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Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry
( Stefan H. Lutz ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2000 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.15 No.2
In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With significantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares. (JEL Classifications: F12, F21, L13)
Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry
Lutz, Stefan H. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 2000 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.15 No.2
In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With significantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfare.
Pre-emption, Predation, and Minimum Quality Standards
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz,Stefan Lutz 한국국제경제학회 2010 International Economic Journal Vol.24 No.1
We present a model of vertical product differentiation and exit where a domestic and a foreign firm face fixed setup costs and quality-dependent costs of production and compete in quality and price in the domestic market. Quality-dependent costs are quadratic in qualities, but independent of the quantities produced. The domestic government may impose a minimum quality standard binding for both foreign and domestic firms. In the presence of an initial cost advantage of the domestic firm, a sufficiently high minimum quality standard set by the domestic government will enable the domestic firm to induce exit of the foreign firm, i.e. to engage in predation. However, the same standard would lead to predation by the foreign firm, if the foreign firm had the initial cost advantage!}
Cycles through a given set of vertices in regular multipartite tournaments
Lutz Volkmann,Stefan Winzen 대한수학회 2007 대한수학회지 Vol.44 No.3
A tournament is an orientation of a complete graph, and in generala multipartite or c-partite tournament is an orientation of acomplete c-partite graph.In a recent article, the authors proved that a regular c-partitetournament with r ge 2 vertices in each partite set contains acycle with exactly r-1 vertices from each partite set, withexception of the case that c = 4 and r = 2. Here we willexamine the existence of cycles with r-2 vertices from eachpartite set in regular multipartite tournaments where the r-2vertices are chosen arbitrarily. Let D be a regular c-partitetournament and let X subseteq V(D) be an arbitrary set withexactly 2 vertices of each partite set. For all c ge 4 wewill determine the minimal value g(c) such that D-X isHamiltonian for every regular multipartite tournament with r geg(c).
Weakly Complementary Cycles in 3-Connected Multipartite Tournaments
Volkmann, Lutz,Winzen, Stefan Department of Mathematics 2008 Kyungpook mathematical journal Vol.48 No.2
The vertex set of a digraph D is denoted by V (D). A c-partite tournament is an orientation of a complete c-partite graph. A digraph D is called cycle complementary if there exist two vertex disjoint cycles $C_1$ and $C_2$ such that V(D) = $V(C_1)\;{\cup}\;V(C_2)$, and a multipartite tournament D is called weakly cycle complementary if there exist two vertex disjoint cycles $C_1$ and $C_2$ such that $V(C_1)\;{\cup}\;V(C_2)$ contains vertices of all partite sets of D. The problem of complementary cycles in 2-connected tournaments was completely solved by Reid [4] in 1985 and Z. Song [5] in 1993. They proved that every 2-connected tournament T on at least 8 vertices has complementary cycles of length t and ${\mid}V(T)\mid$ - t for all $3\;{\leq}\;t\;{\leq}\;{\mid}V(T)\mid/2$. Recently, Volkmann [8] proved that each regular multipartite tournament D of order ${\mid}V(D)\mid\;\geq\;8$ is cycle complementary. In this article, we analyze multipartite tournaments that are weakly cycle complementary. Especially, we will characterize all 3-connected c-partite tournaments with $c\;\geq\;3$ that are weakly cycle complementary.
CYCLES THROUGH A GIVEN SET OF VERTICES IN REGULAR MULTIPARTITE TOURNAMENTS
Volkmann, Lutz,Winzen, Stefan Korean Mathematical Society 2007 대한수학회지 Vol.44 No.3
A tournament is an orientation of a complete graph, and in general a multipartite or c-partite tournament is an orientation of a complete c-partite graph. In a recent article, the authors proved that a regular c-partite tournament with $r{\geq}2$ vertices in each partite set contains a cycle with exactly r-1 vertices from each partite set, with exception of the case that c=4 and r=2. Here we will examine the existence of cycles with r-2 vertices from each partite set in regular multipartite tournaments where the r-2 vertices are chosen arbitrarily. Let D be a regular c-partite tournament and let $X{\subseteq}V(D)$ be an arbitrary set with exactly 2 vertices of each partite set. For all $c{\geq}4$ we will determine the minimal value g(c) such that D-X is Hamiltonian for every regular multipartite tournament with $r{\geq}g(c)$.