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      • KCI등재

        Will Donald Trump Overturn US Nuclear Non-proliferation Posture?

        ( Mark Fitzpatrick ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2016 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.21 No.2

        For over 60 years, the United States has led global efforts to stem the expansion of nuclear weapons, an effort that has succeeded in keeping the number of nuclear-armed states to single digits rather than the 25 that were once direly forecast. For most of this period, the non-proliferation regime has been comprised of treaties, conventions and bilateral agreements, formal arrangements that offered legitimacy at the cost of leastcommon denominator compromises. More recently, the US has favored non-proliferation action through the 15-member UN Security Council and via ad-hoc coalitions of like-minded states. The US has also applied unilateral pressure. These efforts have been directed not just against US adversaries, but also vis-a-vis its friends, including the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, both of which were persuaded to stop their pursuit of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. The US failed to stop Israel, however, as well as India, Pakistan and, of most concern, North Korea. The Iran case may be instructive in fashioning a policy to denuclearize North Korea. US policy is largely focused on sanctions, which have finally reached the intensity of sanctions that were applied against Iran and third parties that engaged with designated Iranian entities. In the case of Iran, which is more susceptible to pressure than North Korea, it took at least a year and a half before severe sanctions contributed to serious negotiations on a deal. But the Iranian deal did not come about solely as the result of severe sanctions. It also took a willingness on both sides to accept compromises. In the coming months, sanctions and other forms of pressure on North Korea will be sharpened. The worst response would be for the ROK and Japan also to seek nuclear weapons. As in the Iran case, incentives should be considered among the tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.

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