DUALISM IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S NORTH KOREA POLICY

Quinones, C. Kenneth 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2003 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.27 No.1

President George W.Bush and North Korean strongman Kim Jong Il are locked in a potentially deadly tango. Weapons of mass destruction, particularly North Korea's nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile capability, are the apparent cause. But their dueling has much more fundamental ramifications, especially for North Korea. Bush seems determined to confront Kim with the ultimate dilemma of his regime: either disarm or face the consequences. This contest is being played out in the context of Bush's global foreign policy strategy that accents preventing the "axis of evil," which includes North Korea, from threatening or using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. The President's foreign-policy team agrees on what they must accomplish, but is divided into "regionalists" and "globalists" regarding strategy to achieve his goals. Bush has allowed their debate to continue, giving his foreign policy a duality that is source of concern, and some confusion among allies, friends and the primary enemy, North Korea. Bush claims he seeks a "peaceful, diplomatic" outcome in his clash with Kim Jong Il, but has ruled out negotiations with his regime. Instead, Bush seems hopeful that Kim's regime will collapse. If it does not, an armed confrontation seems inevitable.

BEYOND COLLAPSE - CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NORTH KOREA

Kenneth Quinones 통일연구원 2002 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.11 No.2

Kim Jong Il faces a politically complex dilemma - pursue change or see his regime collapse. His primary goal is regime survival. Toward this end, he appears to have initiated a program of carefully managed change. He must pursue his program within the context of Juche to avoid alienating Pyongyang’s aging guardians of his father’s legacy. Surprisingly, within this rigid dogma one finds the pragmatism that allows Kim to rationalize change in terms of building a “strong and prosperous nation.” The August 1995 floods and food crisis gave Kim the opportunity to initiate “managed change.” The July 2002 announcement of “economic reforms” suggests Kim Jong Il is less concerned about potential domestic resistance to his program, and more realistic about the extent to which he must pursue change to secure regime survival. But his goal is regime preservation, not its transformation. Democratization is not on his agenda. National defense still tops the regime’s agenda, and dominates its economic priorities. To sustain the changes necessary for regime survival, Kim Jong Il has had to turn to the international community for the resources vital to his programs’ success: money, technology and training. The more Pyongyang needs from the international community, the greater the international community’s ability to influence North Korea’s conduct, and the pace and direction of change inside North Korea. Pyongyang’s October 2002 admission that it has acquired uranium enrichment equipment appears aimed at improving North Korea’s access to scare resources vis a vis negotiations with Washington. The admission was a constructive step, but it cannot compensate for Pyongyang’s breech of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Nor can North Korea’s reversion to coercive diplomacy be condoned. Pyongyang’s blunders place the regime’s survival in doubt. Either continued refusal to discard its nuclear weapons program will convince the international community to deny Pyongyang the resources it needs for survival, or North Korea risks war with the United States and its allies. Kim Jong Il faces a politically complex dilemma - pursue change or see his regime collapse. His primary goal is regime survival. Toward this end, he appears to have initiated a program of carefully managed change. He must pursue his program within the context of Juche to avoid alienating Pyongyang’s aging guardians of his father’s legacy. Surprisingly, within this rigid dogma one finds the pragmatism that allows Kim to rationalize change in terms of building a “strong and prosperous nation.” The August 1995 floods and food crisis gave Kim the opportunity to initiate “managed change.” The July 2002 announcement of “economic reforms” suggests Kim Jong Il is less concerned about potential domestic resistance to his program, and more realistic about the extent to which he must pursue change to secure regime survival. But his goal is regime preservation, not its transformation. Democratization is not on his agenda. National defense still tops the regime’s agenda, and dominates its economic priorities. To sustain the changes necessary for regime survival, Kim Jong Il has had to turn to the international community for the resources vital to his programs’ success: money, technology and training. The more Pyongyang needs from the international community, the greater the international community’s ability to influence North Korea’s conduct, and the pace and direction of change inside North Korea. Pyongyang’s October 2002 admission that it has acquired uranium enrichment equipment appears aimed at improving North Korea’s access to scare resources vis a vis negotiations with Washington. The admission was a constructive step, but it cannot compensate for Pyongyang’s breech of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Nor can North Korea’s reversion to coercive diplomacy be condoned. Pyongyang’s blunders place the regime’s survival in doubt. Either continued refusal to discard its nuclear weapons program will convince the international community to deny Pyongyang the resources it needs for survival, or North Korea risks war with the United States and its allies.

The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy

( C. Kenneth Quinones ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2004 North Korea and the World Vol.- No.-

Criticism : “March Madness”; the Korean Peninsula`s Annual War of Words

( C Kenneth Quinones ) 한국정치평론학회 2013 정치와 평론 Vol.12 No.-

Ramifications of North Leader Kim Jong Il's Declaration of Independence from th International Community

C.Kenneth Quinones 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2006 Pacific Focus Vol.21 No.23

The United States and Japanese governments' reactions to North Korea's launching of several ballistic missiles in early July 2006 was either completely misunderstood by North Korea watchers in Washington and Tokyo, are they simply preferred to ignore yongyang's underlying motives. Actually, North Korea has been relatively transparent about its intentions regarding not just its ballistic missile but also nuclear programs. Since February 2005, ranking North Korean officials and Foreign Ministry spokesmen have made it North Korea's intentions clear. It aspires to strengthen its “deterrence capability.” In other words, North Korea is striving to counter the US‐Japan alliance by matching its military capability not just with conventional but also nuclear weapons. The United States and Japan need to recognize this. Otherwise, their efforts to compel North Korea's submission using economic pressure will back fire. Pyongyang's priority is national defense through deterrence. Economic revitalization is a secondary goal. As the United States concentrates on the Middle East and gradually withdraws from Northeast Asia, Japan would do well to assess its relations with its neighbors China and the two Koreas. If Japan's new prime minister perpetuates Japan's commitment to the US‐Japan alliance, it could find itself increasingly estranged from its neighbors. This became evident when Japan clashed with China over the UN resolution that censured North Korea's missile launchings. Japan's stance regarding issues rooted in history, such as prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, if unaltered, will intensify Japan's isolation in Northeast Asia. This will work to North Korea's benefit.

JAPAN’S ENGAGEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1990-2000

C. Kenneth Quinones 통일연구원 2000 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.9 No.-

Japan stands at a critical junction in its relationship with the two Koreas. Tokyo, like Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang, faces a profound choice. It can strike out on a new path that will depart from the practices and priorities of the Cold War and, potentially, toward a durable peace in northeast Asia. Essential to this process is close trilateral coordination with Seoul and Washington, a process already underway. Success will require that all parties make major adjustments in their conduct, attitudes and priorities, particularly toward North Korea. The potential reward for these changes would be the improvement of both relations and prospects for peace and stability in northeast Asia. Ultimately, a durable peace for the region will be possible only after Pyongyang relinquishes its reliance on coercion and fear as ways to pursue its national interests. For Japan, the dual policy of persistent engagement and restrained deterrence backed by trilateral diplomatic and military cooperation between Tokyo, Seoul and Washington appears the best approach. Japan stands at a critical junction in its relationship with the two Koreas. Tokyo, like Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang, faces a profound choice. It can strike out on a new path that will depart from the practices and priorities of the Cold War and, potentially, toward a durable peace in northeast Asia. Essential to this process is close trilateral coordination with Seoul and Washington, a process already underway. Success will require that all parties make major adjustments in their conduct, attitudes and priorities, particularly toward North Korea. The potential reward for these changes would be the improvement of both relations and prospects for peace and stability in northeast Asia. Ultimately, a durable peace for the region will be possible only after Pyongyang relinquishes its reliance on coercion and fear as ways to pursue its national interests. For Japan, the dual policy of persistent engagement and restrained deterrence backed by trilateral diplomatic and military cooperation between Tokyo, Seoul and Washington appears the best approach.

TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

C. Kenneth Quinones 통일연구원 2003 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.12 No.2

The most pressing challenge facing the people of Northeast Asia in the 21st Century is the forging of a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula. But today, prospects for peace in the region remain dim. North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the United States’ reluctance to engage Pyongyang in diplomatic negotiations, have created an impasse that could quickly explode into a second Korean War. The Six Party Talks holds out the hope that a “peaceful diplomatic solution” can be forged in the near future. But the process of diplomatic dialogue and resolution of the nuclear issue alone cannot dissipate the threat of war. Even if a negotiated settlement is achieved, as now seems increasingly possible but still far from certain, implementation of any accord between the United States and North Korea will prove extremely challenging. The fundamental problem is neither the participants in the process, be it two, four or six nations. Nor is it in the terms of any agreement. Inevitably, successful implementation of any accord will require mutual trust between the Washington and Pyongyang. Building that trust began in 1994 with the first US-North Korea nuclear negotiation and the forging of the Agreed Framework of 1994. But that agreement, and the subsequent trust it fos- tered, has now been rejected by both parties. If any accord is to be successfully implemented and a durable peace built in Northeast Asia, it will require nothing less than a radical transformation of the region’s balance of power and network of international relations. To many, this may seem a distant and rather idealistic wish. Looking back over the past half century, however, nurtures perspective and fosters hope that such a transformation is indeed a realistic goal. After all, half a century ago, the emergence of stability, prosperity and democracy in the region then seemed wishful thinking. The most pressing challenge facing the people of Northeast Asia in the 21st Century is the forging of a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula. But today, prospects for peace in the region remain dim. North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the United States’ reluctance to engage Pyongyang in diplomatic negotiations, have created an impasse that could quickly explode into a second Korean War. The Six Party Talks holds out the hope that a “peaceful diplomatic solution” can be forged in the near future. But the process of diplomatic dialogue and resolution of the nuclear issue alone cannot dissipate the threat of war. Even if a negotiated settlement is achieved, as now seems increasingly possible but still far from certain, implementation of any accord between the United States and North Korea will prove extremely challenging. The fundamental problem is neither the participants in the process, be it two, four or six nations. Nor is it in the terms of any agreement. Inevitably, successful implementation of any accord will require mutual trust between the Washington and Pyongyang. Building that trust began in 1994 with the first US-North Korea nuclear negotiation and the forging of the Agreed Framework of 1994. But that agreement, and the subsequent trust it fos- tered, has now been rejected by both parties. If any accord is to be successfully implemented and a durable peace built in Northeast Asia, it will require nothing less than a radical transformation of the region’s balance of power and network of international relations. To many, this may seem a distant and rather idealistic wish. Looking back over the past half century, however, nurtures perspective and fosters hope that such a transformation is indeed a realistic goal. After all, half a century ago, the emergence of stability, prosperity and democracy in the region then seemed wishful thinking.

Asian Values in the International Society of the 21st Century : Toward a Durable Peace in Northeast Asia

( C. Kenneth Quinones ) 성균관대학교 인문과학연구소 2004 人文科學 Vol.34 No.-

Ramifications of North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il`s Declaration of Independence from the International Community

( C. Kenneth Quinones ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2006 Pacific Focus Vol.21 No.23

The United States and Japanese governments` reactions to North Korea`s launching of several ballistic missiles in early July 2006 was either completely misunderstood by North Korea watchers in Washington and Tokyo, are they simply preferred to ignore yongyang`s underlying motives. Actually, North Korea has been relatively transparent about its intentions regarding not just its ballistic missile but also nuclear programs. Since February 2005, ranking North Korean officials and Foreign Ministry spokesmen have made it North Korea`s intentions clear. It aspires to strengthen its "deterrence capability." In other words, North Korea is striving to counter the US-Japan alliance by matching its military capability not just with conventional but also nuclear weapons. The United States and Japan need to recognize this. Otherwise, their efforts to compel North Korea`s submission using economic pressure will back fire. Pyongyang`s priority is national defense through deterrence. Economic revitalization is a secondary goal. As the United States concentrates on the Middle East and gradually withdraws from Northeast Asia, Japan would do well to assess its relations with its neighbors China and the two Koreas. If Japan`s new prime minister perpetuates Japan`s commitment to the US- Japan alliance, it could find itself increasingly estranged from its neighbors. This became evident when Japan clashed with China over the UN resolution that censured North Korea`s missile launchings. Japan`s stance regarding issues rooted in history, such as prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, if unaltered, will intensify Japan`s isolation in Northeast Asia. This will work to North Korea`s benefit.

Dealing with Pyongyang: In Search of a More Effective Strategy.

C. Kenneth Quinones 통일연구원 2005 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.14 No.1

The United States and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) both claim equal determination to achieve a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue, but their strategies have failed to achieve progress toward their avowed goal. Here we focus on Washington’s preferred strategy of “neo-containment.” The Bush Administration, since taking office in 2001, has consistently rejected any engagement of North Korea, diplomatically and commercially. Yet at the same time it has declared its preference for a “diplomatic” solution to the nuclear issue. Achieving a “diplomatic” solution without diplomacy and diplomatic dialogue is impossible. Since the start of his second term, however, President Bush appears to have moderated his rejection of “engagement” by tempering his preference for “containment” with some aspects of engagement. This has yielded a hybrid strategy labeled here as “neo-containment.” All the fundamental elements of containment remain in place, such as restrictions on diplomatic contact and economic sanctions, but some dialogue is permitted “under the umbrella of the Six-Party Talks and for the sole purpose of resolving the nuclear issue.” Bush’s “neo-containment” strategy, however, ignores the fact that even if the Six-Party Talks resume, successful negotiation of a resolution and its implementation will require a strategy of engagement The United States and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) both claim equal determination to achieve a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue, but their strategies have failed to achieve progress toward their avowed goal. Here we focus on Washington’s preferred strategy of “neo-containment.” The Bush Administration, since taking office in 2001, has consistently rejected any engagement of North Korea, diplomatically and commercially. Yet at the same time it has declared its preference for a “diplomatic” solution to the nuclear issue. Achieving a “diplomatic” solution without diplomacy and diplomatic dialogue is impossible. Since the start of his second term, however, President Bush appears to have moderated his rejection of “engagement” by tempering his preference for “containment” with some aspects of engagement. This has yielded a hybrid strategy labeled here as “neo-containment.” All the fundamental elements of containment remain in place, such as restrictions on diplomatic contact and economic sanctions, but some dialogue is permitted “under the umbrella of the Six-Party Talks and for the sole purpose of resolving the nuclear issue.” Bush’s “neo-containment” strategy, however, ignores the fact that even if the Six-Party Talks resume, successful negotiation of a resolution and its implementation will require a strategy of engagement