What Makes Good Trilateralism? Theorizing the Utilities of Trilateralism in East Asia

ZHANG MUHUI 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2020 Pacific Focus Vol.35 No.3

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions has proliferated widely in East Asia. Inspired by an analysis of minilateralism, prevailing studies have spoken highly of trilateralism, as trilateral groupings offer greater outputs for regional community building. In contrast to the prevailing optimism, this study argues that trilateralism – the miniature form of multilateralism – is not unconditionally “good.” A three‐party arrangement is seen as potentially problematic, and its effectiveness is not guaranteed. This research examines two potential structural uncertainties for trilateralism in East Asia, which are the efficiency problem and the solidarity problem. This article sets up a theoretical model for examining the utility and operability of trilateralism in East Asia, and presents a cost–benefit analysis by comparing the utility of trilateralism with those of bilateralism and multilateralism. In East Asia, countries have been struggling with bilateral conflicts, and the prevailing logic of rivalry has led to the pursuits of “relative gains.” Thus, three preconditions are required in order to establish a “good” trilateralism: firm shared interests that prevent trilateral agreements to be eclipsed by embedded bilateral approaches, stable bilateral ties that ensure the operability of trilateral arrangements, and an effective leading country for implementing coherent policy responses. This article also enacts theories into practices and explains the performances of three trilateral relations (US–Japan–Australia, US–Japan–Korea, and China–Japan–Korea) in East Asia.

中日“第三方市场”合作: 困境与挑战

ZHANG MUHUI 동북아시아문화학회 2022 동북아 문화연구 Vol.1 No.72

In the wake of the intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry in Asia, a new third-party market cooperation (TPMC) framework between the two countries emerged in late 2018. TPMC has been considered as a landmark event that signifies the resilience of the Sino-Japanese relation. It was initially proposed by China side, and it aims to facilitate business and industrial cooperation in developing countries between China and Japan. The new mechanism was inaugurated around the time of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Beijing, signifying the resilience of Sino-Japanese relations. Despite of prevailing optimism among scholars in China and Japan, this paper raises skepticism towards the TPMC, as it remains at a concept stage and has not achieved tangible cooperation outcomes. Furthermore, this article presents a two-level analysis on the obstacles and challenges ahead. First, there appears to a asymmetry between the two governments in a way that Japan’s policy passiveness starkly contrasts with China’s proactive leadership taking. Second, this paper also sees the contradiction of business management models between the two countries’ enterprises. Chinese state-owned enterprises are abundant in capital, and can accommodate the demands of local governments in the third-party countries better than Japanese counterparts do. In contrast, Japanese enterprises are far more cautious and calculative in oversea investments, and are particularly careful in assessing the risks of infrastructure investments. For these two reasons, the bilateral agreements on the facilitation of TPMC in 2018 has not been materialized in the implementation stage. This study also endeavors to propose several policy recommendations for the future prospect of the TPMC.

Fraught but Promising

Zhang Muhui 동아시아재단 2018 Global Asia Vol.13 No.4

东北亚能否成为“一带一路”的新潜力区域?− 中国的视角及前景分析

ZHANG MUHUI,두보 부산대학교 중국연구소 2019 Journal of China Studies Vol.22 No.3

Since 2013, China has increasingly expanded its ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI) to a broad range of countries and regions. Nowadays, the BRI has geographically covered a variety of countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. In contrast, Northeast Asia remains to be excluded by the BRI in past years. Entering into 2018, part of the BRI projects suffered a lot of setbacks due to the underestimate of local political risks. This study points out that, ever since 2018, the Chinese government has begun to re-assess the achievements and challenges of the BRI projects within the past five years, and is currently adjusting its BRI policies and strategies. Against this backdrop, this research finds out that, notwithstanding the Chinese government not officially incorporating Northeast Asia into part of the BRI map, increasing China’s scholars and policy makers have been cautiously watching at the possibility of doing so. This study explores a recent Chinese policy prospective that has started to see Northeast Asia as a new potential area for the future development of the BRI. This study mainly comprises of four parts. First, this article reviews recent progress of BRI in Northeast Asia, including China’s proposal of ‘China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor’ and the Sino-Japanese ‘third-market cooperation’ mechanism. Second, this article also argues that, in the long term, China has been closely watching the possibility of connecting its Trans-China Railway with a prospective Trans-Korean Peninsula Railway. China’s ambitious vision can be explained by its domestic needs of economic development (in the local Northeast Asian provinces) and recent improvement of geopolitical tension in the Korean peninsula. Third, this study also illustrates a number of major challenges and obstacles in future development of the BRI in Northeast Asia. At present, Northeast Asia is mixed with underdeveloped economies (Russia, Mongolia) and advanced economies (Japan and Korea), leading to the necessity of a dual-track BRI strategy for China. In particular, Japan and Korea have proposed the ‘Indo-pacific Strategy’ and the ‘New Economic Map for the Korean Peninsula’ respectively. At present, many of existing BRI concepts in Northeast Asia remain in a preliminary and vague stage. To what extend can China coordinate its own BRI with diplomatic strategies of other regional stakeholders remains questionable. Finally, this article also aims to provide a number of policy recommendations to the Chinese government.

Transboundary Fine Dust and “PM 2.5 Diplomacy” in Northeast Asia: Cooperation and Future Challenges

Zhang Muhui(?暮?) 한국중어중문학회 2020 한국중어중문학회 학술대회 자료집 Vol.2020 No.11

Growing Activism as Cooperation Facilitator

Zhang Muhui 한국국제정치학회 KJIS 2016 The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.14 No.2

The China–Japan–Korea Trilateral Free Trade Agreement: Why Did Trade Negotiations Stall?

Muhui Zhang 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2019 Pacific Focus Vol.34 No.2

Launched in 2013, the China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement(CJKFTA) negotiations have slowed in recent years. The three countrieshave convened at 14 rounds of negotiations but failed to make any substan-tial breakthrough. A number of previous studies have presented a crisis-driven approach in explaining the progress of the CJKFTA, and argue thatthe accomplished China–Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA) willaccelerate the CJKFTA negotiation. This study questions optimism over theCJKFTA, and investigates the reasons for the stalemate of ongoing negoti-ations. It does so by considering three sets of factors that have stalled thenegotiation–economic interdependence, domestic politics, and industryinterest groups–in addition to international politics/national FTA policies.First, the trilateral economic interdependence shows a downward trend inrecent years and has weakened the necessity of having a trilateral FTA.Second, domestic sectoral interests remain highly divergent over a poten-tial CJKFTA; opposition from loser groups in Japan remains strong, andthe majority of the Korean business world still regard the utility of anaccomplished CKFTA more highly than an accomplished CJKFTA. Finally,the three countries have failed to narrow the gaps during past negotiationsbecause no party views the CJKFTA as a top priority, nor wishes to takethe leadership. China does not want a high-level CJKFTA; Japan’s lack ofpolitical incentive and Korea’s cautious“wait and see”stance have alsoled to a stalemate of the negotiations. In consequence, this article deliversa relatively pessimistic vision for the CJKFTA negotiation in the nearfuture.

中欧班列的发展与中日“第三方市场”合作

?暮?(Zhang, Muhui) 동북아시아문화학회 2021 동북아 문화연구 Vol.1 No.68

Under the “Belt and Road” initiative, China-Europe Railway Express has grown into a new project for the connectivity construction in the Eurasia continent. Since the early 2010s, the Chinese government has substantially increased the use of the China-Europe Railway Express for cooperation on logistics and transportation in recent years. In the meantime, the Sino-Japanese relations have revealed certain signs of resilience, despite Japan remaining relunctant to participate into the China-led “Belt and Road” initiative. Along with former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s visit to China in 2018, the two governments and private sectors worked out a nascent “third-party market” cooperation initiative, with the aim of facilitating business and industrial cooperation in other developing countries. In this context, the China-Europe Railway Express has become a pilot program that can generate substantial demonstration effects to the future of the “third-party market” cooperation mechanism between China and Japan. Nowadays, increasing Japanese logistics enterprises have utilized the China-Europe Railway Express, and developed the “air-rail” and “sea-rail” models to deliver its goods from Japan to Euroasia countries. The use of China-Europe Railway Express can largely reduce the time and costs compared with conventional ways of air and sea transportations, and thus appears to be favorable by Japan’s private sectors. This study sees the China-Europe Railway Express as a flagship project for the emerging Sino-Japanese “third-party market” cooperation, and also conducts a number of case studies to see its merits and advantages. Furthermore, this paper concludes by discussing the future prospect of Sino-Japanese “third-party market” cooperation and tries to raise some policy recommendations.

中日韩三国合作制度化建设的前景与挑战

?暮?(Zhang, Muhui) 동북아시아문화학회 2020 동북아 문화연구 Vol.1 No.64

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and Korea has begun to take shape. The three countries initiated the first independent Trilateral Summit mechanism in 2008 and established a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in 2011. Nonetheless, trilateral cooperation at the political-diplomatic level remains unstable at present. The periodic ups and downs caused by political discord have repeatedly posed serious challenges to the stability and sustainability of the trilateral relationship. This study looks at the institution building of trilateral cooperation, and analyzes its strengths and weaknesses. We first examine the achievements of trilateral cooperation, and find that a pyramid “summit-minister-working level” structure of institution building has been established. In the meantime, pragmatic cooperation have been steadily advanced, with over 20 ministerial consultation mechanisms and specific projects established in a wide range of fields. Second, we investigate the problems and challenges for trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation has revealed its vulnerability and susceptibility to its three pairs of bilateral relationships. Thus, the framework of trilateral cooperation is still far from an authentic multilateral arrangement, but can more accurately be characterized as the aggregate of three embedded pairs of bilateral relationships. Third, this study discusses future visions of trilateral cooperation, and takes notice of its two significant functions, that is, to provide a diplomatic buffering to bilateral conflicts and to serve as an extra-regional coordination mechanism for three countries’ business and economic interests. Finally, the study aims to make several policy recommendations for the future of trilateral cooperation.

Proceeding in hardship: the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional evolution of China–Japan–South Korea trilateralism

Taylor Francis 2018 PACIFIC REVIEW - Vol.31 No.1