연구논문 : 최고경영자 교체유형에 따른 차별적 시장반응에 관한 연구

곽영민 ( Young Min Kwak ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.5

본 연구는 경영자교체에 따른 시장반응이 교체형태에 따라 차별적인 양상을 보이는가를 실증적으로 검증한다. 구체적으로 최고경영자 교체시점을 전·후한 시장반응이 전임경영자의 퇴임유형(자발적 교체 vs. 강제적 교체)과 신임경영자의 승계형태(내부승진 vs. 외부영입)를 결합한 4가지 형태의 교체유형에 따라 어떻게 달라지는지를 살펴보았다. 이를 위해 2001년-2013년까지의 기간 동안 최고경영자를 교체한 367개의 기업-연도 표본을 대상으로 교체공시 시점을 전·후한 비정상수익률의 변화추이가 경영자 교체유형에 따라 차이를 보이는가를 사건연구 방법과 횡단면 회귀분석을 통해 검증한다. 주요한 분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 먼저, 경영자 교체유형을 구분하지 않았을 경우 경영자교체에 따른 유의미한 시장반응이 관찰되지 않았으나 경영자의 교체유형을 전임경영자의 퇴임유형과 신임경영자의 영입유형을 고려하여 구분하였을 경우에는 교체시점을 전·후한 시장반응이 각 교체유형별로 상이하게 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 구체적으로 전임경영자가 자발적으로 퇴임하고 신임경영자가 내부에서 승진된 경우에는 교체에 따른 시장반응이 관찰되지 않았으나 전임경영자가 자발적으로 퇴임하고 외부에서 신임경영자가 영입된 경우에는 교체시점에 통계적으로 유의한 양(+)의 시장반응이 관찰된다. 또, 전임경영자가강제 퇴임된 상황에서는 신임경영자가 내부에서 영입되었을 때는 유의미한 음(-)의 시장반응이 이에 반해 외부에서 영입된 경우에는 유의미한 양(+)의 시장반응이 각각 관찰되었다. 이는 경영자교체에 대해 시장이 획일적인 반응을 보이는 것이 아니라 전임경영자의 퇴임과 신임경영자의 승계유형이 어떠한 조합을 이루느냐에 따라 최고경영자 교체에 대한 시장의 기대가 차별적으로 형성되고 있음을 제시한다. 또한, 상술한 결과는 경영자교체의 내생성을 통제한 2단계 회귀분석 결과에서도 재차 확인되었다. 끝으로 건전한 기업지배구조가 경영자교체에 관한 정보비대칭을 완화하고 이해관계자의 이익과 합치되는 방향으로 교체에 관한 의사결정을 유도함으로써 경영자교체에 따른 시장반응에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm. This paper investigate the reaction of the Korean stock market to announcements of a change in the chief executive officer (CEO). The concern for stockholders is whether CEO replacement will influence the company’s stock value. However, the market reaction associated CEO turnover differ depending on the type of CEO turnover that would provide differential expectation about changes in current and future firm performance and changes in investing, operating, and financing policies. For Example, a forced turnover occurs when the stakeholder is dissatisfied with the existing CEO. If the stakeholder wishes to move the firm in a new directions and believes that the current CEO cannot perform the task, the board dismisses the CEO. This will be most common when the current business strategy is performing poorly, forcing the stakeholder to consider a successor CEO who is expected to take actions that include a combination of operating, investing, and financing policy changes. On the other hands, when a CEO voluntarily leave the firm, this event does not provide a signal to change firm strategy because voluntary turnover is not a stakeholder’s decision. Assuming that the market considers the different context between voluntary and forced turnover, market reaction surrounding CEO turnover is expected differently according to CEO turnover type. Therefore, to construct a powerful test of market reaction associated CEO turnovers, it is useful to identify types of CEO turnover. In this study, I propose quadruple classification of CEO turnovers based upon the joint types of departure of predecessor CEO and replacement by successor CEO. The four categories are characterized by peaceful departure succeeded by internally promoted new CEO, peaceful departure succeeded by externally recruited candidate, forced departure replaced by internal candidate, and forced departure accompanied by external replacement respectively. This study documents the differential market reaction according to CEO turnover under four different CEO turnover contexts for Korean listed company observations. The sample of this study covers firms from 2001 to 2013 listed on the Korea Stock Exchange market. Main analysis is to examine the market response using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around CEO turnover announcements and to ascertain whether there are different market reactions across CEO turnover type or not. Main findings can be summaries as follows. First, market reaction associated CEO turnover is positive and significant for outside appointments but insignificant for inside appointment when the incumbent departs voluntarily. Second, the response of stock price on CEO turnover announcements is negatively significant for inside appointment but positively significant for outside appointment under forced succession. Third, After controlling for endogeneity of CEO turnover, I find evidence to support previous results based on standard event study methodology. Finally market reaction on CEO turnover tends to be affected by sound governance mechanism. These results suggest that each of these four categories represents differential context and circumstance so that market reaction are differently across CEO turnover type. The contribution of this study is as follows. First, this study provides the first comprehensive Korean evidence on the market reaction surrounding executive changes announcement by explicitly taking the differential contexts of CEO turnover along with the endogeneity issue associated with the firm performance and governance structure into account. Second, the results documented in this paper provide an important implication for diverse interest groups participating in the CEO turnover decisions and a logical underpinning on the relationship between the CEO turnover and stock price. By understanding the market response on CEO turnover in conjunction with specific contexts of CEO turnover, one can develop adequate intuition into circumstances surrounding certain types of CEO turnover, which will help various stakeholder groups to make proper judgement in selecting CEO and reviewing the effect of CEO turnover.

최고경영자 교체연도의 이익조정

심동석(Shim Dong-suk),안창호(Ahn Chang-ho) 한국국제회계학회 2015 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.64

전체표본을 대상으로 최고경영자 교체연도의 이익조정 현상을 분석한 국내연구는 두 편으로 매우 적어 그 연구결과를 일반화하기가 어려운 실정이다. 전체표본을 전임경영자 퇴임유형과 신임경영자 영입유형으로 각각 구분한 소표본을 대상으로 이익조정 현상을 분석한 국내연구결과는 서로 일치하지 않았다. 따라서 본 연구는 2000년부터 2005년 사이에 표본으로 선정된 167개 기업을 대상으로 최고경영자 교체연도의 이익조정 현상을 분석하였다. 분석결과, 전체표본에 대한 성과대응 재량적 발생액은 –0.024(t=-1.29)로 유의하지 않게 나타나 한국적 기업환경에서 신임경영자의 big bath에 대한 증거는 발견되지 않았다. 이러한 분석결과는 전체표본을 대상으로 big bath 현상을 분석한 국내외 모든 선행연구결과와 상반되는 것이다. 이는 한국에서 일부 신임경영자는 유리한 자금조달과 신용등급을 향상시키기 위하여 이익을 상향조정할 수도 있다는 것을 나타내고 있다. 다음으로 전체표본을 신임경영자의 영입유형에 따라 외부영입과 내부승진으로 구분한 두 소표본의 성과대응 재량적 발생액은 1%에서 유의한 –0.092(t=-2.70)와 0.013(t=0.22)으로 각각 나타났다. 또한 두 소표본간의 성과대응 재량적 발생액 평균 간의 차이가 –0.105(t=-2.74)로 1% 수준에서 유의하였다. 마지막으로 전체표본을 전임경영자 퇴임유형과 신임경영자 영입유형을 함께 사용하여 비자발교체/외부영입 소표본과 자발교체/외부영입 소표본을 대상으로 측정한 성과대응 재량적 발생액은 5%에서 유의한 –0.088(t=-2.22)과 –0.086(t=-1.74)으로 각각 나타났다. 그러나 두 소표본간의 성과대응 재량적 발생액 평균간의 차이는 –0.002(t=-0.13)로 유의하지 않았다. 본 연구의 결과는 외부투자자들이 최고경영자 교체 후에 공표된 이익정보를 바탕으로 미래이익을 예측할 때 신임경영자의 영입유형에 따른 이익조정 현상을 신중하게 감안할 필요가 있음을 시사한다. This study examines whether the incoming CEO is to make a big bath at the transition year associated with CEO turnover using performance-matched discretionary accrual measures. With 167 CEO changes data collected over 2000-2005 periods from Korean listed companies. We examine the empirical evidence on earning management associated with CEO turnover. The empirical findings are summarized as follows: First, using full sample, we find evidence that the incoming CEO is not likely to take a big bath at the transition year. This finding is not consistent with that in all prior researches. Also this finding suggests that all the incoming CEOs do not make opportunistic earning management. Second, we examines whether types of incoming CEO(internal promotion vs external recruitment) affect the level of earning management. We find evidence that externally recruited CEO is more likely to deflate earnings in order to make a big bath. Finally, when incoming CEO is externally recruited, we also examines whether types of departing CEO(voluntarily turnover vs forced turnover) affect the level of earning management. We do not find any significant differences in terms of level of earnings management between samples having voluntarily vs forced CEO turnover.

최고경영자 교체유형과 이익조정 행태간의 관련성

곽영민 ( Young Min Kwak ),최종서 ( Jong Seo Choi ) 한국회계학회 2011 會計學硏究 Vol.36 No.2

최고경영자는 자신의 교체시점을 전후하여 사적 이익을 도모한 이익조정을 하는 것으로 알려지고 있다. 최고경영자의 교체에는 전임경영자와 신임경영자의 두 당사자가 연루되며 이에 따라 두 가지의 독립적인 이익조정 문제가 개입된다. 선행연구에 의하면 전임경영자는 자신의 마지막 재임기간에 보수수준을 증대시키거나 퇴임 후의 재취업 가능성을 제고할 목적으로 이익 상향조정의 동기를 갖는 반면 신임경영자는 미래에 양호한 이익을 보고하기 위한 가능성을 높이기 위하여 취임년도의 이익을 하향조정하려 한다고 제시되고 있다. 그러나 최고경영자의 교체를 전후한 이익조정의 동기는 획일적이 아니라 구체적인 교체유형에 따라 전임경영자와 신임경영자가 각각 상이한 이익조정의 동기를 지닐 수 있는 것으로 추론된다. 예컨대 전임경영자가 퇴임 후에도 회사 내부에 남아있는 경우에는 신임경영자가 이익조정을 할 수 있는 기회는 제한되는 반면 전임경영자가 회사에 잔류하지 않을 경우에는 취임년도의 이익조정을 시도할 수 있다. 또 신임경영자가 내부승진을 통해 영입되는 경우에는 외부영입의 경우에 비해 전임경영자와의 이해관계가 더 첨예할 수 있고 이익조정의 수단에 대해서도 더 정통할 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 최고경영자의 교체시점을 전후한 이익조정에 대하여 검증력이 높은 분석을 확보하기 위해서는 이익조정의 유인과 기회에 차별적 효과를 초래할 수 있는 교체의 유형을 식별하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 판단된다. Anecdotal and empirical evidences suggest that the CEOs(Chief Executive Officer) engage in earnings management to bolster self-interests around the time of their change. CEO turnover involves two distinct decision makers, the departing(predecessor) CEO and the incoming(successor) CEO. Turnover then raises two independent earnings management issues: how the predecessor manages accounting earnings and how the successor manages them. Previous research suggests that a departing CEO tries to inflate earnings to obtain higher bonus in the last year of operations or to obtain better employment after retirement, while an incoming CEO deflates earnings in order to build reserves of reported income. However, type of CEO turnover provides different incentives for departing and incoming managers to make opportunistic earnings management. If the departing CEO stays with the company after retirement on the board of directors, the incoming CEO might not have opportunity for earnings management because of monitoring by former CEO. On the other hand, the incoming CEO takes a bath in his first year by recording big charges, so long as the departing CEO does not remain in the firm as a director. Therefore, to construct a powerful test of earnings management in the CEO turnovers, it is useful to identify types of CEO turnover that would provide differential incentives and opportunities for earnings management. This study was motivated by the suspicion that types of CEO turnover influence earnings management around CEO turnover. Specifically, we first examine the association between earnings management and types of departing CEO which were classified into voluntary departure and forced departure according to the rules used by Huson et al.(2001). Second, we investigate whether types of incoming CEO, whereby the types are classified into internal promotion and external recruitment, affect earnings management around CEO turnover. Finally, we explore whether earnings management around CEO turnover are distinguishable depending on the types of departing CEO and those of incoming CEO combined together. By understanding the motives or incentives for earnings management in conjunction with specific contexts of CEO turnover, one can develop adequate intuition into circumstances surrounding certain types of CEO turnover, which will help various stakeholder groups to make proper judgement in reviewing financial statement around CEO turnover. To achieve the afore-mentioned research objectives, we first examine the magnitude of discretionary accruals and abnormal real activities around the CEO turnover. In particular, we calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model and variants of this model that correct for the bias due to extreme operating performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005). Proxies for real earnings management activities are developed using the models suggested by Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). We next examine whether the proxies of accrual and/or real earnings management are systematically related with the each type of CEO turnover using single equation and Heckman`s two stage equation models. In addition, we also examine whether earnings management around CEO turnover tends to be alleviated by sound governance mechanism but intensified by higher agency costs. The analysis yields following key findings. First, when we classified sample into four portfolios based on the joint types of departing CEO and incoming CEO, different patterns of earnings management are observed for each portfolio around the turnover. In particular, when departing CEO leaves the company voluntarily and incoming CEO is invited from outside the company, there is an evidence of upward earnings management in year t, when the incoming CEO is promoted from inside the company, he or she did not manage earnings on the other hand. And, there was an evidence indicating upward and downward earnings management in year t-1 and year t, respectively, when former CEO leaves the company under forced turnover context and incoming CEO is promoted from inside the company. However, we can not observe earnings management, when former CEO leaves the company on a compulsory basis and incoming CEO is invited from outside the company. These results suggest that CEOs have differential incentives for earnings management around their turnover depending on the types of departing and incoming CEO combined together. Second, after controlling for the possible endogeneity stemming from the linkage between corporate performance and executive change by using Heckman`s two stage approach, we find evidence to support previous results based on single equation-based analysis. Finally, the opportunistic earnings management around CEO turnover tends to be alleviated by sound governance mechanism but intensified by higher agency costs. This paper contributes to the existing earnings management literature in Korea in a number of respects. First, we incorporate recent innovations in measuring earnings management into our research design by combining the accrual and real activity based metrics and show that these innovations substantially alter the inferences in the CEO turnover context. The results provided in this paper mark significant evidence to support that the circumstances surrounding certain types of CEO turnover provide incentives for departing and incoming CEO to engage in opportunistic earnings management. Second, the results documented in this paper provide an important implication for diverse interest groups participating in the CEO turnover decisions and a logical underpinning on the relationship between the CEO turnover and quality of accounting information. The evidence obtained herein suggests the need for more rigid screening for financial statement around CEO turnover.