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박종평 한국외국어대학교 중동연구소 1996 중동연구 Vol.15 No.2
Following Nasser's revolution of 1952, a domino effect of military revolutions swept the Millde East and the process has yet to end. A notable point is that the majority of the military leaders of the region, including Saddam Hussein, not only poses as successor to Nasser but copies his political philosophy and policy. Contrary to the prior treatment of the military regimes of the Middle East merely as an analysis of revolutions, this study attempts to find out how Nasser's regime controled the Egyptian popular participation in the government and how it institutionalized the government, by examing the political and economic policies, government philosophy, the so-called Nasserism, and charismatic leadership of the administration. In addition, it tries to understand the problems of institutionaliation and the instances of failure in the policies of the regime. Attempt is also made to analyze the core of the political and economic policy and power of Nasser's regime during the 1950's and the 1960's. President Nasser held power for 18 years, since the 1952 takeover of power until his death in 1970. However, this study limits the period of his effective rule from 1952 to 1967. The reason behind the restriction is due to the Third Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and Egypt's loss, which is significantly weakened the foundation of military rule, and afterward the leadership of Nasser suffered a tremendous breakdown, In this light, Nasser's regime lasted, for all practical purposes, from the revolution of 1952 until the end of the war in 1967, and during this time the central doctrine of Nasserism, his charismatic leadership, and the basics of his political policies were in effect. Therefore, the study analyzes the character of Nasser's government from 1952 to 1967. In this period, President Nasser made an attempt to rely solely on military support and his own charismatic leadership rather than a more liberal approach involving popular participation in the government and individual incentives for progress. Of his social programs, Nasserism, and individual leadership, he depended most upon his individual leadership for control, and the other two were used only to strengthen the existing power, in this respect, a parallel can be drawn between the Nasser administration and many military regimes of South America. With the fact that most of the major internal position were occupied by military and technical personnel, and the fact that only restrictive government was possible through bureaucratizing and thus resulting in the exclusion of the popular, Nasser was very similar to the Latin American government, but concerning the characteristic economic reforms and the capitalist movement of the BA system Egypt went through a debilitated development. Taking into account the inability of the military, led by President Nasser, the vital character of the regime, to cooperate with the economic capitalist, it is unique that the accumulation of the national funds was not dependent upon capitalism but the expansion of the government holdings. Also, it is notable the early free-market policies developed into a socialistic system after the 1961 expansion of the government. The individualism and authoritative nature of Nasser's control was damaging in the long run. His charisma had been dependent upon the success of his programs, with the breakdown of his policies, his charisma suffered a irrevocable loss. This was very evident following the defeat of Egypt in 1967, as was the dependency of the entire government upon the charisma of its leader. It was impossible for Nasser to regain his control after the damage that the third Arabian war had inflicted upon his charismatic leadership.