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Development Power Theory: The South Korean Case
허욱,Terence Roehrig 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2018 Pacific Focus Vol.33 No.1
Despite the ties between politics and economics, little attention has been given to how economic development affects foreign policy. To fill the gap in the literature, Heo and Roehrig1 developed a theoretical framework, linking economic development and foreign relations. We refine the theory and name it development power theory, which is based on the logic that economic development influences a country’s foreign policy in three broad directions: (i) it encourages a transition to democracy that leads to elite changes and foreign-policy modification; (ii) it provides more resources and a larger set of tools to be used to pursue a broader set of national interests; and (iii) it enhances pride and ambition among state leaders and the public, resulting in a stronger military and a greater role in international affairs. Then, we apply the theory to the South Korean case.
Terence Roehrig 한국학술연구원 2013 Korea Observer Vol.44 No.4
For many years, South Korea was largely a consumer of security,protected and supported by the United States and others to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula. South Korea’s economic takeoff and ascent as a rising middle power has changed these circumstances and as the years progressed, the Republic of Korea increased its contributions to international peace and security becoming more of a provider of global security than solely a consumer. Two areas where South Korea has made particularly important contributions have been in international development assistance and peace keeping operations. Though these contributions are significant, South Korea continues to lag behind other foreign assistance donors relative to the size of its economy. Yet, South Korea’s increases to development assistance have been substantial and larger than most in the midst of the global economic turmoil, and it remains a staunch supporter of peacekeeping operations.
Creating the Conditions for Peace in Korea: Promoting Incremental Change in North Korea
Terence Roehrig 한국학술연구원 2009 Korea Observer Vol.40 No.1
This article examines the vexing problem of bringing peace to Korea. Success will require fundamental change to the North Korean regime and its behavior. However, North Korea faces a dangerous security environment with external and internal threats making regime survival its chief goal. Consequently, North Korea’s strategic world view is firmly anchored in the international relations theory of realism. Increased pressure makes it more difficult for North Korea to move beyond the constraints of realism and the North’s collapse would create even more serious problems for the region. This paper argues that a long-term, three-prong approach by South Korea, the United States and others in the region may be the best way to create the foundation for peace: diplomatic engagement that begins to reduce North Korea’s security concerns; economic engagement to open up the North Korean economy to encourage forces within to push for change; and continued military preparedness as a hedge to ensure stability.
The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Toward a Negotiated Settlement
Terence Roehrig 한국학술연구원 2008 Korea Observer Vol.39 No.4
At the end of the Korean War, the United Nations Command promulgated the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a maritime boundary between North and South Korea. Pyongyang insists the line is illegal and should be redrawn while Seoul maintains the line is essential for its security and will remain as it is. In 1999 and again in 2002, North and South Korean naval forces clashed along the NLL reminding all of the potential danger that remains over this possible flashpoint. This paper will examine the dispute over the NLL, what is at stake for both Koreas, and possible solutions to address the issue.
North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox
( Terence Roehrig ) 한국국방연구원 2016 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.28 No.2
As the chances wane of North Korea relinquishing its nuclear weapons, how will this capability affect its behavior and tolerance of risk? Increasingly, scholars are using the Cold War concept of a stability-instability paradox to describe the possibility of Pyongyang being more willing to tolerate risk and conduct increased numbers of lower-level provocations under the cover of nuclear weapons. North Korea has long been tolerant of accepting a great deal of risk prior to its acquisition of nuclear weapons, and it is not clear if nuclear weapons have increased that tolerance..or as some have argued, it may actually decrease North Korea’s risk tolerance, making it more cautious. While North Korea’s rhetorical barrages in recent years have exceeded past outbursts, and weapons testing has done a great deal to rattle nerves, much of this can be viewed as part of its deterrence-posturing and less of the more aggressive, status quo-altering actions predicted by the stability-instability paradox.
( Terence Roehrig ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2017 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.41 No.1
As the international security environment grows increasingly complex, the need for multilateral solutions grows. Two such efforts are United Nations peacekeeping and counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Over the years many states have contributed police, observers, military personnel, ships, and other assets to support these multinational efforts. Since 2009 Seoul has sent a destroyer and a team of Navy SEALS to the counterpiracy operations near Somalia. In this study I contrast South Korea`s contributions to UN peacekeeping and maritime security with those of Australia, China, and Japan.
North Korea and the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism List
Terence Roehrig 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2009 Pacific Focus Vol.24 No.1
On October 11, 2008, the Bush administration removed North Korea from the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. Pyongyang had been on the list since 1988 and was placed there after the November 1987 bombing of KAL 858 over the Andaman Sea. Though North Korea went on the list for terrorist actions, its removal became part of the Six-Party process to convince Pyongyang to forgo its nuclear weapons ambitions. This article will explore these issues and examine the leverage the terrorism list had on North Korean behavior, how the United States chose to utilize that leverage, and North Korea’s response to U.S. efforts. This article argues that the intertwining of the terrorism list with denuclearization gave the United States leverage in the Six-Party talks but there were limits to what this leverage could gain. Moreover, the links to the denuclearization process also generated leverage for North Korea that it exercised, creating a more complex and crosscutting mix of costs and incentives that was more difficult for Washington to control.