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Domestic Welfare Effects of Foreign Strategic Trade Policies
( Philippe Kohler ),( Michael O. Moore ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 2003 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.18 No.3
Within a duopoly strategic trade policy model, we analyze the effect of foreign strategic trade policies on domestic welfare when the domestic government pursues a laissez-faire import policy. With Cournot competition and domestic production and consumption, an increase in the foreign strategic export subsidy increases domestic welfare when the domestic price exceeds the foreign firm marginal cost. With Bertrand competition, an increase in the foreign strategic export tax has ambiguous effects on domestic welfare and depends on the degree of product differentiation and domestic cross-price elasticity of demand between domestic and foreign goods.
Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplete Information about Material Injury
( Philippe Kohler ),( Michael O. Moore ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 1998 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.13 No.1
This paper deals with the inability of an administering authority to directly observe the level of material injury in antidumping petitions. We focus on the use, by the domestic firm, of private information about injury in order to obtain higher protection. By using an incentive framework, we show that asymmetric information about the level of injury can be resolved by using a mix of lump-sum compensation, domestic unit taxes and antidumping duties rather than just import duties. Surprisingly, the lump-sum transfer decreases and the domestic unit tax increases with the level of material injury. This efficient antidumping rule will induce the domestic firm to tell the truth about the level of material injury. (JEL Classification: F13, L50)
Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplate Information about Material Injury
Kohler, Philippe,Moore, Michael O. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1998 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.13 No.1
This paper deals with the inability of an administering authority to directly observe the level of material injury in antidumping petitions. We focus on the use, by the domestic firm, of private information about injury in order to obtain higher protection. By using an incentive framework, we show that asymmetric information about the level of injury can be resolved by using a mix of lump-sum compensation, domestic unit taxes and antidumping duties rather than just import duties. Surprisingly, the lump-sum transfer decreases and the domestic unit tax increases with the level of material injury. This efficient antidumping rule will induce the domestic firm to tell the truth about the level of material injury.(JEL Classification: F13, L50)
Domestic Welfare Effects of Foreign Strategic Trade Policies
Kohler, Philippe,Moore, Michael O. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 2003 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.18 No.3
Within a duopoly strategic trade policy model, we analyzw the effect of foreing strategic trade policies on domestic welfare when the damestic government pursues a laissez-faire import policy. With Cournot comperirion and domestic production and consumption, an increas in the foreign strategic export subsidy increases domestic welfare when the domestic price exceeds thr foreign firm marginal cost. With Bertrand competition, an increase in foreing strategic export tax has ambiguous effect on domestic welfare and depends on the degree of product differentiation and domestic cross-price elasticity of demand verween domestic and foreign goods.