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Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models
( Sandeep Baliga ),( Tomas Sjostrom ) 한국경제학회 2013 The Korean Economic Review Vol.29 No.2
Would perfectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful outcomes at the bargaining table, or would they sometimes fight costly wars? The Coase theorem suggests that when rational agents negotiate freely, they will reach a surplus-maximizing outcome. This seems to rule out war, since war will not in general be surplus-maximizing. However, the Coase theorem is valid only under certain assumptions, such as transferable utility (no restrictions on side-payments) and complete information. Brito and Intriligator (1985) showed how incomplete information may lead to war. An aggressor who demands concessions may simply be bluffing, so it may be rational to refuse his demands. If the aggressor is not bluffing, a war may ensue. We discuss how long such a war may last, and whether other kinds of “frictions” (such as limited commitment power and limits on side-payments) may also lead to war.
Depth-of-Field Enhancement in Integral Imaging by Selective Depth-Deconvolution
Navarro, Hector,Saavedra, Genaro,Martinez-Corral, Manuel,Sjostrom, Marten,Olsson, Roger IEEE 2014 Journal of display technology Vol.10 No.3
<P>One of the major drawbacks of the integral imaging technique is its limited depth of field. Such limitation is imposed by the numerical aperture of the microlenses. In this paper, we propose a method to extend the depth of field of integral imaging systems in the reconstruction stage. The method is based on the combination of deconvolution tools and depth filtering of each elemental image using disparity map information. We demonstrate our proposal presenting digital reconstructions of a 3-D scene focused at different depths with extended depth of field.</P>