유의하게 감소하였다. 강건성 분석에서도 높은 감사위험 하에서 품질관리검토시간비율 증가시 시간당보수 증분차이의 감소라는 수익성 악화현상이 일관되게 나타났다. 이 조사결과는 감사수익성을 희생하더라도 높은 감사위험에 더 많은 투입노력을 기울인다고 보고한 선행연구(Schelleman and Knechel 2010)와 일맥상통한다. 한편, 전체 표본을 Big 4 감사법인과 Non-big 4 감사법인 표본을 구분한 경우에는 양 표본그룹 사이에 감사인의 대응이 위험요소별로 다소 차이가 있지만, 대체로 감사위험 증가시 품질관리검토시간비율 증가현상과, 감사위험이 높을 때 품질관리검토시간비율이 증가하면 시간당보수가 하락하는 것은 동일하다. 본 연구의 공헌점은, 외감법 개정에 따라 2014 회계연도부터 시행된 품질관리검토시간 공시정보가 감사위험에 대한 감사인의 차별적 대응행동을 식별할 수 있게 함으로써 품질관리업무에 대한 회계감독 목적으로 유용한 정보임을 확인한다. Francis and Krishnan (1999) suggest that auditors respond to earnings management in five ways: (1) screen out high-risk clients, (2) charge a fee premium, (3) adjust audit effort, (4) negotiate financialstatement adjustments, and/or (5) report more conservatively. In this study, we focus on (2) and (3) above. Several prior studies demonstrate that earnings management affects audit fees and/or hours (Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Schelleman and Knechel 2010), providing evidence that both audit effort and pricing are affected by accruals. In particular, Schelleman and Knechel (2010) provide explanations for engagement profitability in the context of risk-adjusted audit fees. This paper investigates (1) the effect of increased levels of audit risks perceived by the auditors on the quality control review hours, and (2) the combined association of the increased audit risk level (measured by quality control review hours) with the auditors`` responses (audit hours, audit fees, and the hourly audit fees) to the auditors`` perceived audit risks. Our paperexploits the Korean regulation setting which mandates audit firms to report the "audit details information" in the audit reports from the fiscal year 2014. This regulation requires auditors to disclose the quality control review hours expended for the specific audit in each audit report. Prior studies expect that auditors respond to high audit risks by increasing audit hours (Bell et al. 2001; Bedard and Johnstone 2004) and audit fees (Gul et al. 2003). Further, Bell et al.(2008) and Schelleman and Knechel (2010) suggest that audit firms assign more experienced and (or) specialist professionals for risky clients even when they may not able to recoup the normal engagement profits from those audits. This finding indicates that as perceived audit risk increases, audit firms likely increase audit hours and/or also put more quality control review hours. Moreover, Matsumura and Tucker (1995) report that audit issues raised by quality control review partners are usually addressed successfully, but tend to increase interactions among the audit engagement team, the quality control review partner, and the client in the interacting process, which eventually increases audit inputs (i.e., audit hours). Based on this argument, we expect that auditors will exhibit different behavior with quality control review hours in accordance with perceived audit risk. The difference in auditor behavior, in turn, will be manifested as differences in audit hours, audit fees, and hourly audit fees. Our initial sample is consisted of 1,620 non-financial listed companies with December 2014 fiscal year. We first dropped the companies that lack the necessary financial variables and audit fee and hour information for the analysis. We also eliminated the companies with audit hours less than 100 and companies in industries with less than 10 observations. After this screen, our final sample is consisted of 1,449 companies. We use the absolute performance-matched discretionary accruals as the proxy for auditors`` perceived audit risk.We find that auditors`` perceived audit risk is significantly associated with the level of quality control review hours ratio. We also find that an increase in quality control review hours ratio leads to a significant increase in incremental audit hours when audit risk is high, but no corresponding increase in incremental audit fees, resulting in the significantly lower incremental hourly audit fee. This finding is consistent with Schelleman and Knechel (2010), who find that auditors respond to higher risk by increasing audit inputs even when they sacrifice engagement profitability. One possible explanation for this auditors`` response to audit risk is that auditors address high audit risk even at the expense of sacrificing profitability of the engagement. Also, an increase in the quality control review hours ratio leads to higher engagement team hours designed to address the quality control review issues. Our additional analyses also find that differential auditors`` responses are not constant across audit firms with a different size. This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, prior studies find that audit risks are positively associated with higher audit fees and quality control reviewers`` activities are associated with increased audit inputs and fees. Our work investigates the combined relationship between thequality control review inputs and audit risks, audit hours, audit fees and the hourly audit fees. As such, it provides insights into understanding auditors`` behaviors when quality control review efforts and audit risks are considered simultaneously. Second, although there are many experimental studies, few empirical studies have investigated quality control review procedures. Therefore, our empirical evidence expands the scope of the extant research. Third, we contribute to the related literature by showing that disclosing quality control review hours in the "audit details information" likely provides additional useful information to investors and other interested parties to understand auditors`` behaviors in response to the increased audit risk.